the federal forces would bump into forces commanded by -- brigadier general robert garnett. they would defeat the confederates in july 1861 all those rosekrantz that did all the heavy lifting in this campaign, it was mcclellan that had access to the reporters. it was mcclellan's name that got into the newspapers. and immediately after the union defeat at mannasses junction, first bull run as they called it in the northern papers or bull run, the battle at bull run, he got an order from washington to report immediately to washington. he was needed there right away. so he boarded a train that took him up through ohio over to pennsylvania. made a quick stop to visit with his wife ellen marcy mcclellan, mary ellen there in philadelphia his hometown where he was loudly hailed as a hero one and all.

and then arrived in washington on the 26th of july. very, very exciting for someone in his mid 30s. this gentleman right here. i think that probably his letters describe best what it was like in washington in july 1861. because after meeting with the president, the commanding general of the army about that time quite elderly and infirm winfield scott and a number of influential members of congress, he sat down that night to write as he did almost every night to his wife at home who was waiting for him in pennsylvania. and here's what he said to ellen. "i find myself in a new and strange position here. president, cabinet, general scott and all deferring to me. by some strange operation of magic, i seem to have become the

power of the land." mcclellan then set to work right away to try and bring some order out of the chaos that represented the u.s. army in and around washington. you had people whose three-month enlistments was running out. militia units like the hoity toity 7th of new york were going home and others just arriving. the great mass of enthusiastic volunteers who were arriving in the washington area by the fall you had over 80,000 federal troops around there. mcclellan actively pursued a campaign to get regular army officers assigned to his department there, the defenses of washington, which was called at that point "the military division of the potomac". and he used all those engineering skills that he had honed at west point and mexico, and he had observed in crimea to

build fortifications around washington and to construct controlling areas, drill field and so north parts of the city. the newspapers began to refer to him as the young napoleon. well, he was young. and he wasn't very tall. and he did have a tendency to put his hand in his coat whenever the photographers asked him to. throughout the fall of 1861, this ever-growing field force of soldiers in washington, troops and their rookie officers reading hardy's infantry tactics at night and going out to practice it in the morning went through what we would call the school of the soldier. his troops began to call him not the young napoleon, but they referred to him family as little mack. you could see little mack riding through the camps with typically an entourage, sabres and spurs jing ling, a whole troop of

cavalry behind him, staff officers eager to be seen with the great man. his horse was named daniel webster [ laughter ] >> the troops learned that. and he -- during this period he did his very best to incull kate a sense of mission in those soldiers. historian ethan matthews in his book "mcclellan's war, subtitled the failure of moderation in the struggle for the union." makes a good point when he writes this. "mcclellan did not want fear of punishment to be the primary force motivating the efforts of his men. mcclellan recognized that the american citizen soldier was a member of the political community, sensitive to his rights, and would not tolerate the brutish discipline to which soldiers in the european armies had been accustomed for centuries. mcclellan's soldiers had his

orders of the day read to them by their own immediate commanders at the evening formation. they heard word like these from their general. "i'm to watch over you as the parent over his children. and you know that your general loves you from the depths of his heart." they believed him. they believed him. and for the most part, they responded in kind. in fact, the young napoleon established an emotional bond. long before this bonding business got started, the guy that sells me gas says "we're really bonding now, aren't we?" i say, "well, not really, i just like your coffee. the gas is okay but the coffee's better." but this was a bond. just like this. this loyalty to their first commander would lead the veterans of the army of the

potomac to erect this striking monument on some of the same ground where they drilled endlessly in the late part of 1861. this is where he organized those soldiers, where he taught those soldiers, where he molded them in the image that he had for his army. this loyalty to their first command commander would only grow even as he found it harder and harder to do the things he wanted to do when he wanted to do them. because there was another actor, in fact several, one being the commander in chief and another being the commanding general of the army at that time, winfield scott. and mcclellan became so frustrated late in 1861 with having to submit everything by way of order or plan through

winfield scott's small staff which then took a long time to approve it. and this was what winfield scott wanted to do. he wanted to see what was going on even though he was in no longer in the position. he weighed almost 300 pounds by this point and couldn't ride a horse. to go to see what the army was actually about. finally it became obvious to winfield scott and all around him it was time for him to turn over the rein toss a much younger man. so his request for retirement was approved in late october 1861 as he left on a train up to west point the military academy where he would live out his days, a new order arrived for mcclellan. he was now appointed commanding general of the entire united states army. remember, he's only 35 years old. he's now commanding all of the federal forces. in response to president lincoln's express concern, here's your commission and i'm really worried that you can't do

all this [ laughter ] >> the young general looked back at the president and said simply, "i can do it all." and so given that, the assurance that "i can do it all" they moved forward together. but it wasn't long before they began to see things differently. lincoln disagreed with what he was hearing from mcclellan about an appropriate strategy for union offensives in the east along the atlantic seaboard and also out west. concerns abounded in the government then at the end of 1861, the start of '62, about the continued presence of a si under joseph e. johnston near mannases and g e into winter ca. they were moving into the neighborhood. they were establishing different camps with a little sign saying "first texas this way, 15th

south carolina that knows whene in southerners. get it up in their mind to just attack washington one night. kill us in our beds. they got to be cleaned out. this is a nest of vipers at mannases. then the pesky confederate artillery batteries that had been established along the potomac. in 1861 when honest ship captains couldn't sail their vessels up and down the potomac from fear of being shot full of hole by those pesky rebels. they had to be cleaned out. then of course the third leg in this stool that created such concern was the baltimore and ohio railroad, bringing critically-needed sup across the edge of virginia, northwestern virginia, into maryland. passing by harper's ferry. dissatisfaction with the pace of mcclellan's movements, especially those in the east, were particularly acute in the

congress where after the unfortunate situation that occurred in ball's bluff in the fall of 1861, they formed a committee, a joint committee on the conduct of the war and began to demand that the younghill an was going to win the war in the next spring campaign. mcclellan really these people in congress. then, as now, united states congress didn't include very many members who had any personal experience of man nufrg troops or even living in the mcclellan felt agrieved at this. as he wrote to his wife, "makes me feel heavy at heart when i see the weakness and the unfitness of the poor beings who control the destiny of our country." this is not from a gallup poll

[ laughter ] >> we should note that in all honesty, mcclellan didn't get along with the congress, although they did all right with the democrats. and the bloom was off the rose a bit in his relationship with his former business partner or business associate from illinois, abraham lincoln. it's about this time that he began occasionally to refer to the president in letters to his wife ellen as "the original guerilla." for their part, many members of congress were just as equally out of love with mcclellan. and they just thought, i'm not sure this young man has the fortitude to fight. he's a good talker, but is he a fighter? in december 1861, the progress that was being made was dealt quitse came down with a serious case of typhoid fever. basically he was in bed for

three weeks. during this time, abe lincoln, being constantly pounded by his cabinet and by the republicans, decided "i better move on by myself if mcclellan is too sick to do so." so he invited all mcclellan's subordinate generals up for a conference. how would you defeat the confederates? and how would you defeat the confederates? but doing so very effectively forced little mack's hand. so he got himself out of his sick bed in january 1862, met with the president and the cabinet, laid out his plan for the capture of the confederate capitol here in richmond and the defeat of the confederate forces defending richmond. he told them that his plan would involve defeating the enemy's capacity to make war, and he would do so through the use of maneuver as opposed to costly head-long assaults against confederate bastions.

the seizure of what were known as strategic points by the napoleonic scholars of the day would enable him to grab the initiative and force the confederates to respond to his initiatives. and what he laid out then was a giant flanking attack. not a head-long assault from washington right down the telegraph road along the line of richmond, fredricksburg, potomac railroad to richmond. no, he would go down the chesapeake bay after touching base at fort rest monroe at hampton which never, ever surrendered to the confederates. his plan was then to move up to the rapahac and go ashore someplace like urbana and then move inland cutting off joe johnston's forces there around mannases and centerville. he said he'd need 140,000 soldier toss do that. andusly priority navy

assets to move them down the bay through virginia. well, that concept troubled lincoln and his newly-appointed secretary of war, edward stanton. it appear toss them that the army of the potomac could actually do a better job of protecting washington and defeating the confederate forces in northern virginia by attacking head long into mannases. clean out those camps and then head south. by way of fredricksburg. or alternatively, move southwest down toward cullpepper, orange, go donesville, and cut that virginia central railroad line that was bringing so much sustenance from what was already called the bread basket of the confederacy in 1862. the shenandoah valley to retch monday. the second time he went back with his whole staff engineers and so forth, he laid out that concept.

then they reluctantly agreed to it. but although they did approve to his concept of this turning movement through the chesapeake bay, they insisted that before he removed his forces from washington he agreed to leave enough forces there to defend washington in 1862. and that insistence on a garrison force, a defense force around the nation's capitol, would move to be a recurring irritant between mcclellan in the field, secretary of war stanton and the president throughout 18 2. and he -- 1862. he would not be the only general to have that discussion with people in the washington area. before mack's plan to go sailing off down the chesapeake with all those soldiers could be put into place, however, abraham lincoln had one of two shots in his quiver yet to fire. so in 27 january, 1862, he issued -- president lincoln issued general war order number one which mandated offensive

action by all elements of the u.s. army and the u.s. navy by the end of february. he followed this up with a special war order number one, requiring mcclellan to take the army of the potomac from washington, at least parts of it, and attack to clear mannases and centerville of all those confederate forces, again by the end of february. mcclellan responded by ordering his western field commanders, general halec at that point, subordinate's people like general grant, beull, to follow up on the successes in early february at forts henry and donaldson, move into eastern tennessee, move in the upper mississippi. he ordered segments of the army of the potomac to move out to mannases. they would do so in early march. but in every case he urged

caution. in other words, well, to put it in modern army jargon, our current strategy calls for this, don't do nothing dumb [ laughter ] >> in other words, be careful of your flanks. tidy flanks would be important. not wanting to find himself isolated in northern virginia when joe johnston heard about all this activity, especially the fact that there was going to be a major attempt to move down the chesapeake bay, he said, i am very vulnerable here. and quick pointed out, jo joe johnston had no intention of attacking washington. in fact, he didn't really like to attack anyone. so he withdrew. he withdrew more precipitously than jeff davis thought he was going to withdraw. when he did withdraw his forces from mannases and centerville they left mountains of supplies he didn't have any way of moving out. those supplies were still burning on the 11th of march

when the union forces basically marched into centerville and mannases unopposed. bacon, rations of all sorts, uniforms, and perhaps most critical, bales of newly-constructed leather brogans. if you think of a confederate cause for concern for lee's army and every other army throughout the war, what particular piece of equipment might it be? shoes. okay. in any case that was a problem that joe johnston had with his commander in chief. mcclellan got in there and reported that they had seized mannases. crossing in the mail were two messages" i've got mannases. here comes another from the president. very good. by the way, i want you to reorganize your army. i want you to break it into four parts. i want you to create four army

corps. oh, unless you have any concern i want them named first, second, third and fourth corps and these are the generals i want commanding them. they were not the men that mcclellan would have picked himself. the one that is were designated by the president were typically older, spent most of their lives in the peacetime army. mcclellan would have preferred to see those men in action against a confederate force and then promote those that had done really well. but the president had already issued the order. it was a done deal. we should note, though, that within a few months mcclellan had created two more corps went the army of the potomac, the fifth corps and sixth corps and putting in command people he wanted in command. fifth corps, john porter, and another protege', william franklin in the sixth corps. major change, of course, in mcclellan's personal status also came at this time. i told you he'd been commanding general of the whole army.

he gets another order which he receives in mannases. you're no longer the commander of the whole u.s. army. you're longer commanding general of the whole u.s. army, you are now commanding the army of the potomac, and the rational is we want you to concentrate on the job at hand, defeating the confederates down here in virginia. don't worry about the rest. we'll take care of it at the war department. secretary of war stanton will issue orders from the president. we do appreciate your opinion, general mcclellan. lincoln and secretary of war stanton also in that order specifying him as commander of the army of the potomac, and before any order took place, he would be ordered to leave 40,000 troops in defense of the washington area. well, what about his plan? with the withdrawal of joe johnston's forces from the northernmost part of virginia, the initial concept that he had, move down the chesapeake bay, bump off of fortress monroe,

head up the rappahannock to urbana and move inland probably wasn't going to work as well as he'd hoped it would. because he wasn't going to catch the confederates napping up in northern virginia. so, as i pointed out here, he comes up with a plan two, if you will. they will start the action at fortress monroe and they'll maneuver north from fortress monroe up the peninsula of virginia between the york and the james river as opposed to between the york and the rappahannock.

he was going to depend on the u.s. navy to make this work. as i pointed out here, flag officer louis goldsboro, we didn't have any admirals until flag officer farrgut was appointed. kind of wishy-washy, the capacity to support mcclellan was in direct relationship it seems to how angry the confederates were along the riverbank. if they were shooting at the u.s. navy, the support was not as strong as if they were simply waving as the u.s. navy sailed by. the army of the potomac began to execute its movement to the river ports near washington and baltimore in mid-march with the initial troop ships moving downriver toward the bay on the 17th of march. and this was no small undertaking, because, remember, at this time anything that was too heavy for a man to lift or pull or move had to be moved by a horse or a mule. and so thousands of horses and mules had to go at about the same time as the troops, because otherwise when you got them off the ships down here at fortress monroe, how would you move anything out of the landing area?

it was very complex. very complex. and as mcclellan was moving his army out, he was being sniped at by the committee on the conduct of the war and other politicians from the radical republicans. he thought i think so a successful rear guard action with them and actually on the 1st of april, he himself got out of town. he arrived out at monroe on the 2nd of april within just a few days he began moving up the peninsula toward yorktown. now here's where he had his first major shock in the field. part of his plan, a key part of his plan, was the movement of the first corps as designated by president lincoln under the command of general irving mcdowell, the unfortunate commander of union forces at first bull run.

but mcdowell's first corps incidentally amounted to 40,000 men was up around fredericksburg. and what mcclellan had planned for mcdowell to do is march from fredericksburg almost due south and come in on the left or the northern flank of confederate forces defending the peninsula. imagine his shock when he got an order from washington telling him, no, you can't have mcdowell, you took too many troops out of washington. we're unsafe here. you can't have mcdowell because this fellow jackson that we read about, he's already attacked the union force near kearnstown and no telling what he'll do next. he may sweep down the potomac and attack washington, we've got to keep him here. what this meant for mcclellan

was not that they weren't going to attack to siege richmond, but they weren't going to be able to do it through strategical point maneuver, they'd have to rely more on a pounding, slow process starting at yorktown and he thought to bring along a siege artillery, so in early april his forces arrived near yorktown. the whole revolutionary war entrenchments now much improved by the confederates but lightly manned and began actual siege operations near yorktown that would last throughout the month of april. and while this was going on, mcclellan, being a thoroughly modern major general decided that he was going to use all the enhancements that technology could bring to him first off, he hired professor thaddeus lowe to bring the balloon corps down to the area around fortress monroe and lowe's balloons began to

rise on tethers with people on board looking to see what the confederates looked like around yorktown. and, by the way, they had a teleographer in the basket on the balloon sending word down on a copper line stretched down to the ground. and because of his experience on illinois central where you had hobos and people trying to get on the trains without paying, they had to use some pretty stout railroad detectives. one agency in chicago that he especially liked run by a fellow allen pinkerton, the pinkerton detective service, so he contracted with pinkerton to send some of his agents down to virginia and they were going to infiltrate confederate positions and bars and find out how many troops the confederates really had defending richmond. well, while this is all going on, you got the balloons going up, you got pinkertons detectives with their bowler hat and their suits moving into richmond or dressing up as they said like rustics to infiltrate richmond's farmers markets, picking up info wherever they could, during this whole period in april, mcclellan's never out

of touch with washington, because he's got the telegraph linking him through ft. monroe to field telegraphs and ft. monroe back up to washington. so, there's a steady stream of message traffic back and forth. sometimes that proved not to be a blessing for mcclellan. because even as he was able to send messages up saying i really need more troops, i really need more shells, i really need more horses, i really would like to have more mules, he's also getting orders back like this one in mid-april from the president himself. you now have over 100,000 troops. i think you'd better break the enemy's line from yorktown to the river at once. the general in the field was a little miffed at this. he would write ellen that night saying, my dear, i was very tempted to tell the president that he should just come down here and do it himself. those of you that know about the active president lincoln know that he did come down to

fortress monroe and did closely observe the recapture of norfolk just a month later. but even as the army of the potomac under mcclellan was preparing to make their final ground assault on about the 3rd of may at yorktown, general joe johnston who had now slipped from the area around fredericksburg, joe johnston knew and was advised by his generals and subordinates, we can't hold this, we don't come close to have enough men to hold the peninsula, i think we better withdraw and take strong positions along defensible ground closer to richmond. so, joe johnston began to do what he became famous for doing, he began to retreat, in an orderly fashion. union troops moved in on the 4th of may and except for sick

confederates and a few that, well, let's say they were not quite as enthusiastic about secession they'd had been earlier in the year. the kisses had been delivered. they already started getting letters from home, dear john, hope all is well with you in camp. just thought i should tell you, i met the very nicest fellow who is a clerk here in the war office. please don't write anymore. a few of those were leftover at yorktown but basically it was empty. mcclellan sends a message, i have seized yorktown and gets a response from congress. unexpected but quite welcome. a resolution commending him for little sacrifice. so just for a moment, he had good relations once again with the largely republican congress. mcclellan then from yorktown sent general franklin with forces up the york river toward west point to seize an advanced logistical base and then he sen wiia