we will continue to have that. we are certainly going to need our partners to move along with us as we do this. i don't think there is any greater expectation that they would provide more. i think we want to continue to do what we have been doing. we have built strong partnerships as we address challenges around the world. >> it is a very short one. which of the four brigades -- which are the -- >> we are still working our way through that. it will probably be another couple of weeks and we'll announce which two there are. >> with all due respect, there are only two heavy brigades in europe so we can do the math ourselves. >> we'll announce in a couple of weeks. >> following on michael's question, have any of your counter parts in europe or germany expressed specific concern about withdrawing the army and all the families and

their economies are tough there, too? specifically about the drawing down the 80,000. when will that start? is that going to begin the war in afghanistan is going to end? >> first, we have been working very closely with them. we have been talking about this for several months how he would mitigate this. i think they are somewhat pleased with the mitigation strategies we have in place. i think we will be able to work through that. the thing i would tell you about the draw down is there are two things i was concerned about as we start to have this discussion, first with the number, 490 and how we got to 490. we will start this year. if you remember we already committed to going down to 520. we are starting this year to take some structure out. we have been able to move it across a six year period from 12 to 17. by doing that it is spread

evenly. it allows us to down size and take care of soldiers and families. we hope to do it mostly by attrition. there might be other things we have to do. we are trying to do most of it by attrition and also counts for our commitments in afghanistan. we are going to be able to sustain our commitments in afghanistan and get it to the right tempo that we need. that was part of this. and to me as important as a 490 number was the fact that we were able to do this over a six-year period. it is not exactly even because we do it based on what we call cohorts that come in. we might reduce those a little more than the ones that we do in 15 or 16. but we have worked this very carefully against all requirements. we were very thoughtful in doing this. this was very important to me as

we worked through this process. thank you very much. appreciate it. thnchlths u.s. air force chief of staff also spoke with reporters friday about how the new budget proposal will effect the air force. he discussed how the air force decided which programs to cut and the sevling of the global 30. this is half an hour. > . good afternoon, everybody. welcome back. it's my pleasure to welcome back here to the briefing room chief of staff of the united states air force. the general has been serving in that capacity since october of 2008 which makes him the longest serving body of the chiefs and will make this his fourth budget

season. today he is here to provide context on the air force impplications of the defense strategic guidance released last week and the budget priorities inside that guidance which chairman and secretary discussed with you yesterday. the general will be making a brief open statement. >> ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. we appreciate you being here today and allowing me to share with you some insight into the air force's contributions to the new defense strategy and how we have approached the budget challenges that we face. innovation and adaptability are strengths of the united states air force and ones we have sharpened during the last two decades of combat operations. we have become ever more integral to the successful operations of the u.s. armed

forces and our joint teammates rely on the air force for the core contributions that we provide. against the back drop of fiscal challenge and diminishing resources the security environment continues to evolve and become ever more complex. thus driving the need for new defense strategic guidance. and as the air force approaches further reductions consistent with that guidance, our fleets are already smaller and older than at the end of the post cold war down sizing. by trading size for quantity the air force has made the hard choices to support the new strategic guidance in the fiscal year '13 budget submission. and we will be smaller but

superb force that brings us to engage a full range of contingencies and threats. throughout this evolution we remain and shall remain committed to our ongoing responsibilities to provide globally postured, regionally taylored power, from nuclear deterrents to air, space and cyber operations, counter terrorism and global surveillance. we will sustain global operations through our continuing presence in the asia pacific and the middle east and by tayloring our presence in europe. air force capabilities are clearly instrumental to the major priorities of the new defense strategic guidance such as deterring and defeating

aggression, projecting power and antiaccess in area denial environments, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, space and cyber operations and strategic deterrence. through virtually every area although every area of the air force budget faces constrained resources the air force has taken care to protect the critical capabilities in which our partners rely. in summary, these enduring capabilities that air men provide every day are air and space control, global intelligence surveillance, rapid global mobility and global strike. air men also maintain the cross domain command and control necessary to make these

capabilities effective across the full spectrum of operations. confronted by a more complex and dynamic security environment as well as reduction in defense resources the air force determined that the best fath forward was to become smaller emphasizing multi role systems and common configurations in order to maintain and protect a high quality force, mitigating risks from reduced capacity while seeking to improve our ability to deal with advancing adversaries over time. to avoid a hollow force we have and we will protect readyiness at any force level and strength in our integration of the total force team of active guard and reserve air men. we are slowing modernization in

some areas but at the same time we will protect the key programs that are most critical to future air force capabilities. for example, the kc 46 tanker, the f 35 joint strike fighter and the long range strike bomber. despite the many challenges that we have faced, today the air force is still by any objective standard the world's best. it is our intent, indeed it is our obligation to the american people and to our air men and their families, that we remain the world's finest air force in the years and decades to come. ladies and gentlemen, i'd be happy to take your questions. >> yesterday secretary offered numbers for the size of the active duty army and marine

corps. can you talk about the size of the active duty air force including what happens to the personnel in the six eliminated squadrons. >> the total force will come down in the neighborhood of 10,000 personnel. importantly, however, that those reductions are tied to force structure going away. so we are not reducing personnel in order to meet budget targets. these are directly connected with the force structure adjustments that we have undertaken. >> could you explain to us what is meant by using the word terminate when you talk about the block 30 but best about the c 27 j? are you selling jets to other forces? give them to other government

agencies? and if you could go into a little bit of detail about the cost assessment that tipped the scales in favor of extending to service? >> the bottom line on your multiple questions. let me start first with the rationale. it was our expectation, our hope certainly, that the advantages that a global hawk-like platform provides which we anticipated both would be cost of operation on the one hand and clearly persistence on the other, would play out in practice. the reality is that the global hawk system has proven not to be less expensive to operate than

the u 2. in many respects the global hawk block 30 system is not as capable from a center point of view as the u 2. so we had made the choice as the deputy secretary mentioned yesterday to cancel the block 30 program. and the disposition of the aircraft is not yet finalized but it would be my expectation that we would place these assets into storage, usable storage for future possibilities, whatever they might be. importantly, we will retain the block 20 and the block 40 capabilities. and so we will use the global hawk to its best effect but the

bottom line is that the delta between the global hawk and the u 2 was not sufficient in order to retain both for the same mission. yes, sir. please. >> you mentioned that every aspect of the budget was under constrained resources, aside from the block 30 are any platforms getting cut. i noticed the predator caps are going up. is there any sacrifice you are seeing from isr? >> isr is one of the areas clearly that we maintained and in some areas have increased. but generally maintained our levels of investment. there are individual changes. for example, there is a j platform that was damaged beyond economical repair that we will

not repair. but generally speaking the existing isr inventories will remain as they are with the exception of block 30 that we answered earlier. >> is there an increase or decrease in future budgets for rnd on these platforms? >> particularly in the snt area this is an area we will continue to invest. yes, ma'am. >> you talked about the rationale for the global block 30 being too expensive. does the same rational apply to other programs? do they have to be cheaper to become justifiable in the budget? >> it is a consideration. i mean, we, in a limited budget circumstance that we face, have to compare what is the best value to the armed forces and

obviously to the taxpayer. i would say each circumstance is an individual assessment. clearly, we are going to make calls on what gives us the best capability for the dollar invested. in this particular instance the u 2 was the better bet. >> one followup on block 40. do you buy additional block 40s no matter twhaut quantity is to show confidence in the program? >> you'll have an opportunity to see the five year defense program investment profile next week, tony. i prefer not to go into greater detail at this time given that we would prefer to give the congress an opportunity to, the courtesy of seeing our program before we open it up at that level of detail. >> how do you reverse surge is

pilots taken out of the six squadrons if many are in the reserves? what is the concept of surge and reversibility for pilots who haven't flown? >> for us what we are doing is remissioning the units. in other words, for example, a unit that was operating manned aircraft might transition to a remotely piloted aircraft mission. and so their fundamental skills will still be employed but in a different way. thank you. >> the block 40 and the global hawk, is it expected to be that much cheaper or that much better than a u 2? why is is it that the block 40 is not being eliminated but the block 30 is? >> the block 40 is a ground moving target indicator based platform that is not a u 2

censor capability. on the other hand the block 30 is the comparable platform to the u 2 in terms of its censor suite. it's for that reason that it was a trade. >> all told, what percentage -- will you see an increase in the number of uavs after this is said and done or decrease and if you could put a percentage or number on that? >> we are somewhere over 250 remotely piloted aircraft today. that number will continue to increase through the five year defense program. >> general, just to shift a little bit, you are getting smaller and more agile. what is that going to mean for air men and their families moving forward? are they going to deploy more or be based in places longer? how does that work for you? >> what we have done is to adjust the mix of forces, active

rbs reserve and guard to recognize the tempo that is inherrant in the new defense strategic guidance. our goals will be to manage the active duty force at deploy to dwell ratio of not less than one to two and not less than one to four to the reserve or guard or better. and that we have approached this in that mix in order to attain that predictable level of work load that we think is sustainable for the long term. you can surge but the sustainable level of effort will be one to two and not less than one to four. >> you mentioned earlier reducing the personnel by 10,000. over what period? and what effect reinstating breck will have on the air

force. >> we will execute reductions provided the congress authorizing those reductions over the program period. and with respect to base closure, for the united states air force base closure around 2005 did not close bases. we did a multitude of realignments and so on. there are estimates in that era that our infrastructure, we had excess infrastructure in the neighborhood of 20%. since 2005 our inventory of aircraft has declined. there is yet more excess infrastructure. and so, indeed, we certainly support the proposal to go

through another round of base closure analysis and execution. >> do you have a number of bases that you think could be closed? do you see any being closed or just a reduction in the size of the ones you have? >> i think our expectation is that we would close bases in a future base closure round. >> in your opening statement you cited the air force's role in deterrence. it is basically status quo when it comes to nuclear forces. what kind of analystics are underway in the air force today to help the president reach his goal of going lower with the aspiration of getting to zero? as you look at that since both the air breathing and air base leg that you own are aging, do you think it is wise to sustain both or could you see getting

rid of both of those? while there are no for us in the fy '13 program the important thing you need to appreciate is that we do have new start programs to meet. those central limits just quickly address 700 strategic delivery vehicles, deployed drivly vehicles, another 100 not deployed, 800 total. and that, of course, is across the supplies including our navy teammates. the bottom line is that there are still decisions pending on how to go about reaching those

new start central targets. i would expect that that would unfold in the '14 program. with respect to your question on the mix, it remains our conviction that especially as you go down in terms of nuclear force structure that the triad becomes more important. the diversity, the variety, the attributes associated with each leg of the triad actually reinforce each other to a greater degree. i would expect and will offer best military advice recommending that we retain the triad even as we go to lower numbers. do you have concerns about

these various programs coming into production at one time? and what effect might that have on resources the. >> in fact, there is a stagger there. clearly f-35 is currently in low rate initial production. the new tanker will begin to deliver in the '15 and '16. we are talking about post 2020. so clearly this is a challenge in terms of sequencing this in a way that meets budget targets. but the bottom line is these are important capabilities for the nation and ones that we will make sacrifices elsewhere to sustain. over here, sir. >> the bill yesterday talks about the retirement of older c 5s and c 130s.

how confident are you that the air force can continue to deliver on that front especially talking about continuing to separate in afghanistan? >> sure. the force size and construct that we're dealing with which produces lesser number of brigade combat teams, for example, also has implications for the size of the air force. and so our assessment is that the strategic air lift force pegged at the 275 aircraft level, that is 223 c-17s and 52 c-5 with reliability,

reengining, reliability aircraft are sufficient to satisfy the demand for dedicated strategic air lift. with respect to the c-130s, an inventory of 318 modernized c-130s is sufficient to provide the intratheater support. this is an analytically based approach. you asked me if i'm comfortable. i am. and importantly the other commanders concerned in this instance are, as well. yes, sir, back erhhere. >> i want to get back to the question about reversibility. how is the air force going to address that across the board as far as force structure?

are you talking about keeping things in the bone yard, putting capacity in contractors? how is this being dealt with across the program? >> reversibility has a different flavor for the navy and the air force perhaps than it does for the ground forces. the navy and the air force are major capital end item intensive. and so when you think about reversibility, one needs to think about what programs you have in training that really serve the role of modernization or recapitalization because there are long leads associated, obviously, with major end items. and in each of the major disciplines i think you will find in this program and certainly outlined in the defense strategic guidance,

commitment to those programs that will allow us to expand if necessary or an established program that would compensate for the unexpected. and i think it's certainly true with the tanker. it is true with the bomber f-35, space programs similarly. yes, sir right here. >> what process did the air force determine that it could establish six fighter? have you identified which you are talking about? >> the basic approach was an analytal approach associated with what is known and the jargon is case three scenario. it is one of the baseline scenarios that the department

uses to conduct force sizing, analysis and so on. that assessment based again on the new strategy, the new defense strategic guidance. and this addresses your question, as well, sir. came to the conclusion that we had somewhat excess capacity on the fighter side. and that was the driving -- the driver for the choices made here. the mix in this was again having to do with emphasizing multi role over those kinds of aircraft with more niche or less versatility. because in a smaller force i think you can appreciate the mandate, the necess city for

maximum versatility. >> we have time for just two more. >> sir, is the decision of the global hawks a reflection of the draw downs in iraq and afghanistan? we just don't need as much isr? is there a broader lesson? >> i don't think so. in fact, my combat and commander colleagues would probably indicate to you that there has been suppressed demand for intelligence outside the central command area for a number of years. and so it is not our expectation that when combat operations subside that demand for isr generally will come down dramatically. el