troops not for the union or federal army but for the confederate army and destroying bridges and tearing down telegraph lines and poles, all of which is really not only treasonist but military acts the president is commander in chief believed he had to take. that's how he explained it to the congress when they did meet in special session. as jim getty will replicate this evening when he gives a part of that july 4th message. so i think there are two separate situations. vis-a-vis, maryland and virginia. maryland, he clearly wanted to stay in the union and was going to use the force necessary to do it, not only for political

reasons but for military reasons. and virginia, i think he was treating more politically, hoping he wouldn't have the votes when they met in convention to vote for cessation. unfortunately, that did not turn out. >> this continues the theme of -- that jack alluded to, the surprising burst of confederate nationalism, the desire to other a union some states were not authorized to do, while lincoln in washington sees the maryland event as a security issue and, perhaps, overestimates union sentiment in virginia, or might have reacted the same way. that's an imponderable, i think. i want to stay on the lincoln question for everybody to weigh in on. because, you know, adam has written that '61 is a result of the failure of compromise in

some ways. certainly the peace convention was a failure of compromise, but since we are the lincoln forum, i want to get back to lincoln. and this is a period that i've written about, at least until march 4, 1861, when lincoln determinedly, some say stubbornly, refused to express himself on cessation. refused, as he put it, to beg for the right to be inaugurated. he thought it was unmanly to do that. he thought his opinions were already in print. the only thing he privately conveyed to members of congress is that he would not tolerate an extension of slavery westward to the pacific. although he wiggled a little bit at the end on that as well. but i want to ask each of you to answer briefly, lincoln asks congress eventually for what he called the legal means to make this contest a short and

decisive one. neither of which it turned out to be. did he ask for legal means or assume too much power too soon, or in a way did he not assume enough power and did he do it when he did it too late? could he have done more? start with frank and come down this way. >> well, i think he did it just right. if you look at article 2 of our constitution, and it describes the duties of the president as the presidential be commander in chief, and you hear the term war powers, this -- there's no even mention of the term in -- anywhere in the constitution. today, in 2011, we're still arguing among ourselves and with congress and our supreme court and our president and commander in chief, what is the meaning of war powers? and here we have a president in -- at the beginning of a major civil war, about the worst

situation that a country or a nation could be embroiled in. and it was up to him to define what the war powers were. and i think he did it right. i think he was a bit mocky asay lent by doing it first out of necessity and then asking congress to meet and also ratify or give him the means, as harold just said, to conduct the war. and this was an amazing thing by a president who was a former wig. wigs were passive. they were not for constitutional amendments. they were not for strong legislation or strong powers in the chief executive. and yet he made that transition

as a republican, the first republican president, from wig to passivity to a proactive commander in chief and chief executive. >> okay, so doing the golgoldils analysis, neither too hot nor too cold, that's your analysis. adam, you're next. >> i think lincoln could have done more. and i think that, you know, lincoln, for the first month of his presidency, did very, very little to directly address the crisis. harold, you and i may disagree about that a bit. you know, lincoln himself said that the most vexacious facing him was determining the postmastership of bloomington, indiana, which was -- it was kind of odd. i think he didn't come into his own until the sumpter crisis. another place, forgive me

harold, i don't mean to turn on the moderator where i want to disagree with a little bit with-b what you said in your introduction to the panel suggesting the north was the sort of overwhelming favorite going in and the south was scrappy little underdog. first of all, let's not forget that, of course, the north needed to win the civil war, whereas the south simply needed to not lose. i think the south in some respects was militarily better prepared in early 1861 than the north was. they had been organizing troops very actively in many places actually since mid-1860. and the north was much slower to do that. one of the few places in those first weeks of the war where union force hs notable success was in st. louis, missouri, where actually these predominantly german wide-awakes had been drilling since early that year and where they staged basically a successful coup against the pro-cessation state

government. i think lincoln could have done more and i think the union side as a more could have done more to mobilize sooner. >> too cold. greg? >> you know, jack davis and i were at a conference recently. we were talking about the often annoying but always irresistible questions we get to begin with, what if? the most famous one i think jack got this, what if robert e. lee had had automatic weapons? would that have made a difference at picket's charge? and in a way -- in analyzing what lincoln might have done, we're dealing with a what-if question. let's speculate for a moment that what lincoln does instead of acting as -- without calling congress, that his first decision is to call congress into special session. and then turn this issue over to congress. you know, given our wide high opinion of congress and its ability to find solution and compromi compromise, you can only imagine what might sl come out of that. i think, i'm going to say just

right, i think more than too cold, in the respect it was wise of him for all his dealing with the postmaster of bloomington, illinois, to avoid direct -- calling congress into session and including a broader variety of advisers in that -- in that issue. one. things clearly lincoln wanted to do was conserve his enemies. there were 15 slave states. seven cessation, eight were in the union. the other disaster would be to see the other eight follow the first seven. proactive action of any kind might have triggered that, throwing it into the hands of congress would have complicated it. and he was picking his way very carefully through this mine field in those early first months. and i think wisely so. so, i'm more with just right than too cold. >> and i absolutely for the record agree with you about -- it's almost self-indulgent to ask speculative questions.

i could have lived without the phrase annoying, i might add. cut off his mike. john? >> in looking at what lincoln did or didn't do, it strikes me that he did exactly what lincoln would always do. he would never do enough, according to some people, and he would do too much, according to some people. if we look at the emancipation proclamation, for example, and the whole issue of the freeing of slaves, that's precisely what happened. lincoln, you're not doing enough. linco lincoln, you're doing too much. and i think the thing that strikes me about this early, early period of 1861 is, yeah, there was cessation. obviously, some states had. but the general feeling that lincoln had and that most of the country this is this wasn't going to work. there's too many unionists around, too much love for the united states.

so it's going to fail. cessation happens and it works. well, there won't be a war. americas would not fight one against another. then war comes. well, it's not going to be much of a war because we know that the other side is -- you know, the north is a bunch of shopkeepers and, you know, they're not going to -- with some famous southern said, you know, you can slap a yankee in the face. he may sue you. but he won't fight you. so, there was that kind of attitude. and the attitude -- >> another slur, i might add. >> and then you have -- so you have this whole idea that it's going to happen. well, no, it's not going to happen. if it happens, it's going to be easy and quick. so, consequently there doesn't seem to be as much urgency as there ought to have been,

obviously, to prepare. i like to use the example of winfield scott. you know, winfield scott was there. he was a great military mind. great military hero. but he does very little preparation for this war that, well, it may come, may not come, until george mclelland comes up with this idea of the trans-montana campaign, going across the mountains and capturing richmond from behind and it will all be over very, very quickly. well, it's then that winfield scott comes up with what comes to be known as the an con da plan. he basically says, now, george, you know, that's an interesting idea but those kind of campaigns don't work. but i've got this better idea. of course, i'm going to want you to be a leader in all of this. well, the war comes, doesn't it? what happens at first bull run? both sides have the same battle plans.

they're both going to hit the other one's flank. and i used to do this in a classroom on a blackboard or whiteboard, whatever it is today, show the two sides and show them if both battle plans had worked at the same time, what would have happened is they would have been chasing each other. so, i think -- maybe that's too simplistic of you, but i think it's just not in the cards. nobody wants to believe it. and lincoln is one of these people. >> jack? >> first of all, just to clarify the hypothetical question i was asked is, could lee,en the confederacy, it's always could lee have won the war if he had had the atomic bomb. and i will share you with the answer which is, no. because he didn't have a delivery system.

try to picture -- of course, it would have to be jeb stewart and john moseby riding up to washington towing unhappy mule with an a-bomb on its back. you know, lighting the fuse and then trying to ride 50 or 60 miles in the next ten seconds before it went off. highly impractical. i think lincoln defined his policy and created his own defense of -- in response to harold's question -- in the first inaugural. you can have no war, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen without being yourselves the aggressor, which i confess i never realized how much eloquence was in that speech besides that line until we heard steven lang deliver it at willard's hotel last february. it's a marvelous composition that deserves re-reading. if lincoln's declared policy is

not to act first, remember lincoln represents a party that itself is still something of a coalition. of old abolitionists, old line wigs, the old know nothings that don't agree on anything except they disagree. they oppose the extension of slavery. remember lincoln's elected with 39% of the popular vote. his own north is something of a coalition. large -- there are large chunks of diseffected people in illinois and indiana and ohio. lincoln also believes, perhaps to some degree wrongly, but lincoln also still believes there is, as has been mentioned, still widespread attachment to the union in the south. in fact, the confederates themselves to get back to that montgomery convention, really kind of aligned themselves into three groups. the ses sessionists, those for independents, the cooperationists, those who thought there ought to be some mean to cooperate with the north in order to defray or avert war.

and then the outright reconstructionists of whom alexander stevens, vice president of the confederacy, had been one. those who hoped by putting up a front, a broad bluff, they could force concessions from the union that would allow them to come back together. the south is never solid. lincoln understood that. so, again, for all of those reasons for him to take action risks setting off something he doesn't want to happen. in retrospect, that's perhaps easy to say he should have prepared more. i don't see how he could have. without essentially saying, it's going to be on my hands because i'm dissatisfied. there will be a war. one last point, however, if you read the very, very brief little speeches that lincoln gave from the back of his rail car as he made the rail journey from springfield to washington, i

don't know how many he made, but you can find eight, ten printed. rarely more than a couple paragraphs. when you read them carefully, you can see he's not rattling a sabre but he's telling his audience, i may need to call on you. he doesn't have to tell them why. but he's gradually preparing the north for the fact that he may have to do something, something more. >> before i turn to tom, just -- since i know one thing statistically, i might as well throw it out here. 101 is the total number of speeches made on the inaugural journey. not all in print, but some repetitions. there was actually one occasion, i can't remember the city, after indianapolis -- what would come after indianapolis on the -- it wasn't cincinnati. it was ohio but it wasn't cincinnati. >> columbus? >> yeah. he does get very, very bellic because he's criticized for his indiana speech.

and he gets extremely bellicose and then he backing off again and retreats. the lack of consistency leads this famous orator back in massachusetts to say that the ramblings of our president-elect are an embarrassment to the notions of his incoming presidency and to the very idea of speech making. of course, that's edward everett, who is later outdone in this village a couple years later. tom, would you give us your final word on this speculation. >> well, i'll follow up with what jack said. i think i would come down on, i think, lincoln just -- did it just right. i thought his handling in terms of the border states was just right. you know, we talk about the advantages, several advantages the north had going into the civil war. population, white population, potential soldiers,

manufacturing ability, but if the border states of maryland, missouri and kentucky cessation, think of the impact on the north and the south. i think 40% of would be the population -- white population of the southern states would increase by 40%. the manufacturing capacity of the southern states would increase by 80%. the number of resources, like mules and horses, would increase by 40%. and i think lincoln understood this. you know, he's quoted as saying, you know, it's great to have god on my side, but i need kentucky. and the way he -- i thought the way he approached kentucky particularly, let's say, he was allowing -- he knew there was

trade going on through kentucky to the south but he did not go in there and try to coerce the government. he waited until the unionists faction took control of quen n kentucky, the legislature. and i think his moderate approach to the border states was a very key factor, i think, in terms of of not only the capacity of the north militarily and economically but also the psychological impact. so, i think he did it just right. >> i'm going to invite everyone now who has a question to come to the microphone, while we continue to chat here. i think -- you know, all of this is urn avoidably speculative and my next question would be about bull run. i think we have basically come to the agreement that, led by john, that everybody's trying to outflank the other person.

if bull run -- you know, i just have to flatter all of you, compliment all of you, can and then we'llyou, compliment all o you and then we'll go to the questions. these answers are so thought provoking, so deep and profound, that it's clear that none of you could ever engage in a presidential debate. [ laughter ] >> whoops. >> i'm sorry, i forgot what i was saying. let's have our first question. tell us your name and where you're from. >> clay stuckey from bedford, alabama. the original 13th amendment that did not -- was not even submitted, but in the body of the amendment itself, it said that it was unamendable and it would guarantee the perpetuity of slavery, and my question is, what would any future court say about any amendment that in the

body of the amendment says it was unamendable? if they chose to say that it was unconstitutional, they would have to hang their judicial hats on some reasoning when the very words in the amendment. >> right. i think you all know this is the so-called shadow amendment, the 13th amendment that would have perpetuated slavery and guaranteed its existence where it already was. lincoln actually submitted it to the states with a tepid message saying, it's my responsibility as chief magistrate to address this to you for the consideration of your legislature. frank, why don't you answer the legal question? >> actually, it would depend whether justice scalea was on the court or justice pryor. but as far as i'm concerned, it would have been suffrage to say

it was unamendable, because i think a supreme court, depending on its makeup, of course, would determine whether or not it was appropriate, the amendment was appropriate. so i think if you had chief justice tawney, which we did at the time, no friend of lincoln or the north, i think he would have ruled as he did in writing the majority opinion in dread scott that you could say it was unamendab unamendable. so i think it's in the makeup of the court. if the challenge, like the price cases, came later in the war in a 5-4 decision, even with chief justice tawney still on the court, but it came much later than manassas determined what the president did in the conduct of the war was legal. i think with lincoln having the votes in the supreme court, they would have found that it was not appropriate to say the constitution or that amendment

was -- couldn't be amended or couldn't be ruled against by a court of appeals. >> craig? >> i just wanted to add, i think that that's really true, and from a legal point of view, i want to try to explain a little bit, and i'm sure almost everyone here knows this already, but i can't resist saying it nonetheless. and that is that lincoln and virtually 80% of the people on both sides believed that slavery couldn't expand, it couldn't continue to survive. so the key, when lincoln became active again as an active politician until his presidency, lincoln's commitment was to prevent the extension of slavery. he said in the inauguration, i have no desire, i have no inclination, i have no legal authority to interfere with slavery where it exists. but slavery nonetheless would have disappeared, he was convinced, and most of his supporters were convinced as well if it couldn't expand. because you would create a

circumstance where there would be excess labor that would cost the owners of that labor force more than they could get back in terms of benefit. there would be no outlet because it would be restricted, and then one by one, the state would abolish slavery themselves and the shadow 13th amendment would become entirely moot because slavery would not exist anywhere in the union because the states individually would have abolished it. that was the vision that lincoln and most of his supporters had at the time. the question of whether it really would have been amended, i think their justification to themselves was we wouldn't have to because the states would abolish it because it would become economically sustainable. whether that's true or not, we'll never know. >> i'd just like to point out an interesting irony. while on the one hand you have this amendment that at least some thought would have hurt the crisis by guaranteeing slavery and perpetuity where it existed, the federal constitution, while it thoroughly embedded slavery

into its fabric, still there was a theoretically possible mechanism by which a confederate state could ie manslaughtemanci abolish slavery. the federal constitution in some ways is more flexible than the united states constitution because it was more easily amended. so you had the theoretical possibility of slavery being better protected in the union than the confederacy. but only theoretically. >> by the way, should anyone wish to test this theory, the original 13th amendment is alive and/ organic, unlike the equal rights amendment which had to be passed by a specific number of years. the 13th amendment, the shadow amendment is still out there if anyone wants to pass it and see what happens. it was actually passedstate. you'll never guess which one. we'll see if anybody knows out there. deference to senator

corwin, who was the compromiser. >> i think one of the fascinating areas in terms of james buchanan is in terms of what he didn't do are the things he didn't do that could have made things far worse for lincoln coming in, including -- confederacy. just what was his motivation?pa he genuinely have a few remaining principles that he was not going to put lincoln in a worse position than he already was? >> well -- this one? yeah. let's keep in mind that he was making decisions with only several months remaining, and he

wanted to get out of town without -- seriously, he wanted to get out of town without having the war start on his watch. so he made it very clear that -- and he even actually states this, that i will do nothing that will incite any kind of a war or conflict. and i think the prime example of this is even though he did send a message to the commissioners from south carolina that he would protect and respond militarily to any kind of attack on a fort or interfere with the carrying out of federal law, when he did send a release expedition to relief with sumter, when it was fired upon

as it tried to enter the harbor, he did nothing. and there was no further attempt to send relief. and so, you know, i think he was paralyzed by this internal conflict of his devotion to the union. i mean, he stated that the profession was illegal. and he lost a lot of southern support for that. on the other hand, he thought, well, why is this happening? it's all because of year after year after year after year of abolition and sagitation. his sympathies with the south and his devotion to the union, he had this conflict where he was basically paralyzed. >> you know, you mentioned buchanan's desire to go home. we know abraham lincoln was not

interested in such things as the homes of presidents, because when he had the opportunity to visit mt. vernon in 1861, he was on the boat. his wife got off the boat and visited the house and collected cards of mt. vernon and the graves of the washingtons. when abraham lincoln is in his inauguration in 1861, he is reading his things, and he says, look, we're passing buchanan's home. abraham lincoln never looked up. never looked out the window. stayed focused on the future. next question. >> i hope this is more of a -- not a what if, but a would have. would have the war ended in 1861 had the union crushed