to what could be those c comprehensive proposals on territory and security and that actually does allow you to deal with the questions. >> labat, cnn. >> thank you very much. on the palestinian question -- >> would you get closer to the mike? >> sorry about that. >> on the palestinian question, we just always talk about abu mazen, but i was wondering if you believe that there will be elections, do you see anybody that perhaps would have the credibility within the palestinian base and also possibly with the israelis to eventually cut a deal, and i'm wondering if you have a repeat of 2006, the palestinian elections and hamas does make a good showing, would you recommend repeating the same course of action that the u.s. and the international community did which was to boycott hamas

because my personal feeling -- >> i just don't feel that they were given the opportunity to show whether they would govern or whether they would moderate because you, in effect they were backed into a corner and we never knew. so i understand there are these quartet red lines and i'm just wondering if you would make any changes to that approach? thank you. >> we're asking two different questions. one question that relates to who being emerge in elections on the palestinian side individually in term of the presidency and then the other is you know, in a sense which movement is the one that emerges? on the first one, i don't think it's ever a good idea for anybody on the outside to look like they're trying to anoint and it's for the palestinian people and they'll decide who they're going vote for. it doesn't mean there shouldn't be consequences for who you vote

for. my concern about what happens in 2006 and my concern and i said it at the timed to at minh station. we had the interim agreement. that interim agreement actually created by the criteria for who can be candidates. >> i felt if they signed up to that criteria they could be candidates, and at that time, the from visions of the interim agreement were not, in fact, followed. i would have preferred that that be the case. in the end the palestinians will decide for themselves what it will be. if you're vote for example those who believe that there is no such thing as coexistence, then they shouldn't assume that they'll have a relationship with us. that's fair. i think what isn't right is if

we create a misimpression where you look like you're pushing for elections and that would happen with hamas. >> i do think that's what happened in 2006. we need to be consistent. my own attitude is we created conditions for the plo. and in the end the plo met the conditions. i don't know why we would treat hamas differently than we did the plo. >> respectfully, do you think there's any way that perhaps down the line, five, ten years from now you can see hamas like we're dealing with the muslim brotherhood. who would have thought the deputy secretary of state would be meeting with the muslim brotherhood talking about we'd love to work with you and form a partnership. is there any way that you can guide them toward that? >> guide whom? look, again, if hamas wants to

be able to deliver and by the way, take a look at the polling in gaza. hamas' standing in gaza is quite bad. one of the reason -- one of the things that i was -- one of the reasons i said before it would be quite something if the international community would -- but we all worked to help those palestinians who believe in nonviolence. i said before, think about the significance if the first election we've seen where they don't win is among palestinians. i think that would be quite remarkable. one of the things that you see happening right now in the region, i think there is a hunger for successful model. so some are looking at -- if they think about turkey, you know, if the palestinians came to embody a successful model because you look at what they're doing in the west bank that would be significant for the region and that applies to the

isthmus. they'll all be dealing in a different universe now. this is not the same middle east. when i made the reference to people seeing themselves as citiz citizen, we shouldn't underestimate the significance of that. this is the region where people were acted on as subjects. they couldn't make demands. they had no rights and there was no accountability and now they see themselves. they've discovered their voice. the fact that they've discovered their voice suggest to me that they're not about to give it up easily. syria is another interesting example because for all of those who think that coercion can work and they can simply apply their own rules, it simply hasn't worked in syria. >> los angeles times. >> i would like to ask you to go back to iran for a moment and spend a little time deciphering the various israeli warnings of the potential military action

that you've almost gone through mood swings. is it unresolved? is it a message for the united states, for the p-5 plus one and if it's a message for iran and if it is, is it possible to decipher which message arrives at iran? >> i think you can have -- one of the things you know for certain particularly in international relations, but particularly in today's world, is that you can have audiences when you communicate things, but it doesn't mean when you have a message that even if you have multiple audiences, and put multiple messages that they need to be competing. one of the things is you want to see crippling sanctions and now you see for the first time crippling sanction are being

adopted. one can ask the question if the rest of the world wasn't convinced that israel might take military action, would they have been as likely to adopt crippling sanctions which by themeses mean that those adopting sangs are prepared to assume a certain cost. so i think there's no doubt in my mind that some of what the israelis do has been designed to motivate the rest of the world to adopt the kind of actions which they themselves think might alter iranian behavior. one thing is clear. the israelis never wanted us to be israel against iran. i have no doubt that some of the purpose and some of the reasons that you've seen from some of what they said is to motivate the rest of the world. by the same token is partly that they view this in existential terms. ehud barack again was stating that yesterday. so if you see it in existential

terms, obviously, if you're israel you'll develop the capability to try to deal with that. does it mean that they're just posturing? no. i don't think they're just posturing, but i think there's no doubt that some of what they've done has had the effect on others. again, i go back to the fact that the fact that the sanctions work suggest there's an alternative to the use of force that they hope will actually succeed. >> jennifer, please. >> thank you. ambassador -- would you hit that mike button, too, please? thanks. >> ambassador, you laid out some very important points about the arab street really controlling a lot of this political process and that the most important issue to them is jobs. walter isaacson wrote a fabulous book about steve jobs. if i -- a different kind of

jobs, but i think they're very connected because the arab street is so connected to the internet and there's so much on face book. why is it that the u.s. administration is so slow to come forward with facebook applications that teach job empowerment tools like how to get a loan how to market your business and to do podcasts and other things on facebook so that we can be ready for a post-apple world in the arab spring? >> i don't represent the administratio administration anymore, but i think if you had somebody here from the state department, the secretary of state would have put a media, i think you raise an interesting point that there are multiple applications for

that new media. it's not just a vehicle for communicating. it's not just a vehicle for trying to create a certain kind of mobilization, but it could be something that could be used effectively. and to try to promote the private sector at a time when we have an enormous stake and the success of it, but frankly, all of these countries have an enormous stake. if you look at the one of the senior members of the muslim brother hood, and the assistance still coming from the outside and he was putting a real premium on their interest in promoting and responding to their economic needs. and we need to be thinking about

how we can add to it and how creative we can be and i think your suggestion are well taken. >>. >> can i also respond? the global entrepreneurship program at the state department, we are very engaged, i can assure you on entrepreneurship. gefentrepreneurs if you want to look us up. we don't have all of our followers on facebook. however we reach them through multiple media. we have an entrepreneur in residence in egypt and we're about to send one up as walter knows and now they went up in tunisia and morocco. we have been very active in jordan and other places. we just received his excellency, the king of jordan with a group of entrepreneurs where we brought in silicon valley investors to work with them, so on and owe, i could share with you any of that -- >> i was going give shelly a shout out because one of the things we've done here is we

served as a secretariat for partners of a new beginning which is what secretary clinton wanted to do, and condy rice with the palestinian partnership which sale was my co-chair, in which we tried to set up both jobs, entrepreneurship, economic investment and we were just in marrakesh, secretariiaiay albri and i can also speak as former head of the broadcasting board of governor, we have tools for people who want to and we worked with facebook, twitter and others that are too public to make sure it's safe and that fire walls can be broken and that anonymity can be assured when need be. all of that to create a sense of partnership with the u.s. and

the arab world in creating entrepreneurship and jobs and i urge you to talk to people here on the partners for a new beginning and what we tried to do and jim right next to you was in marrakesh two weeks ago, right, jim? >> i'm extremely familiar with the work that you're doing and what sally's doing and with all due respect it was not put in the book in arabic and you're doing extraordinary work in so many places where if you try to google it in arabic you can't find it and that you could have a force multiplier of leveraging of the economic investment in these kinds of fabulous programs that you're doing if you were to broadcast them you were to put them in arabic and they were widely broadcast. >> we'll have an intervention committee meeting next week in which crowd source translation

was translated into all of the languages. we're trying to work that out, but obviously, especially with the international broadcasting of the united states, it's done in all of the languages and we're standing that up. you're right. we have to be faster and more nimble on it and people like alex ross have been pushing hard for diplomacy 2.0 in multiple languages. karim of the carnegie endowment, correct? >> yes. thank you, dennis. my question, dennis is that the two enormous blows to both iran and hezbollah would be the fall of the assad regime in syria. i wanted to know if you think that the israelis have any ability covertly or overtly to expedite the fall of the assads and is that something that they would be willing to pursue if they did have that ability? >> you know, i would -- i would

not exaggerate the israeli ability in that respect. i would -- you know, my -- without knowing, my assumption is that you're much more likely to have arab states which are much more active in that regard than the israeli are and the israeli reach into syria is quite different and if you're going to see a change in the regime, i think it's coming. it's only a matter of time, but i do think the longer it takes the worse it is for everybody, and the worse it is for syria itself and the worse it is for all of syria's neighbors and the less likely you'll have a transition that you can manage. that's why i say it's important to accelerate the process of the change, and i think the more we can put pressure on the russians. if they really do want to

preserve their position in syria, they should be the ones that are seen as hoping to preside over the transition. they're the ones put in jeopardy. >> my name is abu kuzalam. today say very wonderful meeting and i want to ask the honorable dennis ross. they were for the democracy in the middle east, but at this moment what we are looking, that is going on, but there is nobody there taking care of the u.s. side to tackle the situation because what hosted them, now

jordan was doing the same thing and my question is abdullah jord jordan, he's agreeing to help us, but after this kind that is not controllable, who will be taking care of this situation? because all areas in the brotherhood in egypt and everywhere and we need some kind of special guidelines so that we can make a summit. can we make a summit for middle east peace process and another question is regarding israeli issue and israelis are always -- why? but it is lebanon and the southern part is -- the northern part is hezbollah and the southern part of lebanon is hamas, and if there is something wrong with iran then even after that, this, hezbollah and hamas will not stop. they will stop after that. thank you.

>> i thought you were going in a somewhat different direction. i was going to pick up on some of the points you were raising. i thought the first point you were raising was this question whether the u.s. has 14s and friends are not -- are not adopting the kinds of political reform postures that they might and ultimately we'll find that they'll become increasingly difficult. i do think that the -- and you're referring to the king of jordan who i was talking about is playing a very important role right now in the peace issue and that's a fact. i think he has been quite

mindful of getting in front of the reform process. i think he's trying to wrestle with the best ways to introduce it in jordan. he's looked at different models and he's looked at what's going on in morocco where you had elections and where you actually have a government that is -- or you have a prime minister who is from the party that won those elections and but that the king retained responsibility for religious affairs because in morocco much like in jordan you had leaders that were able to retrace their lineage to the prophet and because of that they do have a certain, i think, credibility and legitimacy, and i know that the king of jordan has looked at the moroccan example that is worth emulating. >> he's looked at the timing of

elections. i think that he is working on this, and i can tell you that i know from when i was in the administration that that we tal and i think that the administration talks in the very intensive way with him. these are -- none of these are simple problems that we faced with dilemmas, and you have to make choices, but there is a general direction that we have to be mindful of. and i do think that know one in the region immune from the kinds of changes that are taking place, so it makes sebs s sens to get out in front of the changes so that you are not a victim of the process and become part of the process. >> holly from the wood rorow cer and friends. >> and for the next four or five

next days, the king will be in town, the turkish foreign minister who is going to be in town, and is there a chance that, that the administration might use again turkey as a go between after the previous, you know, we won't call it fiasco, but misunderstanding. to really send a serious message to iran, number one. and number two, do you think that there is still a chance or possibility for engagement? >> on the second point, the answer is yes. i do. i don't think, again, i don't want to keep repeating the same point, but i don't speak for the administration, so the administration has plenty of spokespeople. i do think though that, you know, from the time i was in the administration until the time i

left, the administration closed the door to engagement ever. i also think that the, you know, the relationship with turkey has, it is i think a close relationship, and i have no doubt that there'll be a kind of extensive discussion when he is here on this issue as well as many others. i don't know that the administration is really anxious for the go betweens, but there is no doubt in my mind that the administration has consistently used a variety of different messengers, and one of the reason has the fact that the door to engagement was never close and the reason that the effort of engagement in the first year of the administration was intensive one at outreach was precisely because there was a fundamental concern that if you were going to have any possibility of producing a

diplomatic outcome, the united states needed to talk directly with the you he iranians interp to usk and us interpreting to them. there are a limited number of exceptions, but they were always on the specific issues and always episodic, and never systemic. and so i think that we need less go-betweens and the ability to talk directly with them. i think that when the administration shaped the strategy that was designed, you know, the initial effort wasn't designed to focus on how to pressure them, but the initial effort was designed to reach out. now, if they weren't being responsive, you could use the fact that you were reaching out the mobilize others and that is the vehicle for the pressure, but if you try to produce a diplomatic outcome, pressure is a means and not an end. the idea is that you leave a way out to see if the iranians are

prepared to take it. you and kareem are the last people i need to suggest this to, because you know the history better than i do, but it is a fact that khomeini was drinking poison from the chalice, and he understood the cost of not doing it. when the assassination of dissidents was going on in europe, they dropped the policy, because they decided that the price was too high to continue w with it. when they engaged with the suspension of enrichment in 2003 there was a time they thought they might be next, and i felt -- and many people debate this issue -- but they either acquiesced in the proposal at the same time that was real. whether they represented them or acquiesced in them or had knowledge of it, there were proposals that were presented

that were potentially interesting and maybe it was not real and i wrote about this, but i think that should have been tested. if it weren't real, you could have exposed it for not being real and if it was real, you would have had a different place, but the reason that they may have acquiesced in the proposal at the time which is by the way not only on the nuclear issue, but across the board is because after we had defeated the iraqi army in three weeks and an army they could not defeat and accept a cease-fire with after 8 1/2 years, they thought they were next. so there is a pattern here when the pressure is sufficient, they oseek seek a way out, and will they do it this time? i didn't know. but there is a context for a chance of diplomacy to succeed. i don't understand it is going to be simple. i also can envision what the character of that might look like and what some of the choices might be. i would certainly like to see that take place. >> and last question, my partner

of the u.s./palestinian partnership that we founded as well as the american task force on palestine. >> partner, mr. am bas dor, a pleasure to see you. you have mentioned of two measures that vick s thas that place, and one is the jordanian relations and the other one that has to do with the palestinian elections and is it my understanding that there is any degree of coordination between them and any possibility of conflict between these two separate initiatives? >> always a pleasure to see you as well. not surprising you have asked what i think is both an

interesting and kind of compelling question. once again, i will say that i don't know. i mean, you know, one of the things that again when it comes to this region, the notion of humility is not only called for but the readiness from time to time to actually say that you don't know, which is oftentimes an understated reality in this city, the truth is that i think that there's -- there's often good reasons to say you don't know. but i will come back to what i said earlier. you know, and you follow this as closely as anybody. we know how long the issue of reconciliation has been discussed. we know how long times announcements have been made about agreements. now it isn't to say that such an announcement may not actually be meaningful, and i don't know if this is one of those moments. it could be. you know, it could reflect the

better judgment that is being made or a reflection of a decision he has made, and he has said many times that he is not going to run in the next elections, and you also know that he talked earlier that he wants the elections by may. so, it is possible that he is doing this because he is serious about moving the elections in that time frame. so i don't know if this is like a case now. it could be that it's a case of keeping options open. i do know that it will be problematic when seen from this city, and i do know that it is twoing to be problematic when seen in israel. so, you know, i'm hoping that it is like some of the previous efforts that while it may be a step, it is not necessarily a step that, you know, where

everything is finalized, and i'm -- i remain quite hopeful that what the jordanians are doing can bear fruit and i think that it deserves a chance to bear fruit. >> as usual, dennis, absolutely fascinating. we thank you very much. [ applause ] >> thank you. >> those who want a little bit more information on our middle east programs, jim pickup is there, and dave cross and anybody else who is there, check with them and get more involved in the middle east programs. thank you all for doing this. i appreciate it.