these were large rafts piled with kindling and logs soaked with oil which the confederates lit. veering to avoid one of them the hartford ran aground under the grounds of fort st. philip, a confed rlt tug pushed a raft. flames climbed up the hollow and shot half way up the mast. i thought it was all up with us, farragut wrote but after a few secs of confusion the crew began pulling hoses on the ship. the quick thinking signal officer, the same man who had talked farragut down from the rigging rolled three shells to the side of a deck and pushed them over the side into the blazing raft blowing it into fragments. the hoses finally doused the fire. the engineers applied all power

to back the ship off the mud and she proceeded on up river. after treating some wounded men below the hartford surgeon came back on deck again where as he wrote in his journal i saw a big river steamboat coming straight for us. decks were black with armed men. the forecast of men by marines immediately planted a shell in the advancing steamboat, he wrote. he must have gone straight to a boiler or magazine for there was an explosion. the most feared confederate vessel was the css manassas which was actually the first iron clad to have gone into action on the lower mississippi the previous october. it was a small river steamer cut down and sheathed in one inch of

iron so that it looked like a turtle shell. in a letter to his wife farragut described what happened. after we passed the forts i saw the ram, that's what they called it, the ram coming up. i hailed smith, commander of the big side wheeler uss mississippi and told him to run her down. smith turned the ship and they ran at each other. we all looked on with intense anxiety. within 50 yards the enemy's heart failed him and he turned to the right and ran on shore. smith poured in abroad side. he fired down stream and soon sank. as a side bar to this sinking, the lieutenant who conned the

mississippi in this confrontation was 24-year-old george dewey who would sale into manila bay to earn his admiral stripes 36 years later. 14 of the 17 union ships at new orleans made it past the forts. and only one was sunk. the confederates lost seven of their eight gun boats plus the manassas. the remaining confederate gun boat was later captured and the southerners blew up the uss louisiana to prevent its capture. 147 wounded, farragut's fleet won a victory. that was incomplete until new orleans was in their possession.

at mid morning, farragut ron ronde -- farragut decided to continue upriver and attack the city. the confederate troops that had been stationed in new orleans earlier had been called upriver to tennessee to meet the union threat there arch grant had captured fort donaldson leaving behind only local militia which fled at the approach of the fleet. the city was virtually defenseless except for two with 14 guns flanking the river at chalmette, three miles down stream from new orleans where andrew jackson had stopped the british in 1815, but nothing was going to stop faragut. five of his ships including the hartford came on firing first

with their bow guns and then veering to fire crushing broad sides into the works. in 20 minutes the confederate guns were silenced. those who could run, farragut reported to secretary of the navy, were running in every direction, cut off and isolated down river with butlers troops finally approaching the forts, the garrison at fort jackson mutinied and both forts surrendered to porter and the navy ships that had remained there. farragut led the fleet to new orleans where they found the ships on the water front burning and thousands of bails of cotton floating down the river also on fire destroyed by confederates to prevent the capture. mobs threatened the yankees with

bloody vengeance. george washington cable witnessed the fury of this mob. the crowds on the levee howled and screamed with rage, he recalled. the swurming decks answered never a word. one standing with lanyard in hand so plain to view that you could see him smile silently patted the breach and blandly grinned. with nav trained on its streets new orleans sullenly surrendered and butler's troops finally arrive to preserve some kind of order. if the passage of the forts by the union fleet under farragut was not quite the night the war was lost as a title of a modern book would have it, the capture

of new orleans was argbly the most important union victory of 1862 and one of the most important in the entire war. southern newspapers bemoaned the great disaster and humiliation, sudden shock, unexpected and heavy blow, deplorable calamity, by far the most serious reverse of the war. the fire eating secessionist edman roughen of virginia who proudly claimed to have fired the first shot lamented in his diary, i cannot help admitting the possibility of the subjugation of the southern states. far away in london young henry

adams returned to the american ligation from a spring time walk in hyde park to find his father, charles francis adams, american minister to the court of st. james dancing across the floor and shouting we've got new orleans. the effect of this news here, henry added, has been greater than anything yet. the confederate envoy in britain, james mason, virginiaen also wrote from london that the fall of new orleans will certainly exercise a depressing influence here for intervention. it was the climatic event in the series of union victories that winter and spring that talked about this morning that jackson's campaign began to turn around. but the fall of new orleans at the end of april was the

climatic event in a series of union victories that winter and spring which dampened even the french emperor's pro confederate sympathies. the american minister to france noted there is little more said about the propriity of an early recognition of the south. farragut did not intend to rest on his loyals. his original orders instructed him take advantage of the panic to push a strong force up the river and take their defenses in the rear. you will also reduce the fortifications which defend mobile bay and turn them over to the army to be held, a tall order, indeed, as future events would demonstrate. farragut would have preferred to attack mobile before going up the mississippi. he was a blue water sailor.

never really happy confined by river banks with mud or sand bars uncomfortbly close under his keel but his orders specified priority for opening the river before attacking mobile. so he informed wells in early may i have sent seven gun boats up the river to keep up the panic as far as possible. the large ships, i fear, will not be able to go higher than baton rouge. in fact, as we'll see in a moment, they did go much higher than that but he thought they could not. while i sent the smaller vessels under commander samuel phillips lead, also a virginiaen, a loyal union commander, the smaller vessels under commander samuel phillips lead as high as vicksburg.

these force the surrender of baton rouge. when lee reaches vicksburg and demanded its cupitchulation the governor sent a cheeky reply. mississippians don't know and refuse to learn how to surrender to any enemy. if they can teach them, let them come and try. farragut would soon come and try. he decided to take most of the fleet up to vicksburg, including a large sea going sloots of war at a fairly high stage of the river. and that's late spring. but he was not happy about this prospect. in letters to his wife he complained of the navy department's pressure on him in ignorance of the difficulties he faced. they will keep us in the river until the vessels break down and

the reputation we made is evaporated. the government appears to think we can do anything. fighting is nothing to the river. to secretary wells farragut reported the elements of destruction to the navy in this river are beyond anything i have encountered. more anchors lost and vesseled ruined than any i have seen in a lifetime. no doubt an exaggeration. and wells' reaction to this letter is unknown. he knew that farragut would be named the first rear admiral in the history. wells told farragut we know that the job of capturing vicksburg

will be challenging but we also know you can do anything and are about to become an admiral so go do it. so farragut took his beloved flagship to vicksburg in june, 1862. and when i will go back down again god only knows he wrote to one of his naval colleagues. it appears the department is under the belief that it is easier for me to encounter the mississippi and ascend a thousand miles against a strong current than it is to come down the stream. farragut's reference here was to andrew foot and charles e davis and to the western flotilla of iron clad river boats and

supported by the september clads which had worked with the army on the tennessee and cumberland rivers and moved into the mississippi where they helped capture island number ten and had destroyed the confederate river defense fleet at memphis and captured that city in early june, 1862. foot had been wounded in the ankle at fort donaldson and by may, 1862 his wound was giving him so much trouble that he took a leave and was replaced by charles davis. at the end of june and beginning of july the two fleets met in vicksburg. davis coming from above and farragut from below which had become the principal bastion on the mississippi. deciding to test vicksburg's

defenses farragut repeated by steaming up with broad sides ablazing. the river was too difficult to navigate at night at that stage of the water. the river was now dropping so they had to begin this maneuver at dawn on june 28. all but three ships made it past the batteries at the cost of about ten men killed in the fleet. farragut was lucky not to be win of them. for the hartford he reported was riddled from stem to stern. farragut had just climbed down from his favorite spot when the enemy cut to shrouds above his head, the same shot that hoisted my flag he informed his wife which dropped to half mast.

this caused the other vessels to think that i had been killed. this experience convinced farragut that while the fleet could drive gunners from their weapons they return to them as soon as they passed. naval guns and mortars could not knock out all of the enemies dug in batteries at vicksburg nor could they capture the town and hold it against confederate infantry, 15,000 of whom under major general earl were reported to be in the vicinity. i am satisfied, farragut wrote to wells that it is not possible for us to take vicksburg without an army force of 12 to 15,000 men. general butler had sent 3,000 soldiers with the fleet but they were far too few to do anything but to start digging a canal between the loops of the river

in the hope it would create a new channel. farragut wrote to general helic whose 100,000 men had occupied mississippi and asked for enough troops to help capture vicksburg in a combined operation with the navy. not for the last time would helic prove himself to be general can't be done in response to such requests from the navy. he replied to farragut the weakness of my -- while waiting for a reply from helic farragut began to fret about the dropping level of the river which threatened to strand his deep draft vessels a thousand miles from south water during the summer heat that was taking a toll on the sailors and army

soldiers trying to dig the canal. so were the ravages of malaria, diarrhea, the captain of the uss richmond was depressed by the prospect of being stuck in the river for the rest of the summer as he put it, smitten with insects, heat intolerable, fevers, chills and dysentery. farragut and charles davis were concerned about reports and rumors concerning an iron clad, the css arkansas which was almost completed and ready to come into the mississippi to challenge the union fleet at vicksburg. davis and farrgut sent three gun boats on a scout on july 15. they found the arkansas to their

regret for she was coming down with the ten guns blazing damaging two of the union gun boats and sending the third fleeing before her. as the arkansas emerged into the mississippi she found both union fleets at anchor with their steam down to conserve scarce coal. as the arkansas passed through the gauntlet of inert union ships they fired at her but couldn't stop her. in return as commander isaac brown of the arkansas later wrote, his vessel fired back to every point in the circumference without fear of hitting a friend or missing an enemy. she finally reached the protection of vicksburg batteries below the union fleet. it was an impressive achievement but a costly one. in the fights on the mississippi the arkansas lost 25 men killed and 28 wounded.

the scene around the gun deck up on our arrival was ghastly and . blood and brains bespattered everything while arms and legs and headless trunks were strewn about. general van doren praised the arkansas's exploit as the most brilliant ever recorded in naval annals. it seems a bit over the top, but at least it was acutely embarrassing to farragut and his fleet. the fleet surgeon on the heartford admitted they had been caught wgs with our breaches down." farragut reported the incident to wells with what he confessed was deep mort fication. he was determined to destroy the arkansas whatever it took. that evening he led his own fleet down river past vicksburg again hoping to blow the crippled arkansas out of the water but couldn't spot her in the gathering darkness.

this failure only whetted farragut's wrath. he intended, he said, to try to destroy her until my squadron is destroyed or she is. there's no rest of the wicked until she is destroyed. farragut persuaded a reluctant captain davis to send one of his iron-clads and especially designed timber-clad under the vicksburg guns to ram the arkansas while farragut's fleet would bombard the vicksburg battery toss keep down their fire. this union attack occurred on july 22nd. the two northern vessels hit the arkansas glancing blows which at first appeared not to have done significant damage. but they evidently cracked the engine's connecting rods, potentially deranging the arkansas's weak and unreliable engines. two weeks later when the arkansas steamed down river to

support a confederate infantry attack on the garrison at baton rouge, the connecting rods broke and the arkansas's crew blew her up to prevent her capture by union gun boats. the arkansas had been able to get that far down river as baton rouge because the navy department had finally sent farragut the welcome orders to take his fleet down to new orleans and then with part of it out into the gulf of mexico to avoid being stranded in the river as the water continued to drop. we don't know where we will be next, farragut informed his wife, but just so that we are on salt water i shall be satisfied and hope not to grumble at the face that will take me out of a fresh water river. the failure to take vicksburg in july 1862 was part of a succession of union failures in the second half of that year

which arrested the union momentum that had crested with farragut's capture of new orleans and the river navy's capture of memphis. for the time being, the con fed rates owned the mississippi river between vicksburg and port hudson which they also fortified. but farragut's achievements in 1862 had set the stage for the campaigns that captured these two bastions the following year and cleaved the confederacy in twain. farragut was well on his way toward becoming one of the pre-eminent union heroes of the war, and the first full admiral in american history. thank you and i'll try to answer your questions. [ applause ]

>> oh, come on. >> let me ask the audience a question while general mount castle is going to one of the mikes. how many of you suspected that jim mcpherson was going to nominate david farragut? we got one vote. >> how much do you think the efforts of the carondolet at new madron assisted farragut's activities in new orleans? by pulling some of the confederate forces up? >> that was an important faq torment because originally the confederates had created what they called a river defense fleet down in new orleans, 14 vessels, which could have given farragut a lot of trouble.

but they were called up river, six of them were center up river. i think ultimately this was a decision by confederate secretary of the navy steven mallory and then endorsed by jefferson davis. so those six vessels had been sent up to contest the union fleet's effort to capture island number 10 near new madrid, missouri. this is in late march. that lessened the opposition to farragut at the fleet below. so it's another example, i think, of what lincoln was trying to get all his commander toss do was to move time up tapiously against confederate defenses so they would have to thin out those defenses rather than just one at a time. and so clearly, i think, the simultaneous advance by the upper river fleet, union fleerkts and especially at island number 10, was of a

material aid to farragut's effort, no question about it. >> i was struck also by the similarity, at least in my mind, of the tactics used at the island 10, the carondolet running at night, et cetera, and use of the mortar rounds. >> that's right. now, the union fleet was learning these tactics of running the fort. actually the commander of the union fleet at island number ten, charles davis, who had replaced andrew hallfoote, was very reluctant to allow the carondolet to go. and henry walker who was the commander of the ship had volunteered and said we can do it. and he did. general john pope, who was the army commander there in vesting island number of 10 said he needed a second gun boat. davis was again reluctant but finally agreed to allow the uss

pittsburgh. these are both iver-clads built by charles eades at the end of 1861 and 1862. they had captured fort henry, helped with the capture of fort donaldson. those two gun boats made it possible for the pope's army to trap the entire garrison at island number ten and capture there. so these tactics of running enemy fortifications, or attacking and running them which would go back to 1861 the union navy were bearing a lot of fruit on the river here in 1862. >> dr. mcpherson, thinking about some of the examples that you provide in your great study "battle cry of freedom" are the individual decisions made by people like david farragut, tennessee-born, virginia not bred but wed, why do you think

that as many officers, especially of the naval forces, marines and sailors, made the decision in 1861 to stay with the old flag? >> there are some other good examples of that, too. i mentioned samuel phillips lee although he had married into the blair family, maryland family but he was also a virginiaen. principal dreighton is one of my favorite examples. his brother thomas was actually a confederate general defending fort walker in port royal bay when percival dreighton -- came from a wealthy south carolina family but remained loyal to the union. i think that one of the reasons why you find a fairly substantial number of naval officers doing that is that they had spent much of their life at

s sea. as representing the united states. rather than living on shore in the south where their allegiance might be more to the local or state body politic. and as a consequent, they had spent in farragut's case 50 years under the american flag, most of it away from the united states. and they had a more national outlook, a more national perspective, i think, than some of their counterparts. i think that's especially true in the case of percival dreighton compared with his brother thomas. >> you took us through to july of 1862. what was farragut doing for the