facilities with chemicals is much better today than before congress gave dhs its first ever regulatory authority. unfortunately, my confidence in dhs and the substantial amount congress has given to it is not nearly as strong. someone compared it to an unmanned police car positioned at the side of a highway. it wards off speeders, but not much else. we need to be assure that dhs's cfats program has plan focused solely on correcting problems, implementing the program as drafted in law and not projecting the program should take on any other additional responsibilities. i mean, they better first do the responsibilities designed under law than to take on additional ones such as drinking water or ist issues. cfats is an appropriate component of the subcommittee's jurisdiction, and the days of oversight of this program are

over. i urge all members of this committee to join me in that effort. as a fellow u.s. military officer, i have a tremendous respect for the undersecretary bureau service to this country. that said, he and have i been taught there are only three acceptable responses when questioned by an officer. yes, sir, no, sir, and no excuse, sir. or sir, i don't understand. four. i expect no less than that today. i want to welcome undersecretary beers and wulfe who showed great courage with the frankness of the internal memo. mr. wulf, both of you should know the committee takes seriously pressure, intimidation or retaliation because of your testimony today while we continue to investigate these important issues. in other words, we really do appreciate this internal memo. i think it's been very, very

helpful. and we want to ensure those who came forward are not penalized for that. please let my committee staff right away if you have any concerns, retaliation, intimidation of congressional witnesses is illegal and will not be tolerated. mr. beers, i trust and ensure you are in agreement with me that no retaliation should be retaliated, and we will hold you and any other white house officials accountable to that. with that, i yield to the ranking member from texas, mr. green for five minutes for the purpose of offering his opening statement. >> thank you, mr. chairman, for ordering the hearing today. undersecretary beers requested an internal memo on the status of cfats program and approved recommendations in 2011. his memo was delivered to mr. beers in november of 2011, and it leaked to the media in a detailed story on december 23rd, 2011. i must say when i read the internal memo i was surprised and dismayed by the level of

dysfunction and the lack of progress within the cfats program. i almost as amayes mazed that discuss cfats program on the full invocation of the anti-terrorism act. the portion of the internal memo is related to challenges to implementing these priorities. i won't go into all the details, but it seems to me the root of the problem lies at the fact that dhs has hired people who are unqualified for their positions and was prohibited from hiring appropriate and qualified individuals and they had no training program to help those folks who were unqualified. this inappropriate hires along with a lack of proper training of the employees has forced dhs to reassigning and appropriating employees, relying on contractors to do the work that should be done by the agency. the memo outlined several priorities including the process for review, the site's security plants. at the time of the memo they had

received 4200 site security plans, and not a single plan was approved. i know that dhs is working to clear up all the tier 1 facilities, but it's been six years since the program was enacted, and we haven't even cleared the low-level facilities. how to conduct compliance and preparing staff to do the inspections. dhs has not conducted not a single compliance inspection. not that any of my industries i represent along the houston ship channel are looking for an inspector to come knocking on the door. but they have been working to comply in a substantial private investment. in some case we actually were able to receive grants through dhs for homeland security protection and our plant protection. but i must say that this proposal reinforces the problems identified in the internal memo, which mostly reinvolve around the fact that dhs is constantly making issues more complicated than they needed to be and not relying on existing systems such

as the twit card to work. what i'm speaking about is developing personal asurety programs. dhs transmitted a new personal assurety program to omd and i have plans about this problem, this proposal, and i'll discuss that later. one, because at earlier hearing in the subcommittee, i felt like i had some assurances that the twit card would be used as a standard id for someone working whether it be in waterside or land-based industry under cfats. my concern is additional personal surety programs will make the duplication of the cfats. that's one thing the committee needs to look at. last year the subcommittee hearing i asked undersecretary beers if the department intended to integrate twik into the program. i received a positive response, and yet the proposal does not make clear that twik is an acceptable background check. quite frankly now is not the time for dhs to go reinventing the wheel when implementing a

personal surety plan. the planned response including a plan of action for 85 items. i look forward to hearing from the witnesses today to confirm, but i believe several of the action items have been initiated or completed. to say the least i'm disheartened by the lack of progress in the cfats program which seems to stem from lack of appropriately assigned and trained employees. which seems to stem from the fact that no one knows if the program will be reauthorized by congress. chemical security is extremely important to our public health, particularly in the district i represent. i represent the houston ship channel, which is the heart of the petrochemical complex that stretches from the texas gulf coast and produces more products essential to modern life, and it's also the largest petrochemical complex in the country. i can't stress how important the success of cfats is for the communities that surround the facilities. they deserve the best security standards possible to prevent the act of terrorism on u.s.

soil. our role today is to listen to our witnesses and get a better understanding of the problem, and see how congress can assist. the agents recommended several legislative fix, and i'm hoping we on the committee can work together and find a compromise on how to assist dhs after hearing the suggestions and hearing from our stakeholders. the program is too important to our national security. to be this much in distress. mr. chairman, thank you for the time, and i yield back. >> the gentleman yields back his time. the chair looks to my colleagues on the right, if anyone would like time for an opening statement. hearing none, the chair will recognize the ranking member of the full committee, mr. waxman for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman, for calling on me. and more importantly for holding this hearing to examine the implementation by the department of homeland security of the chemical facility anti-terrorism program or standards.

the letters have been made into shorthand called cfats. this program is intended to address the threat of terrorism to the nation's chemical facilities. we'll hear testimony about its successes, but we're also going to hear about the program's many challenges. the cfats program was established in 2006. now almost six years later, it's clear that implementation has stumbled because of serious challenges and limitations in the program. undersecretary beers will testify about a detailed report that he received in november of last year. this report takes the form of a memorandum. and dhs also provided it to the committee. it paints a stark picture of this program. according to this memorandum, the program has been plagued by personnel issues, budget issues, and statutory limitations.

the challenge is described in the memo are serious, and they must be addressed. the department of homeland security has a plan to address the identified programs, and that plan deserves our careful scrutiny. this is a crucially important effort, and we must get it right. in some ways, the odds have always been stacked against this program. this program was created by a provision not authorized by this committee, but a writer of an appropriations bill. the program was not established with carefully crafted legislation that defined its mission and forged a vision for its implementation. it did not have adequate enforcement authorities. enforceable deadlines, or clear procedures for approving or disapproving site security plans. it never even had an authorization. in some ways it's fortunate that we've learned of these problems when we have, because this

committee can now return to this issue and do the hard work of understanding where the problems are and determining how to fix them. it's stunning to realize that this committee of congress, which has jurisdiction over this issue, reported legislation that simply rubber stamped the current program for seven additional years. we didn't really know how the program was working. we didn't give it any guidance. we didn't do our job. and that legislation needs to be revisited in late of this new information. i look forward to the testimony of undersecretary beers and learning more about the department's efforts to get this program on track. the department can take constructive actions, but it can only do so much. they cannot address shortcomings in the underlying statute. that task falls to us. as the committee of jurisdiction

and the committee that should have been involved in crafting the original provision. that is a responsibility we must take very seriously. i hope today's hear willing be part of an ongoing effort by this committee to address the serious challenges facing our chemical facility security program. this is an important issue. it deserves our attention. in the last congress, when i was chairman of the committee, we were working on a bipartisan basis. we brought in all the stakeholders to craft legislation to authorize the program. it was a major undertaking. we brought in industry. we brought in labor. we brought in everybody else that had a concern about this issue. we were consulting everyone throughout the process. that's the kind of type of undertaking we should begin anu. because what we saw this last year was not a furtherance

examination is of the program, but simply saying oh, it's already in effect for six years. we'll continue it down the road. and we hope it will do a good job. we've got more work to do than just sending our best wishes with a long period of authorization without doing a thorough examination to figure out how we can make this program work the way we intended it to, and the way it must to protect the security of the american people. thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back the time. >> and i thank you, mr. waxman, for your statement. i'd like to yield with permission of the committee to mr. barton for five minutes. but before i do, i would just like to say based upon my opening statement, i think mr. waxman's response was pretty much what i said. when problems are hid, you're going to face a swifter and more ferocious corrective response by congress. and that's really part of that concern. and i would also say we did have a hearing prior to the markup of

that bill where department of homeland security said things were going well. and obviously -- and industry. and obviously that is not the case either. so with that, i would like to yield five minutes to the chairman emeritus mr. barton. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'm not sure i'll take that time. if i don't, i'll be happy to yield it to anyone else who you wish it to be yielded to. i do appreciate you for holding this hearing, you and mr. green on the chemical anti-terrorist program, cfats. back in march of last year we discussed the concerns and dissatisfaction that the program had not met its goals. this program was set up to serve and protect the companies in the general public in the potential threat of terrorist activity. i was chairman of this committee back in the 109th congress, and one of the authors of the chemical facility anti-terrorism standard act that was included as section 550 of the department of homeland security

appropriation act for 2007. the intent was very clear. it was for the activity of the nation's businesses and its citizens against the threat of terrorism in these types of facilities. i understand that the program's got many facets and that the orchestration of a thorough implementation plan at an expedited pace could have challenges. but i don't seem to understand is how the undersecretary could be so unaware for so long of so many of the internal problems. why have employees been hired in managerial positions that don't have the skill set to full their jobs? the industry has invested billions of dollars to upgrade security to meet the cfats requirements. this is beyond disappointing. you have totally mismanaged this program, mr. undersecretary. we've spent about $90 million a year, and we have no well

developed direction and no plan. it's my understanding that you've received over 4200 site security plans to date, but not even one has been approved. now we have our differences on this committee and this subcommittee, and there were differences between the democrats and the republicans when this bill was put into law. but there is nobody, no one regardless of political affiliation that says if you receive 4200 site security plans, you don't even get one approved? not one? i mean -- when i read that a couple of days ago, i just was astounded. your own national protection programs directorate have prevented you from hiring personnel with the experience and qualification to review these programs. and to conduct the compliance inspections. you've allowed the hiring of an inappropriate staff and not taken control of your own

infrastructure security compliance division to fix this problem, and it's been three years. the administration of the cfats program must be fixed immediately to provide stability to the program and regulatory assurance to thousands of facilities, many of whom are members of the society of chemical manufactures and affiliates alliance. they have invested heavily in security measures over the past five years to attempt to be in compliance. i have to say one good thing. your office has been open and candid and transparent in providing the internal memorandum for committee staff to review that is one positive checkmark in your column. having said that, everything else in the negative, and everything else is black. it is time to get this thing done. if you can't do it, resign. if there are things that need to be fixed, tell us, and we'll try to do it. i think mr. waxman's opening statement was very good, as was

mr. shimkus's, which i wasn't here to hear, but i did read. with that, i have a minute left if you want to yield. >> let me reclaim that time and look to chairman emeritus to see if you would like to use the remainder of your time. >> most briefly, mr. chairman, thank you. i want to welcome our two witnesses and our panels today, secretary beers and wulf. i want to note that it is being conducted in a bipartisan fashion, something which merits high praise around this place. having said that, i look forward to the results of the hearing today. i would note that i have a number of these facilities in my district. and when they let go, as one did not long back, it causes lots of excitement. and it can cause significant numbers of casualties and

enormous hardships on the communities in which the facility might exist. so your labors and your leadership, mr. chairman, are much appreciated. and i look forward to the hearing going forward in the spirit in which it has begun, and in the hope that we will be able to see to it that we get these programs of widely differing character under different agencies to the point where they are pulling together and working together to accomplish the great purpose of seeing to it that we have safety and security for the country. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. , mr. dingell. the chair calls the honorable rand beers, the directorate at the department of homeland security, mr. david m.wulf, director of infrastructure security compliance division, office of infrastructure protection, national protection, and programs director at the us department homeland security.

as you know, excuse me, as you know, the testimony you're to be give is subject to title 18, section 1001 of the united states code. when holding an investigative hearing, this committee has the practice of taking testimony under oath. do you have any objection to testifying under oath? the chair then advises that you that under the rules of the house and the rules of the committee, you are entitled to be advised by counsel. do you desire to be advised by counsel during your testimony today? if that case, if you would please rise and raise your right hand, he will swear you in. do you swear that the testimony you're about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? you may now be seated. and it's my understanding that the only opening statement will be given by you, mr. secretary,

and mr. wulf is here to answer questions with regard to the internal. they're both going to give it. okay. it, okay. a change in direction from last night. mr. beers, if you would then -- you're recognized for five minutes to give your opening statement. >> thank you, chairman, and ranking member green and distinguished members of this committee. i'm pleased to be here before you today to discuss the department of homeland security's efforts to regulate the security of high-risk chemical facilities under the chemical facility anti-terrorism standards act. as you all are aware, the department's current statutory authority to implement this came about under section 550 of the fiscal year 2007 appropriations act, and it has been amended and recently to extend that authorization until october 4 of 2012. i believe strongly in the cfas

program, and i welcome the opportunity to continue to work with this committee, with the congress and all levels of government in the private sector to further improve this vital national security program. since the inception of cfas, we have initiated a basic rule, we've defined chemicals of interest, we've jointly conducted two surveys in the industry to define the facilities that have a substantial quantity of chemicals that caused them to be determined to be at high risk. after receiving the initial submissions from more than 40,000 facilities that might potentially be under the program, we've narrowed that down now to about 4500 covered facilities. and in the process of doing that, more than 1600 facilities, which would have fallen under the program, and 700 facilities -- 1600 facilities have totally removed their chemicals of interest, and 700

have reduced them to the point that they are no longer under the program. so i think we can say that these actions represent some of the successes that have happened with respect to this program, and the adoption of the regulation. so i think we can say that there has been a reduction in risk throughout the nation, and that the nation has correspondingly been made more secure. the department has done much work over the past few years to establish and implement this unprecedented program. but as the report suggests and as we acknowledge, cfas still has a number of challenges to address. in recognition of this, and upon the arrival of penny anderson and david wolf, i asked both of them to provide for my consideration the views on the successes and challenges of the program. candid, honest assessment and challenges to the program. these kinds of assessments are

extraordinarily valuable tools that we need in order to evaluate progress and determine where improvement is needed. in a program like cfas, corrections are to be expected and ongoing decisions will need to be made. in late november of 2011, a detailed report was hand-delivered to me. it is important to note that in addition to the reference challenges, the report also positive posed for my consideration a charted path that will address those challenges. specifically, the report included an action plan with detailed recommendations for addressing the issues identified, and we have shared those recommendations with this committ committee. since my receipt of this report, each of the numbers in the action plan have been assigned a number to the leadership team, and i have already seen progress on these issues.

for accountability planning tracking purposes, the members of the leadership team have been asked to provide milestones and a schedule for completion on each task assigned to them. the acting chief of staff will monitor that progress. in addition, they meet with my principal deputy, suzanne spalding, at least once a week to provide status updates to this program. mr. chairman, let me assure you, there will be no retaliation to the people who wrote this report, who have served me and you and this nation by frankly telling us where we had challenges and what we need to do about it. nor will i tolerate any retaliation between me and the office director and her deputy. you have my pledge on that and i expect to be held accountable to that issue. the department does take cfas

and the nation's security seriously, and we're going to move forward both quickly and strategically to address the challenges before us. again, we believe cfas is making the nation safer and we're dedicated to its success. we will make the necessary core changes to complete the program and protect the nation. thank you for holding this important hearing and i will be happy to answer any of your questions. >> thank you. i would like to recognize mr. wolf for five minutes. there might be a button. there you go. >> thank you. i would also like to thank the members of the committee for the opportunity to testify before you today. in july of last year, penny anderson and i assumed our positions as deputy -- as director and deputy director, respectively, of the infrastructure security compliance decision, or iscd, the area that monitors the cfas program. under the request that we apply

a fresh look at the program, we applied what we see to be the challenges and priorities to the program. both penny and i feel strongly that the challenges we have identified are not significant, but they are also not in seiz e insurmountable. i would also like to echo the undersecretary's focus on the action items. we've already made tangible progress in addressing some of the challenges in the report. one of the things in the report is the ability to cite security plan reviews in a consistent, reasonable and timely fashion. to help overcome task difficulties in meeting this challenge, iscd is utilizing an interim review process that allows the department to utilize plans in a more effective and timely manner. using this interim approach over the past few months, iscd has

more than been able to quadruple the number of the authorized plan. specifically throughout all of 2010 and through november 28, 2011, we had conditionally authorized ten site security plans. in the subsequent two months leading up to january 23rd of this year, we conditionally authorized an additional 43 tier 1 site security plans. iscd expects to complete our review of all tier 1 site security plans and to notify the facilities of iscd's decisions on those plans within the coming months. iscd also expects to begin giving authorizations to tier 2 facilities in the next 12 months. and we're also working on a more efficient long-term approach to plan reviews on tiers 2, 3 and 4. this is one example of how we've identified programmatic issues such as the lack of a review process and found workable solutions to ensure near term

improvements and progress as well as the long-term success of cfas. while not every action item will have a near term or simple solution, what i can tell you is that i'm very proud to represent the working men and women, and i'm confident of the ability to address these challenges together. i welcome your questions and look guaforward to working toger to encourage success of this national security program. >> thank you, mr. wulf. what i would ask, and i'm looking also at the staff, is i don't think we have a copy of that and some members already want to refer to that. if i can get you to grab a copy of that and copy it and get it distributed, because we did have the undersecretary's testimony for the record. with that i'd like to recognize myself to ask questions. i'm going to bounce around a little bit, but we're in a

fiscally strained environment. undersecretaries, you understand, and the challenges that will occur to our military. 45 billion to 90 billion a year that could be cut. we are going to be looking everywhere we can go to try to adjust dollars so we can meet the needs of the primary role of some of the federal government's operation. so let me start with just this whole -- this budget type question. the anderson/wulf memo states on page 15 that iscd tracks consumable supplies which creates an environment for fraud, waste and abuse. our concern is this is not an ito or gio saying, this is program managers describing their own program. how can a member of congress choose to fund a program that is