captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2008 of the policy community, the academic community and the regional and politics of the region for the last few months. and really has posed a devil of a problem to all of us as we've watched a peaceful uprising turn into something quite brutal and had to stand by as an international community, trying to figure out how to respond effectively to the escalating bloodbath. and in order to try to discuss this, this extremely difficult problem, from the inside from the syrian perspective, not from washington's perspective, i brought together, and i'm delighted to be able to have brought together three of the leading scholars, of syrian politics. to give us some insights into the dynamics of syria's

uprising, where it came from. where it might be going. and how the regime is responding. we'll speak in the order that you see. my colleagues and friends down the table. our first speaker will be bassam haddad, direct ever of middle east studies program at george washington university. the founder of the arab studies journal. and most recently the co-founder of the excellent online journal, jeddilia.com. he's written a number of important contributions on syria. including the new book, "business networks: the political commentary of brilliance." and published an interesting essay called the "idiot's guide to fighting dictatorship while opposing military intervention." sorry, that was a long title. our next speaker will be ismael

at the school of oriental and african studies at the university of london. written two of what i believe to be the best books about political islam in egypt, particularly in cairo. and she's also spent a great deal of time living and working in syria. she in fact was in syria from november 2010 until the end of may of this year. and had some firsthand experience with the evolution of the protests in damascus. she has new article out called "syria's uprising" in the journal studies in ethnicity and nationalism and quite a bit more coming out on syria in the months and years to come. finally, steven hideman, the senior adviser for middle east initiatives at the u.s. institute for peace. he previously directed the center of democracy at georgetown university, taught at

columbia university and is the author of the book, "authoritarianism in syria." and recently the author of "a policy brief from the brookings institution called upgrading authoritarianism" which i think to this day is the single best resource in understanding how arab regimes have responded to challenge these faced from below. i asked each of our speakers to speak about ten minutes and i'll ask them questions from the podium and we'll have some dialogue back and forth for a while. i might have a few remarks of my own to contribute, i usually do. and then we'll open it up to questions from the audience. for now, hassam, the floor is yours. could you come to the podium. >> always. >> we're standing up? >> yes, it's easier.

thank you all for coming, thanks, mark for putting this together. an inviting us to this discussion. i'm hoping the best part of the discussion will be actually the discussion afterwards. the q&a. it is perhaps absolutely impossible for me to say anything that i would like to say in ten minutes, because it's a very short time. so what i will be doing is touching on the four themes that i prepared to discuss in almost bullet-point form. starting with the caveat that as we all know, uprisings are complex. however, the syrian uprise something particularly complex, especially because it plays a pivotal role in various historical struggles in the middle east. and it's at the heart of a lot of these intersecting conflicts. this explains to a large extent, the protract the nature of the

syrian uprising and the undesirable nature of nearly all tradeoffs that one can come up with today. so we are no longer looking at what is a better outcome or solution than the other. we're looking at what is less horrible. and we are doing so, and sorry, if we are not doing so, i think we will be a fair amount of disillusionment as to what is going on inside syria and around syria. i will pose four questions and try to answer them in this, which is an impossible task. and the questions are, what explains the syrian uprising in terms of the structural effects. what is key, in other words. what explains the resilience of the regime. why is there stalemate and then where are we going? i will start by the structural effects or causes of the uprising. i will not talk about all the causes. i will focus on one key

structural element which is usually diluted by all of the politics and major stakes that most people have in the conflict. and that is, basically, the question or the answer for me is the issue of what i call dual polarization. which is very much what i have researched for more than 14 years in the book that was just publi published. and that is, we have in syria, historically over the past 25 years at least, an economic change or reform process led by the regime and its partners, which is a select group of private-sector moguls. we have a process of economic change that created two kinds of polarization in the syrian society. first, it created a polarization between the have's and the have not's and acute manner. in other words, i cannot unpack this very much at this point. but it polarized society between rich and poor, if you will. to an extent that is

unprecedented in syria's history. after the 1950s. and it also polarized society in regional terms between the country side and the rural areas, whereby most of the invets and most of the development took place in the city and the urban corridors, especially the major metropolitan cities, including of course, damascus at the expense of the countryside. this is a development which is post 1986. so what we have in effect is two, two kinds of polarizations that hit the countryside the hardest and the small cities the hardest. in such a way that produced a, a situation that was literally becoming, was becoming unbearable in the early 2000s. and a drought that caused at least the migration from the countryside to the cities.

of at least 1.2 million people over the several years after the 2003. and of course, the numbers can be adjusted always according to new finds. the point is that most of the smaller cities that and towns that absorbed or tried to absorb the migration, had a lot of trouble doing so. including cities like homs and then on the coast at some level. but damascus was better equipped and had better infrastructure, a higher standard of living, in terms of families able to absorb this migration in such a way, they were able to hold up a little bit more. after that, the effect of the iraqi capital that came from iraq in 2003 and boosted specifically the damascus in terms of real estate and other matters before actually returning to cause problems later on at the end of the decade. so we have a situation where the country side was ready to

explode. and it is no wonder why the uprising is strongest in the country side, started in the country side, and is most intense for reasons that have to do with the level of discontent that was reached at that time, actually throughout the 2000s, but certainly in 2010. now 2010-2011. now what i would like to move to is from this basic understanding is what is key to understanding the uprising, i would like to move to the question of the resilience of the regime. let me just say first, that there is, this is by no means a compl complex, sorry, comprehensive account of the causes. but without understanding this particular structural cause, it's very difficult to understand what is transpiring and its base nature and so on. what is causing resilience of

the regime. if you would like a brief response over and beyond a lot of the politics of the situation, we should look at the two levels, the regime of course and society where from the opposition must come. so at the level of the regime, we have observed over and over, that the syrian regime historically and today, is far more -- organic and far more cohesive and coherent than a lot of the regimes in the region. it doesn't mean it's the most cohesive and coherent and organic. it has this trait whereby it's very difficult to separate the parts of the regime in syria as you would be able to in egypt. in egypt you have to some extent, a modicum of autonomy for the army and also for other parts of the regime. and this can be debated to the extent in terms of the extent to which the autonomy of these institutions of the regimes in egypt exist.

but certainly in syria, the autonomy of the different parts of the regime. whether we're talking about bureaucracy, army, security services and the top leadership, it's very difficult to try to institutions. had makes it very difficult for a solution which is akin to egypt and tunisia's quote-unquote solution, where the head of state departs, as a result of some sort of bargain, usually pushed by the security services or the army. in syria, this is literally impossible. at least it will not be effective. because the regime is considered, is actually one and the same with its institution. with its institutions. and it's very difficult to imagine a scenario where the army, certainly not the army, but even the security services or the republican guard or what have you will come and say to the head of state, that as a result of what's happening and to avoid further escalation, and to preserve the regime, the head of state must leave. this scenario is just not possible in syria.

because of this organic nature of the regime. at the same time well before i go to the society, this issue of organic leadership or, sorry, not organite organic leadership organic regime structure. on the side of society we have in syria, to be brief because i know my colleagues will be discussing this at some level. at the level of society we have a remarkable hetero generics. if you do the math, the demographically, which i don't think is always the most productive thing, but if you do the math, things sound a lot more balanced than one would think. you talk to lot of people and they emphasize the 10% ruling over everyone. the picture is much more complex and even though the state or the

regime is allawi in constitution, we don't have something akin to the apartheid south african state where the white population rules the majority via policies that only benefit the white minority. things are a lot more nuanced in syria. the minorities, whether alongside the allawis who have developed an interest in the status quo, if not the regime. these are not regime-lovers, these are people who are very cognizant of the fact that they might fare better under a minority regime than a majority regime. whether this perception is true or false is another matter. then after that the question of sunni urban merchants and other social groups that are supportive of the regime because they have benefitted from the regime. you get a picture that is a bit more balanced. at the same time the hetero gl

jenitity of the society creates problems, as we have seen in the case of syria. not so much inside sirria because under bullets and bombs, the opposition for the most part has been able to focus on the prize, focus on the main issues. whereas the opposition outside syria has actually been very divisive and is actually in my view, going to this disintegrate even more with time. now i can't talk any more because i need to drink something. is this diabetes, when you -- i have to get it checked out. >> that will give you another three minutes. okay. thank you, mark. so between the coherence at the top and the head heterogenity we have a stalemate. the stalemate what causes it, is certainly structurally attributed to this kind of

opposition between the coherence of the regime and the heterogenity in society and the collective action. and we have a strategic set of variables that explain the stalemate in syria today. the regime on the one hand from the beginning of the opposition has not gained a significant power, actually it has stayed where it is or dwindled in power for various reasons. the regime in many ways as by the week has been losing ground in terms of its control of various territories in syria. sometimes because of strategic reasons. the regime just pulls out of certain territories in order to actually maximize its effect in territories where sees conflict arising. or it needs to suppress the opposition. a lot of these times the regime is actually also could be strained by its ability rely on the most loyal forces that it deploys to basically crush the

opposition from the beginning. the higher up you go in the apparatus in syria, the more the regime is likely to rely on its officers. the lower you go in terms of the 300,000 strong army, the less it's able to rely on the loyalty of its officers to shoot civilians. hence, it must be careful in terms of its economy of deployment of resources and troops. so the regime is losing ground in various ways territorily. but more importantly, if you looks at the question of power and you break it down in two kinds, the physical material and the nonphysical material one. it's holding up the physical material one. it is undergoing problems, logistically. but this is not something that we can completely assert. but it's less important. what's more important is the nonmaterial dimension of power. which is the question of authority and the ability to

govern. the regime is no longer able to govern the entire territory of syria. not just because it's withdrawing from certain territories. even in territories where it has not withdrawn from, it has lost the ability to governor. and a lot of people are missing the point in terms of this question of being able to govern. once you are not able to govern, basically you must actually govern by force in ways that are even much more brutal than in the past 40 years where the tick tickdic dictatorial regime, the ability to make things happen has been severely compromised. and that is actually very much part of its weakness, which is increasing by the week. no matter what people say about the regime is holding on, it is

holding on. but the edges and in terms of the soft power, it is certainly not gaining in power. one thing that allows it to gain in power is foreign intervention and threat. one of the keys here. now the opposition on the other hand, is gaining in power in various ways. gaining in power in terms of people who are fighting and in terms of coordination between people. and actually gaining in power, the more the regime kills protesters, so this is a very tough dynamic whereby for the regime in fact, where it's actually in this place where it must respond as far as it is concerned. and its responses are producing more deaths that are increasing the power of the opposition, an opposition which is becoming more trained. whether or not there are infiltrators, conspirators and so on. i agree that this is taking place, exaggerated by the critics. i think most of the opposition locally are fighting a regime that has suppressed the

opposition for four decades. beyond the fact we can discuss four things. we're talk about how this might be broken. my last point because i was asked to stop. is where is the uprising going? and i've said this several times before. i'm getting sick of hearing myself say it. and that is, we are now witnessing the transformation of the syrian revolution or uprising from a legitimate fight against dictatorship, against authoritarianism to an occasion for a regional and international attempt to restructure power relations in the region. so we have a situation where this is not simply about syria any more. this makes it very difficult for people who wish to fight the dictatorship that has existed for decades. but also are not keen on bringing an alternative that will involve what can be called replacing a local dictatorship in syria with a regional

dictatorship run by saurm, qatar and the united states, which have always pushed for authoritarian, for the most part in the past 40, 50 years for authoritarian regimes that crush their populations. and recently, the last accomplishment of this problematic access is to crush the opposition in bahrain in the name of i don't know what. so we have to take things not at face value when we talk about opposing the syrian dictatorsh p dictatorship. we should not think of it as a humanitarian effort only. thank you. >> i'm pleased to be here, thank you very much, mark for inviting

me. i want to speak up from where, on some of the issues raised by bassam, i probably would be providing a slightly different narrative. first of all, this talk is part of a comparative study for a more academic presentation that i'm giving next month on the urban revolutions in the arab world and i'm looking at both cairo and damascus. so i will just speak to the damascus part and i'll let you know what i'm trying to do here. basically, i want to deal with a number of questions that emerged in reference to the geography of the uprising. the one set of arguments that have put forward, one is that the uprising is a sunni protest against the allawi rule. but some had addressed this to some extent. two, that the uprising is a peripheral uprising that's taking place only on the periphery. i think this is the argument also put forward by bassam,

which i will differ with to some extent. and the uprising is rural. again, i would differ with that. it seems to me, and there is much emphasis on the sectarian dimension. the sunni uprising against the allawi rule and this expresses a kind of sectarian conflict. i would disagree with that. i would say on the surface it appears and if we look into, into other dynamics, if we focus on the urban setting. by virtue of patterns of population movement, the rural, urban migration and the problems of settlement in syrian cities, there's a question of why is damascus quiet. i would say damascus is not quiet at all. there are three types of urban areas that where we see protest and mobilization in damascus, one in the traditional quarters. in the historical kurdish

quarter. one of the oldest quarters of damascus outside the old city. so the extra area and another area as well. we find a great is called, on the edge of the city, particularly, two the quarters in the north, i put forward the names, barzai and kabun on the northern gate of damascus the these have also been in therising. if you just google them or are in the face book pages, you'll see great mobilization, people in their 100,000s going out every single day. we have every single day, students going out for a thmonstration. are largely peaceful. however the so-called free syrian army.

is now providing some protection in some of these areas. in the third area, just what is referred to as rural damascus. which is really on the edge of damascus and extension. so areas further down in what is known as other areas, these are the rural hinterland of damascus. much of it has actually been urbanized and has seen great movement of damascus. so a lot of damascus people would tell you damascus now has 20% of its original inhabitants. we can differ on the numbers, but 50% of places like harasta, to 25% of other places in the western region. and part of the explanation why we've seen movement in those places, the people know each other. there is a tightly-knit community.

network, that's made it easier for them to mobilize. the same goesmedan. here we actually talking about lower middle classes as well as middle classes who have been against the regime. that position is not against the regime as allawi, but for economic reasons. the practices of exclusion. now we see who is supporting the regime in the cities. and i pick two quarters in damascus who we call the lawyers or a group that we love you camp. and these are in mezza 8 6 or another area. these are two peripheral communities that have been brought in or set up, urban establishment that are predominantly allawi if not allawi.

and they came because they came with army divisions and settled there. they were settled there. and particularly if we talk to another area, 0en a land that belongs to the bardsa people, there's been conflict over land and title. the conflict is not sectarian. however of course when you're looking at it, well of course you're saying there's allawis against sunnis, but they have hi historical grudges. the regime is functions on the basis of basic relies on the military. so if the members of the military happen to large extent to be allawi, not because you know, perhaps there have been favoring or there are other reasons, economic reasons for instance many of the allawi villagers in latakia had to be abandoned because there was no economic development in them. and the only avenue of work for them was to join the army. below officer rank. and they were set in those areas

by people like assad, and no integration into the urban economy. and i must say also about other rural migrants have not been integrated into the urban economy, either. but they work in the informal economy. unlike many of the allawi who is came to work in the state. first generation works in the state and the army and the public sector, second generation get to be the thug who crush the demonstrators, who these are divisions in the urban setting that can be read sectarian, but we should look at them as socio political and economic and functionalized by the regime in sectarian terms, there are no sunnis or allawis who hate each other because they differ on religious matters. there may be some references, but on the whole, you know, if you talk to the population at large you will find out this is not a religious matter, it's a socio political and economic

matter. my only reading of the regime. the regime functions on the basis of violence. it did that for 40 years. its main mechanism has been the massacre and the prison or the detention center. so it has done that against the entire population. this has been reasons for suppression protest, but alsoup. so the violence we see today is a continuation of that. what can we say about other areas, mobilization, in the rural hinterland. many damascus people have moved there. we're talking about workshop owners. kind of self-employed in workshops that have two to three people. tied to the economy producing for the large merchants.

the liberalization has hurt them and that has been a variable for them. a long process of exclusion. i think we can say if we're talking economic firms, only the upper strata of society is supporting the regime or continuing to stand on the side. there's been an ongoing differentiation in merchant classes, so middle ranks, lower ranks of the merchant. workshop producers and so on. these have been excluded for long time and we're seeing now the complete disengagement from the regime. we're seeing the urban corridors have been peripheralize and have engaged in the informal economy. as opposed to the regime. so -- i just want to conclude i th