embitered old ass which was not kpabltly a term of endearment and i wonder if the documents said -- you can show some of this because the british attitude on this was really different from clay's. checkpoint charlie, on october 22nd when alan light her was going to east berlin to botch opera he was stopped by the east germans demanding additional identification which he wouldn't show. clay was notified and he sent a squad of soldiers, they escorted light her in and out because they could go american soldiers could go through that checkpoint and the east germans had no authority to stop them and within 24 hours the east germans were no longer at the checkpoint. they were just soviet there is manning it because they weren't going to take a chance. a week earlier, clay had sent kennedy a cable which i saw. he showed me that at the time.

and he said, our problem is the soviets are letting the east germans harass us and harass us while they stay mt. background. they beat up on us and they, themselves, appear to take no responsibility. the next time this happened, i'll cobb front them and force the soviets to show their hand. and clay saw this as the ideal opportunity. after all allen wlooirtnor came he sent in them in civilian clothes. low and behold, they were stopped and we walked them through with squads of soldiers with bayonets drawn and this went on for several days. about the third day, clay brought up a group of tanks, a squad of tanks, maybe wo, about ten tanks.

only -- which was about ai a third of all we had. and he brought them up not to the checkpoint itself but to an empty lot that was there. and a soviet officer walked over to the line which they could do. they were authorized to come into west berlin and he looked around and he said -- we have tanks too, which was not exactly a mystery to us. and low and behold, within 24 hours there was a group of soviet tanks that appeared on an empty lot in east berlin and their markings had been robbed and covered so it could have been east german and journalists and others went up to those tanks and heard them speaking russian so we knew they were russian. clay was delighted. he said, this is exactly what i told kennedy i wanted to have. i wanted the russians to come forward. so the next thing he did was to bring this american tanks right up to the checkpoint.

then we had an odd ballet. excuse me. we brought our tanks up to the checkpoint and the russians cake up to the checkpoint and they pulled back. it went on like this for a while and then, suddenly, on the evening of the 27th, which is the day we celebrate today, the 50th anniversary, both groups of tanks appeared at the same time. they faced each other about 100 feet apart. with their guns pointing directly at each other. well, big crisis. all the journalists said, this is a potential war. the soviets and americans are facing each other directly got to do something about that. and kennedy's people came to him with bundy and the rest and said -- you've got to order clay to pull back the american tanks. and clay said -- excuse me, kennedy said -- i'm not going to order clay to do anything until i talk to him and he called clay

and he said -- general, what's going on? and when clay said -- hello, mr. president, the operations in berlin fell dead silent. they wanted to know what was going to be said. what was said was this. kennedy said -- what is happening? can you tell me? clay said, all very calm. all very relaxed. the soviets brought up ten tanks which is what we have and they could have brought up a thousand tanks but they didn't. so a sign they don't want trouble. we can go on and on.

kennedy said to him, don't lose your nerve. clay replied, mr. president, we're not worried about our nerves, we're worried about the nerves of the people in washington. and kennedy replied -- some people here have lost their nerve but i haven't. one of the most important things kennedy ever said because it showed that by then he got the drift of what was necessary. there were times when it was just required in the berlin situation to hang tough. and that's what he did. next morning, the tanks left. something was going on and we were not too sure what it was but the point was -- the soviets had been shown that they could not play this game any longer and they didn't play it any longer. from then on we had more direct

confrontations, some of them were not terribly pleasant but things were going on that we felt was just enough to provoke atex and just enough to make us appear weak but not enough to generate the kind of crisis that would lead to war. checkpoint charlie ball one of the most important moments in berlin history. there's nothing very much to say about it because so many people have written about it. that it's not worth talking too much. but there was one other element of crisis, potential crisis. and that was in february of 1962, the soviets, not the east germans, but the soviets began to reserve airspace in air corridors. they aren't shown other map but you know they were one went

north. one went south and one went straight west. the air corridors were limited to 10,000 feet through kinds of tradition which we accepted but we didn't like it. what they would say is, want to reserve the southern air corridor from zero to 7,000 feet. they were denominated in feet. or they would say, we want to have the central corridor. the idea being, they were trying to created a situation where our planes, our civilian aircraft or our military aircraft, could not fly into west berlin, along the altitudes that they had so-called reserved. clay objected to that. he said, we've got to fly through those zones. washington, of course, didn't want to do that but, again, kennedy backed clay and said, you can fly through the zoneses and the berliners loved flying

through those zones. any time they saw that, they hoped they could fly through it and they wanted to show that they were ready to resist whatever the soviets demanded. it happened, obviously, that other people got involved. one of the people who didn't send all his cables to us but we understood he was involved was the general. i'll be interested to see what the documents show us on that. what we understood is that they wanted to take control of the civilian aircraft so that he could fly them in accordance which clay o'mosted normally they flew through the reserved sections and kennedy wouldn't do that. he thought it was too much. he supported clay totally and letting us fly right through those reserves. by may by may, the reservations

stopped. they left berlin. clay left shortly thereafter. we kept saying to ourselves, why has the harassment stopped. why have the reserves -- clay sent a message to kennedy saying we have now end the present crisis we should be prepared for everyone else. and that, of course, is what you know because the and in the summer of 1963, and i hope you can survive a little longer. in the summer of 1962, the soviets began building pipelines, across east germany. from poland to the to the west german border. to carry oil or gasoline for

troops. they usually did this in conjunction with the auto maneuvers but they never went to far and there was a wonderful man at the cia, and john napol. i don't know if he's in the documents who briefed me opts and we all knew that it meant something but we didn't know what it meant. an interestingly enough, by september, soviet troops began coming into east germany and going close to the west german border and going close to berlin. there was something going on and we didn't know what. we found out later when kennedy revealed that there had been missiles in cuba. soviets had installed missiles in cuba. he felt that the cuban missiles would help them solve the berlin crisis. he told interior secretary udall who was visiting moscow at the

time and who he called in that, quote, we would put kennedy into a situation that was necessary to solve the berlin problem. udall, very perplexed, went back and briefed the. and he said, i didn't know what that meant. it was obvious there was something in his mind. he also called the german ambassador. and said to him, the same thing, essentially. we are going to solve the berlin problem he went back in a message saying, i don't know what this means but we have to take it very seriously. the foreign minister in the meeting with kennedy, which became famous because kennedy knew about the missiles but didn't tell him, told kennedy that he was trying planning to go to the united nations that

october and would hope to meet with kennedy and settle the berlin problem. this would be what they call, special interest that, perhaps the missiles in cuba as one of their missions, one of their missions, to begin putting pressure on kennedy very directly about berlin. and that and the soviet forces on the west german border to tell them to shut up this time. and perhaps perhaps, even to impress -- the kinds of things they would okay to exert pressure on the allies to get them out of berlin. later, he told his son that he had expected kennedy, quote, to protest to protest a little more. and then to accept the missiles. he thought that kennedy would

back down. kennedy, by 1962, was a different man from what he had been in 1961. the evolution of young presidents is something that for those of you who enjoy writing dissertations and thinking of topics should look at. because it's fascinating topic. he was many things but one of them one of them he was an enormously quick learner. by 1962 he went through the berlin crisis. he would know what worked and what didn't work and he was ready to take the kind of action which you know. i'm not going to go through the details. you know the story of what happened in cuba. interestingly enough the day that kennedy made his speech or the next day, about the missiles, they began withdrawing from east germany.

and they began quickly to pick up the pipelines. that will re-enforce that there was a connection there. in november, 1962, after the end of the berlin crisis, i happen to be in new york. i met with general clay as i often did in new york at the lynx club. we had a drink together. he believed that he would have never dared to try the cuban venture if kennedy acted more firmly in berlin. that's a bit of special pleading, i recognize. this might be worthwhile for you to think about. pushing back hard on every occasion when he would try anything was in clay's mind the thing to do in order to discourage the soviets from trying something else. clay, like kennedy, kennedy liked him.

kennedy sent several messages to clay saying everything that clay wrote, kennedy had given him instructions that he wanted to see it. he did not want the general to be out of touch. clay, at least would do one thing which kennedy liked which is he would contradict everybody else on the after the and that was something kennedy wanted. he wants one thing above else and that is a variety of opinions when there's a decision to be made. and kennedy like every other chive executive in that sense. finally, of course, kennedy's visit to berlin. june 26th, 1963, i was still there. it was one of the most incredible experiences of my life. i was not, obviously, in the lead caravan but i was in one of the lead buses carrying white house people. at first they rather snickered at the berliners. people always like a parade,

don't they? germans, especially, yeah. they had never seen anything like this. they had done campaigns and all the stuff in the united states when you drive around and there's crowds. this was something unlike anything they had ever seen before. they were chanting "kennedy." it still rings in my head. in any case, kennedy came to the city hall and had a room to himself for a while to rest. two people were with him, bob lock lockener, head of usa. and a german interpreter and a

russian interpreter. kennedy has -- i've seen the speech in the kennedy library and i can tell you that they are god-awful. the kind of speech he wouldn't make to an american crowd. oh, yes, things are tough. but sooner or later, yes, indeed, one day the wall will fall and this kind of stuff. kennedy looked at it and he said, i can't give this kind of speech to the people that talked to me this way an he decided to go back to his old latin where he had learned -- and to say -- [ speaking german ] and there was a discussion about if he said am i a jelly donut. he did not say that. he said, i'm a berliner. i talked to them about this, a very extraordinary man. and i asked him what he had

recommended and he said, i recommended -- nobody would have thought that kennedy was saying he was a jelly donut and if he had said that, it would have been implied that he had been born in berlin which is not something he could say. what he was really saying was -- i am with you. so the two agreed with that and the translated it and kennedy said it twice and we all know the rest of the story. kennedy's widow, jackie, used to complain. but the most famous words kennedy ever spoke were this a foreign language. thank you.

in may of 2011, historian richard smith led a ten-day bus flour asheville, north carolina, to austin, texas. stopping at several presidential and historic sites on the route and one was the andrew johnson homestead in greenville, tennessee, owned by the national park service. johnson served as vice president under president line conand succeeded him when lincoln was assassinated. here's park guide, daniel luther, portraying president johnson and telling the story of how andrew johnson met abraham lincoln. >> in 1847, i went into the 30th congress for my third term representing the people of the first district and while i was there i met within extremely tall, rhee-boned young man, representing the prairie state of illinois and his name was abraham lincoln. and we fell into conversation and i introduced myself and told him that i was from northeast tennessee and he replied that i

tennessee and he replied that he had relatives in northeast tennessee and perhaps i knew some of them. he identified his great uncle isaac as having owned a farm at which his father thomas had worked as something of a hired hand in the 1790s and he also identified another great uncle, a gentleman by the name of mordecai who lived in the town of greenville, to which i replied greenville is my hometown. and your great uncle mordecai in fact performed the wedding ceremony for me and my wife e eliza in 1827 as well as we bed on the town council together in 1829 and i reassured mr. lincoln that he was in good hands in terms of politics that his great uncle had gained a great many more votes than i had. but like many young men who came into congress at the time, we went in there with goals. and each of us had a cherished goal that we wanted to achieve in that congress.

mine was the introduction of a homestead bill. for mr. lincoln, it was the introduction of legislation which would have provided for compensated emancipation of slaves in the district of columbia. and like other young men who go into congress, we find it is not so easy to get your cherished goals accomplished so we left that session of congress without those bills passed. i would serve two more terms. mr. lincoln, that would be his only term in the house of representatives. at the beginning of the fourth term, i bought the house you have just seen. it is irony, those of us who lived through our late unhappy struggle often felt we were caught up in the hands of fate and as fate would have it, each of us, abraham lincoln and myself were 15 years in the future able to help the other achieve that earlier cherished goal. . for my part, abraham lincoln

signed the homestead act into law in 1862. in 1864, i helped mr. lincoln gain at least one state into the column emancipation and that is the state of tennessee that you're visiting today. you heard some of these words earlier so i'm going to give you just a short excerpt. in october of 1864, word got out that i as military governor was about to issue a proclamation of emancipation for the slaves in tennessee. and then created a large gathering at the state capital and i stepped out to address them. and used some of the following words. colored people of nashville, you have all heard of the president's proclamation by which he proclaims that a large portion of the slaves in the states still in rebellion have been declared hence forth and forever free. for reasons which seemed wise to the president, this plok

proclamation did not apply to you or to your native state. consequently, many of you were left in bondage. the fetters still around your lives. gradually this ini can equity has been passing away but the time has come for the last vestiges of it to be removed. therefore, i without reference to the president or if he other person vrn a proclamation to make and standing here on the steps of the capitol with the past history of the state to witness, its present condition to guide. its future to encourage me. i andrew johnson do hereby proclaim freedom, full, broad and unconditional to every man in tennessee. those were words, some four months later, we backed them up with action. the convention i called to re-create a loyal state government to the union also

enacted an amendment to the tennessee state constitution ending forever slavery in this state which became part of our constitution with a popular vote of the people on february 22nd, 1865. shortly after that, i went back to washington to take the seat as vice president. the second highest office in the gift of a free people. five weeks later, the war was over. one of its final casualties, our president and with his death the burden he had for four years fell upon my shoulders. sorrowful times, discouraging times and yet as i spoke to the gathering of the cabinet ta came to my rooms at the kirkwood hotel the morning of april 15th, i told them that i had hope. i had hope that our government having emerged from its present trials would settle on policies

more consonant with the great principles of free government than it had had heretofore. and i believed this nation would come together and would move forward and i had good, strong reason for my hope. i had faith in the union. i had faith abiding faith in the constitution. and above all else, i had faith in the people. thank you for your kind attention. >> one quick question. >> sir. >> there's a bit of a controversy among us 150 years later over you and the part you played in the decision and the trial of the lincoln conspirators. >> yes, sir. >> and in particular the decision, the unprecedented decision on the part of the federal government to execute a woman, mary sir rot. could you tell us how that you

came about? >> yes, sir, i will tell you, and i'm aware of the controversy and i'm aware there are a number of different sides to it that in my view it, mrs. sirot was guilty. i believed she was the person who kept the nest that hatched the egg. however, the controversy arises over this, having been convicted by military tribunal and having been sentenced to death by that the same tie bunal, five of the nine judges on the tribunal recommended clement sit for mrs. sirat. in other words, that her death sentence be commuted to life in prison. i was unaware of the that commutation recommendation. i was freshly into my office. i was allowing myself to be guided by the cabinet and the other officer who's had been present. and when judge advocate joseph holt brought meet papers include willing the death warrants, i signed them. some two years later, 1867, this is interesting this is when the

impeachment crisis was emerging, the newspapers began printing the awareness that a recommendation of clemency had been made. and that i had ignored it. and i sent to the war department requesting to see those documents and when is i did see them, it appeared to me that the clemency recommendation which was right there had been torn out and reattached. and i thought only two men could have done such a thing. one of them joseph holt judge advocate general who had been responsible for the trial but the other was his superior edwin stanton. so perhaps i will leave it this way. the next day after i saw those documents from the war department, i sent a short note to secretary stanton which read "dear sir, public considerations of high character contain me to inform you that your resignation as secretary of war will be

accepted." may i tell you what he said in response? dear sir, public considerations of a high character contain strain me to inform you that i will not resign the office until congress comes back into session." knowing at the time he believed that he was already protected by the tenure of office law. >> thank you. >> you're welcome. you're welcome. you're welcome. indeed. all right. >> for more information about the andrew johnson national historic site, visit their website at nps.gov/anjo. and to learn more about tours with historian and author richard norton smith go to presidents and patriots.com. you're watching american history tv all weekend every weekend on c-span3. >> tommy, 14 years. seven months.

come on, tommy. yoo-hoo. >> thank you, thank you, thank you, thank you. >> next weekend, book tv and american history tv explore the history and literary culture of beaumont where the texas oil industry got its start. saturday beginning at noon eastern on book tv on c-span2, john roberts on beaumont's literary culture and the challenges of running an independent bookstore. also jay lee thompson on teddy roosevelt's post presidential expeditionings to africa and europe and on american history tv sunday at 5:00 p.m. eastern, january 11th, 1901, the lucas gusher at spindletop hill changed the economy of texas and helped usher in the petroleum age. and with the oil came the rough necks and with the rough necks advice. tour the dixie hotel on crockett street,ec