highest level of fidelity for what we need to do to accomplish our interests in securing insuring the security and resilience of global supply chains. there is obviously a much richer, deeper problematic implementation that goes underneath that. what the strategy tries to convey is the idea of all of the preceding patrioticmatic and strategic efforts that have gone before that this strategy builds upon. and rather than belabor, you talk about all the authorities and everything that goes before that, we tried not to do that because we wanted people to read it. that said, we'd be happy to give you a more detailed brief at some point of all the things we're doing and have been accomplishing in the last year. >> please do because business has a great difficulty dealing with your lack of specifics. why is the administration spoken against the 100% scanning and in some cases it's even waived the

mandate but not requested that con res repeal the mandate? >> at this point, we are looking -- one of the things that we have done in the last several years which i think is important for people to recognize is put in place programs that actually allow us to do much better risk management, and if you look at the ats, which my colleague described, the advanced targeting center and the ten plus two which allows us to do much better analysis, we are probably, i don't know, eones, much further down the road in terms of our ability to identify high risk and bir dict high risk cargo than we were five years ago. and so in many regards, we're moving in the direction which allows us to be practical and responsible in the

implementation of the law. >> you as the finance committee, we've looked at a number of the tools that have been developed. you're utilizing some that are just sitting in warehouses. i would liking to have from the department a rundown of how much money has been spent on technologies that have been used and discarded as being effective and how much money has been even spent and not even utilized what's sitting in warehouses. if you would please provide those data for me, i'd be very interested to see those. because i know from a science committee perspective, there have been a lot of technological proposals that the department has purchased and have just never been deployed. but i encourage the department to change tracks. . we've got to focus on terrorism instead of focusing on objects.

psa's just takes great pleasure in talking about how many weapons have been -- have been found in the airports and talking about the successes that they've had, but we've let terrorists on airplanes. we're doing our job to keep america safe. the department is looking in the wrong direction looking at objects. we need to look at those people who want to destroy us and those people groups that want to destroy us. i'm not talking about looking at every muslim, every person frrn middle eastern descent. we need to look at terrorists instead of looking for the objects that the department of home line security is doing to you. we're wasting billions of taxpayer dollars in doing so. so i encourage the department to change track. i've told the secretary that she's wasting money and that the

whole philosophy of the department is totally wrong. we need to look at terrorists. we need to look at those people who want to harm us instead of trying to look at objects and keep them from coming into this country or getting on airplanes or ships or trains. we aren't even looking at those other things, just at aircraft. i yield back, madame chair. >> thank the gentleman. the chair now recognizes the young lady from texas, miss jackson lee. >> thank the chairman and the ranking member and to the witnesses. let me ask this first question of everyone. i was trying to catch the gentleman from georgia's comments about wasting money, but i know that you can't put a price in america on loss of life. obviously, the issue of property can sometimes generate enormous

catastrophic impact on communities. so let me ask the members of this panel, representing a number of entities that are involved in the i believe the requirement of the mandate of 100% cargo screening that was supposed to take place in january of 2012. secretary heyman, do you have the re sourcesources and please tell me that this is not in my area. you're here to talk about cargo screening and, et cetera. so it is your impression that the department has the resources, the money right now to make good on the mandate of the 100% screening cargo? >> no, ma'am. >> thank you. mr. of okay, we're always

getting this -- mr. mcaleenan. >> mcaleenan, right. >> yes, thank you. kevin, my good friend, no. >> that works. . >> a distinguished name. your answer to that please, sir. >> my answer would be the same, ma'am. >> okay. admiral? zukunft? >> we're not in the container screening but an element that wasn't introduced was the foreign port assessments. >> that's correct. >> over 153 nations, four that we don't do trade with, and such there's another piece of it. we're embedded with cbp. we screened 28.5 million people last year. getting back to the congressman from jar's question looking at those people. are there holes in the fence line in a foreign port where there are not good access control points where someone can enter that facility and then

introduce an object into a container. >> manifest. >> screening people, is there somebody on that vessel that may do the same? and then impose conditions of entry on those vessels that may enter a u.s. port. that comes down to let's not stop it at the terminal. so we currently have the resources to do these foreign assessments. we have roughly 60 individuals dedicated to perform port'sments. our challenge is the resources it would take to stop threats before it enters u.s. waters. that's where our rubber meets the road. >> so you have the personnel right now and you have the resources. is there a time when you might expect those resources to run out? >> not on port assessments. we've been able to advance those objectives working with foreign partners particularly in the european unit. >> this is under your coast

guard funding? into it is. >> mr. caldwell, you're likewise with the government accountability. do you think dhs made an assessment of the resources that they have to meet the mandate that was given to them? >>. >> not 100%, no ma'am. >> is anyone in your shop looking at that issue? that is part of what may be the potential problem, is it not? >> well, every year we do analyze the budgets to provide advice to congress to economies such as this. >> during the most recent budget that you've analyzed, what is your guess on that? and i say most recent one that we may have had because we don't have a budget as we speak. >> could i be very yes, you ca. >> the 2012 budget versus the 2011 budget was a 50% reduction in international cargo screening

requested from the administration. >> thank you very much. and requested from the administration and then ultimately what occurred? do you have a next step what they actually received? >> well, part of this was a shifting of funds from people in the ports like in the csi port back to the national targeting center. and from our perspective at gao, while we believe some people need to stay in those ports to have relationships with the host countries in general for the targeting purposes, that can be done more efficiently and cheaper at the national targeting center, man. >> if the chair would indulge me for one last question. a study produced indicated a 30-day closure of the port of new york, new jersey, would result in the an economic impact on the usgdp of almost $5 billion and loss of 50,000 jobs. whether in new york, in my

hometown of the port of houston, houston port or in any of the other major ports across the country a terrorist incident that closes our nation's ports would have a devastating economic effect in the u.s. and around the world. understanding these potential economic growth impact, potential economic impacts, can we afford not to increase the security of maritime cargo arriving on our shores? i want to point back to the assistant secretary and to the assistant commissioner. >> thank you for that, congresswom congresswoman. that's right. this is one of the reasons the strategy is being put forward. in fact, the disruptions to ports, the disruption to commerce and supply chain is going to happen at some point. we've seen it recently with the tsunami and the volcano and with terrorism. one of the things we've tried to do is to internationalize the solution, that is to say we have

gone to and are going to multilateral organization, flogs customs organization like ko, imo, universal postal union. we're working bilaterally and saying look, we need to raise standards. no one government, no one private sector firm, nobody can solve this on its own. it has to be a community effort. that's why one of the things we're going to be working on is to internationalize this. >> i've given up on 100% screening? >> we have. we are continuing to operate under the law. >> can mr. -- the commissioner just finish the answer to two of those that i posed in. >> okay. >> we must maintain our robust layered approach to enhance cargo security and we've got to continue to improve. we take the gao's comments seriously and would use them as mrs. wald well testified to improve our programs over the course of the past five or six years. the csi recommendation they made has saved us $35 million a year without diminishing our security

with the csi program. that's maintaining our structure and expanding it is absolutely essential. >> i thank the chair and the ranking member. i yield back. >> thank you gentle lady. the chair now recognizes the gentle lady from california, miss richardson. >> i'd like to thank chair woman miller and ranking member cuellar for my participation today in the hearing. i'd like to note that representative boy balker is the one who represents the port of los angeles and long beach which is known as the san me dro complex and it's the largest port in the united states of which i will be focusing my comments today. i also want to note for the record that at a full homeland security committee hearing on february 5th, 2010, i questioned secretary napolitano on the progress of the 100% container screening. on june 16th, 2011, as chair woman of the subcommittee on

emergency communicates preparedness and response, myself and committee members submitted a letter to the secretary regarding the impending deadline of the screening. and then again on march 3rd of 2011, i asked secretary napolitano about the 100% cargo screening. so this has been a concern of pine for quite some time. with all due respect to some of our folks here who are testifying, for those of us who live in these communities, the port complex itself is in mr. rohrabacher's district. however all the land portion and all of the impact report meaning trucks and activity for example in the port of long beach is in my district. so i take it pretty seriously. madame chair woman, for the record i would also like to point out that the not speculating ideas but according to the university of southern california's homeland secure center, a preliminary economic, a report was performed back in 2003 due to the strikes that we had, the labor strikes in 2003. and it was recorded at that time

that $1 billion a day was lost based upon the closure of our port. so with all due respect to the people ho are testifying when we say a number of 16, $20 billion, whatever it is, when you keep in mind that we lost $11 billion in 2003 and that was a labor issue. that wasn't even. if there were infrastructure damages. so i'm not putting aside the costs that we need to consider these costs which leads me to my first question. if you could do yes and no as much as possible, i'd appreciate it. mr. heyman, to your knowledge, has the department conducted a feasibility analysis based upon costs as mr. wald well as referenced? have you guys done that? yes or no? >> we have not done a if you feasibility study. >> thank you. my next question would be mr. heyman, to your none, have any steps been taken, are any steps

being taken at this time to achieve the safe port 9/11 act recommendations of 100% scanning in the department? >> yes, and we have submitted a report. we can make sure you get a copy of that. >> let me make sure you're clear on the question that i'm asking. this report will directly reflect what steps you're taking to achieve a 9/11 recommendations of 100% scanning? >> this report reflects all of the safe port requirements and how we are implementing it. >> and how you're working to achieve 100% scanning? >> the report talks about what we've done top achieve 100% scanning to this point. >> okay. commissioner, is it true that the cbp relies upon ot host governments with their customs personnel in relevant foreign countries to resolve issues of containers that are demand high

risk? >> yes, we work with host nation authorities that are sovereign in those ports and oftentimes, observe the examinations and participate. >> is it true that the cbp does not require scanning of these ports? >> is it true that you do not require scanning of the high risk containers out of these various ports, these foreign ports? >> our csi folks are operating with requests as opposed to requirement authority to and. >> so it is correct, my question, that you do not require scanning at these ports, is that correct? >> we do not have the authority to force a sovereign nation to take action on our behalf. >> again, building upon miss sanchez, it's true that 4% of the cargo identified at these ports have been identified as high risk and have arrived in the u.s. without being scanned? that's correct? >> that's correct 17 450u7b shipments last year. >> okay. plix heyman, you've testified about all these wonderful

international relationships. however, when i asked the secretary when i also asked the ambassador kirk in these trade agreements that we recently approved, was there any effort to work with these foreign countries to establish a scanning process? and the answer in both of those was no, didn't know, would get back to us. do you know anything different than that? >> i do not but i can get back to you if you'd like. >> finally, madame chair woman, i would just like to build upon mr. brown's request of not only requesting the information of the cost of some of the technology that's being done but to supply to the question to the folks testifying to supply details on what steps have been taken, what technology is currently being considered, when was that last reviewed and what future technologies are they considering to meet this question, which may require a classified answer. >> thank the gentle lady. the chair now recognizes --

>> did you accept? >> he >> yes, out objection. were you conclude zpld. >> yes. >> without objection, certainly. chair now recognizes miss hahn. >> thank you, madame chair and ranking member. i really am appreciative of this hearing as i mentioned to you yesterday on the floor.friend, and i have founded the port caucus here and in december, we actually sent a letter to the chair of the homeland security committee asking for a hearing such as this. and i'm very pleased that we're holding this. and i'm -- i've been very interested in the testimony, but i think sitting here this whole time and listening to the question and answer, i'm not feeling any better about where we are in this country in terms of port security. and i echo many of the comments

that my colleague, miss richardson just made. and while neither one of us actually represents the port of long beach or los angeles, those two ports we call them america's ports because it's about 44% of the trade that comes into this country comes through those port complexes. and both of our districts border those ports. many of our students live minutes from those ports and any attack, natural or manmade, would be devastating. and to the national economy as miss richardson said. in 2002, we had a labor dispute. everyone knew it was happening. there was already efforts under way to divert cargo from the west coast ports and yet, we were able to determine that it was a one to $2 billion a day hit to our national economy. so, and it lasted ten days.

so do the math and we know what that did. also, just not to our national economy but the global economy, but the global economy. we heard that many businesses throughout asia actually were extremely impacted by the loss of cargo moving during that ten days. some of the businesses we even heard never recovered from that. i think the threat to our national economy, the global economy and to lives is severe and i have real concerns. i always felt like the most vulnerable entry way through the country is through the sea ports. after 9/11, we focused on securing our airports, rightfully so. we did not take into account the cost or convenience. i think of the traveling public knew exactly what it would entail to make it through

security lines. they would have probably balked at what we were recommending. they knew it was for the safety of the traveling public and commerce. i don't feel we have done the same with our ports. i know there is a lot of vulnerability still. i would like to get to a greater percentage of scanning. i think that is imperative. i think by your testimony today, you have talked about, you know, a lot of what you are focusing on is the layered approach and knowing what is in the manifest. believing what is in the manifest and believing that when it reaches our shores, nothing has happened across the ocean to have tampered with any of that cargo. since we have implemented this, i know at the port of los angeles, there has been twice on the anniversary of 9/11, a national media company actually

ship depleted uranium through the ports. it was discovered in los angeles. also note since we implemented this, there have been a couple of containers that come in that harbored folks from other countries. one was 19 chinese in a container that was discovered by the longshoremen in los angeles. in terms of cost, you know, the cost that would impact our economy if something were to happen at one of the major ports is significant. we were spending, you know, a lot of money on our wars per month. $12 billion per month for both of our w afghanistan. we believe that was worth it. we believed it was worth it for the national security. i really think this is at that level and i feel like we are

fu vulnerable. you answered where we are with the screening. you heard from a lot of the members from the committee that we really are interested in seeing you get a higher percentage of scanning. let's talk about not if something happens, but let's talk about when something happens. it was touched on terms of recovering. i know i will introduce legislation that talks about all of our ports in the country having a recovery plan because i think that would make our ports less attractive to an attack if we knew they could get up and running. in the port caucus, we will talk about a recovery plan for all of our ports. what would you suggest that we look at in terms of what would be important for our major ports to get back up in business after

a major disruption? >> thank you, congresswoman for your thoughts on this subject. we take this seriously. we appreciate your seriousness about it as well. on the recovery side, it is noting is that has been embraced or as thought through as the prevention side. that is because largely we are very concerned about prevention and we have done less on the resilience side. in the united states, that is why we are taking an initiative and building in resilience internationally in the strategy. we have led the way partly through the apac forum of ensuring trade recovery procedures are put ine othe mai will do, and frankly the ports should consider, is having the appropriate information of when and where things can open so the

businesses can rely on the timing and recovery of a disruption. the sharing of information is one of the things we can do a lot more on as it pertains to e resilience of the ports. >> let me also ask about the point of origin. we have the manifest. it arrived at its point of destination. we are hoping for the best. that nothing has happened on our wide open seas. can any of you speak to that issue? are you 100% sure that when these containers leave their points of origin and they arrive at the destination that nothing has happened and what are we doing to ensure that? >> we try to make as certain as possible. that is part of the 10.2

filings. that allows us to see if they are accessible on theetermine i compromised under way. we do seal checks when they arrive. we are able to compare the seals by the importer or shipper. >> who does the seals checks? >> u.s. border as customs at the port of entry. this is a concern. it is something we take seriously. we work with our partners and coast guard as they approach the u.s. ports. >> do you do seal checks on all of the containers? >> no. we do targeted seal checks and random operations to ensure the integrity. >> that's what makes me nervous, too. it keeps me up at night. that random, you know, your best guess to where to check the seals. as more and more points will go

automated. i'm concern that the loading and unloading of our cargo by automation as opposed to real folks is also, i think, presents a bit of a risk. thank you. >> i want to thank all of the participation from the members today. it has been one of our -- we had great hearings, but this has been a good one. a lively one. a good discussion. i certainly want to thank all of the witnesses for your testimony. i sincerely want to thank you for your service to our nation. i know i speak on behalf of all of the members as we are, obviously, working in a very bipartisan fashion about national security. my staff gets sick of me saying this. i say it all the time. i try to remind myself that all of the issues the congress

faces, first is to provide for the common defense. that is in the preamble of the constitution. national security, homeland security. all of these things are always our priority. so, it has been very eye opening to hear about the dollars that would be involved in us getting to where we may want to get to. i think you can see again from the bipartisan standpoint that we are very cognizant of the challenges to ever get to 100%, whether or not it is feasible. we are waiting for the secretary to come forward to modify the current mandate or what have you. this sub committee is very interested in assisting you with the resources you need to do your jobs and the mission we have tasked you with. you are out there every single day. it is for us to prioritize our

spending here. again, i will say that from the bipartisan standpoint. it is interesting hearing the administration is proposing a 50% reduction to csi program. i understand what the makeup of all of that as well. it is expensive to have officers overseas. we are not looking for a sound byte here. we are trying to understand how we prioritize our spending and do what we need to do to keep the nation safe. particularly to our ports. i appreciate all of your testimony. with that, i would mention that the hearing record will be open for ten days. if there are any additional questions, we will get those as well. without objection, the sub committee stands adjourned. thank you very much.