among state actors we're concerned about russia and china in u.s. networks to steal u.s. data. the growing role that non-state actors are playing in cyber sfas is a great example. easy access to potentially disrupt a lethal technology anden-how by such groups. it two challenges are first definitive real time attribute of cyber attacks, versus know when they hold out, and second managing enormous vulnerabilities in the i.t. supply chain for u.s. networks. in this regard a cyber security bill was recently introduced by senators lieberman, collins, rockefeller and feinstein. it addresses the core homeland security requirements to improve cyber security for the american people for the nation's critical infrastructure and for the own networks and computers. intelligence community considers such legislative steps essential

with the infrastructure vulnerabilities which pose serious national and economic security risks. briefly looking geographically around the world, in afghanistan and general burgess will have more to say about this, during the past year the taliban lost some ground mainly in places where the international security forces were concentrated. taliban senior leaders continued to enjoy safe haven in pakistan. the efforts to partner with afghan national security forces are encouraging, but corruption and governance challenges continue to threaten the effectiveness. most provinces have established basic governance structures but struggle to provide essential services. the sfwernlt security assistance forces and the support of afghanistan's neighbors noticeably and particularly pakistan is essential to sustain the gains achieved. although there's broad

international political support for the afghan government, there are doubts in my capitals, particularly in europe, about how to fund afghanistan initiatives after 2014. in iraq violence and sporadic high-profile attacks continue. prime minister maliki's recent aggressive moves against sunni leaders hooipten political tensions. for now we believe the sunnis view the political process as the best venue to pursue change. elsewhere across the middle east and north africa those pushing for change are confronting ruler elites, tribal divisions lashgs of experience with democracies, stalled economic development. military and security force resistance and regional power initiatives. these are fluid political environments that offer opening for extremists to participate more assertive manically in pol life. places like tunisia, egypt or

libya have to reconstruct among complex negotiations among competing factions. nowhere is this transition i believe more important than in egypt, which i think will be a bellwether and is so strategically important because of its size, location and, of course, the peace treaty that it now has with israel. in syria regime and social divisions are prolonging internal struggles and could turn domestic upheavals into regional crises. in yemen although a political transition is under way, the security situation continues to be marred by violence, and fragmentation of the kunlt is a real possibility. as the ancient roman once observed, the best day after a bad emperor is the first. after that i would add things get very problematic. intelligence communities also pay close attention to

developments across the african continent, throughout the western hemisphere and across asia. here, too, few issues are self-contained. virtually every region has a barging on our key concerns. throughout the globe wherever there are environmental stresses on water, food and natural resources as well as health threats, economic crises and organized crime, we see ripple effects around the world and impacts on u.s. interests. amidst these extraordinary challenges, it's important to remind the distinguished body and the person people that the u.s. intelligence community strives s ts to exemplify amer values. that pledge leads me to mention our highest legislative priority this year, and it requires the support of both houses of congress. i refer specifically to the foreign intelligence

surveillance act or f.a.a., which is set to expire at end of 2012. title 7 of fisa allows the intelligence community to collect vital information about international terrorists and other important targets overseas. it this law authorizes surveillance of non-u.s. persons located overseas of foreign intelligence importance, meaning they have a connection to or information about threats like terrorism or proliferation. it provides for comprehensive oversight by all three branches of government to protect the prif see and civil liberties of u.s. persons. the department of justice and my office conduct extensive oversight reviews of these activities and report to congress on implementation and compliance twice a year. intelligence collection under fisa produces crucial intelligence vital to protect the nation against international terrorism and other threats. we're always considering whether there are changes made to improve the law, but our first

priority is re-authorization of these authorities in their current form. we look forward to the speedy enaktsment of the legislation and reauthorizing the fisa amendments and acts so there's no interruption if in our ability to use these authorities to protect the american people. in this brief station where i began and turn it over to general burgess. the fiscal environment requires careful identification of manage of the challenges the ic focuses on and the risk we must mutually assume. with that i thank you for your dedication to the security of our nation, your support for our men and women of the intelligence community and your attention here today. so with that, i'll stop and turn it over to general burgess. >> thank you, director clapper. general burgess. >> chairman levin, ranking member mccain and other members of the committee, i want to thank you for opportunity to join my long-time friend and

professional colleague general clapper in representing the men and women of the united states intelligence community. i would like to begin with current military operations in afghanistan. we assessed deficiencies in the army and police forces undermine efforts to extend effective governance and skurtd. the afghan army remains reliant on isaf for key combat support such as logistics, intelligence and transmit. while performance improved in some operations when partnered with isaf units, additional gains will require sustained mentoring and support. despite successful coalition targeting, the taliban remains resilient and able to replace leadership losses while competing to provide governance at the local level. from ms. pakistani safe havens,

the taliban leadership is confident of eventual victory. to the west iran remains committed to threatening u.s. interests in the region through its support to terrorists and militant groups, including in iraq and afghanistan, while it remains committed to strengthening its naval, nuclear and missile capabilities. i ran can close the strait of hormuz, however, the agency assesses iran unlikely to initiate or intentionally provoke a conflict. iranian ballistic missiles in development could range across the region and central europe. iran's new space launch vehicle demonstrates progress toward a

potential ibcm. iran today has the technical, scientific and industrial capability to eventually produce nuclear weapons. while international pressure against iran has increased, including through sanctions, we assess that tehran is not close to agreeing to abandoning its nuclear program. in iraq they assess baghdad security forces will maintain current security levels this year despite manning shortages and overly centralized command and control. despite perceptions and a need for logistics and tactical community training, iraq is putting forces on the street and securing high profile sites and conducting intelligence driven targeting. however groups are serious challenges for iraq and

remaining u.s. personnel until a more comprehensive reconcile lags with religious and tribal constituencies. more broadly the popular forces sweeping the middle east and north africa are demonstrating the potential to reorder long-standing sumgtss, relationships and alliances in a way that invites risk and opportunities for the united states and our allies. armed domestic opponent have aan unprecedented challenge to the al assad regime in steer ya and its collapse would have serious kwlikzs for iran, hezbollah, hamas and lebanon. turning to asia, north korea's third generation leadership transition is under way. improving the economy and regime survival remain enduring leadership priorities. pyongyang's nuclear missile programs provide strategic deter

ants, sbenlt prestige and leverage for concessions. while north korea may abandon portions of its nuclear program for better relations with the united states, it is unlike to surrender the nuclear weapon. pyongyang can attack south korea with little for no strategic warning, but it suffers from logistic shortages, aging equipment and poor trainings. pyongyang likely knows it cannot reunite the peninsula by force and unlikely to attack on a scale that would risk its own survival. we see no sign that the leadership transition has changed the regime's calculus regarding nuclear weapons. in the defense intelligence agency retains continued focus on the peninsula to provide warning against additional attacks from the north. china continues to build a more modern military to defend its core interests, which are

territorial sovereignty, national unity and sustained access to economic resources. countering u.s. forces in a taiwan or south chi na sea are a priority. it's designed to' chooef p periodic and local air and sea superiority to include islands closest to the mainland. once focused on territorial defense, china's air forces develop an offshore strike, air and missile defense, strategic mobility and early warning and reconnaissance capabilities. china may incorporate new capabilities in novel way to present challenges for u.s. forces. last year's first flight of a fifth generation fighter in launch of china's first aircraft carrier underscore the breadth and quality of china's military modernization program. however, aa lack of modern

combat experience is but one example that steps remain before china aachiechieves the full potential of new technologies, platforms and military personnel. regarding cyber threats, we continue to see daily attempts to gain access to our nation's government and business computer networks including our own secure systems. this threat is large and growing in scale and sophistication. finally, al qaeda losses in 2011 have focused the core group and its affiliates in yemen, somalia and north africa on self-preservation and reconstitution. those damaged, the group and its affiliates remain committed to trans-national attacks in europe and against the united states. al qaeda acquired weapons from libya this year. kidnapped westerners and continued its support to

nigeria. while we have made important gains, al qaeda sxitsand affili we remain in a race to evolve and regenerate leadership and launch attacks. self-radicalization or lone wolf individuals including within the united states and even within our own ranks remain an enduring concern. i would like to close by noting how honored i am to represent the men and women of the defense intelligence agency. we remain akrooutcutely aware tr work is a public trust. on their behalf i would like to thank the members of this committee for your continued support and confidence in our work. thank you. >> thank you, general burgess. let's try seven minutes for a first round. i hope there is time for a second round. director clapper's prepared statement said the following in

terms of the intelligence community's assessment about iran's nuclear program. quote, we assess iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons should it choose to do so. we do not know, however, if iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons. his statement also said that we judge iran's nuclear decision-making is guided by a cost benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence tehran. general burgess, do you agree with that statement of director clapper in his prepared statement? >> yes, sir. sir, i think it would be very consistent with what the vice chairman of the joint chiefs and myself along with a couple of other witnesses stated for this committee almost a year and a half ago.

>> and director clapper, i understand, then, that what you have said and now general burgess agrees with is that they have -- that iran has not yet decided to develop nuclear weapons, is that correct? is that still your assessment? >> that is the intelligence community's assessment that that is an option that is still held out by the iranians, and we believe the decision would be made by the supreme leader himself. he would base that on a cost benefit analysis in terms of -- i don't think you want a nuclear weapon at any price. so that, i think, plays to the value of sanctions, particularly the recent ratcheting up of more sanctions and in anticipation that that will induce a change in their policy and behavior. >> and it's the intelligence

community's assessment that sanctions and other international pressure actually could -- not will necessarily but could influence iran and its decision as to whether to proceed. >> absolutely, sir. of course, the impacts that the sanctions are already having on the iranian economy, the devaluation of their currency, the difficulty they're having in engaging in banking transactions, which will, of course, increase with the recent provisions in the national defense authorization act. to the extent that the iranian population becomes arrestive and if the regime then feels threatened in terms of its stability and tenure, you know, the thought is that that could change the policy. i think it's interesting that

they have apparently asked the eu for resumption of the five-plus-one dialogue. of course, there's another meeting coming up with -- another engagement with the international atomic energy administration. so we'll see whether the iranians may be changing their mind. >> well, i must tell you i'm skeptical about putting any significance in that, but it's not my telephone we're here it to hear, and it's obviously important testimony. director clapper, in a recent interview defense secretary panetta said if iran decides to pursue a nuclear weapon capability it would probably about a year to be able to produce a bomb and then possibly another one or two years in order to put it on a deliverable vehicle of some sort in order to deliver that weapon.

do you disagree with defense secretary panetta's assessment? >> no, sir, i don't disagree. particularly with respect to to the year that's feasible but practically not likely. there are all kinds of combinations of permutations that could affect how long it might take should the iranians make a decision to pursue a fuch lar weapon, how long that might take. i think the details of that are best -- it's rather complex and ar contain and sensitive because of how we know this. they're best left to a closed session discussion. >> when you say that the year is perhaps right but it's more likely that it would take longer? was that the implication of your -- >> yes, sir. >> now, a "washington post" columnist recently wrote that a senior administration official

believes that an israeli strike against iran was likely this spring. general burgess, in view of the intelligence community, has israel decided to attack iran? >> sir, to the best of our knowledge israel has not decided to attack iran. >> i was concerned as i indicated in my opening statement, director clapper, by recent news reports that the latest nukz assessment reflects aa dirch of views between our intelligence community and commanders over the security situation in afghanistan and i made reference to who signed up to that difference of views, including general allen, ambassador crocker -- not including. these are the ones that signed

the difference. general allen, baambassador crocker, general mat tess and admiral rivas. can you tell us whether those news reports are accurate there's a difference in views on it that matter? >> without going into the specifics of classified national intelligence estimates, i can certainly confirm that they took issue with the nie on three counts having to do with the assumptions made about poor structure. didn't feel that we gave sufficient weight to pakistan and its impact as a safe haven, and generally felt that the nie was pessimistic. i have to say -- >> pessimistic about that or about other matters as well? >> just generally it was pessimistic. >> about the situation in --

>> in afghanistan and the prospect for post-2014. that, by the way, was the time frame after 2014. if you forgive a little history, sir, i served as an analyst briefer for general westmoreland in stram in vietnam in 1966. i lost my innocence a little bit when i found out operational commander sometimes don't afwree with the view of the success with their campaign as contrasted with that perspective displayed by intelligence. fast forward about 25 years our so, and i served as the chief of air force intelligence in desert storm. general schwartzkopf protested long and loud during the war and after the war about the accuracy and intelligence and the fact it didn't comport with his view. classically intelligence is supposedly in the portion of the

glass that's half empty, and operational commander and policymakers for that matter are in the portion of the glass half-full. probably the truth is the somewhere at the waterline. so i don't find it a bad thing. in fact, i think it's healthy that there is contrast between what the operational xhantders believe and what the intelligence community assesses. >> thank you very much. senator mccain. >> i want to follow up on the chairman's questions. so you believe that post-2014 afghanistan faces extremely difficult challenges? >> yes, sir, i do. i think in terms of governance and the ability of the ansf, which we're striving hard to train, train up, there are some indications that that's having success. but i think the afghan

government will continue to require assistance from the west, and, of course, another issue is the extent to which we and other coalition members will be able to sustain that support. importantly as well is the achievement of a strategic partnership agreement with the afghan government, which would premise -- be a preface for our continued presence in some form to advice and assist and perhaps to conduct -- assist with particularly counterterrorism. >> there has been no change in the isi relationship with the accounting network who are killing americans in afghanistan? >> yes, sir. you know, with respect to the pakistani government and isi as a microcosm of the larger government, their threat is india, and they view everything

and they focus on that. >> i understand that. >> their concern is, of course, sustaining influence and presence in afghanistan, and they will probably continue to do that through proxy militias. >> our relationship with pakistan must be based on a realistic sesment that isi's relationship with other organizations will probably not change? >> yes, sir. i mean, there are cases where our interests converge. you know, government to government, and that relationship and that factoid is reflected in the relationship with isi. >> secretary panetta publicly stated that israel will decide in april, may or june whether to attack iran's nuclear facilities or not. do you agree with that?

well, i think that was quoted by a columnist. i think general burgess answered that question. we don't believe at this point that they've made a decision to do that. what could you have given rise to this is simply the fact that the weather becomes better obviously in the spring, and that could be conducive to an attack. but just to re-emphasize what general burgess said, we don't believe they made such a decision. >> we're seeing a very intriguing kind of situation evolve here. there have been what are believed to be iranian attacks or attempts to attack worldwide. in the united states and the ambassador in georgia and india the explosions there and now today we read about thailand. does this tell us a number of things, including the extent of the iranian worldwide terrorist

network? does this also tell us that there is a covert conflict or war going on between israel and iran? >> i think iran is -- well, there are two dimensions of this. i think on the one count they feel somewhat under siege. on the other hand they're sort of feeling their oats through the iranian lens, they view arab spring as a good thing and opportunities for them to exploit, which thus far have not worked to their favor. so they through their proxies, the irgc particularly, have decided and made a conscious judgment to reach out against primarily his israeli and then secondarily against u.s. interests. >> they're displaying some

capabilities. >> well, yes, sir, to a certain extent they even -- even though the attacks that you reference were not successful. in one kay they blew one of their own up, but they regard those as successful because of the psychological impact they have in each one of the countries. >> quickly, is the situation in mexico, do you believe that, as you know, 50,000 mexicans have lost their lives as a result of drug-related violence. is your assessment that these violent criminal organizations pose a threat to the united states including states along the border? >> yes, sir, they do. there is always the prospect of spillover, and that's one reason why we're working closely with the mexican government.

that's particularly true with respect to intelligence initiatives that we're working with them, which i'm happy to discuss in a closed session. but it is a profound threat to both countries. >> have you seen any indication that the top candidates vying to success the president will ail ter the way the mexican government addresses the threat of the cartels? >> i believe, sir, that -- i can't do a one bin assessment, but i believe that the -- no matter who succeeds president caldron, they will be committed to continue this campaign. >> i suggest you look a little more carefully, because i think that might not be the case with one of the candidate. in the status quo remains in syria with increasing