appointments and the consistency of the moral fiber of the individuals president eisenhower put on the court it's no surprise that someone like earl warren was put in the position of chief justice of the u.s. supreme court. i have my theories about where some of the tension came from between the two, but he also put justice brennan on the supreme court, and dr. specht did a wonderful job of explaining the context that we faced as a country. i want to give you a little context about with what our court system was like during this period. my father's mentor was a man named charles hamilton houston who excelled in law school at harvard law school, eventually became dean of howard law school where he mentored my father. charles hamilton houston was clearly a brilliant legal thinker and was a tremendous law

student at harvard. to give you a clue as to just how much of a pioneer and how brilliant this man was, in 1935 he gave a speech that we recently found at the library of congress where he laid out the entire strategy of the school desegregation cases. that's 1935. this was not a man to be trifled with. i mentioned that as background because of the context of the court system that president eisenhower did so much to change. charles hamilton houston went before the supreme court in 1938 and argued a case called gains versus missouri to get a gentleman admitted to the missouri law school. rather than listen to a black man argue in the supreme court, justice mcreynolds turned his chair around. so if you think about that sort of behavior from a federal judge on the highest court of our land and then you juxtapose that with

the quality of the people that president eisenhower put on the bench, it's remarkable to me, and i think that, you know, it bears noting these were not one off flukes. that's a consistency through his appointments, and if there's one thing in closing that i would say that i picked up from reading most of the ambrose books, it is that general eisenhower and president eisenhower sought out people of tremendous moral fiber and courage. he surrounded himself with these individuals. they were drawn to him. for those who worked immediately with him, he mentored them in tremendous ways. for those who were a step or two removed, it's very clear that the example of his service guided them. so it's been quite clear to me that although there may have been criticism along the way on individual pieces of his agenda,

he made a remarkable contribution to our nation's history when it comes to a number of things, but in particular on civil rights. i look forward to the discussion. >> okay. thank you, dr. specht, for that introduction, especially the line from the students. you have no idea what those things cost me, so it's always good to hear them. right? and it's always going being back at the ike. this is like a second home and i'm inspired every time i walk on the campus and to be able to sit next to a gentleman like this and listen to his words, well, that's just gold. my talk today is going to be an echo how dr. specht started her talk because if you want to talk about little rock, right, the first thing you got to do is you got to get right with ike and

getting right with ike is hard to do. i mean maybe the real ike never stands up. i don't know. so what we're going to try to do here today is we're going to try to get right with ike. this time just prour to the little rock crisis and then the crisis itself. i said we which means this is not a spectator event, right? i want you to think through this with me. i don't have all the answers, trust me, right, but think through this with me and you i would hope would also try to do an assessment as we go through it based on the things that mr. marshall said and the things that i'm going to tell you, and you try to get right with ike. he's a man in motion. he was always a man in motion. he's still a man in motion. listen to this. in a 1962 poll arthur schlesinger, sr. asked 75

scholars to rank the chief executives washington right up to eisenhower based on, quote, their greatness. of the 31 presidents rated dwight d. eisenhower ranked 21st. he was tied with arthur. just above andrew johnson. most of these academics would have agreed at that time with the presidential scholar who said eisenhower would be remembered primarily as a man who single-mindedly pursued his appetite for leisure and recreation while leaving the day to day administration of his office to trusted subordinates like assistant to the president sherman adams. over the past 50 years, however, these earlier assessments of eisenhower as a well-meaning but bumbling political novice have been challenged. drawing on newly opened collections of official records like right here at the eisenhower and personal papers, eisenhower revisionists have constructed a new image in which

the president emerges as a capable, clever executive to led the nation with a strong hand and a clear vision. the new scholarship has enhanced ike's reputation dramatically. in 1980 a new poll modeled on that of 1962 placed eisenhower ninth. he then in 1990 slipped to 15th but in the 2010, last year, ike had once again moved back into the top ten. nudging aside some guy named kennedy. i'm not sure -- although the results of this new appraisal have been significant, the revisionists have focused mainly on ike in the foreign policy sphere. they have not focused as much on ike in the domestic sphere. particularly ike and civil rights. now, if you tried to do ike and

civil rights, you readily understand why that is. it sometimes can be just maddening. who is the real ike here? who is the real guy? some people have argued that eisenhower met civil rights reform with ambivalence if not outright opposition. they say that he failed to develop comprehensive policies and strategies required to implement school desegregation in the south. it was this failure some revisionists maintain that rul resulted in the crisis that erupted in 1957 in little rock. now, there's no debating these scholars assertion that eisenhower was certainly less than enthusiastic in his support of school desegregation. but what i will suggest here today is that their claim that the president's failure resulted from an overriding opposition to civil rights is wrong.

i will argue it was wrong. i will argue also they're wrong when they say he did not have a consistent administration policy aimed at ending desegregation. i think they missed the mark completely. i maintain that a close examination of the president's personal and public correspondence and actions reveals that his approach to all civil rights issues eisenhower adhered to a precisely defined strategy. it was based on two things. first, his own personal views on race. of course. it was based also on his deeply held belief that a course that emphasized moderation and gradualism would prove the most effective in advancing racial equality while at the same time maintaining law and order in the affected areas. a little bit more about this strategy. this strategy of moderation and gradualism had served eisenhower

well. not only through his administration but as a military man. you will really ike and so on. and it served him very well. but it will prove completely inadequate to the new set of challenges that develop following the supreme court ruling in brown v. board. i s his inability to achieve the actives he sought will end in the little rock crisis and that crisis will result directly from his inability to taylor that strategy to meet the new challenges he faced. any analysis has got to begin with an analysis of the president's personal racial views. we've talked a little bit about it. as you know, ike was porn in texas. he grew to manhood right here in kansas. the population of both states

was, of course, predominantly white but surprisingly to me when i read this, there was a relatively large black population when ike was growing up right here in abilene. the schools that ike attended here in abilene were integrated. and it was here that the future president first displayed what would be a life long aversion to bigotry. when a high school coach harassed and then dismissed a black athlete from the football team. team captain eisenhower told the coach, if he can't play, i won't play either. other players lined up behind ike, the coach reinstated the black player. the fact that eisenhower was no big got, you're going to hear that word however a lot today, the fact that eisenhower was no big got did not mean he rejected the commonly held racial views

of the day. he entered the u.s. eaarmy that remained segregated for nearly all of his four decades plus of military service. black soldiers in the main were generally considered unfit for combat duty and were denied training in any but the most rudimentary skills. eisenhower did not chal lege these practices during world war ii. when questioned immediately after the war about possibly integrating the army, he responded with the statement that would become the cornerstone of his civil rights policy. a statement that dr. specht quoted earlier. if we attempt merely bypassing a lot of laws to force somebody to like somebody else, we're going to get into a lot of trouble. by the end of his military career general eisenhower, however, was overseeing as we heard, the final portions of the integration of the armed forces.

and when asked what he thought about that, ike expressed the hope that, quote, the human race may finally grow up to the point where it, race relations, will not be a problem. as president eisenhower's signals on race relations continued to be mixed. depending on what you wanted to see, you could find it. you could look at eisenhower's personal remarks, for example, and say there goes a racist. to presidential speechwriter arthur larson eisenhower explained his support for black political and economic equality did not mean that he thought the races should mix socially or that, quote, a negro should court my daughter. when he returned from golfing trips to augusta, georgia, his son remembered that the president would regale the family with, quote, darky jokes. told him by his golfing

partners. in the south. the chief justice earl warren defended the views of segregationists. he claimed that all they are concerned about is to see that their sweet little girls are not required to sit in class alongside some big overgrown negroes. but it's troubling. i told you but. but it's troubling. they have to be balanced against the many statements and alaskas that indicate that ike did truly favor political and economic equality for blacks. typical of these pronouncements was a letter to the famous editor of the "atlanta constitution" ralph mcgill in when the president emphasized the high cost of discrimination. until america has achieved reality in the concept of individual dignity and equality before the law, we will not have

become completely worth of our limitless opportunities. eisenhower supplemented these statements with a sincere effort to make blacks more advice able at the highest levels of government as we heard in mr. marshall's talk. he asked sherman adams at the nominating convention, seek out qualified blacks, bring them in. loyce litman, frank snow, jay earnest wilkins who became assistant sget of labor. and, of course, the most significant posting was e fredrick murrow as the an minute stray tiff assistant to the president. you cannot organize with the fact that black faces appeared where none had ever been before. now, the important distinction that must be noted is that while eisenhower's support for the political and economic rights of blacks was clear and unwavering,

his endorsement of their right to social equality was, indeed, often weak and hesitant. in a revealing letter to the presidential committee chairman, eisenhower suggested that one of the guiding doctrines of the rm party should be, quote, equality of all citizens before the law. meaning the political and economic right of no citizen should be jeopardized because of his race or his new jersey. the obligation of the law was to protect social rights. but in ike's view those words were open to interpretation. and debate. in expressing these views the president agreed he was addressing the most important concerns of blacks.

as sherman williams said eisenhower disagreed with his brother friends. he, eisenhower believed that the negro was more anxious for economic equality and equal chance for a job and a good indication, equal justice before the law, equal right to vote. the president was certain then that he possessed a full appreciation of the aspirations of the negro and he also believed that he had divined the best policy for achieving those goals. eisenhower's policy, the president's strategy for whatever goals he caught, reflected his core beliefs. eisenhower first and last was a man of moderation. he characterized his approach to problems as the policy of the middle way and he was utterly

convinced that this policy offered the greatest chance for the successful resolution of the difficult problems that surrounded school desegregation. the most important tenant of this policy of the middle way was the avoidance of extremism of all stripes. as eisenhower explained once to a friend, the critical problem of our time is to find and stay on the path that marks the way of logic between conflicting arguments, advanced by extremists of both sides, and that will solve, he said, almost every problem that arises. the proper role for the president in all of this was that of honest broker. an impartial judge who prevented confrontations by hearing the contending arguments of reasonable men and then rendering a solution that provided the most good for the most people. the second tenet of eisenhower's policy of moderation concerned the proper role of government in

resolving emotional issues. eisenhower was a firm believer in limited government and he was extremely skeptical of any solution thatted a vou kated the use of law or force to solve fundamental what he called human problems. the third tenet of the policy was caution. gradualism said eisenhower in all things, gradualism. give the parties a chance to accept and become comfortable with proposed settlements. and the final component of the policy was his reference for minimizing his personal role in any solution that was divined. this was accomplished as you heard in dr. specht's talk by arranging private meetings with the persons concerned. by sending emissaries in the president's name, very low key behind the scenes. what greenspan called the midden hand, presidency.

it was this policy of moderation constructed by the principles of gradualation, caution, minimum government intrusion which eisenhower believed would offer the best chance of solving the difficult problem of desegregation. he put this strategy to the test when he completed the desegregation of the armed forces and when he integrated the schools in washington, d.c. they would be disappointment ed. the same rational that led him to speeding desegregation would preclude him from launching any presidential initiative to battle it in the individual

schools. asen however knew the real battles over the integration of the school systems would occur in the deep south. and although he often stated his belief that the use of, quote, political or economic power to enforce segregation based on race, color, or creed is morally wrong, he also acknowledged that the desegregation of public schools in the south would entail, quote, very serious practical problems, not the least of which was what eisenhower called deep-seated emotions of the persons in the region. the eisenhower administration did little to challenge school segregation in the south. i do not believe eisenhower wrote in his diary on 24 july 1953 that prejudice will succumb to compulsion. consequently, i believe the federal law imposed on our in such a way as to bring about

conflict of the police powers, of the states and the nation which set back the cause of racial progress and race relations in this nation for a long, long time. how then was the fight for equality to proceed? eisenhower provided his solution in a letter to his friend, governor james byrnes of south carolina. writing byrnes on 1 december '53, he expressed the hope that a means might be found where by all parties could, quote, progressively work toward the goals established by abstract principle but which would not at the same time cause such d disruption and any mental anguish that any progress would be reversed. this statement was in accordance with ike's policy of moderation. ike refused to be pinned to a specific date when desegregation

would end. he was asked one time how long will this take? eisenhower answered the length of time i am not even going to talk about. i don't know anything about the length of time it will take. in truth, of course, eisenhower knew that voluntary desegregation if it ever occurred would take a very, very long time. what eisenhower sincerely thought was he would be given that time. for gradualism, for the policy of moderation. he was wrong. and he found that out on 17 may 1954. the supreme court rendered its decision in brown v. board, and with that ruling ike's time ran out. in spite of his presidential assertions that he agreed with the unanimous decision, eisenhower, the man, believed that the justices had vastly

overstepped their authority. to intimates he railed against the, quote, political stupidity of the court. i am convinced, he told his speechwriter, that the cousupre court decision will set back black progress in the south by 15 years. the president knew that most white southerners would oppose brown and as he wrote to his friend, john haslett, laws are rarely effective unless they represent the will of the majority. when pressed on his personal opinion of the court's decision, i would simply say it was the ruling of the law of the land and as the president he was required to enforce it. most telling however, the prz steadfastly refused to endorse the decision of the court. more importantly, to speak out on the immorality of segregation. as presidential press secretary james hagerty later remembered

after brown, he said after brown civil rights became a whole different ball game. indeed, it did. and it was a game that would result in the confrontation at the little rock school desegregation crisis and in that crisis eisenhower's policy, his trusted policy of moderation, would prove woefully inadequate. not that he didn't try to use it. he sought to avoid any high profile actions during the crisis, any high profile pronouncements. four times during the crisis he dispatched personal emissaries to arkansas to gather information and attempt to bridge the differences between the state and national government. he repeatedly refused advice from subordinates to turn legislative or even forceful measures to solve the crisis. he sought to provide as much

time as he could for the people of arkansas to accept and become comfortable with court man dated desegregated. in the end, of course, the ruling of the court was implemented only after the president ordered the 101st to occupy the city of little rock. so what happened? what happened? why did the policy that had served ike so well in other foreign and domestic difficult challenges fail him so completely at little rock? well, there are many answers to this question, of course, political, economic, certainly social answers but in the minutes i have remaining i want to key on one reason that i think is often ignored and it shouldn't be. and that one reason, orville eugene falbus. falbus was the governor of arkansas, and he was therefore the person with whom ike would predominantly interact.

put simply, in that interaction ike underestimated orville. falbus was a master politician. his father had been a hart core socialist. eugewugene was in. >> you ge-- was from eugene deb. orville was. he had supported the exhibit gration of the colleges and the university in arkansas. they were already integrated. when the dispute over integration of the public schools, the high schools in arkansas, turned ugly in the northern arkansas town of hoxy in 1956, falbus the consume mate politicians decided to sit that one out. at his very core, that was orville. consummate political opportunist. he possessed this, an uncanny

ability to devine the strategy and objectives of his opponents and devise ways to take advantage of those strategies to achieve his own ends. after the crisis had bubbled on for a while, we can't do the whole crisis in the time allowed. you will remember that eisenhower sent personal emissaries down to falbus, particularly senator brooks -- congressman brooks hayes of arkansas, and he sort of played his trump card. still, moderation, low key. he asked falbus to come to newport. here is ike, this is eisenhower, yeah? the general. the president. calling falbus to him. falbus said, of course, i'd be glad to go and they meet at newport. 14 september, eisenhower opened

the meeting by getting in f falbus' face. he reminded him that the instructions of a federal court be followed by a state to the letter. if i left it right there, whether he a who knows what would have happened but falbus countered quickly assuming his aw shucks persona, he listened and then like a snake charming a bird he began to cast his spell. he remind the president only a few years earlier captain falbus had been crossing the english channel as a member of general eisenhower's invading armies. as he had gazed on the hostile shores of europe he had thanked his god that the fate of the free world rested securely in eisenhower's hand. now as then falbus assured the president he was but a humble

subordina subordinate. arkansas he insisted was the most racially progressive sate in the south and the crisis at little rock could be swiftly ended if the president would just curb the dictatorial excess excesses. what we need fal mississipmuss cooling off period. for determination to wane. this is what eisenhower wanted to hear. it fit perfectly with all his misgiving over this pushing and shoving over brown. it fit with his policy of moderation and so it was that under the established assault of falbus' particular blend of down home populism, subservians, and syrupy southern civility, dwight david eisenhower saw what he wanted to see and heard what he wanted to hear. he believed the