into the causes of the volt battery fire that occurred after crash testing. based on what we know so far, ntsa's new car assessment program appeared to do just what it is intended to do, catch potential safety concerns with new cars before they become a risk to consumers. and general motors appeared to do exactly what we hoped it would do, even before ntsa determined whether or not there was a real safety issue. it designed improvements to the volt to make its battery better protected from risk of intrusion or fires. so far, we have seen no evidence to support the implication that ntsa has allowed politics to guide its decision making. and i understand my chairman raising that question. because there are -- there's safety issues here at risk.

considering what in the last few months, there have been efforts about it majority to defund programs that support the development of technologies for electric and alternative fuel vehicles and other proposals to take away tax incentives for purchasing electric cars. i'm concerned that an effect of this hearing could be to undermine technology that's critical to both protecting the environment and insuring the success of the u.s. auto manufacturing industry as well as to generally have an adverse effect on the u.s. economic competitiveness. it would be very bad, i think, for our economy to do anything that would try to demolish the potential for electric vehicles. as we established at this

hearing, clean vehicle technologies protect public health by cutting air pollutants, smog, climate change pollution. additionally, developing clean vehicle technologies for battery, electric and hybrid cars has grown jobs on the assembly line and supported the recovery of the domestic automotive industry. we don't want to be buying lithium ion batteries from china in five years whether we can develop the infrastructure and skills to make them here in the united states. electric and other clean vehicle technologies have already established market share. now let me be clear. i'm well known as a consumer advocate. i support early public disclosure of safety risks. i hope and expect that ntsa

consistently works as quickly as possible to make intelligent assessments of any safety risks and to disclose them to consumers as soon as possible. and mr. chairman, in a meeting that i had yesterday with general motors ceo and chairman, i told the chairman the same concerns for early disclosure and transparency, the kind that we know we didn't have with toyota. so we have an obligation to ask these questions. and we also have an obligation to rely on facts as they are. and as a majority wanted to work with me to craft stricter laws mandating them. i might join him. i hope this committee's activity on this issue -- and i just want to be -- excuse us for that interruption -- i want to be very clear on this. i wouldn't want this committee's activity on this issue to

discourage companies like gm from continuing to innovate and advance technologies that will insure u.s. competitiveness. and while it appears that we have different opinions with respect to whether the chevy volt is a fiery failure or innovative success, at least it appears we have an agreement that there is a proper role for government to play in regulating business and insuring public safety. thank you very much, mr. chairman. and let us proceed. >> i thank the gentleman for his statement and his great work on the committeement we now would yield to the gentleman from pennsylvania, mr. kelly. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. strickland, thank you for being here today. my concern has nothing to do with general motors. general motors has a history of building the most wonderful cars in the worldment i go back to the days when former president bush made a statement and said if we could just start -- if general motors could start building cars that were relevant, they wouldn't have their problems.

at the time the leading manufacturer and sold more vehicles on the planet. sometimes there is a disconnect between what we say and what we do. my concern is not so much with general motors. my association with general motors goes back to 1953. my father became a dealer. in the early 30s when he was a parts maker and had the opportunity to move forward with his life but our family's and establishing a dealership and being somewhat successful through the combined efforts of a lot of people. my problem today has to do with your agency. and certainly it comes down to a question of trust. and one of the things i see all the time, whether i'm in washington, d.c., or back home in my district or in my dealership, can i trust you? can i trust you to do what you said you were going to do? can i trust you to do the best thing for me and my best interests all the time? and it's about trust. and we know that you can spend your whole life building trust. and one misjudgment, one false step you can destroy an entire

legacy. and certainly with the passing of joe paterno last week, we saw a gentleman who spent his whole life establishing a legacy and lost it in the last two months of that life. now with your agency, the formation of it was to protect the public and to work in their best interest. i look at the definition of trust. a short reliance on the character ability, strength or truth of someone or something, one in which confidence is placed. firmly reliance on the integrity, ability or character of a person or thing. deals with custody and care. something committed into the care of another. and that's where the disconnect comes. i have no problem with general motors because general motors acted very quickly once your agency let them know what happened. if we were to look at the slides, if we could, slide 11

and slide 12, if they're available. now this happened with the car that you folks tested. d out when you look at the time line, when did you let general motors know this? they haven't had that problem on the highway with the cars. we only had it in the testing. again, it comes down to that trust. who's best interests were you acting in? it certainly wasn't with the american public and it wasn't with a manufacturer who has a 100-year history of building the best cars in the world. why not get on the phone and ask them? now, my association with general motors is very strong. i am not a volt dealerment i'm not a volt dealer only because the volt doesn't appeal to people in my marketplace. and i have some other things i'll bring forward later on. i have to tell you, i really am disturbed with the fact that this happened so early on and, yet, the full disclosure of it

happened by chance from a reporter, not from the agency that's out there to protect the public. and so we ask then why is this erosion of trust there? why do people no longer trust congress? why do they no longer trust our form of government? why do they no longer trust things that have taken years to build? and it comes down to incidents that question -- that cause them to question what it is that happened. so i'm hoping today, because we talked to you earlier on, what did ntsa know? when did they know it? when did they let general motors know that? my friends have always acted quickly in the best interest of the public and the people they serve. i understand that. what i don't get, why so long? and my question comes down very frankly. is the commitment to the american public or is it a commitment to an administration whose agenda is we're going to get to green technology one way or the other and i don't care if we have to use the department of defense to get there. i don't care with who we have to

use to get this alternative energy. and i'm all for it, by the way. but when the market is ready for the science, it won't have to be subsidized. it will go on its own. so i'm hoping today that we can talk about this and talk about it in an open forum so the american public can, again, have the trust that it needs to have in the people that they send to represent them in the agencies that were formed, at least in the beginning, to protect those folks that rely on us and not to protect an aagenda gentleman or push an ajaeagenda gentleman forward. the problem with electric cars is where do you store the energy source and how do you drive that? that's what i'm here to hear what you have to say. as we look what happened in these cases, there was no loss of life or limb. nobody was jurtd. i just wish you would have culled gm the same day you found that out. because they would have, i

guarantee you, would have had the same fix this ended up w mr. chairman, i yield back. >> i thank the gentleman for hi his insightful opening remarks. the rules require us to swear in our witnesses. please stand. do you swear or affirm the testimony you're about to give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? let the record reflkt that witness answered in the affirmative. and the floor is yours, mr. strickland. you've done this before. you get five minutes. give or take a few seconds. we're pretty lenient with that. so fire away. [ no audio ] >> on the status of the volt investigation, yes, i have done this before. of course, i forget to hit the button. i am pleased to share that we have recently closed our investigation without finding evidence of unreasonable risk to safety. before i discuss the vents that led to this termination, i would

like to establish some context. one way we reduce traffic deaths and injuries is by setting and enforcing standards for motor vehicles. we test many of the vehicles on the road to insure that they comply with these standards. however, the fact that a vehicle complies with all of the standards does not necessarily indicate the absence of an unreasonable risk to safety. the agencies ability to investigate and determine whether such a risk exists is key to getting defective vehicles recalled and ready. it is within this context that the agency undertook the tass chk led to the formal investigation of the volt. to be clear, the first priority and the core mission of the national highway traffic safety administration is safety. i have the honor of leading more than 600 professionals who collectively have one goal in mind, to hept american public get to their destination safely every single trip.

when we learned of the fire at the mga test facility in june, we had no relevant real world data to help us assess the safety risk and no clear understanding of how the fire began. the agency took numerous unprecedented steps to ascertain the real world risk of volt owners and passengers and then to isolate the root cause of this incident to determine if a defect existed that posed an unrenl risk to safety. the technical team at ntsa working in collaboration with the department of energy and defense used every second over the past six months to provide the data needed for the agency decision. and they delivered an innovative and expert fashion. during this period i had any notion that an imminent safety risk existed to the american public, i would have been sure that public knew of that risk immediately. we at ntsa rely on data to drive our decisions. as i noted in my written statement, we undertook several

volt crash tests to replicate the june incident. the agency reviewed all the crashes that involved volts. we found no results of post crash fires. we looked at a variety of data sources and all relevant early morning recording data and vehicle owner questionnaires. the agency found no indication of a post fire crash risk in the volt, nor were we able to re-create the june incident at the vehicle level. we shared our initial thoughts for the public on this in november. they analyzed the volt to see what caused the problemer in the battery compartment. we designed and constructed completely new and unique test mechanisms to replicate the intrusion that occurred during the may crash test. in mid-november, ntsa tested

three volt lithium battery packs by damaging the battery compartment and rupturing the coolant system. on november 24th, one of the battery packs caught fire at the testing facility burning the shed that housed them. the next day, ntsa opened a formal defect investigation of post crash fire risks and voeltz. by taking this uncommon step, ntsa sought to insure the safety of the driving public. gm proposed a feel fix to mitigate intrusion by adding a reinforcement collar around the battery compartment. our technical team reviewed and tested the remedy and confirmed there was no intrusion into the battery compartment, no leakage of coolant and no post impact fire. as a result, we have concluded the agency's investigation and found no discernible defect trend.

ntsa continues to believe that electric vehicles show great promise as a safe and fuel efficient option for american drivers. based on the available data, ntsa does not believe that voeltz or other electric vehicles pose a greater risk of fire than gasoline powered vehicles. in fact, all vehicles that have some fire in the event of a serious crash. however, electric vehicles have specific attributes that should be made clear to consumers, law enforcement, emergency response communities, and tow truck operators. ntsa has been working with the department of energy with assistance from the national fire protection association and others to develop guidance to help them identify vehicles powered by lithium ion batteries and take the appropriate steps in handling these following the crash. we have also been working with the manufacturers to veb protocols dealing with the li e lithium ion battery powered vehicles. i'm happy to answer questions from the committee.

>> thank you. let me just start with the time line. when did you -- give me the date you first learned of the fire concerns of the explosion that took place in the test? >> i was notified in the agency was notified on june 6th. >> was this the same time that awe long with the epa were working on finalizing or -- maybe not finalizing but negotiating the standards? >> there's lots of work that goes on between the agencies. >> isn't it true you were working on negotiating the standards? >> yes, that is correct. >> and isn't it true that the proposed cafe regulations rely heavily on the sale and deployment of vehicles, electronic vehicles like the volt? >> absolutely. that is not true. by statute, ntsa is forbidden from using electric dshg. >> don't count on reaching -- to get to 54 miles per will go lon, don't you count on the sale of these kind of vehicles, these kind of technologies? >> there are several vehicle technology pipelines to achieve

this. frankly, most of the manufacturers are using internal kbungs engineses to reach the standards. >> the rules talk about electric vehicles. the administration talked heavily this about vehicle. so these were included in getting to that standard? >> for ntsa's cafe regulations, i will is illegal for us to consider electric vehicles as part of our technology. so, therefore, if we look at the technology pipelines that are available to the manufacturers -- >> fair enough. certainly the epa is counting on this? >> there are several technology pipelines that are used to achieve the standards. >> isn't it true the administration is heavily touted vehicles like the volt as alternative fuel vehicles that could help meet or surpass the fuel efficiency targets? >> the obama administration believes in american innovation. and anything that helps support american manufacturing is something that is a keystone. >> fair to say this administration feels strongly about technology like this helping to get to the standards. helping with the future of the

automobile industry. >> the obama administration feels that electric vehicle technology shows great promise. >> now when did you -- whether did you testify before congress on the cafe standards? >> i believe i was before you in october of last year. >> october of last year. okay. so you were aware of the safety concerns when you were developing and negotiating a cafe standards? >> there was no safety concern on the part of the agency regarding the chefly volt. we were still in the process of figuring out the root cause and whether this posed an unreasonable risk. >> whether you came in front of congress, you came in front of this committee, that picture mr. kelly had shown had taken place, correct? >> yes. >> all right. so you were aware of the safety concerns when the president announced on july 29th of last summer the negotiated agreement on the cafe standards? >> we were still in an investigation process. >> i get all. that did you know about it? >> i knew about the fact that

there was a four vehicles catching fire. >> that picture, that explosion, you knew about that picture when you came before congress. and you knew about it when the president talked about the manufacturers? >> he with knew of the incident on january 6th, yes, mr. chairman. >> obvious question. one other point. if you recall during that hearing mr. kelly and mr. berkel asked specific questions about the chevy volt and about safety concerns and about reaching the standards, and dunlt feel it was appropriate to let us know that there was an explosion with pictures like that? >> there was no agency decision as to whether that's juan an unrenl risk of safety to the chevrolet volt. my understanding is mr. kelly and the vice chairwoman was asking me about mass reduction in the cafe standards. >> just think about it. we're talking about safety. we're talking about cafe standards. you know that there has been a safety concern with the battery in the volt leading to an explosion, leading to a fire and you don't think it's appropriate to tell congress? >> mr. chairman -- >> let me ask you this question.

but for the reporter at bloomberg, would you have ever told us? >> of course we would. >> really? >> absolutely. >> you wait that long? you testify once before congress and didn't tell us but once the reporter breaks the story, then you let everyone know? >> when the agency was prepared to make a decision as to what the steps were in the protocols and whether we were going to make a decision as to the risk of the volt, we would have clearly disclosed it. mr. chairman, i want to make one point here. i wake up every morning on this job with one purpose and one purpose only, to make sure i keep as many people safe and healthy as possible. that's my only goal. >> then why did you wait? >> bottom line is it is our responsibility to deliver it carefully. >> why did you wait six months? >> because -- >> before you start a formal investigation, why did you wait six months? >> it took every second of that time for the technical team and engineers to figure out -- >> if it's total -- here's the inconsistency i don't get as

well. you started the formal investigation six months after that picture. six months after you did other tests in the interim and when did you officially say that the chevy volt is okay and officially cleared it from any safety concern? >> we refer to the time line, mr. chairman. >> then just last week? >> we concluded the investigation last week once we had finished all of our work. actually, we finished it on the last volt vehicle. >> so you waited -- you waited six months, november 25th is when you started the vorm alfor investigation, correct? >> yes. >> november 25th. so you opened a formal investigation on november 25th. >> that's correct. >> you officially cleared it, gm just last week, last friday if i'm not mistaken. >> that's correct. >> last friday. >> that's correct. >> but on december 6th, secretary lahood said the chevy roelt is safe, no problems. how how does that connect? if you didn't start -- you waited six months after you saw pictures like that before you started a formal investigation. you didn't officially finish it until last friday. but between november 25th and last friday, the secretary of

transportation says the volt is fine. >> the chevrolet volt was safe to drive. the chevrolet volt was safe to drive this entire period. as i said, mr. chairman, our responsibility is to figure out whether there was unreasonable risk to safety. that did not exist. we did, however, try to replicate the post fire crash. >> but, no. you see how members of congress and frankly the american public could see some inconsistencies. you don't start a formal investigation after a six-month time period from when the explosion occurred. then you don't clear it until two months later. in between when you officially clear it, the secretary of transportation says it's fine. >> mr. chairman, in our investigate torre process -- drs drs. >> and then you're developing the cafe standards but can't share the information with the congress let alone the american public. at some point people say what is going on? >> mr. chairman? >> that's why mr. kelly made his opening remarks like he did wlachlt is going on? >> and we're very happy to

explain in great detail exactly every moment that we worked on this investigation. it was six months of fact find will to get to the point where we felt we should open a formal investigation. we don't take the matters -- we have 40,000 vehicle owner complaints every single year about safety defects. we investigate the same ones. >> i'm over time. want to get to my friend and colleague. let me just ask, were you concerned -- i mean here's the bottom line i think, were you concerned about if you told us last summer, excuse me, told us in october about what was going on, that you would impact sales of the volt and/or impact the negotiations in the cafe standards? that's what we want to know. were you concerned about that? is that why you weren't square with us? is that why had to wait for a reporter to break the story?

>> every day. >> i want to be clear. i just want to be clear. so the -- your decision not to share information with congress when you were in front of congress and you knew the information and we were talking about that subject, your decision not to share that information has nothing to do with your concern about the sales of the volt and the administration's involvement in the promoting this sales of the volt or -- and nothing to do with the negotiation of the cap a standards? >> absolutely not. it would be irresponsible to disclose anything unless we made an agency decision. >> i will yield to the gentleman from cleveland, mr. kucinich. >> thank you very much, mr.

chairman. administrator strickland, i'm going have a series of questions. i would ask that your answers be brief and, of course, true. >> yes, sir. >> now the fire occurred on june 6th. and as my colleague points out, it wasn't until november that ntsa's follow up testing confirmed that this was not an isolated incident. it does seem like a long time. what we need to know, administrator strickland, is whether there was a valid reason for so much time to pass. so the first question is, what was ntsa doing between june and

november that required such a long internal investigation? >> thank you for the question, ranking member. in june, once fire was discovered, after the fact, some time over the weekend, and we were notified, we had absolutely no notion of what the source of the fire was. there was three other vehicles around it. it could have been arson. it could have been one of the other vehicles. it could have been a number of factors. so we had to go out, figure out what happened on the scene, higher fire investigators and folks like that. and then we began the work to actually figure out what happened on the scene. that also included crash testing other volts to replicate what happened out there. >> was there a second crash test? >> absolutely. there were actually several. >> did that second crash test produce an impact into the battery or fire? >> it did not. >> and did ntsa develop a

mechanism to damage the battery pack directly in order to test for fire risk? >> yes, sir, that's exactly what we did. we were not satisfied with the fact that we could not re-create the incident at the whole vehicle level. so we took the unprecedented next step to do component level testing. we had to create a whole new system and mechanism to re-create. that. >> so you created the circumstances under which the fire could occur. this wasn't created independently through the vehicle -- an intact vehicle without you having to essentially rig it to go on fire, is that right? >> that's correct, ranking member. >> so you intentionally -- is it correct that ntsa intentionally damaged the battery compartment and intentionally ruptured the coolant system to try to reproduce the fire? is that correct? >> that is correct. >> was this fire difficult for ntsa to reproduce?

>> actually, it was. >> why? >> because there's several issues in terms of getting through the substructure of the vehicle, in order to get a certain percentage of intrusion of the battery. not only intruding into the battery, when he to replicate the exact angle, depth, exact force of the impact in order to do that. we wanted to take this component level test and make it as close to the real world circumstance as we could. that took a tremendous amount of engineering. >> you went to extensive efforts to replicate the fire? >> absolutely. >> is that a normal procedure? >> absolutely not. the reason why we undertook the steps is because we feel that advanced technology vehicles and especially with ano, ma'am lus circumstances as would happen in june, we need to know full answers in order to make a decision to protect the american public. >> did gm ever request that ntsa keep the information from your internal testing and your efforts to replicate a fire? did gm ever ask you not to disclose that or make it public?

>> absolutely not. >> did anyone in the administration who is your superior ever ask you to fail to disclose information relating to ntsa's replication of the fire? >> absolutely not. it is my expectation, it is the secretary's expectation, it is executive office of the president's expectation that i lead this agency. >> what did you do if someone did say, you know what? we've got these issues out here with the technology. we've got, you know, issues out here with cafe standards. what would do you if that happened? >> i have a higher moral obligation. i would disclose any risk if it's proved to be unreasonable risk to safety, period. >> does ntsa all keep initial internal investigations confidential prior to opening a formal safety defect investigation? >> we have predecisional work to be done. >> why? because we