here of the contributions that this one judge courageously did. it's quite clear to me that president eisenhower, with the good counsel in particular of his attorney general, had no surprises in mind when he made his appointments. he knew the positions of these individuals in whom he entrusted these powers. bill moyers described judge johnson as -- and said that he altered forever the face of the south. burke marshall, yale law professor, who served with distinction in the kennedy justice department said that these four judges, dr. speck mentioned them, including judge johnson, have made as much of an imprint on american society and american law as any four judges below the supreme court have ever done in history.

if you look at these kind of appointments and the consistency of the moral fibers of the individuals that president eisenhower put on the court, it's no surprise that someone like earl warren was put in the position of chief justice of the u.s. supreme court. i have my theories about where some of the tension came from between the two but he also put justice brennan on the supreme court. and dr. speck did a wonderful job of explaining the context that we faced as a country. i want to give you a little context about what our court system was like during this period. my father's mentor was a man named charles hamilton houston who excelled at harvard law school, eventually became dean of harvard law school where he mentored a number of lawyers in the movement. charles hamilton houston was clearly a brilliant legal thinker and was a tremendous law student at harvard.

to give you a clue as to just how much of a pioneer and how brilliant this man was, in 1935, he gave a speech that we recently found at the library of congress where he laid out the entire strategy of the school desegregation cases. that's 1935. this was not a man to be trifled with. i mention that because with the context of the court system that president eisenhower did so much to change, charles hamilton houston went before the supreme court in 1938 and argued a case called gaines versus missouri to get a gentleman admitted to the missouri law school. rather than listen to a black man argue in the supreme court, justice mcreynolds turned his chair around. i mean, if you think about that sort of behavior from a federal judge on the highest court of our land and then you juxtapose that with the quality of the

people that president eisenhower put on the bench, it's just -- it's remarkable to me. and i think that, you know, it bears noting that these were not one-off flukes. there's a consistency through his appointments. and if there's one thing in closing that i would say that i picked up from reading most of the ambrose books, it is that general eisenhower and president eisenhower sought out people of tremendous moral fiber and courage. he surrounded himself with these individuals. they were drawn to him. for those who worked immediately with him, he had mentored them in tremendous ways. for those who were a step or two removed, it's very clear that the example of his service guided them. so it's been quite clear to me that although there may have been criticism along the way on individual pieces of his agenda,

he made a remarkable contribution to our nation's history when it comes to a number of things. but in particular on civil rights. i look forward to the discussion. >> thank you for that introduction. especially the line from the students. you have no idea what those things cost me. so it's always go -- it's always good to hear them. and it's always good being back at the ike. this is like a second home, and i'm inspired every time i walk on the campus. and to be able to sit next tgeos words, well, that's just gold. my talk today is going to be an echo of how dr. speck started her talk. because if you want to talk about little rock, right, the first thing you've got to do is you've got to get right with

ike. and getting right with ike is hard to do. i mean, maybe the real ike never stands up. i don't know. so what we're going to try to do here today is we're going to try to get right with ike. on his time just prior to the little rock crisis and then the crisis itself. now, i said we which means that this is not a spectator event, right? i want you to think through this with me. i don't have all the answers. trust me. right? but think through this with me. and you, i would hope, would also try to do an assessment as we go through it based on the things that mr. marshall said and the things that i'm going to tell you. and you try to get right with ike. he's a man in motion. he was always a man in motion. he's still a man in motion. listen to this. in a 1962 poll, office lessenger sr. asked 75 officers to rank

order the chief executive, washington right up to eisenhower based on, quote, their greatness. of the 31 presidents rated, dwight d. eisenhower ranked 21st. he was tied with chet arthur. just above andrew johnson. most of these academics would have agreed at that time with the presidential scholar louis koenig who said eisenhower would be primarily membered who single-handedly pursued his appetite for recreation while leading the day-to-day administration of his office to trust subordinates like assistant to the president sherman adams. over the past 50 years, however, these earlier assessments of eisenhower as a well-meaning but bumbling political novice have been challenged. during our newly opened collections of official records like right here at the eisenhower and personal papers, eisenhower revisionists have constructed a new image in which

the president emerges as a capable, clever executive who led the nation with a strong hand and a clear vision. the new scholarship has enhanced ike's reputation dramatically. in 1980, a new poll modelled on that of 1962 placed eisenhower ninth. he then in 1990 slipped to 15th. but in the 2010, last year, sienna college research institute poll, ike once again moved back into the top ten. moving aside some guy named kennedy. i'm not quite sure. the results have been significant. the revisionists have focused mainly on ike in the foreign policy sphere. they have not focused as much on ike in the domestic sphere. particularly ike and civil rights. now, if you tried to do ike and

civil rights, you readily understand why that is. it sometimes can be just maddening. who's the real ike here? who's the real guy? some people have argued that eisenhower met civil rights reform with ambivalence if not outright opposition. they say that he failed to develop comprehensive policies and strategies required to implement school desegregation in the south. it was this failure, some revisionists maintained, that resulted in the crisis that erupted in 1957 in little rock. now, there's no debating. these scholars' assertion that eisenhower was certainly less than enthusiastic in his support of school desegregation. what i will suggest here today is that their claim that the president's failure resulted from an overriding opposition to civil rights is wrong.

i will argue it was wrong. i will argue also that they're wrong when they say that he did not have a consistent administration policy aimed at ending desegregation. i think they missed the mark completely. i maintain that a close examination of the president's personal and public correspondence and action reveals that his approach to all civil rights issues eisenhower adhered to a precisely defined strategy. it was based on two things. first, his own personal views on race. of course. it was based also on his deeply held belief that a course that emphasized moderation and gradualism would prove the most effective in advancing racial equality while at the same time maintaining law and order in the affected areas. a little bit m sategy of modera gradualism had served eisenhower

well. not only through his administration but as a military man. you'll recall ike, the monty and so on. and it served him very well. but it will prove completely and adequate to the new set of challenges that develop following the supreme court ruling in brown v. board. eisenhower's inability to achieve the objectives that he sought will end in the little rock crisis. and that crisis will result, i maintain, directly from his failure to tailor that strategy to meet the new challenges that he faced after brown. any analysis of the strategy of eisenhower, of course, has got to begin with an analysis of the president's personal racial views. we've talked a little bit about it. as you know, ike was born in texas. he grew to manhood right here in kansas. and the population of both

states was, of course, predominantly white. but surprisingly to me, when i read this, there was a relatively large black population when ike was growing up right here in abilene. the schools that ike attended here in abilene were integrated. and it was here that the future president first displayed what would be a lifelong aversion to bigotry. when a high school coach harassed and then dismissed the black athlete from the football team, team captain eisenhower told the coach, if he can't play, i won't play either. other players lined up behind ike. the coach reinstated the black player. however, the fact that eisenhower was no bigot, and you're going to hear that word "however" and "but" a lot today. i'm sorry. i told you, it's work, right? the fact that eisenhower was no bigot did not mean that he rejected the commonly held racial views of his day. upon graduation from west point,

he entered the u.s. army. a u.s. army that remained segregated for nearly all of his four decades-plus of military service. black soldiers, as mr. marshall pointed out, were generally considered unfit for combat duty and were denied training in any. but the most rudimentary skill. eisenhower did not challenge these practices during the war. and when questioned immediately after the war about possibly integrating the army, he responded with the statement that would become the cornerstone of his civil rights policies, statement that dr. speck quoted earlier. if we attempt merely by passing a lot of laws to force someone to like somebody else, we're going to get into a lot of trouble. by the end of his military career, generaliz eisenhower, however, was heard during the final portions of the integration of the armed forces.

and when asked what he thought about that, ike expressed the hope that, quote, the human race may finally grow up to the point where it, race relations, will not be a problem. as president, eisenhower's signals on race relations continued to be mixed. depending on what you wanted to see in eisenhower, you could find it. you could look at eisenhower's personal remarks, for example, and say, there goes a thorough-going racist. to presidential speechwriter arthur larson, for example, eisenhower explained that his support for black political and economic equality did not mean that he thought the racists should mix socially or that, quote, a negro should court my daughter. when he returned from golfing trip to augusta, georgia, his son remembered that the president would regale the family with, quote, darkie

jokes, told him by his golfing partner in the south. to chief justice earl warren, he defended the views of segregation. he claimed that all they are concerned about is to was a letter to the famous editor of the "atlanta constitution," ralph mcgill, in which the president emphasized the high cost of discrimination until america has achieved reality in the concept of individual dignity and equality before the law, he wrote to mcgill, we will not have become

completely worthy of our limitless opportunities. eisenhower supplemented these statements with a sincere effort to make blacks more visible at the highest levels of government as we heard in mr. marshall's talk. he asked sherman adams at the nominating convention, seek out qualified blacks. bring them in. lipman joined the white house secretarial staff. frank snow, howard university, was designated cultural attache to italy. wilkins became assistant secretary of labor. of course, the most significant posting was e. frederick moreau as the administrative assistant to the president. now, detractors have argued that these were just symbolic, but here's the thing you cannot argue with, and that is that black faces appear where none had ever been before. now, the important distinction that must be noted is that while eisenhower's support for the political and economic rights of blacks was clear and unwavering,

his endorsement of their right to social equality was indeed often weak and hesitant. in revealing letter to the republican national committee or presidential committee chairman mead alcourt, eisenhower suggested that one of the guiding doctrines of the republican party should be, quote, equality of all citizens before the law. meaning the political and economic right of no citizen should be jeopardized because of his race or his religion. the obligation of the law was to protect social rights. but in ike's view, those words were open to interpretation. and debate. in expressing these views, the president believed that he was addressing the most important concerns of blacks. as sherman adams related one

time, eisenhower told me that he disagreed with his southern friends who contended that negros were primarily seeking social equality. he, eisenhower, believed that the negro was more anxious for economic equality, an equal chance for a job and a good education, equal justice before the law, equal right to vote. the president was certain then that he possessed a full appreciation of the aspirations of the negro. and he also believed that he had divined the best policy for achieving those goals. eisenhower's policy, the president's strategy for whatever goal he sought reflected his core beliefs. eisenhower, first and last, was a man of moderation. he characterized his approach to problems as the policy of the middle way. and he was utterly convinced

that this policy offered the greatest chance for the successful resolution of the difficult problem that surrounded school desegregation. the most important tenet of this policy of the middle way was the avoidance of the extremist of all stripes. as eisenhower explained once to a friend, the critical problem of our time is to find and stay on the path that marks the way of logic between conflicting arguments advanced by extremists of both sides, and that will solve, he said, almost every problem that arises. the proper role for the president in all of this, he believed, was that of honest broker. an impartial judge who prevented confrontation by hearing the contending arguments of reasonable men and then rendering a solution that provided the most good of the most people. the second tenet of eisenhower's policy of moderation concerned the proper role of government in

resolving emotional issues. eisenhower was a firm believer in limited government. and he was extremely skeptical of any solution that advocated the use of law or force to solve fundamental, what he called, human problems. the third tenet of the policy was caution. gradualism, said eisenhower, in all things. gradualism. give the parties a chance to accept and become comfortable with proposed settlements. and the final component of eisenhower's policy was his preference for minimizing his personal role in any solution that was divine. this was accomplished, as you've heard in dr. speck's talk, by arranging private meetings wlt persons concerned, by sending emissaries in the president's name, very low-key, behind the scenes. what greenspan called the hidden

hand presidency. it was this policy of moderation skruktsed around the principlesn constructed gradualism, caution, minimum government intrusion which eisenhower believed would offer the best chance of solving the difficult problem of desegregation. he put this strategy to the test when he completed the desegregation of the armed forces and when he integrated the schools in washington, d.c. now, seeing eisenhower do this, many civil rights advocates hoped his executive activism would now be directed toward ending segregation throughout the country. but they would be disappointed. the same rationale that led eisenhower to the speedy desegregation of the armed forces and the nation's capital would preclude him from launching any presidential initiative to battle segregation in the schools of the individual

states. eisenhower knew that the real battles over the integration of america's public school systems would occur in the deep south. and although he often stated his belief that the use of, quote, political or economic power to enforce segregation based on race, color or creed is morally wrong, he also acknowledged that the -- that the desegregation of public schools in the south would entail, quote, very serious practical problems. not the least of which was what eisenhower called deep-seeded emotions of the persons in the region. the eisenhower administration did little to challenge school segregation in the south. i do not believe, eisenhower wrote in his diary on 24 july 1953, that prejudice will succomb to compulsion.

federal law imposed on our states in such a way to bring about conflict of the police powers, of the state and nation, which set back progress and race relations in this nation for a long, long time. how, then, was the fight for equality to proceed? eisenhower provided his solution in a letter to his friend, governor james burns of south carolina, writing burns on 1 december '53 eisenhower expressed the hopes that a means might be found whereby all parties involved in the segregation debate could, quote, progressively work toward the goals established by abstract principle. but which would not at the same time cause such disruption and mental anguish that any process would be reversed. the statement was in accordance with ike's policy of moderation. penned to a

specific date which desegregation would end. he was asked one time, how long will this take? eisenhower answered, quote, the length of time i am not even going to talk about. i don't know anything about the length of time it will take. in truth, of course, eisenhower knew that voluntary desegregation, if it ever occurred, would take a very, very long time. what eisenhower sincerely, i believe, thought is that he would be given that time. for gradualism, for the policy of moderation. he was wrong. he found that on on 17 may 1954. the supreme court rendered its decision in brown v. board. with that ruling, ike's time ran out. in spite of his presidential assertions that he agreed with the unanimous decision, eisenhower, the man, believed

the justice had vastly overstepped their authority. he railed against the, quote, political stupidity of the court. i am convinced, he told his speech writer, emmett j. hughes, the supreme court decision will set back black progress in the south by 15 years. the president knew most white southerners would oppose brown. and as he wrote to his friend, john haslett, laws are ratherly effective unless they represent the will of the majority. when pressed on his personal opinion of the court's decision, he would simply say that it was the ruling of the law of the land, and as the president he was required to enforce it. most telling, however, the president steadfastly refused to endorse the decision of the court, more importantly, to speak out on the immorality of desegregation. as presidential press secretary

james hagerty later remembered, after brown, he said, after brown civil rights became a whole different ball game. indeed, it did. and it was a game that would result in the confrontation at the little rock school desegregation cries. that that crisis, eisenhower's policy, trusted policy of moderation, would prove woefully inadequate. not that he didn't try to use it. he sought to avoid any high profile actions during the crisis. any high profile pronouncements. four times during the crisis he dispatched personal emissaries to arkansas, to gather information, in an attempt to bridge the differences between the state and national governments. he repeatedly refused advice from subordinates to turn to legislative or even forceful measures to resolve the crisis. and he sought to provide as much time as he possibly could for

the people of arkansas to accept and become comfortable with court-mandated desegregation at little rock central high. in the end, of course, the ruling of the court was implemented only after the president ordered the 101st to occupy the city of little rock. so what happened? what happened? why did the policy that served ike so far, other foreign and domestic difficult challenges fail him so completely at little rock? well, there are many answers to this question, of course. political, economic, certainly social answers. but in the minutes i have remaining, i want to key on one reason that i think is often ignored. and it shouldn't be. and that one reason, othrville eugene faubus. he was the governor of arkansas, and he was there for the person with whom ike would predominantly interact.

put simply in that interaction, ike underestimated orville. he was a master politician. his father was a card-carrying, hard core socialist. eugene, in his name, was from eugene v. debs. he tried to cultivate a pop list enemy battling great odds in defense of the common folk of arkansas, he styled himself a moderate on racial issue. and, in fact, orville was, he supported integration of colleges and universities in arkansas. they were already integrated. folks don't realize that. but when the dispute over integration of the public schools, the high schools, in arkansas turned ugly in the northern arkansas town of hoctihoxy in 1956, orville decided to sit that one out. at his very core, that was orville, consummate political opportunist.

he possessed this, an uncanny ability to divine strategy and objectives of his opponents and devise ways to take advantage of those strategies to achieve his own ends. after the crisis had bubbled on for a while, we can't do the whole crisis in the time allowing, but after it bubbled on for a while, you will remember that eisenhower sent personal emissaries down to faubus, senator brooks -- congressman brooks hayes of arkansas, and he did -- he sort of played his trump card. still moderation, low key, he asks faubus to come to newport. now, here's ike. this is eisenhower, yeah, the general, the president, the -- calling faubus to him. he said, of course, i'd be glad to go. and they meet at newport. 14 september, eisenhower opened

the meeting by getting in faubus' face. he certainly reminded him that the instructions of a federal court must be followed by a state to the letter. now, if he left it right there, who knows what would have happened. but faubus countered. quickly assuming his awe shucking persona, he listened to the tenet while the president talked. then like a snake charming a bird he began to cast his spell. he reminded the president only a few years earlier captain faubus had been crossing the english channel as a member of general eisenhower's invading armies and that as he had gazed on the hostile shores of europe, he had thanked his god that his personal fate and the fate of the free world rested securely in eisenhower's hands. now is then, faubus assured the president, he was but a