think that report came out, most of the pilot projects had run their -- had been concluded either governments have said they weren't going to continue to implement it or they actually had concluded for other reasons. so actually getting those cost estimates, that's the best we have right now. it's every that original data. >> okay. platform caldwell, just out of the recommendations that you all paid on a 1 to 100 scale, what percentage do you think they were implemented? i understand there's a give and take. they're not going to accept everything 100%. the way i see gao, inspector general, somebody that comes up with ideas, see it as a way to improve. how do we make it better. what would you say on a 1 to 100 scale roughly? >> i would say that you know, our goal within gao for example engaging with the executive branch and this is true with dhs as well is to get 80% of our

recommendations implemented. >> and in this specific case, what did they get roughly? >> this year we're not doing very well. in five recommendations, we maybe have two of them partial and the other three. i think also i mean, one of the rem days we made that they do a feasibility study was the statue rit authority in the safe port act. it was not just gao recommendations. >> you're saying it was a recommendation from y'all, there was a statuary requirement and they have not done it yet? >> that's correct. >> let me -- >> there's pieces of it, but they need to pull it together. i think the important thing is, some of that analysis that feeds that will be important even if we do the blanket waivers because under the waiver procedure, there's still reporting requirement that dhs talk to p about how they plantom achieve you know what they're doing to still trying to achieve

the 100% standing and if not, why not. so that's still some of the justification they're going to need in that analysis, sir. >> right. i think, madame chair members, this is a difficulty when there's a recommendation, there's a stu to youry requirement, how do we get your b buy-ing into this. in regard to the strategy required by the safe port act, statutory. the 2007 interim was 128 pages long, included details on topics such as finding the problem, strategic objecti objectives, the role of tool, the agency stakeholders roles and responsibilities, implementation of schedule, priority for milestones, recovery and trade, training and exercise requirements, but the report we just got last month had only six pages which means that there was very little discussion of those topics. i don't understand.

usually when you do an interim report, you build on it. in this one, you build and you took away. and i just don't understand how that comparison was made. i guess my time is up. but i'll pick whoever wants to -- mr. heyman, due to you go from details to now a six-page and i think the first was more of a summary, it was a managed report of a summary of a summary. how do you explain that? how do you build down instead of building up? >> it's a good question. i would just note. >> by the way, you saw the other six pages. this is the interim report. and then the -- the interim report, 127, 128 pages, you build up on the other one and again, i'm not saying maybe this is a perfect example of

streamlining. and efficiency and effectiveness. how do you go from an interim report that goes from the details we want to see as oversights and come up with this report here? >> so there's a -- pardon me, take a little bit of time on that answer. there's a couple things we've done differently here than the interim report that should be noted. the scale of the report goes beyond the maritime into all modes of transportation and includes resilience as a critical element and also looks to international engagement on a way that frankly is unprecedented. what we've done in the strategy document is to talk about building on these previous documents. so rather than regurgitate all of them, we've tried to make it as simple and straightforward as possible. that doesn't mean there's more behind it. there are implementation things that we're working on. we have a report to the president that we owe in a year and things like that.

i would hope that we wouldn't get lost in the length of it. in fact, i think eisenhower's strategy for world war ii was two words, europe first. but we have a lot of innings that go beyond that. we are, in fact, actually implementing it now things like the supply chain security initiative the secretary put forward that fits into the global strategy the president put forward and all of those things come together. >> i can summarize two words into one, when. what i'm saying is this is something that should be a guideline to what we're doing. and i'm just a little disturbed by what i'm seeing here, especially recommendations from mr. caldwell and not needing a lot of them but again, madame chair, thank you for indulging me on this very important issue. >> the chair will now recognize the ranking member of the committee mr. johnson. >> thank you very much, madame chair.

ple mr. mcaleenan, the this congressional law was to give us within a reasonable period of time 100% scans on container shipments coming to the u.s. where are we at this point in that 100%? >> in terms of a total percentage sir? >> yes. >> okay. our csi program covers 80% of global trade to the u.s. in terms of the actual scanning, we do about 45,000 inspections last year. through our csi port prior to ladying on vessels. that is a little bit less than

1% of the total cargo headed to the u.s. and then we scan an additional 4% upon arrival domestically in the united states. >> all right. in layman's terms, what percent cargo that's coming to the u.s. right now is not scanned? >> in the maritime environment in terms of physical scanning, that would be over 95%, the vast majority. >> all right. why not? >> well, we've been discussing with you, sir, and your committee for several years the complexities of this process and the tests that we've undertaken with sfi to examine the feasibility of the physical scanning in particular. at the same time, we've been aggressively pursuing it's a layered approach focused on the

targeting and intel, the coordination through csi with our foreign partners conduct those exams on high risk before they're loaded, working with the international committee on standards and so for the. >> i understand. but taking whatever you're doing to whether it's high risk shipments or anything like that, at this point in this hearing today, is there any shipments using your protocol that's come into the u.s. that we don't know what's in it? it's not a complex -- of what you're saying whether it's the layered approach, whether you're scanning, whether you're taking high risk, i want to know what the number is. >> we have stated contents on all shipments sent into the united states and through the isf ten plus 2 filing we also have the carrier explaining both

the location on the vessel of the container as well as the container status where it is in the process. the combination of those two data elements allowed us to istd any unmanifested containers upon a vessel and we address those with the carrier upon arrival. >> wait, hold it. so your testimony to this committee is that there's no container shipments coming to the u.s. that we don't know what's in it? >> sir, i think that's too strong a statement. what i've explained is that we have requirements. >> i understand requirements. are you doing 90% or are you doing 85%? are you doing 95%? i just want to know where we are so at 100% standard. and whatever protocols you're using, that's fine. but i want to know where the

gaps are right now. >> there are very little gaps on information. we have very high compliance. >> what's a little? give me a little. >> it's 24-hour compliance is over 94%. isf come lines is at 92%. that's where we get the information on the cargo shipments in the maritime environment. very high compliance on both of those programs. >> do you agree with that. >> yeah, almost 100% of all things coming to the united states are known to us in terms of what's in the man test, let's the lading, and we then use that information to do our risk analysis. >> so we are 99% of the container shipments that come to the u.s., it's your testimony before this committee, meets the requirement that we set forth in

the law. >> no, that's not what i was saying. what i was answering the question was whether we knew of all of the stuff that was coming to the united states and the answer is generally yes. >> when you say knew about, i'm not saying of all the stuff. do you know what's in the containers? >> yes. >> you do? 99%? >> yes. the question that the law puts forward as to whether the information that we receive is accurate and whether, in fact, somebody has tried to fraudulently put material into a container or misrepresent what's in a container and that's what we try to identify and in fact, we have done it to great success. about 11,200 narcotics seizures last year. >> i'm not askinging for that kind of data. i'm just trying to give the public the confidence that the law congress passed saying we want 100%, that you telling this

committee from what i understand that you're 99 percent there? >> no in terms of the 100% scanning mandate, congressman, that mandate as we have testified over a number of times over the last several years poses significant operational, diplomatic and techal challenges. >> where are you to do the 100%? what percent along the way are you? >> what my colleague has just testified to is we are doing prol 5%. >> 5%. >> approximately, yes. >> soing what are we doing for the other 95%? >> so those are what we've done, they go through the advanced targeting system to be identified as not part of a high risk containers that require additional inspebszs. the inspection process remember is first to look at whether the manifest is accurate, second to look at whether there's any

threat information, third to look at the opportunity for nonintrusive inspection and ultimately we may have to open that up. that's the most difficult, of course. >> but that's the process dhs put together? that was not the process that congress directed? >> actually, that's the process that was put in place for the pilot projects that congress asked us to do. >> but the pilot process are done, and so you've now taken that and made that the policy based on what you just said? >> i'm not sure i understand, sir. >>. >> mr. caldwell, let me ask the question of gao. are you comfortable with the responses you've heard that 99% of the cargo or container shipments coming to the u.s. we know what it is, know what's in

it? >> no. let me maybe interpret what i'm hearing here. >> no, no. >> no. >> don't interpret it. >> i'll stick with you into stick with the facts. you're not -- why are you not? >> for the majority of the containers we have the manifest. it doesn't look suspicious. that's where the scrutiny stops. in many cases, this may be a standard shipment from a manufacturer overseas into a target store here in the united states. textiles, anything else, but as far as assurance of what we know in there, we have the manifest. and the man tests only. >> other than the manifest, we don't know? >> that's correct, unlazy there's an actual scan. >> thank the gentleman. at this time, the chair will recognize the gentleman from the south carolina, mr. duncan. >> thank you, madame chairman.

let me just pause to say thank you for arranging a tour of the port of baltimore recently where i had an opportunity to witness some of the things that the ranking members are talking about with scrutiny of manifest, looking at country of origin, stops of the ship that's carrying the containers, possible interdiction, multiple places along the then the active screening there at the port for radioactive material, chemical and biological issues. and so when you think about the number of ports in this country and the number of containers that come in, i'm amazed that we're able to do as well as a job as we do. i commend the gentlemen that are doing that, implementing the policies of this country every day to keep us safe. so thank you and thanks for educating me. i guess the question i have is

that mcaleenan, i wasn't here for the introductions, madame chairman so i apologize. can cbp evetively screen high risk shipments in a way that expedites legitimate commerce? from what i saw, there is a stop and gun process. i know we've targeted certain containers and certain countries of origin and trying to do a very good job there. i'm very concerned the speed of commerce and expedition of that. so can you screen high risk shipments in a way that expedites legitimate commerce while at the same time insuring the safety of the united states? if you'll touch on that for me. >> yes, i believe we can, congressman and our layered approach is designed to do precisely just that. the vast majority of cargo that we determine to be low risk based on our analysis of intelligence, the information provided on those shipments our knowledge of supply chain and our knowledge of the parties involved in that transaction, these are released and sent to

their in of our economy right away. for those very small percentage of cargo we think might be risky sore we don't have enough information and want to take a further look at, we try to address that potential risk at the earliest possible time in the supply chain. 45,000 times last year, that was done before the cargo was even laden on the vessel in the foreign port. another 5% of the cargo is examined at the u.s. port of arrival. we try to do those examinations in the most efficient way possible. we use a nonintrusive inspection technology, the x-ray device that you probably saw at the port of baltimore to do the initial exams on cargo we determine might be high risk. that's a very quick process that we can scan the cargo efficiently. if the picture looks consistent with the commodity that we expect to be in that container, we're able to be allow that to

proceed into the commerce. it's only a tiny percentage that we do a full examination by emptying the container and looking at all the contents. that layered approach is designed to do exactly what you're asking about in terms of securing the trade. >> i appreciate you clarifying that. seemed like there was going to try to be a gotcha moment a minute ago asking for 100% or 99%. there's no way that any country in the world can fully screen every container. based on the shear number that are coming in this country. so i think scrutinizing the manifest, understanding the country of origin, understanding the history of that particular shipper or that particular manufacturer or that particular importer senior critical. and so watching y'all implement those different steps and saying this container came from x, yz country but it made stops at

country z and countryy before it came to the u.s., and maybe it was off loaded there and held for a while and then put on another container ship and tracking that container the whole way and understanding we need to pull that out of the line and scrutinize it a little bit further even to the point of possibly unpacking it is an amazing undertaking. and so trying to say a got chat moment of the 100% of the containers and we know everything that's in there, no, that's ridiculous. we don't know the how many towels are in there other than what the manifest says. but you guys do a tremendous job. madame chairman, we saw it looking for threats assessing those threats, and the question i have for mr. caldwell is in your estimate what do you think it would cost the government to fully implement 100% cargo screening? what's the dollar figure on that? >> we talked earlier about a figure of $20 billion, the same

figure we reported in 2009. >> $20 billion. it's unclear who would pay this in the safety port act and 9/11 act did not specify who would pay it, which is a large issue. >> the consumer is going to pay because importers and exporters pass that cost on. that's obvious to most folks. i'm out of time. i yield backing. >> at this time the chair wore recognize the gentle lady from california, miss sanchez. >> thank you, madame chair. you're doing a good job into thank you. so are you. i would first ask the gentle lady, i've had the privilege of being able to go and take a look having chaired this committee before, the subcommittee before to many of the ports abroad to see what conditions they work under. and i would just say that i think aside from trying to take

a look at some of the major ports we have here this committee might think about taking a look at the major ports that actually export to us and see what conditions there are. there's a big difference between mumbai, for example, the port of mumbai and singapore. and that allows us to understand just how -- it is difficult to get to this 100% scanning issue. in fact, as we just learned and we've known for a while that it's just 5% or so that we scan. and i understand the layered approach. i was one of the people who pushed the c-tpat for example. but still there's some uneasiness at least for me about relying on the manifest for majority of what's going on and just looking for abnormal patterns and risk analysis towards that, and then taking a look at that. so i think we're -- i think it's very difficult to get to 100%

screening, but at the same time, there's still a lot out there that we're missing. for example, it's my understanding that of the cargo at container security initiative ports determined to be high risk, customs and border protection scans are otherwise resolved 96% of the shipment that goes overseas. that meansing that 4% of those or in fiscal year 2011, a little under 2,000 shipments were high risk car goep that weren't examined before they arrived to the u.s. somebody who lives 20 minutes away from long beach la port, that's a big concern if there's a dirty bomb or something else in there, i want to push it out and have that happen out there. so that's one of the questions i have is can you please discuss that particular issue, and then my second question would be that

secretary napolitano has testified that the requirements of hr 1 recommended by the 9/11 commission could not be met for several reasons, including that the technology does not exist for 100% efficient and effective cargo screen. so is that the department's position today that we don't have the technology to do an efficient and effective fast 100% screening? and it's also my understanding that the domestic nuclear detection office is developing a plan for evaluating and testi testingtom mography if i as part of the advanced technology demonstration program. this program has been installed in freeport, bahamas, to demonstrate as a private public project in the operational environment. so has the department taken a look to see if they want to participate in this test to see if in fact, that technology

works and whether we can get it put in here to the u.s.? so those would be my three questions, madame chair. and i'll leave it to any of you to answer those. >> okay, i'll take your first, congresswoman. your numbers are correct on the 96% of exams accepted by our foreign partners in the csi ports for examination. the 4% there are changes sometimes in the timing of the request. some of our partners aren't able to respond during the hours that we need them to before the container is ladien. it does mean it gets lading without and i spekds even though we've asked for it lug. >> arrives at my long beach? >> that happened about 780 times last year out of the 10.5 million total cargo shipments to the u.s. a very tiny percentage we've targeted with csi but the foreign governments aren't able to respond. >> but it's still 2000.

if it happens to be one of those that gets put on a truck that goes through the 5 freeway in my neighborhood -- >> understood. the definition of high risk does not necessarily mean that it is a risky shipment. in fact, we have not found an explosive device or terrorist weapon in all of the shipments targeted. these are based on anomalies in the supply chain, intelligence factors and most of all of these inspections or vast majority result in no concern. so you know, to your point, we'd like to get to 100 responsiveness from our csi partners. the 96 level is our highest historically that we've achieved. we continue to work with our rnt pa to try to get to that 100% level in the csi ports. >> to get to your other two questions, first let me just agree with you. i would commend visits to these ports. if you've seen one port, you've seen one port. one of the things that's been challenging to us is that diversity. a terminal operation in one port

can be different from another terminal operation in the same port or even other ports. so in terms of the cost of the tool and things liking that, it's not just that. it's also how you configure your operations on the terminal, all of those things need to be factored into it. they're all problematic. >> because every port was made in a different way. you have a different footprint and you can't put the same standardization in. >> correct. they weren't designed for screening. >> this. >> exactly. furthermore, we've asked account challenge, of course, that we're -- we looking to doing this in foreign countries and the diplomatic challenges. we had i think in the pilot if you look at them, we had labor issues in south korea. weep had what i just described the operations, terminal operations were challenging in other ports, uk expressed that they were not interested in pursuing this. so there are foreign diplomatic challenges not just the it he can cal ones or the cost ones.

let me get to your second question about the technology. we have to look at technology as a possible solution down the road. we always want to look at that as a possible long-term solution. it helps drive down costs. it may increase efficiencies and also the speed through which goods flow through our ports. we are partnering with other agencies and within our own strategy looking to do additional investments in technology and technology development. we'll see where that goes in the long-term. >> so is it still the department's official position that the technology does not exist to do the 100% screening? >>. >> the technology that we have, well, no, there's technology that existeds today that has challenges all of the once that i just described lug and inincluding challenges i didn't describe such as false positives. >> right. could you answer for the record

the third question i had about the freeport situation, what you nope about it, whether you think you're going to get involved in that. i can't do that. >> the chair now recognizes mr. brown from georgia. >> thank you, chairman. this hearing it as well as many others have pointed out something i've long said here in this committee that the department of homeland security has it totally wrong. we're spending billions of dollars, in fact, i submit we're wasting billions of dollars looking for objects instead of looking for those who want to harm us. we would be much better off as a nation, much more secure as a nation if we would spend the money in human intelligence focusing on those who want to harm us. we've got to stop patting down grandma and children and start looking at airports for those who want to do us harm through aviation sector. we need to stop looking at all this technology to try to get to

100% when we can only get to 5%. really focusing on those int entis throughout the world that want to harm us. we're not doing that. we're wasting billions of taxpayer dollars and giving them a false sense of security. we're giving them a message that this country is going to be free from having dirty bombs as miss sanchez was talking about. quit wasting the taxpayers' money. it's actually preposterous to continue looking for objects. we need to totally change our focus, whether it's with shipping into our ports, across this country, around the world. we need to start focusing on those who want to harm us. having said that, i've got just a couple of questions. why is there such a lack of specifics in the administration's new national strategy for global supply chain security? anybody? >> the