appointments and the consistency of the moral fiber of the individuals that president eisenhower put on the court, it's no surprise that someone like earl warren was put in the position of chief justice of the u.s. supreme court. i have my theories about where some of the tension came from between the two but he also put justice brennan on the supreme court. he did a wonderful job of explaining the context that we faced as a country. i want to give you a little context about what our court system was like during this period. my father's mentor was a man named charles hamilton houston who excelled in law school, at harvard law school and became dean of harvard law school where he meantoned lawyers in the civil rights movement. charles hamilton houston was clearly a brilliant legal thinker and was a tremendous law

student at harvard. to give you a clue as to how much of a pioneer and how brilliant this man was, in 1935 he gave a speech that we recently found at the library of congress where he laid out the entire desegregation cases. that's 1935. this was not a man to be trifled with. i mention thatta background because of the context of the court system that president eisenhower did so much to change. charles hamilton houston went before the supreme court in 1938 and offered a case called gaines versus missouri to get a gentleman admitted into missouri law school. rather justice mcreynolds turned his chair around. if you think about that sort of behavior from a federal judge on the highest court of our land and then you uks that pose that

with the quality of the people that eisenhower put on the bench, it's remarkable to me, and i think that it bears noting that these are not one-off flukes and there was a consistency in his appointments and if there was one thing in closing that i picked up from reading most of the ambrose books, it is that general eisenhower and president eisenhower sought out people of tremendous moral fiber and courage. he surrounded himself with these individuals. they were drawn to him. for those who worked immediately with him, he'd mentored them in tremendous ways. for those who were a step or two removed, it's very clear that the example of his service guided them. so it's -- it's been quite clear to me that although there may have been criticism along the

way on individual pieces of his agenda, he made a remarkable contribution to our nation's history when it comes to a number of things, but in particular on civil rights. i look forward to the discussion. >> thank you, dr. specht from that introduction. we have foe idea what those things cost. it's always good to hear them, right? it's always good being back. this is like a second home and i'm inspired every time i walk around the campus and to sit next to a gentleman like this and hear his words, well, that's just gold. my talk today is going to be an echo of how dr. specht started her talk because if you want, we'll talk about little rock, right? the first thing you've got to do

is you've got to get right with ike, and getting right with ike is hard to do. maybe the real ike never stands out. i don't know. so what we're going to try to do here today is we're going try to get right with ike. it was the crisis itself. now i said we that this is not a spectator event, right? i want you to think through this with me. i don't have all the answers, trust me, right? but think through this with me and you, i would hope, would also try to do an assessment as we go through it based on the things mr. marshall said and the things i'm going to tell you and you try to get right with ike. he's a man in motion. he was always a man in motion. he's still a man in motion. listen to this, in the 1962 poll arthur schlessinger asked

presidential scholars to rank the chief executives, washington right up to eisenhower based on, quote, their greatness. of the 31 presidents rated, dwight d. eisenhower ranked 31st. he was tied with chad arthur. just above andrew johnson. most of these academics would have agreed at that time with the presidential scholar louis kuhning who said eisenhower would be presenting his appetite for leisure and recreation while leading the day to day administration of his office to trust the assistant to the president sheryl an axe. over the past 50 years, however, these earlier assess ams of eisenhower as a well meaning, but bumbling political novice have been challenged. the corrections of official records like right here at the eisenhower and personal papers and eisenhower revisionists have

constructed a new edge in which the president emerges as a capable, clever, executive that led the nahition with a strong hand and a clear vision. the new scholarship has enhanced ike's reputation dramatically. a new poll placed eisenhower ninth. he then in 1990 slipped to 15th. the sienna college research institute poll. ike had once again moved back into the top ten leaving aside some guy named kennedy. although the results now, this new appraisal had been significant, the revisionists had focused mainly on ike in the foreign policy sphere. they had not focused on ike in

the domestic sphere. >> you understand why that is. it will sometimes be maddening. who is the real ike here? who is the real guy? some people have argued that eisenhower met civil rights reform with ambivalence, if not outright opposition. they say he failed to develop comprehensive policies and strategies required to implement school desegregation in the south. it was this failure that some revisionists maintain the crisis that erupted in 1957 in little rock. now there's no debating the scholars' assertion that eisenhower was less than enthusiastic in his support of school desegregation, but what i will suggest here today is that their claim that the president's failure resulted from an overrouting opposition to civil

rights is wrong. i would argue it was wrong. i would argue also that they're wrong when they say he did not have a consistent administration policy aimed at ending desegregation, and i think they missed the mark completely. i maintain that the close examination of the public cressence and actions reveals that his approach to all civil rights issues, eisenhower adhered to a precisely defined strategy that was based on two things. first, his own personal views on race, of course, and it was based also on his deeply-held belief that a course that emphasized moderation and gradualism would prove an effective raeshl equality while at the same time maintaining the law and order in the affected areas. a little bit more about this strategy. this strategy of moderation and

gradualism had served eisenhower well. not only through his administration, but as a military man. you'll recall ike, monty and so on. it served him very well and it will prove completely and adequately to the new set of challenges that developed following the supreme court ruling in brown v. board. >> eisenhower's inability to achieve the objectives that he sought would end in the little rock crisis and that crisis will result, i maintain, directly from his failure to tailor that strategy to meet the new challenges that he faced after brown. any analysis has got to begin with the analysis of the personal racial views. we talked a little bit about it. as you know, ike was grown in texas and he grew to manhood in

kansas. the population of those states were predom minutely white. surprising to me there was a relatively large black population when i was growing up right here in abilene. the schools that ike attended here in abilene were integrated and it was here that the future president first displayed what would be a life long aversion to bigotry. a high school coach, harassed and dismissed a black athlete from the football team. team captain eisenhower told the coach, if he can't play, i won't play either. other players lined up behind ike, the coach reinstated the black player. however, the fact that eisenhower was no big on the, you will hear that word however and but a lot today. i'm sorry.

i tell you, it's work. the word big on the did not mean he didn't hold the racial views of his day. he entered a u.s. army, a u.s. army that remained

behind the scenes what greenspan called the hidden hand.

it was this policy in moderation, constructed around the principles of gradualism, caution, minimum government intrusion that eisenhower believed would offer the best sense, best chance, in other words, of solving the difficult problem of desegregation. we put this strategy to the test when he completed to be segregation of the armed forces and schools in washington, d.c. seeing eisenhower do this, many civil rights advocates hope that the activism would now be directed toward ending segregation throughout the country, but they would be disappointed. the same rationale that led eisenhower to the speedy desegregation of the armed forces in the nation's capital would preclude him from launching any presidential initiative to battle segregation in the schools of the individual straits.

eisenhower knew that the real battles over the integration of america's public school system would occur in the deep south, and although he often stated his belief that the use of, quote, political or economic power to enforce segregation based on race, color or creed is morally wrong. he also acknowledged that the desegregation of public schools in the south would entail, quote, very serious, practical problems not the least of which is what eisenhower called deep-seeded emotions of the persons in the region. the administration did little to challenge the south. i do not believe that eisenhower wrote in his deery in 1953 that prejudice will succumb to compulsion. consequentially, the federal law imposed on the states in such a

way to bring about conflict on the police powers of the state and the nation that set back the cause of racial progress and race relations in this nation for a long, long time. how then, did the fight for equality proceed? eisenhower provided his solution in a letter to his friend governor james burns of south carolina, eisenhower expressed the hope that a means would be found for all parties involved could, quote, progressively vote for the goals established by abstract prens pells, but which would not at the same time cause such disruption and mental anguish that any progress would be reversed. this statement, of course, was in accordance with ike's policy of moderation ike refused to be

pinned when desegregation would end. he was asked, he said the length of time i am want even going to talk about. i do not know the length of time it will take and through this course eisenhower knew that voluntary desegregation, if they ever occurred, would take a very, very long time. but eisenhower sincerely, i believe, thought was that he would be given that time for gradualism, for the policy of moderation he was wrong and he found that out on the 17th of may, 1954. the supreme court rendered its decision in brown v. board and with that ruling ike's time ran out. in spite of his presidential assertions that he agreed with the unanimous decision, eisenhower the man believed that the justices had vastly

overstepped their authority. he wailed against the, quote, political stupidity of the court. i am convinced that he told his speechwriter that the supreme court decision was set back progress in the south by 15 years. the president knew that most white southerners would oppose brown and as he spoke to his friend, laws are rarely effective unless they represent the will of the majority. when pressed on his personal opinion of the court's decision, he would simply say that it was the ruling of the law of the land and as the president he was required to enforce it. most telling, however, the president refused to endorse the decision of the court and more importantly, to speak out on the immorality of segregation. as press secretary james hagerty

later remembered after brown, he said after brown, civil rights became a whole different ball game. indeed, it did, and it was a game that would result in the confrontation at the little rock school desegregation crisis. and in that crisis, eisenhower's policy, his trusted policy of moderation would prove woefully inadequate. not that he didn't try to use it. they sought to avoid any high-profile actions during the crisis. any high-profile pronouncements, four times during the crisis, he dispatched personal emsears to arkansas to gather information and attempt to bridge the differences between the state. he repeatedly refused advice from insub ord in thes to prove through legislative or even forceful measures to resolve the crisis, and he sought to provide as much time as he possibly could for the people of arkansas

to accept and become comfortable with court-mandated desegregation. in the end, the ruling was implemented only after the president ordered the 101st to occupy little rock. so what happened? what happened? why did the policy that was domestic, difficult challenges failed him so completely in little rock. there were many answers to this question, of course, political, economic, certainly social answers. in the minutes i have remaining i want to key on one reason they think is often ignored and it shouldn't be and that one reason, normal promise. he was there for the person with whom ike would predominantly

interact. put simply, and in the interaction, ike underestimated normal. it was a master politician. his father had been a card-carrying hard core justice, eugene, would try to cultivate a populist image on the perennial underdog battling great odds with the common folk of arkansas. he found himself a moderate. he supported the integration of the colleges and university in arkansas. they were already int gritted and folks don't realize that. they were integrated and when the dispute of the arkansases turned ugly in 1956, it was the practical politician that decided to put that one out. >> at its very core, it was a consummate political opportunist. he possessed this, an uncanny

ability to divide the strategy, objectives of his opponents and devise ways to take advantage of those strategies. i can't go through the whole crisis in the time allowed, but you will remember that eisenhower sent personal emserious down, particularly, congressman brooks hayes of arkansas and he did -- he sort of played his trump card. still, moderation, low key, he asks all of us to come from new port. now here's ike. this is eisenhower. yeah, the general, the president. i would be glad to report. 14th of september, he sternly

reminded him in no uncertain terms that the instructions of a federal court must be followed by a state to the letter. he left it right there. he knows what would have happen happened. it was countered, quickly assuming his awe shucks persona, he listened, and like a snake charming a bird, he began to cast his spell. only a few years earlier, he had been tossed in the english general as the general of eisenhower's invading armies and as he gazed on the hostile shores of europe, he had thanked his god that his personal fate and the fit of the free world rested securely in eisenhower's hands. now and then he assured the president he was all, but a

humble subordinate. arkansas, he insisted was the most rationally progressive state in the south and it would be ended if he would just curb the dictatorial processes and his department of investigators. what we need is a cooling off period and time to wane. this is exactly what eisenhower wanted to hear. it fit perfectly with the pushings and shoving of brown ask it hit perfectly with moderation and so it was, and to sustain the particular, down home populism, subservient and southern suv ility, and he saw what he wanted to see and he heard what we wanted to hear. he sincerely believed that the meeting had been