execute it was henry kissinger. so i think that the various things they devised for negotiations and all were primarily those that came out of nixon's mind and that the person who would do the negotiating then would be kissinger. i didn't go on the first trip, though zeigler and i had a job of trying to select who of the hundred people could go from the press corps. that was a political fight. haldeman didn't want some because they were not friendly enough. >> why did you not go on the trip? >> i was told somebody had to stay back and keep things going in washington. >> who thought about the television images of the trip to china back at this time? who was thinking about the public affairs part of the trip, scheduling and -- >> zeigler and i did primarily because we had to collect who was going to go. we were -- i arranged to have a

number of like henry porter, write each one like a chapter out after book so we could have an intant book. television probably came mainly from roger hails. >> we talk about photo opportunities in terms of reagan. who was thinking about photo opportunities in china? >> i don't think anybody -- we didn't have enough advancement to really think about what would happen over there. just figured two happen. normally you have an advance man that can tell you about different things. there weren't that many. i went there about three month later when we had a cease-fire and the president saent kissingr and myself to hanoi to negotiate with the north vietnamese as to what our relationship after the

cease-fire. that's how i got to know cho lei. henry was just like an aide on it. but it was interesting because it was a time when jane fonda promoted the idea that there had been a christmas bombing. we'd wiped out hanoi. i had a chance to get their car, their driver and see most of that city. what we had done was the most precise bombing job you could imagine. we knocked out every bridge. one place i saw the railroad station had been knocked out on this side of the street and the other side little shops were operating. we walked out one block where a pilot got shot down and decided to take some of the people with. but we'd done a marvelous job knocking -- our airplane landed. they just dried the cement on the runway because there had been so many bomb holes in it. so at any rate, we then went

from there to china to talk about what had happened and what our relationship would be under the new thung. that was when i got to know him some. >> we talk with secretary laird about how important for american public opinion it was to show that we were withdrawing from vietnam. to what extent did your office work with the pentagon on these plans for the withdrawal and making public the fact that we were withdrawing on a date certain, a certain number of troops. >> i had nothing to do with the number of troops or what dates would be at all. my job because to be sure that it was handled on television correctly. mine was more a handler's job than a policy job. >> couple more questions because you've been very patient. one is in looking for the material from the 1972 campaign, one gets the impression that for

a while, until he dropped out, president nixon was worried about muskie, about muskie could pose a threat to his re-election. do you remember? how optimistic were you and the team about -- the likelihood president nixon would be elected? >> we thought it was a cinch. >> even against muskie? >> yeah. >> well once it became -- >> see, we thought that -- mcgovern made it easier. but we felt that his record was such and that they had enough on vietnam by -- and we would be fine. only big problems i could see from that campaign were the economy and the possibility of having problems from dirty tricks, the dwight chapin type

thing. >> you knew that to be a problem already? >> i knew that there was a problem, there. >> you knew chapin? he was ron zeigler's class. he's a great guy. got involved in little tiny things like sending too many pizzas, and that kind of stuff. but i thought that water gate was starting to break loose some and just a minor form at that time. i went to haldeman and said -- i think i campaigned 70,000 miles during that campaign by myself, made speeches around the country, things like that. so i went to haldeman and i said that i thought the two things we

had to be careful about were to watch the economy, because that could be a serious problem. the second was to fire two or three people so it was symbolic of the fact that we're cleaning up whatever problems there were in the white house. obviously i should have gone to the president with that argument. >> this is before the break-in? >> the break-in had taken place earlier. stories were starting to break in the "washington post" about water gate. >> yes. the break-in. >> this is just after the break-in. what role did haldeman and the president give you to manage the president reaction? >> they didn't give me any. that was zeigler's job.

>> but were you director of communications. >> but he was press secretary. >> help me understand. you're director of communications. is it that they thought it was too small an event that didn't rise to your level? >> no. zeigler had equal rank with me. we both reported to the president. and so it was an issue that was going to come out of the white house would be one that i wouldn't be getting into and the problems with the president developed between zeigler and the press during those briefings and i, fortunately, knew nothing about it so that i could say nothing about it. >> were you a little concerned when they called water gate a third rate -- >> yeah, i thought it was a bad term that he was have to eat, which he did. >> let's set up water gate. go back to '71.

what role, if any, did you play in the nixon administration's reaction to the pentagon papers issued? >> pretty major role. we had a lot of meetings in my office right after that started happening, which involved john mitchell and mel laird. maybe bill rogers. i'm not sure. ron zeigler and myself. maybe someone else. i don't know. possibly colston. and so the question was how do we handle it because the pentagon papers didn't indict us in the slighters. they were all about things beforehand. but our concern was keeping the public supportive of us in the vietnam war. so mitchell was really the dominant factor in the straenl that we ended up with of trying to prevent publication my

approach to it was that the public was right had they cleared it but they knew we had a rule that you should classify a document, you should clear it and they hadn't done that and that was my argument against it. that was supported some by the courts. >> what was mel laird's issue? >> mel was just very angry about the whole thing because he thought it reflected on him and the department and he wanted to go get them. >> someone in the pentagon later concluded that most of his material was not really of great sensitivity. >> yeah. >> what was the strategy for dealing with leaking? >> well, the person who was most sensitive about it was henry. then the president would get angry and he would share little

thing on news notes, write a note on the side to me, why don't you stop talking to these people or just stop talking to them. i took the attitude that i'm independent, i talk to anybody. i never stop talking to any reporter because i was ordered to. i always found with the president that sometimes he would say things to me which might have been harsh and if i just ignored him a couple days, why, he would say you didn't do that, i would say, no, i didn't, he'd say, that's fine. think part of the problem that occurred with people like colston, he would take a harsh statement and make it worse. bob finch and i, who have been close to dick nixon for all those years, never did that. >> is it his temper with a flare up? >> yeah.

he would sound off, get it off his chest, and just ignore it. >> in your book you do talk you saw him as probably wanted him fired. >> yeah. colson was the toughest person in the administration and he did a lot of things which i object to, to this day. i think that the pressure he was putting on jed mcgruter to some of the things he did on the break-in. i can't prove that. i don't think colson ordered it anyway but mcgruter did. i have a theory on how mcgruter got john mitchell to approve it but again that's my speculation. john had a wife who could be a very big problem sometimes. she'd speak out at all hours of the day or not about what are

was bothering her. one of my jobs was try to take care of martha mitchell as well. that was me. so he was taking a little vacation in in order. jed mcgruter came down with a list of things he wanted to prove for the committee and my theory is that he waited until about the last and martha mitchell was yeg at john, saying get rid of that young guy and come back here. and so he just checked it off quickly and let it go. i think he's too smart to do something like that deliberately. my other theory is that i used to talk to mcgruter sometimes about what we did in 1960 on jennings and in 160 kennedy had a guy named dick tuck who was a great trickster and a good guy. so he would do like he planted

chinese cookies at a nixon dinner that said something like "beat nixon" or whatever. but at any rate, he was kennedy's guy to follow us around. i like the idea of knowing who was our spy so i would tell him where we were going on next. when he would go to a phone booth, i would send somebody in the phone booth next and see, reporting in. that was my idea of intelligence. i think mcgruter set out to do something more cutting edge. i think that's probably how water gate occurred. >> everyone was optimistic about the campaign. why the pressure of political intelligence in the summer of 1972? try to help us understand that. >> i think it was because just the point i just made that they wanted to show that they could do a better job. i don't know about the theories about john dean's personal

interests, about his wife. i don't know if that's true or not true. but i put the main plame on mcgruter being too weak to resist. i feel he was pressured by colston to take stronger action. the whole effort was to within big so you had a sland slide. wasn't to win, it was to win big. >> when do you think that became the objective? >> from the beginning. we thought we could win because we had a good record and we thought he kept public support for him despite difficulties of the vietnam war and we had had great demonstrations. we didn't really have any control over kent state but that shook everybody up.

>> did you participate in all in the decision that the bombing should be secret in cambodia? >> no. in fact, i was put in a difficult position because i think i need because the president would send me out occasionally to vietnam with some governors and congressmen to look out and bring back sort of report of what's going on to him in vietnam. so i knew that we were taking action before we announced it. but when we announced it, it had a public reaction greater than i expected. i was due to speak at the school of journalism at columbia university the next morning, which i did, to a very hostile audience, as you might expect. that night i was to be on the

dick cabbott show. also, one of those times when i was in vietnam, i got a call about midnight before we were going to leave to come back. i was there with brice harlow and with some congressmen and governor schafer and another governor and about midnight haig called me and said i think it would be good if you went over talk to the president of cambodia tomorrow. i said i can't because i'm supposed to talk to the president of south vietnam and bring these people back tomorrow. he said, you didn't hear me. i said you're going tomorrow.

mine code was witness. henry's was wood chopper. anyway, so during the night every couple hours somebody would come in with some papers from the back channel to get me what i was supposed to do when i got through. i went out and decided i should have someone with me so i took governor schafer with me. we went on and he saw this small jet. i was surprised that four soldiers with rifles with us. that was because they were shooting at the airport there at that time. we landed and the ambassador there didn't know why i was there and he arrived in a checkered cab painted plaque so it would look like a limousine. took me to his residence to hide

me when i told him that i needed to meet with the president and he said, well, the president sleeps late so i got to wait a while. so i waited, i could see the reporters surrounding the place. he said i should see a little bit of the townfy was going to. then we got an appointment with the president at like 10:00 or 11:00 in the morning. it was with the president. so my purpose by my instruction was to assure him that we were supportive of him that nixon was going to and -- because i was a close personal friend that they could count on us to continue to support him. and so i spent about a half-hour with him, with schafer there, then i got schafer to leave so i could just talk to him personally about it and emphasize it even more.

so i did that. i was trying to figure out what can i give him as a souvenir. i had a nixon fountain penny gave him. so i then went back to saigon and reported on my conversation with -- to the ambassador and chief of operations there, military operations, and then about half-way back to reporting to the navy chief pacific, i got another call from haig said the search light wants you hear tomorrow morning to talk to the cabinet and a few congressional people. so i said well i can't because i got to talk to these people in hawaii. he said we got another airplane for you. you got an hour to talk to them and get on. so i arrived about 3:00 in the morning in washington and i had with me a gun which the south

vietnamese general had given me from china to show me their weapons were coming from china. it was a disabled gun but it was kind after nice souvenir. so i decided i was going to show this to the cabinet an i thought how am i going to get this into the white house? so i called one of my aides about 4:00 a.m. and he figured out how to get it delivered to me. so i met with them and described what had gone on with both cambodia and in vietnam and then showed him the gun. then i went to chicago for a press conference, then i collapsed. >> this was after the secret bombing of cambodia? >> yeah, it was. >> where were you on kent state, the day of the tragedy? >> i was in the white house. it really alarmed everybody was it came as a complete surprise.

i can just remember it was general alarm as to how to handle it. but we decided best thing we could do is deny any role in that. that was zeigler's role to do that. >> the president was shocked. >> he was very shocked. >> must have been angry at the national guard. correct? >> yeah. you know, it was sure to stir up more trouble at that time. we had buses surrounding the white house to keep people from climbing in the grounds. i had national guard troops sleeping outside of my office on weekend in the hallways. part of my role was to go over to where the central headquarters would be to be sure that we didn't have somebody who would be a hothead and get us to take some action which would

provoke more action. so i took that role on myself. >> in 1972 what role did you play in shaping the southern strategy, if any? >> by 1972, haldeman was trying to be more dominant so i had really little role in that. >> it's very interesting to see how president nixon tries to deal with george wallace. taking on issues like bussing. do you recall any of that? >> no. >> in 1973 how did you leave or when do you decide to leave? >> after the campaign, i went -- was with friends from san diego

down to puerto vallarta, with my wife, just get like a week's vacation. while i was there -- well, before i left, to our surprise, haldeman called a meeting of the staff and asked everybody to submit their resignation, which we all did. and at this time there was more of a rift between haldeman and myself. i didn't carry out certain things because i didn't believe in them. >> such as? >> just not talking to certain reporters or more how to handle the press. he wanted us to cut off handle the press. i thought we should be doing more with the press.

larry higby would send out all these instructions about do all this and paperwork and i just didn't believe in doing it all. so i would not do it all. i'd let him know what i was doing but i didn't want to spend all my time on paperwork. so at any rate, while i was down there, i got a call that i should come up to camp david on certain date a couple days later to have a talk. so i went up not knowing exactly what was going to happen and i got there and haldeman met me and said that he thought i ought to resign and thatdy want to become the ambassador to mexico or did i want to head the usa, but they wanted to have more control over what happened in the press office.

i said, well, i don't feel that way and i want to hear from the president if that's the case. so i talk to the president. the president was surprised and he didn't really ask me one thing or other. he just talk to me. but i knew then that i was on my way out. but about that time, water gate was unfolding and haldeman said you got to stay longer. i had said in maybe october or so the year before that i was going to leave some time early in the next administration because i thought i really had to get back to making some money for my family. and that was my plan but not that fashion. so at any rate i decided that i would just let the word out that i was going to resign and so then i got a lot of job offers. i think i had 32 of them or

something like that and i decided i shouldn't stay in the government because there would be no purpose for me. so that was how it happened. >> did they sit down and tell you -- >> after i left, i get a call -- i was in quebec -- no, montreal, and i got a call from haig that the president would like to see me in key biscayne and i -- i caught a rumor that they wanted me to come back in and handle water gate things. this would be in probably late 1973? >> okay. >> or 1974. so i tried to avoid the call because i thought that was what it was going to be. i just had started my new job with metro media and so i got some calls from people, like

leonard -- the attorney. saying that they really need the help. so i did fly to key biscayne and haig and zeigler tried to put a lot of pressure on me to come in and take over all the water gate things because he was no longer credible. and i said i just didn't feel like i could do it because i had a new job and i owed something to my family as well. they said, well, fly on up to washington with us and let the president talk to you. so i got on air force one and met with the president. the president said, i know you got a new job and what do you think? i said i think it would be real hardship on me. i don't like to tell you no because i've never said no to something you've asked me to do and i thought was reasonable. and he said, well, ind that. he said that's fine. he started talking football with

me. so he never put any pressure on me at all. >> but he also didn't talk to you about water gate. did you? >> no, he just -- the question was would i come in and help. he didn't talk about how to solve it, no, he didn't ask me. >> from june of '72 to this point, say early '74, did president nixon ever sit down and say -- he'd known you for years. say, herb, this is what happened. >> no. never heard him do that to anybody. i had a very hard time -- even after he left office, to get limb to say that he was wrong. finally i arranged for television show with the guy from great britain, david frost. i arranged for him to go on david frost. i thought frost would be tough and whatever he did with nixon would be believable. and he came close to saying he was wrong but he didn't say it

directly. >> can you tell us a little bit about how you set this up with david frost? >> david approached me, said he wanted to do it. and i knew him for a long time and i thought he was someone i could count on to be honest with him but he would be a tough questioner. then i knew that dick nixon was always at his very best the tougher the questions. like some of the best things he did were with the cbs correspondent, dan rather, who he didn't like at all. one of his best interviews was with dan rather. so anyway, i talked him into doing it. >> he needed money, too, at that point. >> yeah. but it wasn't the money at that point. it was question whether he would go on the air. my hope was that out of that would come this thing everybody kept saying why don't you say it was wrong? he won't say that. so he came close to it