we see is that from the border of china to the atlantic ocean, the not old but most of the countries are dominated or heavily influenced by the political islam in some cases the very radical islam. since the cold war is first time when one part of the world is dominated by one ideology. now, the strongest emerging power of all this changes is that trend in political islam which on theological, religious basis denies the existence of the jewish state in the middle east and oppose compromise on

this issue. and this political power is mos muslim brothers in egypt and this is only the most famous one. now, how it may affect the most important issue, the israel-palestinian peace process. the changes strengthen substantially hamas in the palestinian political arena. and it may bring about a situation that in a year from now, it will go more difficult for abbas and the current palestinian leadership which is the best partner israel could ever have to maintain their current positions.

especially if hamas will have that strong endorsement and backing that they enjoy today. the readiness and their ability of the palestinian leadership to be forced on it or is to maintain its current position maybe that what may happen? why is it important? because a year from now, two conditions which do not exist today may exist. one is another israeli government which is committed to reach agreement and today is not the case. and an american president who is not constrained by whatever he has to take on considerations in an election year. an american president which will be able at the beginning of 2013

is not to knock heads, to bring to the two parties who marched the extra inch. and here i quote, your book, the inch that on their own will, the two parties will never march. he may bring them to do it. so at the beginning of the next year, the real possibility of new situation where israeli-palestinian agreement can be achievable if he'll then the current palestinian leadership will survive. there is, if we have to look for anecdote, better understand the situation, you aren't for sure the members and many in the audience the scene on the podium in egypt when the oslo agreement

was about to be signed and arafat from some bizarre reason said i'm not signing it and everybody on the podium and the secretary of state and all the regional and international leaders, arafat was standing to the side. and then president mubarak came to him and strongly, loudly whispered in his ear sign, you dog, sign. today, no one will say to any leader to sign. mubarak isn't the case, unfortunately. now about iran. here i prefer to have -- to make few comments in the clearest way that i can.

the first one, no one in israel is a trigger happy about iran. no one. we all know the reprecushions, we all know the unavoidable prize for a military strike. but all of us believe that in certain situation this prize is worth paying or that we don't have another choice. and why is the second comment. there is no government for which may accept nuclear iran. not only because of the philosophic argument that when a regime is committed to the destruction of israel, we can't allow him to have the tools to

do it. but because we have to think one step farther, beyond the immediate horizon, from the moment iran has nuclear bomb, it's a matter of several years. no more than that. saudi arabia, egypt, and turkey will have a bomb of their own. in those three countries what we have is, i will say, conditions which are in a way similar to pakistan. a very strong islamic influence and unknown mechanism of how this nuclear weapon is controlled. so israel, my children, my

grandchildren will have to live in a region where we have one iran and three pakistans. no government in jerusalem has the right to leave this reality for our children. never. it's a strategic and even personal nightmare. and my third comment, the real problem is not the nuclear project. the problem is the regime. the subversion against moderate regime in the region. let alone this -- the oppression at home. the deployment of thousands of missiles around israel and gaza and more so in lebanon.

there is no other country which is so domestically cruel and cruel at home and brutal and aggressive elsewhere. who today, which country today after the cold war, deploys thousands of missiles targeted at civilian population? the only country in the world where almost most of the population could tomorrow, tomorrow night go to live in shelters and part of them already did so. and who behind it? the regime in tehran without the nuclear weapon. so what -- i speak about the israeli perspective. it's not only our problem. but the problem is the regime was imperial ambition and with no real inhibitions.

and this regime must be toppled. and it happens that the a iranian people want the regime to be changed. not by military action of some external power but by its own will. they want to live freely. so -- this is my last comment in the 11 minutes. what should be done? as i say, military option is the really very last resort. that what can be done, real acceleration of the sanctions by imposing them, not just signing

legislation at capitol hill or the white house, to impose the sanctions, to punish international chinese, russian, countries which defy the u.s. legislation. to stop courting the regime, to stop toying with this evil illusion of engagement. what is an engagement? engagement is a give and take. the give, at whose expense will it be? israel? iranian people? and the last comment, although i advise all those who -- the literators and speculate what israel can do, please assume that there is no operational problem if we don't find operational solution to it. that's all.

>> thank you very much. you've sharpened the arguments and the issues. really appreciate that. nate? >> thank you. as a lawyer, i feel professional compulsive to start with a caveat. here it is. we are talking about a changing fluid situation. we're talking about a situation that no one can predict. we can't present a snapshot which i'll try to present. but we should approach recommendations and what have you with great deal of humility. with that said, i will start by saying that the arab world and iran are not natural allies. on paper, you see many points of tension between the two. the persian versus the arab. this is a tension that is latent. we see it emerging every now and then, whether with the arab iran, whether -- so it is something that is there in the arab psyche and the iranian

psyche. there is tension between shia and sunni. this is a tension that keeps on rising. i would say that ironically or not, the more that you have a sentence of the sunni islamist movements of the arab world, the more legislation is sharpensed. if you're secular, it doesn't matter. if you find yourself as a sunni-muslim movement then dealing with the shia incidents becomes a major issue. and finally, there's also the issue of gee yopolitical aspirations. who is going to be the head in the area? we see these playing out best and exemplified through the issue of the three islands and the persian gulf and what i was brought up to known as the arab gulf. so these issues continue to define aspects of their

relation. and these are position that's transcend which govern iran. they continue to be relevant today. and it's no surprise in this context that many arab regimes and arab governments at least at the leadership level, they're more worried about the nuclear iran than they are about the nuclear israel. and in a sense, israel's ability to be at the head and influence the arab politics is limited. for many reasons. iran has not. and so iran with nuclear weapons today is a bigger problem for government for arab governments than nuclear israel. i'm not going to talk about the gulf, by the way. this is true in jordan. this is true in egypt and elsewhere. iran, however, sought to replace this problematic narrative, the points of tension with a super narrative, with another narrative that allows them access at least to the arab street and public opinion. and that is a narrative of

resistance versus accommodation. through cultivating and access towards iran, syria, hezbollah and islamist palestinian organizations, hamas, islamic jihad and fatah, they manage to or try to present a different narrative. this is an access, resistance versus accommodation, resistance versus the traitors. and this is a narrative that had good traction, as long as the anti-israel and anti-arab, anti-u.s. pro palestinian narrative defined the arab public discourse. that was the case for a very long time tore al jazeera, what have you. and palestinians thought it's always if not the headline of the top news item, this is the first page. this, however, this narrative suffered tremendously with the

advent of the awakening troubles, call it what you will. these narratives, the pro palestinian, et cetera, anti-israeli, anti-u.s. are not the main narratives. they're not that -- they are there similarly and at some point i would assume they would come back to the forefront. but for the time being, they are not what defines the arab discourse. again, look at the arab media, al jazeera and you see that palestinian issues rarely emerge. that's what is happening in syria and elsewhere. equally, the arab spring came back to expose some of these tensions that were latent over the last period. for example, iran's characterization of the arab spring as islamic spring or islamic spring simply did not correspond to the sentiment on the street. these arab movements even though

many are being now he could opted by the movements were not initiated by an islamist movement and they were not is lambs in their nature. so there was a degree of disconnect between the iranian messaging and the arab streets that made the messaging more difficult to receive and to take hold. this was compounded by iran's sectarian response to this arab spring. the response to iran and what is happening there which in iranian language was blown out of proportionon, compared to the response in syria. and syria in particular, i would say, is the point that has, i would say, made iran the biggest loser in the arab spring. by supporting syria, who's repression is seen every day on tv scenes? we see in arabic media is even more graphic than we see here, much more tu for the arab stree

the fact that this regime backed by the shia iranians is getting sunni citizens,al basically in my view reduced iran's influence and ability to influence and the fact that the arab street and the arab public opinion n the palestinian case, this was particularly feltarly of where hamas is going and how hamas is managing this situationment as you know, palestinian politics has been defined over the last few years by hamas. hamas traditionally has been closely allied to iraq. and this alliance was made possible through the rhetoric. but it was never realized. and there were moments where this reliance was threatened. for example, when saddam hussei

gaza, we start seeing graffiti that called hamas a shia organization. which hamas is very vulnerable to. by and large, they managed to maintain the relationship, specifically through the lens of syria. in this regard, syria really worked as peration. money and support comes from iran to our arab brothers in syria transferred to hamas, the money becomes cleaner as you receive it. the support becomes cleaner as you recve it. this filter no longer exists. hamas funds itself facing an unpopular alliance. after this, it came with operational costs as well. holding the support to syria and basically iran is not pumping as much money into hamas for many reasons including its lack of support for syria. this has for hamas, especially

which tended to be traditionally where the center of gravity for power in hamas, it forced hamas to start looking for another patron. and this in many ways explains what we see today, the movement of missile and his trip to doha and the letter -- or the agreement he sent and all these things. they are looking to try to find another pattern and this kamz with a price. the muslim brotherhood in egypt, jordanians will not host hamas as long as hamas is involved with terrorism. they want to define what is going to be a very common situation in the west. forces hamas to make tough decisions. this tension, though, even though iran remains an asset and this explains why hamas -- iran is part of the struggle within

hamas. they go to doha to sign the agreement. gaza gaza goes to tehran. we still have options in the region. by and large we see a tension. the trajectory of events forcing hamas and others to be more defiant at least in the access that use to be less -- the arab spraining, iran's influence and message receive ability, this has not changed iran's military capabilities or its military options or any of these issues, but it has allowed some of the arab leaders to counter hamas's influence in a more for giving

way with public opinion. talk about finding a similar lining in this cloud, i would say right now hamas's influence is reduced and easier from counter-intelligence terrorism point of view to counter some of hamas's effects in the region. i go back to where i started. i'll conclude with this. this is a snapshot. a very fluid situation. if things remain the way they are today, yes, iran's influence is use, better way of managing ideological -- many things could change this outcome. what happened in syria is essential. if the regime survives we will see a possibility of resurgence of this iranian capability to influence. equally the direction of arab spring, where it's going, who is going to be in charge at the end of the day is the anti-american rhetoric going to become in a year's time too appealing to

some of these organizations. how we in the united states approach these new arab governments and what extent to we make relationship with us more attractive than a relation with iran. by the way, this is a point here. iran has always been much more flexible in its ability to support its friends in the region. after the lebanon war, the last one, as we were hemming and hawing how we were going to support, pumping money, to the extent more agile supporting some of the friends we like this will affect the outcome. finally, of course, what's going to happen regarding iran's nuclear program. both scenarios present threats. attack on iran by israel or united states could go one way and potentially create a resurgence of sympathy to iran. on the other hand a nuclear iran

would affect the balance of power and start a nuclear race." but i would conclude on a positive note and say until we see these things, until these changes happen, and they will not happen in a day or nity to some of the influence, bring some of the organizations that have been closer to iran to a place we feel more comfortable with. i don't believe we should do this at any price. as we approach homs, for example, some components ready to move, we should not, in my view compromise our positions. keep in mind we are at this moment in a moment of strength and they need to end this. thank you very much. looking forward to the discussion. >> thank you very much for for per spentive observations. >> thank you. thank you so much. it's a great pleasure being here. i just want to echo what congresswoman harmon said in the opening, woodrow wilson truly is quite amazing in creating that

political space for conversations that you rarely find anywhere else. feer partake in that conversati conversation. i'm going to address two key issues, one is iran in the aftermath of recent uprisings. the second one is this very interesting u.s.-israel-iran triangle. to preface it, when you have significant changes, transformation, as was mentioned earlier, taking place in the region, it forces all actors to take into account there's new moving parts. have you to put them into the new equations, figure out how they fit, how they don't fit. you have to reassess and calibrate their interests, vis-a-vis not only their enemies but vis-a-vis their friends. that's a natural process. it's now taking place in the way iranians are dealing successfully with the arab world but also something interesting to analyze on how the

perspectives, diverging perspectives between the united states and israel is taking place on the issue of iran. i'll get back to that later. on the first issue of iran and the arab world, i think it was quite correct that iran's basis for soft power in the region has taken a significant hit. it's taken a significant hit because of the way these arab uprising developed. iranians welcomed it, hoped for it to happen. they thought it would take place with a very strong anti-american component within it. so far we have not seen that. i think it's quite interesting to see currently now what's happening in syria, massacres taking place, as put very visibly viewed on arab tv, that has caused a huge loss for iranian influence and soft power in iran, in a manner government's own repression of

its own people in 2009 did not. the polls in the arab world after 2009 election, during that time in which that super narrative was still centered on the israeli-palestinian issue, still centered on the perspective of the u.s. being too heavy-handed in the region, in that context, the arab public opinion was not particularly affected by the way that the iranian government was mistreat its own people. now, however, in the context of a new narrative, the sectarian or what's taking place in syria is having quite a negative affect for the iranians. the iranians, however, seem to be counting on playing the long game in this, counting on the fact that we have seen in the region in the past periods in which arab regions have embarked on extensive repressions of their own populations.

once that is older, natural gravitation has been to go back to the narrative in which the israeli-palestinian issue is at the center. that is something the iranian government very early since 1979 have tried to perpetuate. it is through the palestinian issue. it's through political islam that the iranian government has sought to bridge the arab sunni divide as well as the sunni shia divide in order to present iran as a potent candidate for regional leadership, which as others put it is viewed on the other side as iranian -- aspirati aspirations. as long as it remains unresolved, as long as it remains a bleeding wound in the region, there will always be opportunities to bring the narrative in the region back to that. we will return to a scenario

much more similar to what existed before the arab uprisings. on the second issue, and i'll spend a little bit more time on that, is the natural divergence and emergence that constantly happens between allies such as the united states and israel when it comes to the issue of iran. i think it's been quite interesting to take a look at how israel -- the united states and israel have had very close perspectives on iran for quite sometime, but there's been interesting fluctuations. there's been times when they have been quite at odds with each other. i would say since the arab uprising divergence between the united states's perspective and israel's perspective on issues has been quite interesting to observe. first of all, with obama coming into power, embarking on diplomacy as was described as naive from the israeli

perspective, putting israeli-palestinian issue in the center compared to what the bush administration did and then the obama administration's reaction in handling of the arab spring are three issues in which israeli and american perspective have been quite difference urgent on. on the issue of iran itself, it's been quite clear. 24 hours after president obama won the elections in november 2008, then foreign minister was asked by israeli radio what she thought of it and what she thought of united states engaging in diplomacy. she added in this region there's a tendency, a reality in which talking to your enemies can be seen as a sign of weakness. she was asked in a follow-up question whether israel supports united states idea of engagement with iran. she said no