steinsteichen. i have a pointer. so because he heard there was a refugee who landed there and couldn't get out. steinsteichen was separate. he and i flew there together. he picked up the refugee and flew him back to west berlin. on the way out the east german guards pointed their guns at us, but we knew they would not shoot. clay found that kennedy supported him much of the time, not always. but there was a lot of opposition toward clay. clay was trying to do things to demonstrate that the american presence in berlin was something we took seriously. that we weren't going to let ourselves be harassed out of it. but he had a lot of opposition in washington.

one was mac bundy. one was dean rusk. secretary of state. he said to clay, you shouldn't react to everything that the soviets and east germans do. you should only react when they affect our vital interest. nobody who exactly what that meant. in any case, clay did not listen to him. the british prime minister, harold mcmillan who wanted us out of berlin and told kennedy that, called clay a senile and bitter old ass, which was not exactly a term of endearment. but which reflected the british policy. i wonder whether the documents that you're releasing shows some of this because the british attitude was different from clay's. checkpoint charlie. on october 22nd, when alan leitner went into east berlin to watch the opera he was stopped

by the east germans who demanded additional identification, which he wouldn't show. clay was notified. he sent a squad of soldiers. escorted him in and out because american soldiers could go through the checkpoint. east germans had no authority to stop them. in fact, within 24 hours, the east germans were no longer at the checkpoint, there were just soviets manning because they wouldn't take a chance. now a week earlier, clay had send kennedy a cable which i saw. he showed me at the time. he said, our problem is that the soviets are letting the east germans harass us and do things while they stay in the background. so they beat up on us but they appear to take no responsibility. next time this happens, i'm going to confront them and i'll force the soviets to show their hand.

and clay saw this as the ideal opportunity. after alan leitner left that evening, we waited a couple of days and then clay sent in a patrol, a couple of gis in civilian clothes to try to do the same thing that leitner had done. lo and behold they were stopped. we walked them through as squads of soldiers with the bayonets were drawn. this went on for several days. about the third day clay brought up a group of tanks, a squad of tanks, platoon, i don't know about ten tanks. which was about one-third about all we had in west berlin. he brought them up not to the checkpoint, but to one of the many empty lots around there. a soviet officer walked over to the line which they could do. they were authorized to come into west berlin. he looked around and he said, we

have tanks, too, which was not exactly a mystery to us. and lo and behold within 24 hours, there was a group of soviet tanks that appeared on an empty lot in east berlin. their markings had been rubbed down and covered so they could have been east german. but journalists and others went up to the tanks and heard the crew speaking russian. we knew they were russian. clay was delighted. he said this is exactly what i told kennedy i wanted to have. i wanted the russians to come

forward. the next thing he did was bring the american tanks up to the checkpoint. then we had an an odd issue. we brought our tanks up to the checkpoint and pulled them back. the russians came up and saw we were not there. they pulled back. it went on like this for a while. then suddenly, on the evening of the 27th, which is the day we celebrate today, the 50th anniversary, both groups of tanks appeared at the same time. they faced each other about 100 feet apart with their guns pointing directly at each other. well, big crisis. all the journalists said this is a potential war. here are the soviets and americans facing each other directly. we have to do something about that. and kennedy's people came to him and said you have got to order clay to pull back the american tanks. clay said, excuse me. kennedy said, i'm not going to order clay to do anything until i talk to him. he called clay and he said, general, what's going on? and when clay said, hello, president, the operation center in berlin fell dead silent. they wanted to know what was going to be said. what was said was this, kennedy said, what is happening?

can you tell me? clay said, all very calm, it's all very relaxed. soviets brought up ten tanks, which is what we have. they could have brought up 1,000 thanks. but they didn't. it's a sign that they don't want trouble. we can go on and stabilize the situation, but we don't need to worry. kennedy said to him -- can somebody get me a glass of water? thank you. kennedy said to him, don't lose your nerve. clay replied, mr. president, we are not worried about our

nerves. we are worried about the nerves of the people in washington. kennedy replied, some people here have lost their nerve, but i haven't. one of the most important things that kennedy ever said. because it showed that by then he gotten the drift of what was necessary. there were times when it was just required in the berlin situation to hang tough. that's what he did. the next morning, the tanks left and the soviets pulled out first. we pulled out later. there was dialogue going on. we never were too sure what it was. in any case, the point was that the soviets had been shown that they could not play this game any longer. they didn't play it any longer. from then on, we had more direct confrontations. some of them weren't terribly pleasant. there were things going on which we always felt was just enough to provoke attention. just enough to make us appear weak, but not enough to generate the kind of crisis that would lead to war. checkpoint charlie confrontation became one of the most important moments in the cold war.

it became an important moment in berlin history. there is nothing very much to say about it because so many people have written about it. that is not worth talking too much. but there was one other element of crisis, potential crisis, and that was in february of 1962, the soviets, not the east germans, the soviets began to reserve air space in the air corridors. air corridors aren't shown on the map but you know they were. one went north. one went south. one went straight west. the air corridors were limited to 10,000 feet through a tradition that we accepted, but we did not like it. what they would then say is we want to reserve the air corridor -- whatever corridor, the southern corridor from 0 to 7,000 feet. they would denominate it in

feet. or they would say we want to reserve the central corridor of 7,000 to 10,000 feet. the idea being that they were trying to create a situation where our planes, our civilian aircraft and our military aircraft, could not fly into west berlin along altitudes that they had so-called reserved. clay objected to that. he said we have got to fly through those zones. washington, of course, didn't want to do that. again, kennedy backed clay. no, you can fly through the zones. berliners loved flying through those zones. anytime they want to fly low-level reserves, they wanted to fly through it because they wanted to show they were ready to resist whatever the soviets demanded. it happened, obviously, that other people got involved. one of the people who didn't send all of his cables to us, but we understood he was

involved was general norstadt. i'll be happy to hear what our documents reveal on that because we didn't get that they said. what we understood was norstat wanted to take control of the civilian aircraft so that they could fly them in accordance with soviet direction, which is something clay opposed totally. clay wanted us to fly fighter aircraft through the reserve sections. kennedy would not do that. he thought that was too much. kennedy supported clay totally in letting us fly right through those reserve zones. by may, the reservations stopped. he left berlin.

clay left shortly there after. we said why has the harassment stopped? he sent a message saying we have now ended the present crisis, but we should be prepared for something else. that of course is what you know was the cuban missile crisis. in the summer of 1963 and i'm almost through so i hope you survive a little longer. in the summer of 1962, the soviets began building pipelines across east germany from poll ant to the west german border. large pipelines to carry oil or gasoline for troops. they usually did this in conjunction with the other maneuvers and never went quite

so far and had large pipes. there was a wonderful man at the cia, john nepal. i don't know if you know his name. he briefed me on this. so many troops began coming into east germany and going close to the west german border and close to berlin. there was something going on and we didn't know what. we found out later when kennedy revealed that there had been missiles in cuba and the soviets installed missiles in cuba. he felt that the cuban missiles would help him solve the crisis. he told the interior secretary who was visiting moscow at the time and who he called in much to our surprise that "we will put kennedy into a situation where it is necessary to solve the berlin problem."

udahl very perplexed went back and briefed the president and said he didn't know what that meant. obviously it was something. he called the german ambassador and said to him the same thing essentially. we are going to solve the berlin problem. he went back in a message and said i don't know what this means, but we have to take it very seriously. the foreign minster in the meeting with kennedy which became famous because kennedy knew about the missiles and didn't tell him. he told kennedy that he was planning to go to the united nations that october and would hope at that point to meet with kennedy and settle the berlin problem. i have always felt this may be a bit of what they call special interest. that perhaps the missiles in cuba had as one of their

missions it begto begin putting pressure on kennedy. that and the soviet forces on the west german and perhaps even to impress the goals were the kinds of things he would do to exert pressure on the allies to get them out of berlin. krushchev later told his son that he expected kennedy "to protest a little more and then to accept the missiles." he thought that kennedy would back down. kennedy by 1962 was a different man from what he had been in 1961. the evolution of young presidents is something that for those of you who enjoy writing

dissertations and thinking of topics should look at. it's a fascinating topic with respect to kennedy. kennedy was many things, but one was an enormously quick learner. by 1982, by the fall he had gone through the crisis and knows what worked and didn't work and was ready to take the action that you know. i'm not going to go through the details. you know the story of what happened in cuba. interestingly enough, the day that kennedy made his speech or the next day about the missiles, the soviet forces began withdrawing from east germany. and they began to pick up the pipelines. they reinforced the sense that there was a connection there. in november 1962 after the end of the berrin crisis, i happened to be in new york. i met with general clay as i often did in new york.

we had a drink together. he said that he believed that he would never have dared to try the cuban venture if kennedy acted more firmly in berlin. that's a bit of special pleading i recognize, but i still think it's something that might be worthwhile for you to think about. pushing back hard on every occasion when they would try anything was in clay's mind the thing to do to discourage the soviets from trying something else. clay liked kennedy and kennedy liked him. they sent several messages. kennedy sent several messages saying everything that clay wrote kennedy had given instructions that he wanted to see. he did not want the general to be out of touch. clay at least would do one thing which kennedy liked which was

that he would contradict everybody else. that was something that kennedy wanted. a person wants one thing above all else. that is say variety of opinions when there is a decision to be made. kennedy was like every other in that sense. finally kennedy's visit to berlin. june 26th, 1963, i was still there. it was one of the most incredible experiences of my life. i was not obviously in the lead caravan, but i was in one of the lead buses carrying white house people. at first they snickered. people always like a parade, don't they? john especially. i didn't say anything because it wasn't my function to say anything. within about a half hour, they sat there. they had never, never never seen anything like this. these were people who had done the campaigns and all this stuff in the united states where you

drive around and this was something unlike anything that they had seen before. kennedy! kennedy. it still rings in my ears. kennedy came to city hall and had a room to himself for a while to rest. two people were with him. a german interpreter. and now his interpreter. he had given it to him for that day and interpret kennedy's speech. kennedy looked at his speech. i have seen that speech. from the kennedy library. i have seen four or five drafts and i can tell you they are god awful. it was a kind of speech he wouldn't even make to an american crowd. yes, the things are tough, but

sooner or later one day the wall will fall and this kind of stuff. he said i can't give this kind of speech for people who talked to me this way. he decided to go back where he learned his old latin. there was a discussion of course which all of you know, did he say i am a jelly donut? no, he did not say i am a jelly donut. he said i'm a berliner. i talked to the interpreter about this. he's a very extraordinary man. i asked what he recommended. he said i recommended it and nobody would have thought that kennedy was saying he was a jelly donut. if he said that he would have implied he was born in berlin .

both agreed with that. kennedy said it twice. we all know the rest of the story. kennedy's widow, jackie, used to complain, perhaps in jest. the most famous words kennedy ever spoke were in a foreign language. thank you. [ applause ] in may of 2011, historian richard smith led a bus tour to austin,texas. they stopped at several presidential and historic sites along the route. one of the stops was the andrew johnson homestead in greenville, tennessee. a site own and operated by the

park service. he served as vice president under president lincoln. here is park guide daniel luther portraying president jns and telling the story how johnson met abraham lincoln. >> in 0th congress representing the people. i met an extremely tall, raw boned young man representing the prairie state of illinois and his name is abraham lincoln. we fell into conversation, and i introduced myself and told him i was from northeast tennessee, and he replied he has relatives and perhaps i knew some of them. he identified his great uncle isaac as having owned a farm and his father, thomas lincoln, worked as a hired hand, and he also identified another great uncle, a gentleman by the name

of morticah. i replied greenville is any hometown. your great uncle performed the wedding ceremony for me and my wife eliza in 1827 as well as mortica and i served on the town council in 1829. i reassured mr. lincoln he was in good hands in terms of politics. his great uncle gained many votes than i had. like many young men who came into congress at the time, we went in there with goals. each of us had a cherished goal we wanted to achieve in that congress. mine was the introductionf the homestead bill.

we found it's not so easy to get your cherished goals accomplished. i would serve two more terms. mr. lincoln, that would be his only term in the house of representatives. at the beginning of the fourth term, i bought the house you've just seen. it's irony. those of us who live through our late, unhappy struggle felt were were ought up in the hands of fate of each of us, abraham lincoln and myself were 15 years in the future able to help the other achieve that earlier cherished goal. for my part, abraham lincoln signed the homestead bill into law in 1862 in . in 1864, i helped him game one state with abolition. you heard one of these words earli

earlier. in october of 1864, word got out that i as military governor was about to issue a proclamation of emancipation for the slaves in tennessee. this created a large gathering at the state capitol and i stepped out to address them and used some of the following words. colored people of nashville, you've all heard of the president's proclamation by which he proclaims that a large portion of the slaves have been declared free. for reasons which seemed wise, this prok clamation did not app to you or your native state. many of you were left in bondage. the time has come for the last vestages of it to be removed.

therefore i, without reference to the president or any other person, have a proclamation to make and standing here on the steps the of the capitol with the past history of the state to witness it's present condition to guide, it future to encourage me. i, andrew johnson, do hereby proclaim freedom, full, broad and uncle to every man in tennessee. those were words some four months later we back them up with action. the convention i call to recreate a loyal state government to the union also enacted an amendment to the tennessee state constitution ending forever slavery in this state which became part of our constitution with a popular vote of people on february 22nd, 1865. shortly after that, i went back to washington to take the seat as vice president, the second

highest office in the gift of a free people. five weeks later the war was over. one of its final casualties our martyred president. his death fell upon my shoulders. sorrowful times wp as i spoke to the gathering of the cabinet that came to my rooms at the kirkwood hotel the morning of april 15th, i told them that i had hope. i had hope our government would settle on policies more consonant with the great principles of free government. i believe this nation would come together and would move forward. i had good strong reason for my hope. i had faith in the union. i had abiding faith in the

constitution, and above all else, i had faith in the people. thank you for your kind attention. >> one quick question. >> sir? >> there's a bit of a controversy over you and the part you play in the decision in the trial of lincoln sconspira r conspirators and the part of the decision to execute a woman. could you tell us how that came about. >> i will tell you and i'm ware of the controversy, and i'm aware there's a number of different sides to it that in my view, he was guilty. i believe she was the person that kept the nest that hatched the egg. be controversy arises thoefr, having been convicted by

military tribunal and having been convicted to death, five of the nine judges on the tribunal recommended clemency. i was unware of that recommendation. i was freshly into my office. i was allowing myself to be guided by the cabinet and other officers president. when i was brought the papers, including the death warrant, i signed them. some two years later, this is when the impeachment crisis was emerging. the newspapers began printing the awareness that a recommendation of clemency had been made and i had ignored it. i sent to the war department requesting to see the documents. when i did see them, it appeared to me the clemency

recommendation has been torn out and reattached. i thought only two men could have done such a thing. one of them joseph holt, judge advocavocate general who was responsible for the trial and the other was his superior, edward stanton. perhaps i will leave it this way, the nextday i sent a short day to secretary stanton which read, dear sir, public consideration of high character have been strain me to inform you that your resignation as secretary of war will be accepted. may i tell kwlu he said in response. dear, sir. public considerations of high consideration con train me to reform you that i will not resign the office until congress comes back into session. knowing at the time he believed he was protected by the nu