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tv   [untitled]    January 29, 2012 6:00pm-6:30pm EST

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they are readable. they do not trash congress as very common in literature. and they are not impenetrable.cf contemporary literature on congress. professor barbara sinclair. >> thank you. i would like to thank the miller center, barbara perry, katrina, who has been just wonderful. i don't think the center could survive without her and everyone else who has made this such a, i think, at least to this point, such a successful conference. the topic on which i was asked to talk and write and half of my title is george h.w. bush, congress and domestic policy making.
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this work is based certainly on the miller center transcripts and fred mcclure's transcript is particularly useful. but it's also based on other primary and secondary resources, including my own interviews with members of congress, congressional staffers and other knowledgeable folks that i conducted during the bush administration. if the spirit of full disclosure i shouldei a congressional scholar, so my paper probably does have a kind of congressional skew of perspective. now, i argue here and elsewhere that presidential legislative success, while certainly in part a function of the president's and his administration's
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political skill is determined much more by the context in and which he prits. operates. in other words, how the president plays his cards does make a difference, but the hand he is dealt is more important. what was bush's hand? i'm arguing it was not really a hand conducive to domestic policy making on a heroic scale. what character? what specifically. well, he won election with a very respectable 54% of the vote. but his party lost seats in congress. so he faced an opposition-controlled house and senate. and one that as governor sent knew knew pointed out was controlled by democrats by substantial margins. there was no perception that he had a mandate coming out of this election. certainly not among
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congressional democrats. that was a function of a number of things, partly a function of the campaign itself. that was partly a function of the fact that running after two terms by a president of your own party presents a whole variety of problems. now, in terms of the problems bush confronted, i think less appreciated as an important factor is that he faced a considerably more formidable congress and democratic party than his immediate republican predecessors had. this was a democratic party that was more ideologically cohesive with a stronger caucus and party leadership. the committee chairs were much less independent operators than they had been when bush himself served in congress.
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there were a lot fewer conservatives, south earn democrats and of course the republican party itself had changed. it was much more -- there were many more hard-edged conservatives. what i'm saying is that the congress at this point was on its way, though it certainly wasn't there yet, to becoming the polarized highly part dan congress of today. then, of course, there was the deficit problem. there were mitigating factors. one was that congressional democrats were so glad that reagan wasn't president anymore. they really were inclined to see bush as someone they can deal with. somebody that they could compromise with. well, since presidents lack the constitutional authority to
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force congress to do their bidding, they have to develop strategies for dealing with congress for trying to maximize the chances of getting congress to do what they want to do. so what were bush's strategies? that is the second part of my title. though it comes first, it is the offered hand in the veto fix. much of the paper deals with what the strategies were and to what extent they worked. the congress and the heavy democratic majorities, bush was going to need bipartisan for legislative success. thus, the offered hand as he, himself, phased it in his inaugural. bush cultivated both members of congress of both parties and he
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would, when necessary, compromise on legislation, on the substance of legislation with democrats. in fact, he did a lot of cultivating, which was not even second nature. first nature. and of necessity, he did a lot of compromising. i think the question arises when you look at this element of strategy is whether bush completely understood how much congress had changed. he did seem to have expected personal friendships and the cultivation of members to pay off in support much more than they actually did. well, the second strategy is the veto. after all, the veto is the
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president's ultimate constitutional weapon. bush used the veto and used the roo veto threats as well liberally and with success. i have a bit of analysis of both in the paper. too much to talk about here. well, as you all know now, if you didn't before, bush had only one veto overridden. i shall also say that veto threats were used quite effectively. veto threats generally did move legislation toward bush's preferences. i don't know if -- fred, are you going to talk about the gradation of the veto threats you all developed? >> you can talk about it. >> i will. anyway -- >> everything else is gone already. i'm the clean-up guy. have at it. >> that's the trouble.
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the administration brought in this quite innovative system of how they phrased their positions on legislation. you can see this in statements of administration policy which were written statements sent to congress. the first gradation would be, oh, we really don't like this. then, second maybe would be, the president's senior advisers would recommend he veto this. if you don't change it. and then, you know, the secretary of treasurely, the secretary of state, the secretary of whatever, would recommend a veto. finally you get to the president is going to veto. this provided us a strategic tactical flexibility that, i think, made veto threats more effective. they have, to some extent, been
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used i think ever since by presidents. in my paper i exam a number of domestic legislative efforts to illustrate these strategies and their limitations. i'll only make a very few points here. an early case of where the open-hand strategy worked really well was on the bill to clean up the savings and loan debacle. this had the potential of being very difficult, but the bush administration came through with a proposal very quickly to serve as a focal point for congress. they worked closely with members of both parties in congress. and those things certainly contributed to the success, but it was also crucial, i think, this was an issue that didn't
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divide members neatly along partisan lines. i spent much more attention on the two biggies, really. for the first two years and for the whole four years. the clean air act and the 1990 budget deal. generally, the clean air act is considered a win for bush. the budget deal, a political loss, if not a debacle. in fact, in both cases, the substantive compromise reached was fairly unfavorable to bush. you know, he had to move a long way from his preferred positions to get legislation. and sure, there were tactical mistakes in both cases. you know, these complicated
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legislative battles are seldom run with -- perfectly without any mistakes. if perfectly orchestrated perhaps the administration could have done better substantively, or politically in the case of the budget deal. i argue that both cases such as head start child care and a the one hand, bush was a conservative. presumably still is. and his policy preferences and those of the majority of democrats really were very far apart on a number of things. given the increasing ideological democratic membership and the greater sway of the leadership in the caucus, it was
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simply not possible in most cases to pick off just enough majority party members to form a winning coalition with minority republicans. in other words, the strategy that had worked for ronald reagan in 1981, just wasn't a feasible strategy. of course, there was also the fact on the budget deal. some of the worst damage was done by house republicans who revolted overtaxes. that was, again, an indicator of how the parties had changed. in conclusion, throughout his presidency, bush successfully used the veto to kill legislation he unefiv cali opposed. he employed veto threats to extract concessions.
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but on his own agenda items, veto threats to only move the outcome so far. substantive terms to get a bill that bush really did not want to veto. he wanted legislation. he was willing to pay a price in substantive terms to get a bill and they made him do it. thank you. >> thank you, barbara. the next two people who will talk to us really make representation work. they are -- if you look at their careers, both are so involved in what it's like outside as it's brought inside washington. about barbara, bobby is currently president and ceo of
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the northern virginia technology council. her resume shows constant involve mpts in community affairs. she worked for presidents nixon, ford and bush. in working for president bush, very involved in public liaison. much like ann wexler, is correct? so highly sensitive to how is it you get representation and make it genuine into the system? and how is it that you convey what's going on in the white house to the american public? fred mcclure worked on capitol hill for senator tower. worked in the congressional liaison for presidents reagan and bush.
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in that role, i actually checked and this man only weighs 110 pounds. this is all battle garb. congressional liaison people have to know the congress, know well on both sides what it is they want and how it is they make decisions and how it is you can work with them. convey that information back to the white house and, yet, participate in trying to sell what the white house is trying to get sold on capitol hill. this is difficult work. there is no punching the clock. just because of the nature of the work.
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bobby, why don't you go first. >> thank you, chuck. my legal name is barbara. the only time my parents ever used it is when they were angry at me. please refer to me as bobbie today. secondly, i was head of public liaison as deputy assistant to the president. i tried to stand on end on anne's shoulders. she was an extraordinary person. she took the office of public l liaison to carter. she took that position to new levels. i'll leave the supreme court analysis to fred. i was on his confirmation teams both times, but he was clearly in charge. i will note that when you talked barbara about religious balance on the court, et cetera, et cetera, the present court has six catholics and three jews. the protestants are totally gone. sorry, boyden.
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it is a new and different court from the days of president bush. what i would like to focus on is president bush's person personal fiphilosophy of gov erns. able to understand his domestic policy. as the romans said yesterday at the dinner, the president's foreign policies initiatives were so extraordinary successful, that sometimes his domestic issues in people's minds were put on the back burner. we heard this this morning. there were very important accomplishments consistent with his philosophy, which was as both said this morning, limited, yet caring government, free markets, fiscal restraints and community responsibility. if you take a look at a few of those, the clean air act boyde instrument until that, and that included, i don't know if they spelled this out. that included emissions trading caps to reduce the cost of compliance.
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for sulfur dioxide emissions and they reduced the cost of compliance for businesses by two-third by the same time reducing the sulfur dioxide by 50%. that is quite amazing. education reform. governor talked about returning the responsibilities to the states and local communities. americans with disabilities act. i between stop and say without boyd and grade, there never would have been an american with disabilities act. he and the president pushed that against all unlikely odds. major transportation bill. no one's talked about that today but it was a major transportation and funding bill. i believe it was 1991? then, of course, there was the 1990 budget agreement. we all understand it was terrible politically. it really set the stage once the short recession was over, which sank the bush presidency. it set the stage for bill clinton's economic success. bill clinton's economic success
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was based on that budget deal, nothing anything bill clinton did. you have to remember there were very tough spending controls in the bill. there were caps on discretionary spending which exceeded the cost funs to be sequestered. those were rigid controls. they were pay as you go. if you wanted to increase spending you had to raise taxes or pay for it and cut other spending. it is interesting. i remember the 1998 convention clearly. i remember sitting in sessions where the president never wanted -- the then-vice president never wanted to put the no new tax pledge in the speech because he thought it was irresponsible. the political folks prevailed and said you must do this for your conservative base. 1990 came around. it was clear to him that the no new tax pledge could sink his re-election but he did what he thought was right and he let the political chips fall where they may. points of light. 1,000 points of light. the national community service act of 1990. john sununu talked about the civil rights ability revision of
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1991 and our opposition to crime. and a nafta. i realize it's trade policy and foreign policy but it's also domestic policy, domestic/economic policy. what was the president's approach to governance in the domestic arena? discourse with civility. the discussion with civility. respect for diversity of opinions. number four, relate to people on a personal level. number five, very important to him, do not grandstand. have humility. that came directly from his mother, dorothy, and her ethics teaching. she would say george, don't boast. george, don't brag. george, don't show emotion. that was something private. always be ethical. be kinder and gentler. seek agreement. come to the center. do what's right. sometimes despite major political fallout, such as the budget deal. and this was one that i always
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loved. we are here to govern, not campaign. those of us who lived through the 1992 bush white house, that was very painful for us because it took -- no matter what we did, he had an internal political body clock and you couldn't shake it. until he was ready to focus on campaigning, you could stand on your head and spit nickels and he would not do that. he didn't get to that point until what? spring of 1992, when frankly, it was just too late. three -- one of the others, don't -- don't -- what did i say here? don't use foreign policy as a domestic political tool. never use it as a domestic political tool. when the economy soured, he was reluctant to play the gulf war card success. to counter act the economy. he felt they had to stand on their own. as a footnote to that, i think he knew that the budget agreement would eventually benefit the economy.
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but he also knew we were going into a recession and that given his economic philosophy that there was a limit to what government could or should be doing in this recession because it was a recession that was redefining the economy of the united states. we were going from a heavy manufacturing dependent economy to an economy with less jobs and less white collar jobs and an economy that was information in technology based. those jobs were not coming back. he really couldn't bring himself to pander or lie to the american people to improve his re-election chances. it was beyond him. he was viewed as being out of touch. when he really was not out of touch at all. what did the president's approach to government mean for the office of liaison? we were supposed to meet with the interest groups in the country. and for him, for george bush, it meant we needed to meet with all different points of view.
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not only those that we thought agreed with us. he threw open the white house gates and cast a wide net. the president reagan's former opl folks were horrified. their philosophy, at the end of the reagan presidency, was you are either for us or against us. we meet with our friends and exclude our enemies and adversaries. president bush felt differently. he wanted to see everyone. i remember one clearly in room 450 of the old executive office building in 1989. i walked in and my mouth dropped off. i was flabbergasted because sitting on the front row, president bush's direction, was ralph nader. i went into the little off stage holding room. he said you look pale. i said yes. pretty good, huh? he was tickled pink to see the startled reaction of all of us. his philosophy, i think, was
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extraordinarily important and set a new tone. the theory was simple. if you included folks in the policy discussions on the way in, they will be more inclined on the way out to sell the decisions to the american people out there to support you, or if they disagreed with you, to disagree with civility rather than rancor. given his personality and style, that was important for him. i wanted to quote from my oral history in regard to the clean air act, if you cared enough to organize the president came in with very strong feelings that he wanted yourself as an interest group, to listen to what everybody had to say. you probable had something intelligent to say about a topic. if he only listened to people he agreed with he was never going to grow. he was a veracious reader of public policy. a perfect example during the clean air act discussions where he met in the roosevelt room with business leaders including roger smith from general motors. the president knew more about co2 emissions than socks and rocks. i said where the hell did that come from?
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he looked at me and said, hey, i have been vice president for eight years. thank you very much. i do read. he really viewed our process as really opening up the white house for people of all views. in clean air, he did not only talk to the auto companies, we talked to the environmental groups, union groups, the consumer groups. i think that really was key. and it wasn't also just for show. boyden knows this better, and fred than i do. he went back to the drawing boards on a number of issues based on the clean air act based on the discussions with the various groups and he made some amendments. he understood policy issues across the board in depth. he participated in the roosevelt room round table discussions, often challenging his guestss before they could get two or three sentences out. he would say yes, but. yes, but, yes, but and he would engage in an interactive discussion. they always ran over time. he has one of his former personal aide here now, but tim
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mcbride was the personal aide during start of the bush white house. he would stand up at the allotted time and the president 45 minutes and in and the president was supposed to look at him and leave. the president would look at him and stare at him and keep on going. the next line of defense would be i get up and stands next to tim and stare at him again. and the president would look at us. i remember one time when he looked at us both and said, sit down. so we sat down. he would go on for another 10, 15 minutes. the point is he enjoyed the interacted and learned from it. it was very different from the way president reagan held those sessions. he held them, also, but you put 20 people around the table and he would go from person and person and they would say their statements and they'd love. president bush wasn't comfortable with that format. one day i asked president bush when we were becoming honest brokers rather than advocates and he replied to me, quote, sometimes that is
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the best way to get something done. along the lines, the office from january of '89 to april of '92, we did 605, i repeat, 605 opl events with the president that included the ones that other people did. plus, without the president, opl briefing speeches and major meetings close to 60 to 100 per month. that's a lot of interaction with people. initially, the president felt we should not use interest groups to lobby congress with friends of his when he served in the congress. boyden had limits on us legally as to what we could do in the sense of encouraging interest groups to contact congress, there were very strict rules. the president went further than that and was stricter than that. after the first year of 1989, he realized that wasn't going to work and he let the floodgates open. i remember in 1989, walking down
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the hallway. he stopped me. he said i want to talk to you. i said yes. he said, sonny montgomery. i said, yes, chairman montgomery. he said you know, he is a friend of mine. i said, yes. he said, did you ask the constituents from the chamber of commerce from mississippi to talk to him about whatever bill it was? about x bill. i went, well, boyden says i can't directly ask them to do that but i sort of encouraged them and told them who key people were on that vote, and he looked at me and said, and he never did this, pointed his finger at me, you know, my blazer. he said don't you ever do that again. sonny montgomery is a friend of mine. i go to the gym with him. i have dinner with him. don't do that. i went up and told fred. fred said calm down. it will be all right. he will change his mind over time. indeed he did. he came from congress. those were his friends. it is part of his personality. which is that you don't make it personal. you don't make it confrontational. outside of the diplomatic
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entrance on the northwest side of the white house, they call it the stakeout place for the press? and this lasted over four years. interest groups would go out for the meeting with the president. go out to the press stakeout and dump all over us. they would say these terrible things about all of our bills. and again, one day i said to the president, mr. president, how long do we have to put up with this? they are not saying anything supportive. he looks at me and he said, bobbie, this i the people's house, not our house. they are the people. they have a right to express their opinions. you must always respect that. that's pretty, pretty classy way operate. we used to invite new groups to the white house that hadn't been invited before. fred tells the story of the president calling young congressmen up and inviting them over. we would invite new groups and reach out to labor groups.

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