side of the lock house and the two circular windows at the bottom were the locations of the boilers. in the early days when the locks was run by steam, so these boilers provided steam for the pumps located in the lock house. and now we are looking at the lock chamber and we can see that there are many hitches located in the wall and that's where the workers on the barges and tugboats would tie their ropes to. we are also looking at the gates that were located on both ends of the lock chamber. two sets of gates were located. and people ask, why two sets of gates? so if we had a malfunction in one set of gates we could use the other set. also, if we had small boats coming in, we would use the internal set of gates and that decreases the amount of water we

had to put in the lock chamber. and located way down at the bottom is a set of gates, very short gates and they were not operated by hydraulic water pressure. we had to use what they call chain hoists or some kind of mechanism to pull the gates closed and the only way they were used is when they dewatered the locks and why did they dewater the locks? to repair the seals down at the bottom. >> how large is this structure? >> this structure is 547 feet long, 55 feet wide, and 50 feet deep. actually, the total lift would have been about 30 feet, which was the largest lift in the country when it was built. this site was closed in 1961 after a new lock system was built in port allen which is

about 10 miles from plaquemine. the reason why is barges and tugboats were being built larger to handle larger commodities. to handle that, they built a larger set of locks and, also, t the entrance to the locks from the intracoastal waterway system is a straight body of water where here in plaquemine we have a curve that's underneath two bridges and so boats had a difficult time making that turn and getting into the lock chamber. it was undecided what was going to become of plaquemine locks here because it was not yet a historical site. it was just sitting up here and closed up. louisiana wanted to run a highway system through here and our local editor thought that we should preserve this site. >> my husband, gary ebe rechlr e

founding editor of the "plaquemine post" newspaper. the department of highways decided that since the lock was closed that they would tear it down and they would put four lanes across this area. but my husband loved the locks so he fought them from the very beginning. in 1969 he wrote about it in his editor yals thials that it was t thing that could happen to plaquemine. but the highway department had the power. we didn't have much. and they went ahead and they made plans to destroy the lock. in the meantime, gary enlisted the help of the louisiana office of tourism. with their help, he prepared papers to get the lock put on the national register of historic places. this took place in the early '70s. so once it was placed on the

national register, it could not be torn down. of course, people were angry with us because they wanted traffic moving. they didn't like waiting in traffic. so we became very unpopular in our own town. as time went on, you know, advertisers dropped their advertising. it got pretty bad. my children were taunted at school. and we were like outcasts for a little while. but as time passed, people realized the value of the plaquemine lock and what it meant to this community. the most historic place in our community. and by this time, people realized that he was so right. he was so right in saving this place. because it would be so sad if we

had a highway right here, right now. a look at a recent stop in baton rouge, louisiana. 1 of 8 southeastern cities we toured last year. to learn more about our tour, visit c-span.org/locatic-span.o. tommy -- 14 years! >> thank you, thank you, thank you, thank you! >> next weekend, book tv and american history tv explore the history and literary culture of boemt whe beaumont where the texas oil industry got its start on book tv on c-span 2, book bizarre owner on the challenges of running an independent book store. beaumont author jay lee thompson

on teddy roosevelt's year-long post presidential expedition to africa and your. and on c-span3 sunday at 5:00 p.m. eastern, january 1, 1901, the lucas gusher at spindle top hill changed the economy of texas and helped usher in the petroleum age. and with the oil came the roughnecks and with the roughnecks, advice. tour the dixie hotel, an infamous brothel on crockett street, decades of gambling, prostitution and other crime thrived until a 1960 james commission crackdown. beaumont, texas, next weekend on c-span2 and 3. herbert klein worked on everyone of richard nixon's campaigns from 1946 to 1968. and he was later appointed communications director of the executive branch from 1969 to 1973. next, in an excerpt of a longer oral history interview for the richard nixon presidential library, herbert klein reflects

on how you met richard nixon. the impact of the alger his case and later the checker speech and his memories from nixon's 1959 trip to the soviet union. this interview airing now for the first time on television is about 55 minutes. -- running the campaign and then bob and i shared everything. he sometimes had to deal with the press and i would deal with the structure and visa versa. we had one team of klein and fimp finch in the senate office building and in the campaign headquarters he later brought in leonard hall and jim bassett and bob wilson, congressman, was there to help in the scheduling of things. so that the campaign structure

was unusual and often he would tell us both the same thing and we would talk back and for the to be sure we weren't duplicating each other. my impression at the time of the campaign was that he hadn't learned to delegate fully at that time. but the issues again were the national issues. we determined that the international relations ought to be our strength and -- another issue was the missile gap which was pushed by a guy name tom

lamphier. but it was a very clean-cut campaign in which we talked issues and kennedy talked issues. we didn't try to snipe back and forth. we made a determination not to bring up the issue of his health, although there near the very end john roosevelt asked about it and i said go ahead and use it. so it was used just briefly by john roosevelt. >> what did you know about -- excuse me -- about kennedy's health and what was just rumor and so on? >> it was rumor, yeah. nothing -- it was kind of interesting story. we were surprised also when johnson was nominated to be vice president. the first word we got of it was from a minister, presbyterian minister and everything, but he was also the chaplain of the senate. somehow he got word and he

called and said it was going to be johnson. and -- >> when you say we decided not to use the health issue, do you remember talking to nixon about the health issue? >> yeah. he didn't want to use it. >> his reason? >> that was unfair. he thought it was -- we shouldn't be talking about health or religion. there was a lot of problems on religion early on in which a famous minister from new york -- you remember his name? >> norman vincent peal? >> yeah. brought the issue in and we had to back it up. the publisher in new hampshire, manchester, new hampshire, bill lobe, made an issue of it and i denied it and said we weren't going to use it. and he wrote an editorial about

me as a weakling, which we then became very good friends. but -- >> nixon, of course, in some quarters had this reputation as a very tough campaigner and whether it was the anti-communism or other stuff. and then this gives rise to all the talk of the new nixon which i know you write a little bit about in the book. was there an understanding that the 1960 campaign was going to be -- you know, to the extent people were buying into this, the new nixon, this was going to be clean, he wasn't going to -- >> he was very conscious of the "tricky dicky." >> right. >> and so we had to be very careful about that. another kind of critical time was when martin luther king was put in jail i learned about it first i think and i came to see nixon in the back -- i think we were on a train, in the back

car of the train. it was with bill rogers. and i thought that we should do something about it and call him. bill rogers argued that it would hurt ourselves with the southern block if we did. so nixon never made the call. and that caused uscost u us a l black votes. >> so in '68 he made sure. and also reaction to the assassination. >> yes. >> it is surprising, i mean given what you were saying earlier about nixon making civil rights kind of a civil issue for himself in the eisenhower administration. he might have seen this as an opportunity to get the black vote. in fact -- >> but, it was interesting to get the southern vote. >> it is interesting looking at nixon's position during these years, because like all politicians he has to try to

court these two constituencieco. a lot of people said at a certain point he starts kind of figuring his support is going to be with white southerners instead of with black voters and is he thinking the winds are already blowing that way in '60 or -- >> he felt that g many and that the southern vote was very important to us, because eisenhowerasve sort of broken t democratic wall in the south. the nomination reagan tried to play to the south more. rockefeller was helping from the -- aiming at us from the left and nixon was perturbing the right against reagan. >> you're talking '68. >> yeah. >> i'm thinking even in 1960 with the call to coretta king, was nixon thinking, well, the

democrats are going to get the black vote now? because a lot of people credit that call that kennedy made as -- >> it was. i think bill rogers was the principal influence in that. i couldn't say that for sure. you'd have to read his mind. but that was my impression an bob finch and i thought that he should make the call. other kind of interesting thing was how he got into the debates in the first place. he'd given me strict instructions to avoid the debates and i was being courted by every network person you ever saw. afraid to even answer my phones even. to them it was a big chance to

have a break-through. but so i was very good in dealing with them on a friendship basis but never committed that i would do it. so after he got the nomination in chicago, he had a press conference and suddenly announced that he was going to debate. the most surprised person in the room was me. >> yeah. i remember that passage in your book. did you ever ask him what changed your mind on this? >> i never really knew, no. >> because, yeah, it seemed like quite a turn. >> my feeling is that he felt he could debate anyone. if he avoid debates he couwould hounded about it by the press. >> but it would have been good. >> he thought it was his ally.

everybody else thought it was his enemy. after the debates. >> wasn't the sense that he was good on tv? >> yeah. yeah. in fact, in -- trying to think what year -- i think in 1958, in those days we'd -- television was mainly you make a speech on a platform in an auditorium. he realized that really wasn't the way to reach someone in the living room. so we came into new york where keating was running for re-election. rockefeller didn't want anything to do with him. he thought nixon would be a drag on him. so rockefeller wasn't there to meet us or anything and we promised keating that we'd campaign for him. so he insisted we were going to come to new york even though rockefeller didn't want us. nixon decided he should try making his speech on television by sitting on the edge of a

desk. he was so effective in making this speech, sitting on the edge of a desk and talking to you on your sofa, that rockefeller equaled right afterward and said he'd like to meet him the next morning and have breakfast. and it was easy to see how big the effect had on keating with that speech. that was sort after new form of television zplch it was kind of breaking out of the formal old-fashioned style. >> yeah. right.the formal old-fashioned . >> yeah. right. >> do you recall some tension with eisenhower over the platform? >> yeah. bob finch and i went to the convention a week early to work with the platform committee and get everything the way that we thought nixon wanted. and suddenly on like i think it

was a friday, we got a call from done hughe don hughes, his military aide, who you should interview some time also. any rate, he said nixon just told him they were going to see rock feller in new york. so nixon and rockefeller had a telephone conversation and rockefeller invited him to come down. he thought that he could bring him more his way, i think. so they suddenly ran to the airport and got on and airplane and the secret service surprised they had to use a car they'd just taken from a counterfeiter to drive him to rockefeller's place. and so they met for hours over dinner at rockefeller's apartment and at the end of it, why, hughes called and said that they changed the platform approach. all the things that we'd been working on now they had to

change, including stance on some military issues. and i had no idea this was going on. eisenhower was in rhode island. there is a military school there and he just went for vacation for a few days, so he had no idea and he became very angry because the platform had been changed and he hadn't been consulted and he didn't agree with the positions that had been changed toward rockefeller's point of view. and we had the hard time of controlling him. meanwhile, rockefeller did not press his campaign against nixon at the convention. that was sort of a trade-off. afterwards the convention was over, eisenhower's situation was serious enough that we flew directly to rhode island where nixon could spend a couple hours with eisenhower, sort of explaining the situation and try to bring him back on-board, and

which he did. but eisenhower was -- didn't give up very easily. >> we interviewed mel laird. he was one who delivered the message to nixon that if the platform weren't changed back, eisenhower wouldn't support him. >> but see, he already had the nomination -- no, i guess he didn't. that was the start of the week of the convention. i didn't know what you just toll me. but, yeah, would be at the start of the week. so the minute the convention was over, that's where we flew. >> i believe that one change had to do with military policy and the missile gap and defense spending. >> yes. >> the other was -- >> i didn't know that. with rockefeller, he wouldn't be taken a more positive position an civil rights. >> eisenhower didn't agree.

did you see some -- i mean nixon must have been very angry at eisenhower's response. >> i think he was more concerned than angry. i don't remember very much about it. >> isn't this about the time when eisenhower says give me a few minutes -- give me a week? >> i think that occurred before -- that occurred before. that occurred maybe couple months before, i think. the thing to figure in all this with eisenhower, jim haggerty was very, very friendly to nixon and he was my mentor. and i'm to this day, i admire jim haggerty. he was always a force on our

side in dealing with eisenhower. >> could you give us a thumbnail sketch bob finch? what was he like to work with? >> bob finch was the finest person i ever worked with in political life. he was very bright, very create i ive. he would come up with campaign ideas. very honest, straightforward and was just a great guy and he was sort of born to be in politics. had he been elected to the senate he would have been a great senator. the reason he didn't get elected was because -- i think a guy

named bell thought that finch was the primary guy in a primary race and he spent a lot of money to knock out finch and tsomebod from the university of san francisco was elected. but, no. bob -- bob knew how to deal with people very well. he kept contact with politicians across the state. when election night, we had a system where i would call newspaper editors and find out what they thought was going on in their state or their locality to -- not by what the polls were but what they thought was going on. bob would call the political leaders across the place. when we would meet again, do kind after quick survey of them. bob was a person who could reach them well and he had friend across the country and that he built up in that way.

it is my believe that nixon wanted him to be his vice president and that bob turned it down because he thought that two things wrong. one was he was from california and the second was that two look like too much of an in-house thing, father-son relationship. it was a pretty noble thick to turn down. but he was superb. >> that was in '68? >> yeah. >> now how did nixon choose? >> he was impressed by what he was doing in the united nations. he made some pretty fiery speeches and made one mistake when khruschchev came to the

united states, the incident with disneyland and all. but he was -- nixon was impressed by what he was saying and doing in the united nations and felt that he had -- could help us in the northeast and so from the start that was the choice we were going to make. we had to give the impression we were listening to everybody so we had a meeting of probably about 25 or 30 leaders on the night after he got the nomination. we were in chicago and everybody had a chance to go all the way around the room and say who they were for. we made sure it was going to be for lodge. >> who was in the inner circle with nixon when that decision was really made? i mean there was this larger group who was giving input but who do you think nixon rely relied on in making these decisions? >> that kind of decision he

probably relied on himself maybe. you know? don't really recall any major conversations bob finch and i had or len hall maybe had some effect on it. turned out it was a bad choice. >> who were the other possibilities? >> some time i get mixed up between '68 and '60. >> right. >> which -- lindsey would have been later. >> yes. he considered the mayor of new york? >> later. >> '68? >> yeah. marquette, '68. there was a wide variety but i don't really recall who the exact people were.

he was always a republican. didn't vote that way much. how he got to the debate -- after he said he would debate -- kennedy had a man who was his tv -- was a very brave guy and a great guy. we really became -- one of the interest things in today's politics versus then. the kennedy people and ourselves were all good friends. and we would fight and argue and have drinks together. ted sorenson's still a friend. we did most of the negotiating on the format of the debates but we would enter with a strategy which would be put together by finch and hall and myself and probably rosemary wood had had a lot of say about policy, as well

as being a very good secretary. so we decided that the debates would build up an impetus so the most important one would be the fourth debate just before the election. and our strength was the debate that would be on international relations. so we agreed to have the first one on domestic policy and the second and third would be on general questions and the fourth would be on international relations. that was a mistake because the big audience was there to see out of curiosity what was a debate like. so the biggest audience was for the first time and that was -- nixon's weakness in that first debate, beside things that were said about makeup -- was that he was trying to be too polite again. he was afraid of the tricky dick

thing. his planning was shown off because of the fact he would have been ill. while he was in the hospital he had to learn how to say a lot of medical terms that described what his illness was, tl thrombitis. he was just scratching to get out and get out on the campaign and so that instead of taking the whole day off and the day of the debates, we flew in to chicago and he spoke to the carpenter's union which eventually supported him. but he should have spent that time preparing for the debate. we normally when he was going to do something major like a press conference we would prefer a book with a lot of questions and answers and his method of preparing for press conference, or in this case a debate, would be to study by himself, not do the -- kennedy's method was