economically having greater presence checkly would be important, and it's not just for the economic benefit. it's also because they will see that something's changing. it is really controlled. it's changing. >> it would help to grow the economy which s you know, they deliver and it's pushing right. >> yes. and i believe, by the way, i think there is a potential that the israelis will see value in this because tat the end of the day, for those who believe in a two-state outcome, if those -- if the palestinians who believe in violence are the ones who can validate it, then i think the two-state outcome itself becomes at risk. >> i'll give a shoutout to jim who runs the middle east, and also doing the small business loans and meedz yum-sized loans. when prime minister netanyahu comes in about a month what do

you think heel say to president obama and others, especially president obama, on iran? >>. >> that's an important preoccupation. when i was outlining the region, i didn't mean to leave you out. >> we knew we would get to iran. don't worry. >> this has cast a major shadow over everything they were doing. there's no doubt this would be a prime topic of conversation. it was in the interview that he gave last night. he talked about the nature of the conversations we're having with the israelis. he talked with the importance of us remaining in lockstep on this issue. i think that from the israeli standpoint you hear it less from the prime minister and more from ehud barack, a preoccupation that he refers to with his immunity and the iranians reach a point in terms of the

multiblissity of the facilities and the accumulation, and the hardening of their sights. the overall infrastructure and what i would describe as both the hard and the soft part of their infrastructure where even if the israelis were to strike militarily that it wouldn't have much of an effect and so the immunity means there comes a point when the israeli military option disappears and for the israelis would, in a sense, give up the military option with the uncertainty whether or not iran would end up having nuclear weapons or not is a big decision. what the israelis have also said which is an important point to keep in mind and this has been a constant theme of theirs. if there are crippling sanks they think it will work. think about what it means. when the israelis say that they judge that the iranians do have a cost benefit calculous.

>> right. >> they judge that you can affect the iranian behavior and if you have crippling sanks you actually can affect the iranian behavior. so it suggests there is no alternative to the use of force and if you look at what the administration has produced it has created a context. the president was saying this last night, but the essence of the context that's been created is a, the iranians are more isolated than ever. >> best indication of that, you have a vote in the general assembly. in the general assembly, 169 calling on iran to protect it from personnel. you have in the region, a clear shift in the balance of power and the kind of concern that you once saw particularly among many arab states and being very tough with us in private about iran and very reticent in public and it's changing. saudi arabia, immediately after the european union announces that they're going to boycott to purchase the iranian oil and saudi arabia says we'll fill in.

israel says that's not the act and they say we'll fill in. >> it's a balance of power for a lot of reasons and not the leet of which is happening in syria, which changes the perception and attitude toward iran in the region. it's contributing to a change. so you have iran ease lated nationality. you have the balance of power against iran in the region and you have the emergence of crippling sanctions and we know the effect it's having on the iranians in term of its economy. their currency has lost half its value in the last six weeks. when you start talking about boycotting their oil the -- they export 18% of their oil to europe and you're talking almost a fifth of their oil. look at china's behavior. china cuts in half their

purchase of oil for january and february which may not have been done because they're trying to link up with the europeans although they're not saying that, but it's also smart business when they see that in fact there will be a boycott of the oil, and they want to sell less, and they'll have to heavily discount which means a further loss of revenue and on top of this the chinese premiere goes to the region, spends six days in the region and doesn't go to iran and it goes to saudi arabia and uae and goes to kuwait who are arguably the hardest lined members of the gcc when it comes to iran. >> in other words, most anti-iranian. >> exactly. beyond that he makes a very blunt statement against iran having nuclear weapons when he's out there. >> when he's in saudi arabia he gets guarantees that the oil will go well, which is what the

administration did well which is orchestratin orchestrating. are you saying there is no need for a military strike? >> what i'm saying is a context has been created where the iranians are increasingly aware of the price they're paying and the key has been all along, concentrate them and leave them the way out. you can debate whether this will work or not, but i would say if you would pursue a diplomatic approach that had any chance of success. i will say, the prospect of inducing the iranians to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons was never going to work because there is nothing that you can offer them that is worth to them as much as having that program, but if you look historically where they've made serious tactical adjustments is when they were under pressure and saw their way out. i read the supreme leader's speech. he's obviously adopting a very tough line publicly.

i wouldn't expect him to adopt a different line publicly, but the fact is they're also now talking about meeting the five plus one, and when the foreign minister talks about meeting the five plus one and this is the security count ilplus germany. when he talks about meeting the the russian proposal which is explicitly about their nuclear program. when they met in geneva and istanbul they refused to talk about their nuclear program and suddenly they're saying they will meet with the five plus one. they want to talk about the step-by-step approach and the russian proposal. the step-by-step approach was raised by the five plus one in the meetings last year so it was interesting whereas last year they wouldn't talk about their nuclear program and now they're signaling they will talk about their nuclear program. i'm not suggesting that any negotiation will be simple. a context has been created where you have a chance for diplomacy

to work. you have the kind of pressures that the israelis themselves have called for. so that does suggest to me that there is time to make the dip lo loam see work. >> syria. what should they be doing now? >> i saw the secretary of state called for the creation of the friends of syria group which is the right thing to be doing. and the veto on saturday. >> dramatically undercut the transition in syria. assad is operating on a premise with at least the constituencies that still support him where he says, you know, we can outlast this because basically we have an insurance policy and that

insurance policy is provided by the russians and that insurance policy ensures that it won't be a kind of intervention. it ensures that there's a limit as to what can be done for us and so, stick with me, we'll be able to outlast this. i think had the russians and the chinese gone along with this resolution, i think the message in syria would have been quite different. i also think it would have had an effect on our side. >> onsee our side as hiding out and somehow, you know, with no electricity and no water and i don't see us that way. i think if our side saw that the real balance of power was changing and from the outside it would have an impact further on the inside, i think that you could see a potential change there. >> the more you created a sense

of inevitability, the more -- stt idea as spends with the operation is right. i understand up until, requiring something to them is important and to create the inevitability because i think that will be the insit sight. >> that's hard to do with russia not cooperating. >> what is russia's -- is this some grand historical thing? is it autonomy with the relation with syria? is it lavrov ore putin? let's put it this way. putin was focused on what was going on in the streets of

moscow. correct. >> putin is focused on what will happen on march 1st and then afterwards, he's thinking about what's the kind of government that he will put together. his preoccupation is on the inside. there will may be a kind of investigation that putin is seen as wanting always internationally to demonstrate russian independence. the only naval base they have in the middle east isser issia, but you would think if you take a step back and if you're russia and want to preserve a position in syria, the only way you will preserve a position in syria is being on the right side of history and where this is headed. the longer you are seen as helping to prop up a anded basically what is now a killing machine and the way assad treated this vote was a license to unleash and if you look at -- i don't know how many people looked at the videos over the

weekend. you're looking at artillery and mortars and antiaircraft they used to fire into buildings. you know, the fact is the russians have a stake right now in demonstrating that they're the ones helping to produce the transition and they were the ones that were an impediment to it. right now it's not just the friends of the syrian opposition that is -- that we should be focused on. i think we should be working up the pressure with the russians and that will leave the russians where they're feeling increasingly uncomfortable and the more they begin to see that their own position in the region could be put at risk. again, take a step back. we're talking about the arab league that put together a transition plan for syria. this is the arab league we're talking about. this is a body that historically was primarily governed by how it

could protect all of the regimes and not how it could be thinking or talking about transitions. there's a reason that they've adopted this position because all of them are more tendered to their own publics and what's going on in syria is a magnet for the public's preoccupation and it's something that's unacceptable and something thatting for thor sharpens the iranians in the region as a whole. >> i'll open it up and it obviously deals with egypt and especially what's happening with the detainees, the people. why is that happening and what should we be doing with things in egypt? >> you know, that is a -- this is one of those issues that is from the outside that's increasingly hard to fathom and understand it. there certainly has been a tradition in egypt of a preoccupation with protecting sovereignty and the symbols of

sovereignty and the like, but it's a -- i know that, you know, the staff, the supreme council for the armed forces is saying that, you know, these ngos were fermenting the instability on the ground. >> these are congressional funded iri in the national democratic institute. >> i was just about to say. y know that's what they say. i happen to know these institutions. there is no way that's what they were doing. yeah. they're talking about how you could register to vote. how you can participate in elections and how you can develop a political agenda and how you can create an identity and this is how you foster civil society at a time when the staff is presiding over a process of transition for a single rule.

to single us out is such a throwback. it is a real challenge for us because the fact of the matter is, you know, the idea of of somehow not being able to provide assistance to egypt right now when it's important for egypt is a potential problem. on the other hand, toen gain if these behave grors and to think there is no consequence is a potential problem. >> so you don't think we should be cutting off militarily 1.6 billion. >> i think it's an unbelievable dilemma. i think we have to do everything we can to persuade the egyptians to fiend a way out of this and a way out of this is not to pursue these prosecutions which is, you know, indefensible and is inconsistent with what they say they want. although it is interesting that the muslim brotherhood seems to

be sip porting the prosecution and it raises questions about what kinds of conversations are going on with the muslim brotherhood and the staff. i'll conclude with one general thought. the one thing that i was getting at before is that, you know, you will have to govern now. you'll have to deliver expectations and you'll have demands. the muslim brotherhood won't have the assistance cut off because they'll find it much more difficult to deliver to have an interest that they'll live up to their international obligations. >> we have an interest. i was just in europe last week and i was speaking in a lot of different places there. the value of us creating a mantra that we repeat internationally, it shouldn't just be us, that focuses on

accountability stand ars that seeps into the bloodstream arne the region and certainly in egypt. you have to have the space and you have elections that are repeatable, you have to have freedom of speech and assembly. you have to respect minority rights, you know? you don't criminalize the private sector. we need to be repeating these standards because, in a sense you'll find that the publics will then hold whoever is seeking to govern to those standards. >> it's somewhat strange to put it into context. the countries to whom we give the most assistance, even israel, we seem to have the toughest time when we really need it, so i don't know what that says. let me -- yes. i'll start with you so our friends at c-span. >> ted.

ambassador, you indicated that it would probably be in israel's rational self-interest to bolster the palestinian authority at this time, but yet we -- there was a major prisoner release that has given as you know, hamas tremendous credibility. i've never been particularly impressed by the measures that the israeli government has taken to bolster the palestinian authority when everybody agrees that this is the most nonviolent, most rational group of leaders ever. is it not possible that given the extreme right-wing nature of the coalition government in israel that there is essentially a tacit understanding between hamas and the underliners, and there are no talks going and that each side believing time is on their side and woupreferring

that the extremists be on the driver's seat or very influential? >> i don't think so, ted. i think that the deal for hamas. it was done to get back shalit and there was a fear that they might lose the opportunity to get back shalit, and the israeli government and the israeli military has a compact with every one of their citizens that everybody goes into the military and something happens and they will do everything it takes to get you back. so that explains the deal, but the fact is it had a validating effect which is one of the reasons i'm suggesting, if you're going have elections this year and a step was taken by consequence, you need to take

steps to validate the other narrative. i don't think there's even a tacit. this government does not want to bolster hamas as a fact of life and they've done, if you had a representative sitting here, you would say they did a great deal to enhance, the reason that the economy for the palestinians have done a lot better is because they've done a lot to ease the restrictions and ease the mobility to make that possible. what i'm suggesting is to take it a step further. what i'm suggesting is when you look at his critics, you would say he makes occupation palatable. i say no, he's going to make the occupation end and so what i want to see is steps that are validating, and also validating abu mazen because he has been the embodiment of nonviolence.

the israelis have their differences with abu mazen. part of the problem -- what i didn't say before in answer to your question, walter, we have this -- we have a major psychological gap between the two sides and particularly the leaders. abu mazen believes there is no deal and why even get into negotiations with them. he interpreted it as something designed to undercut him. prime minister netanyahu looks at abu mazen and says you impose conditions on me that you impose on none of my predecessors. you're prepared to talk to a lot of israelis, and not to me. it looks like you're trying to discredit me and embark internationally on an approach designed to isolate israel. so each of them has sort of cemented psychologically their view of the other that colors how they see the substance and it's very hard to break through that, and i was saying before,

the jordanians are making an effort with the support of the quartet to break that. that's an effort worth applauding and i think it has some potential, but whether it succeeds or it doesn't, either you help to underpin it by suggesting by validating or you run something that's parallel to it regardless because if you're going to face elections, there is going, those elections of the palestinians and it's important to try to affect that in a positive way. >> christopher, let me -- we'll try to get back around that. i feel 19 people are already on my list, and you can grab them afterward. >> chris -- thanks, walter. >> dennis, if you have something that i said earlier, you said one should never limit one's strategic choices and yet, that's exactly what the administration has done on syria and they've essentially taken any military intervention off the table.

secretary of state clinton said there will be absolutely no military intervention. do you think that's wise? >> i think when you're in a situation where you just ended one war and you're winding down another war, it's not a simple thing to then suddenly start talking about another intervention particularly when you don't see a lot of support for it internationally. having said that, i do think that, you know, there is -- there are options that one has to be thinking of right now and if there was discussion about the humanitarian corridors, there are some who talked about maybe safe havens, for those of us who remember bosnia, safe havens don't exactly conjure up wonderful memories, but i think

it is important to signal assad that he has more to worry about. that if i'm right this guy is not a gadhafi and how do you put pressure on him and how do you give him reasons that he has more to worry about. right now my focus is on the russians because the russians could be a dramatic pivot and i don't think the russians are comfortable with the position they're in right now. when the vote's 13-2, that means you have the indians go along with you. the level of international consensus quite striking. what the syrians did over the weekend was embarrass the russians more because what it looked like was that the russians were the ones that engaged in behaviors like what they were doing before. >> i would try to mobilize and that was from my standpoint and that was probably a better way

to go at this juncture. when you talk about military options it's not like you have a lot of great military options, but i think we have to think about how to increase the pressure on assad and he shouldn't think that there aren't ways to add a lot to that. >> said erekat of the newspaper. >> thank you. the problem with you think haddering down and doing nothing that it is not hunkering down and doing nothing. if you were to advise hamas, what should he do over the next 12 months in hunkering down and doing nothing within the two-state liability and the third, do you believe there ought to be a back channel between the president of the united states barack obama as was suggested last week? >> you can't go back. >> i think the administration is fully capable of managing its own communications.

>> i would say in answer to your question, though, that, you know, the -- what the jordanians are doing right now through the preparatory talks is, in fact, trying to get to the resumption of formal negotiations and there were five talks that were held. my impression from the jordanians is that they think, in fact, they were actually promising and that really issues were being put on the table and that the aim is actually to get to what was called for in the quartet declaration of september 23rd and the idea was that once the preparatory talks began that beth sides would put down on the table comprehensive proposals on territory and security. if you have comprehensive proposals that allows to get to the issue of borders. you resolve the issue of

settlements and it's a whole lot better to resolve the issue than to deal with it by saying gee, let's try to stop it or limit it. the fact is you want to resolve it and if you actually resolved borders, then you have resolved it. so my advice would be -- build on what the jordanians are doing, don't give up on it yet. the jordanians, clearly from what i understand they have not given up on it. they think it shows promise. i would try to bell onned that and if there are steps that offer you some -- some achievements, find ways to build on them. there's not a lot to be gained by always devaluing what may be possible and i think at this point there is something that's possible there and i wouldn't give up on it. >> and do you think that a borders-first agreement is possible? >> i believe he has agreed to --

i think, look, the truth is both leaders prefer, in the end to deal with all the issues. if you go back to what the president spoke about in may, he offered what were guidelines on territory and security because the idea was create a foundation on issues that are less existential and go to the heart of self-definition and identity. they go to the self-definition and identity. what you need to do is to provide each side a level of confidence that what's really fundamental to them can actually be achieved. if the palestinians see that the territorial outlines of the state are there and viable from their standpoint, and if the israelis see that what they need from the standpoint of security is there and convincing from their standpoint, then it becomes a lot easier to take on these emotive issues like

jerusalem and refugees. the fact that the quartet statement have called for both sides to present comprehensive proposals on territory and security within 90 days of those preparatory talks being under way. the two sides have a different approach on this. abu mazen feels that while there were indirect preparatory talks that began, he's talked about the january and the israelis said they didn't start until january 3rd when they were direct and tech pickly speaking i know because i was still in when this was drafted. the idea of preparatory talks was they were not the same as formally negotiations, but they were supposed to be direct. the fact is if at this point you, jordan and the members of the quartet believe that the discussions that have been taking place actually have been serious and show promise, then build on them and you're going to get, i think, relatively soon