time schedule tonight with the president sending his 2013 budget request to congress earlier this week will lead off with several hearings, breaking down the numbers. at 8:00 p.m. eastern, u.s. army secretary bob mchugh and chief of staff will discuss the white house budget. then about 10:20, they discuss the $3.8 trillion budget. and later on, ed gillespie, the former counselor for george w. bush speaks at the hispanic leadership conference. >> there is a new web site for american history tv where you can find our schedules and preview our upcoming programs, watch feet video from our regular weekly series as well as history tweets, history in the news, twitter, facebook and four-square. follow history tv all weekend every weekend on cspan-3.

or on line at cspan.org. they called the transition from u.s. to nato control a hail mary pass that was handled well by both sides. canadian royal air force charles bouchard spoke in an event on tuesday. air strikes began on march 18 last year and ended on october 31st, seven months later. >> gregts aetings and welcome t of you. we were just sitting briefly with president bouchard and decided that the title of this event should be liberating libya. there were other titles we came

up with, but they encapsulated the difficulty of leading a complex alliance operation of this sort, and ultimately the success of working that through. we're happy to have lieutenant governor -- excuse me -- i already -- i was already looking to your next career. lieutenant general charles bouchard who served as commander of libya military operations. it's great to have you with us, sir, you did play a very important role in the recent history of the alliance. it was last february when the u.n. security council condemned the use of lethal force by muammar gadhafi against protesters of libya, and on march 25, 2011, general bouchard assumed the role of commander, unified protecter. if you just think of the time that was involved from the beginning, u.n. security council

resolution to actual execution, i'm not sure who keeps records in these things, general, but i think a lot of records were set in just the expediency of it all. i do want to thank saab north america who are partners in this commander series, one of the most popular series, speaker series, we have at the atlanta council and board members enstedt who is president of saab north america. what we will be hearing is thoughts on the future not just of what happened but also if not the foreign remarks but also the q and a discussion of what all this means for future operations, nato partnerships, with the backdrop of fiscal constraints. after general bouchard's remarks, gary boutel, the head

of the security program here, which will be launched on international security this september, will moderate a discussion with the general berry who has joined us from a long and distinguishing career in the pentagon and the white house. i just want to say a couple things about general bouchar because his career has been a long and distinguished one leading up to this operation. he was in tactical aviation within the canadian air forces command which included flying positions in several squadrons, command of 44 technical squad in germany command of one wing kingston. he served importantly in the united states as deputy commander for the continental norad region on 9/11. on that historic day he was conducting air operations and standing duty at the tindall air force base on september 11,

2011. he would later become deputy commander from the first naval air division and from 2007 to 2009 receiving promotion on lieutenant general taking up the appointment. in 2009, he assumed the position of deputy commander allied joint force command naples, and of course, that's what led to his position as commander of operation unified protecter natos military prevention, libya. so thank you for being here, gentlemen. the podium is yours. [ applause ] >> well, good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. it is indeed a pleasure for me to be here today and tell you a little bit of the story of unified protecter and more importantly trying to put it in perspective of the lessons learned. i think it's important, fred did

talk about liberating libya, and the subtitle would probably be, you can't make this stuff up and some of the experience we've lived, and it's part, in fact, what this experience has been to us. for those of you who are familiar with the military, commanders have coins, and some of them are big enough to be belt buckles, some are smaller. we created a coin for the protecter. it's very thin, very small. it was built in my office. it's cheap and it's flexible. and in many ways, that is the story of unified protecter. quickly made, cheap and flexible. and that's probably the biggest points that i've got to talk about. i'll be discussing a little bit about the strategy that we went about for this mission, and then after that, i'll be talking about some of the major lessons learned. but for those of you who have

other duties and will have to go early, and for those of you who wish to take mental holidays, i'm going to leave you with three messages right off the start. the first one is that doctrine processes are for the wise and the blooeliever of fools and th wise. the next one is through communication. and fimnally the third point is agility of the mind. with agility of the mind, you can find that many difficult situations can be resolved. for some of you, this will be deja vu. you have heard some of this before, we have seen it before, and that's my point. will we ever learn? we have observed these lessons again. i was talking to my colleagues of this council over lunch today and some of them, we've seen these events before. when we learn it and how can we

make sure we've learned this part? finally the views i express are mine, and every day that goes by and we look at what we did in libya, i also think about the great warriors from many nations are doing every day in afghanistan and iraq and bosnia and other areas. and we think of all of them, but what i will offer to you are those lessons that came out of libya and how we work at it. it all started with odyssey dawn which was led by the united states coalition also joined by the u.k. and france. in fact, canada joined them as well, and they started the involvement as nato was in the process of building itself to do this. and it was led and the operation started. if you want to put a difference between odyssey dawn and unified protecter, you could, in fact, allude to the fact that odyssey dawn allowed us to gain air superiority.

in fact, nato was able to operate. but also odyssey dawn went after fixed targets by the time nato took over. we went hunting. we had to go and hunt for the people we had to deal with. and this created an interesting point. the legal basis for this is found in the united nations security council resolution 1970 and 1973 which provided us with three tasks, the most important one having been the protection of civilians and population center under attack or threat of attack. this drove the mission. from there we also had two additional tasks which was to conduct an embargo arms and, an embargo and a no-fly zone. by the time saddam turned back to us, we had a perfect storm brewing. the regime forces based in tripoli continued and regained

some of the initiative and made it all ashtabula. those based in bengazi were being shelled daily, so was zellah, and also in the brega area. finally, some under -- the population was truly oppressed. they were being regained slowly by the regime forces, at the same time mother nature got in there and sucked in all the information. we couldn't do some identification of targets very well because of the weather. mother nature has a vote in this process as well. also, regime forces changed our tactics. they got rid of their military

uniform, military equipment, and we found ourselves on both sides having the same equipment and both sides dressed in similar fashion. and, in fact, a lot of the equipment would shift back and forth within hours from one to the other. and it increased the difficulty of the mission as we went through. the last point that i'm going to talk about is in the transfer from odyssey dawn to unified protecter. to use a football analogy, it was a hail mary pass. and it was a long pass. but we caught the football and nato can catch footballs, by the way, and we were able to do it. but interestingly, a lot of the information that we had was privileged national information from one side, had to be transferred into nato, a nato organization. so the transfer of intelligence and information became an issue as well, and it's probably a

critical point we need to talk about, is exchange of information skpand the need to share, not the need to know. we looked at this problem given the tasks we had, and we established the tnc as bengazi. we knew if it fell, it would be very difficult and the population was under severe danger. regime forces had orders to kill every male between 17 and 40 years old as soon as they got into bengazi. that is the threat that was faced by the tnc and its people. tripoli was identified as the center of gravity for regime forces because orders remained and emanated from tripoli. the power remained there. finally, from a nato gravity was the alliance itself, making sure all of us would stick together. we looked at the problem, and because of the difficulty in identifying who was whom, in fact, it became difficult for us to get involved in any closing

battle. in fact, the strategy designed was to hit concentration forces, lines of communication, ammunition depos, maintenance depos, command and control notes. it's important we talk about it. the mission was the protection of civilians. the most difficult and complex ending to this would have been if, say, if islam had said i'm taking over for my father, i love the people, i will stop violence, it would have been good from a nato perspective, but in the long run, it would have been difficult to manage. as it were, the regime insisted until the last possible moment to inflict characters on the islam population. until october, orders were given to behead anyone seen as part of the tnc. so a threat of violence

remained, and it's important to understand that the regime fell and it took to go that far but that was not the end that we were looking at. we were looking at the end of hostility from the built-up area and the clear movement of humanitarian assistance. we provided our quarters out of naples, international headquarters. my chief of staff was a french army officer, two-star. head of my intelligence section was a turkish brigadier general. head of targeting was an italian brigadier general. head of plans and operations was a british officer and we had a greek officer in charge of the resource development. so this was a true nato headquarters. and it works. and we could make it. but there is some cultural differences that we must learn about to make these efforts take place. we formed the headquarters,

small one, 275 people. to put things in perspective, we ought to see dawn at 950. it was in northern italy with 300 people, that's it. so hence the very thin coin i've been talking about here, whereas a thousand people in a cpac operation would not be surprising. it was just south of naples and headed by an italian three-star. there were boots on the ground. they were libyan boots. libyan flip-flops, libyan running shoes. these were the libyan people, organized, trained, led, equipped. these were the people fighting for their freedom and these were people working to make sure they were not killed and they were working to make sure civilians were not hurt. as the campaign developed, and i told you a little about this

strategy, it evolved over time, over the mission. we were not the maritime component of the libyan forces, and also this was not a libyan air campaign. this was a combined and joint operation which involves many aspects of which the air component played a major part. and i think it was important. over the seven-month period, it evolved. the first aspects of it was really stabilizing the area, making sure that bengazi and ashtebay area were free of shelling. ashtebeah, on one side is a pipeline for oil, on the other side is a pipeline for water. it would be difficult to touch this without touching critical structure, which we did not want to hit. so it stabilized itself in the area, and in fact regime forces

decide to do break into the brega area. they were being shoveled every day and faced with being pushed into the maritime area. the number one priority was to keep open for the evacuation of wounded and also movement of the humanitarian movement in that city. finally, stabilizing the western mountains as well was important. from there the second evolution of this was a stable period where we saw forces being -- coming -- we saw the libyans organized themselves. some people confused that with a stale mate. it was not a stalemate, it have -- it was a matter of these folks organizing themselves into a cohesive manner. we saw movement from brega

towards cert and towards tripoli, and finally we saw the western mountain areas move toward tripoli as well, and that culminated in tripoli falling. tripoli fell at a much faster pace than we thought would happen, but it led us to a conclusion that, indeed, the people of libya wanted their freedom. but they were operating on a 90-day mandate and they were concerned that nato would stop. you know, you kind of hedge your bets on this one and you make sure people are going to stay or you make sure you're going to win. it was understandable but it fell. finally, cert and bengazi became the last area. but really, it was truly a much faster movement and pace of action as it went. interestingly enough, gadhafi

himself offered to go to cert in his last stand, and if we look at history a little bit, we also find that in iraq we saw similarity as he had chosen to go back to his own hometown as well, so it's interesting. now, to go back, and you now have a bit of our strategy, how it developed itself on the ground. let's talk a little bit about some of what we've learned there. i think it was peter sanga that said hope is not a strategy, nor is challah, but sometimes that's what you have to work with. it's about understanding, though, what hope means to someone and what enshallah means to someone, especially the people of libya. and we worked through that. nato has exercises and we sbe t internationally have exercises, but in many ways one of the recommendations made to nato is that we need to be more

agressive. we had the team from the joint welfare center come over from naples and he said we would have a problem do you happen indicati -- duplicating the kind of temp owe you're working under. and my reaction was, you should, understanding for some culturally to have an exercise that fails is not appropriate. so here again, we must understand the culture of the people that says, okay, let us work together, and, in fact, an exercise that pushes us to the limits so we can find the seam is the way to do it, not just coming close to it and declaring victory after that. and i think it's an important point to understand. nato, as fred mentioned, nato in the past was perhaps not as speedy as at this point. if we look at the bosnia example, from the time the united nations security resolution came in to the time troops were on the ground, it

took one year. in three weeks we developed four o plans, operational plans, in three states. essentially, a week before the operation started, i was asked to join my boss, force command naples, to report on mt. whitney. i talked to him and essentially said, congratulations, you're the commander. you're taking over in a week. come back tomorrow and tell me what the plan is going to look like. and that was the speed in which we went through it. if you look at it, we had to go through varied speedy processes. speedy processes in the planning where there is directions from the time the mission is executed. we had to find ourselves breaking processes, and, in fact, shortening them and going to crisis response management which caused some people -- and by the way, i talk about nations, i talk about people. there's no such thing as bad

people and good people. there are different cultures and a different approach to it, and what you have to understand is how these people react to the situation and how can we as a group make it happen. and this is where a lot of the processes, people would come to me and say, no, you're not following the process and you're not establishing according to doctrine and so on, and to me was doctrine was there to help us but doctrine wasn't written for libya, doctrine wasn't written for kosovo. it shouldn't become the doctrine of the next place. in fact, use it as a guide, as a tool, but don't become a slave to it because you will find yourself fighting the same old points again. it's a chaotic environment, by the way. it's not comfortable for a lot of folks to work in that. with all due respect to my italian colleagues, 18 months of driving in italy certainly prepared me well to understand chaotic environment. speed is of the essence, and when speed has to take over and

expedien expediency, then processes have to go on the side. remember, people were dying and we had to get on with this. that's probably the biggest part i want to talk about in this part of it. we also brought procedures and process many of the people who were working on the libyan campaign at experience in iraq, at experience in bosnia, at experience in afghanistan. the problem is you can't adapt libya to all of this. in fact, you must adapt yourself to it. in the early days, we had some difficulties managing that, difficulties in a sense that we hadn't shifted the paradigm yet and we needed to move on. wu with us it became important to say, this is libya. let's take what we've learned in all these other places, apply them where we can apply them, but in other places just ignore those points. examples: afghanistan has the ability to spend quite a bit of isr. there are people on the ground to give intelligence

information. we had no boot on the ground, no nato boots on the ground, and two predator orbits. so that tells you a little of the kind of intelligence we were getting or the sources we were getting from was limited in the beginning. also, the changing of the process. possibly identify a target as friend or, in this case, regime forces was a matter of minutes, not hours, of observation. and we went through this. probably what cost us the most was to adapt to our targeting processes. targeting process starts with intelligence and intelligence gathering. and you have to use work intelligence to do the job. we have national intelligence network. then these must be blended into either former coalition such as spy in canada and new zealand,

and if we did that, we left people involved in the strikes out, and this was not acceptable. we had to make sure intelligence would be provided to all of those who needed it. we needed to share intelligence. not need to know. truly, truly an important point. finally, because we were 28 nations under nato, but we also had four partners, sweden and three arab nations, actually, nato's secret had to be classified to mission secret itself which caused some problem as well. by the time you get to a mission secret, the level of intelligence that you're getting, and you can probably say you can question whether it's actionable intelligence you're receiving, the point here again is there are processes established but it's important to understand, and when it comes to a mission, intelligence must be shared with all equally because it was critical. and it's a page from general

horner in the first campaign in iraq is you cannot accept sas t casualties based on knowledge that may have been known but not known by somebody. we worked around it. we had to create our own fusion cell and that's probably the biggest point here for us, was to establish a place where all these various players would come in and actually share intelligence, turn it into actionable intelligence, first part. the second part is now that you have intelligence and you understand some of the points, where else can we go? we found also, and something we're not good at in the early days, is social networks today are a source of intelligence a great deal. people in libya taulk to each other via skype, they would post on youtubes, they send e-mails to each other, so there are social networks, web pages and the like, where we need to do mining as well and learn to work at this. i had a very small intelligence,

in fact, my social networks are consistent with three people. let's not only go with the traditional methods that we know, but what is today's environment? social networking, social media, how do we capitalize on that and get some effects out of that as well? then the targeting became the difference between -- or the progression that goes from the art of war to the science of war. the art of war, archman put things together, scientists take things apart. it was put -- the intelligence that we had, and then leak every target we had to the mission. if it was tied to a connection of a civilian, yes, we would do t but if you could not make a conne connectivity, and strategy became a point. so we went to this concept. it is not one done by one individual, it's done by a team. we had legal advisers, we had

political advisers, we had cultural advisers, we had public affai affairs, we had targeting specialists, we had operation specialists, it was a team effort. and the targeting was a team effort and truly important. and in many places, this became not only what are we going to do if we hit this target, what is the primary effect, but also, what could be the secondary and tertiary effect. let me give you a few examples from that, because to me these were examples that became important to me. i remember reading an article about -- i believe he worked for general petraeus in iraq, and he said, when the u.s. first arrived, we saw them as liberator. but over time we lost faith in them and it became problematic. to me, keeping trust and respect and confidence of the people of libya in nato was truly important. because we didn't want to do that. the u.s. saw general petraeus working for the army camp and after that, we said let's not

have to go through our hearts and mind. let's operate it from the very start and work throughout. the second example i talk to people, and plenty of examples whether it's in iraq or the balkans, especially in serbia, is if you break things, you'll have to rebuild them if you want the country to run at the end. so for us it became important not to touch any of the oil infrastructu infrastructure, the medical infrastructure, the electricity, the water, all of those important networks to keep this country together. by christmas this year, libya was able to go back to around 60% export of its oil. it's not about oil, it's about having a nation that can actually have its own funding source and find money from themselves instead of being supported by the international community, and with money will come prosperity, trade and stability and it's all part of it. so, again -- and it's about the welfare of the population. this was part of our mindset and really the second example. the third example is