no explanation. this became more acute, from the israeli perspective, the key divergent subject is what to do. if there's a successful negotiation, the most likely outcome of a successful negotiation is that there would be some limited level of enrichment left on iranian soil, obviously on very, very strict inspections. that in and of itself the israeli would permit iran to become a virtual nuclear power, which would shift the balance in the region, would have many of the negative repercussions that israelis fear would exist if iran had the actual bomb. differentiation between these two scenarios is far less in the israeli perspective than it is in the american perspective. the bush administration adopted red line of zero enrichment essentially identical to that of the current israeli government. obama has kept this issue quite vague and ambiguous. there's actually no statement

from president obama until today in which he clarifies what his position is. there's no statement enrichment is unacceptable, nor is there a statement enrichment will be acceptable. this has fueled fears on all sides. on the israeli side there is the fear this ambiguity is masking an american desire to accept enrichment on iranian soil at the end of the negotiations. on the iranian side, the fear is this ambiguity is there to mask an american desire not to accept any enrichment at the end of the day but the u.s. needs to adopt this position now in order to get negotiations started because iranians won't even come to the table if it was clear the american position was not to accept enrichment at the end of the negotiations. there's been several examples during this last three years in which obama tried engagement and israeli government under

netanyahu's position was quite clearly to make that more difficult. whether it was to push for a deadline of only 12 weeks for diplomacy, which is interesting, 20 years of sanctions didn't work but diplomacy needs to miraculously resolve the issue in 12 weeks or whether it was t something the obama administration vehemently opposed because they tried to create an atmosphere that would be more conducive to the success of talks, or whether it was the idea of obama not talking about all options being on the table. not taking any options off the table. the obama administration in the early days of its engagement tactic wanted to purr see demilitarization of the atmosphere of the discourse in order to get iranian guards down in order to begin proper negotiations. israeli response was to do exactly the opposite fearing that if there isn't a clear military option on the table there wouldn't be any emphasis

for iranians to compromise. here again you see a divergence of how they do it. these divergence may not be radical or strategic. at the technical level they have been quite problematic. we see that playing out today when there is a higher pitch when it comes to the debate whether israel strike iran, what the u.s. thinks about it. i think it's reached a certain level particularly because it's also gotten itself woven into the american election campaign. what we have seen just in the last couple of weeks is how after the obama administration in the late center 2010 adopted an assumption that was very much supported by israel which read that the only time iranians have successfully agreed to compromise on their nuclear program has been when they have been faced with an imminent and credible military threat. that was in 2003 the analysis

reads when iranians suspended enrichment right after united states had successfully knocked out iraq. the idea has been to ratchet up sanctions as well as demilitary sanctions to create an assumption it exists force iran to make decisions to face the options that they, according to this analysis, have tried to evade for so long. the danger, of course, in this is that it creates a very explosive situation. the slightest spark can get a war i don't believe the obama wants to have but will give the impression it could have. in that, these tabt cal differences between israel and the united states have become quite problematic. can you see it, for instance, when there was this latest assassination of an important person in the iranian nuclear program january 3rd. for the first time, the united

states quickly and in person had secretary clinton go to the podium categorically deny any involvement in this assassination and then condemning it as well. prior to that during the bush administration, no of terrorist acts against iran. then later on during obama administration statements issued but never secretary of state going to the podium and doing so in person. i think that was deliberate because the administration is in a phase in which it wants to deescalate, wanted to ratchet things up to get maximum leverage for a negotiation but it did not want things to spill over into an open conflict. there again the tactical differences between israel and united states are playing quite a decisive role in this. one last point on this, to give you an impression of how tense these tabt cal differences have become. two weeks ago nbc reports three american u.s. administration officials confirmed or gave

their assessment israel is behind assassinations and doing so in collaboration with iranian terrorist organization on the u.s. terrorist list. this was quite explosive. it's pointing a finger at an ally. then you have trips by dempsey back and forth and saw comments yesterday from israel saying this open conversation about these differences is ultimately serving the interest of iranian government. now, what are solutions to be found on this? i'm not going to try to give you a solution within 12 minutes. let me just point out, i think one of the positives that currently do exist here is i think the administration is quite clear on not wanting a military confrontation. we're not in a situation similar to what existed a couple years ago in which there were strong factions in the administration that favored it and happy to see

that develop. you have a situation now in which there is a deliberate strategy to force things to a climax in order to get decisions to be made. no desire, at least not that i have been able to detect within washington and the administration for a miller confrontation. i'll stop there. thank you. >> thank you very much. let me make just a few observations and then go directly to questions. number one, i think it's quite clear that you're dealing with the situation in which there will be no solutions, no concrete determinative solutions to at least the three problems we've identified. there's no diplomatic breakthrough in the offing between the u.s. and iran. i'll get back to this in a minute. there may not be a direct military confrontation coming either. we end up here in a variant of the cartoon. it's a serious business but it's the tom and jerry game, the cat and the mouse over the next six months trying to avoid the worst of both possible outcomes.

here covert war plus sanctions. however escalatory it will be is an alternative to overt war. number two, none of these problems, arab spring, arab awakening, arab-israeli issue or aspirations are amenable in my judgment to what i would call conventional solutions. the conventional transactional diplomacy and projection of american military power that has come to characterize our diplomacy may not be well suited to even producing a more constructive outcome. forget a solution, a more constructive outcome. the problem is transformational approach, bold and decisive initiatives are also extremely problematic, which brings me to my second point. you have a president who came to washington wanting to transform

both the domestic political environment and alter the trajectory of american foreign policy. he's ended up, and i'm not being critical here, much more as a trans actor. in fact, you can make an argument without being too critical that evolved into a much less ideological, much less reckless, much more disciplined version of his predecessor in the last several years of his predecessor's administration. the surge in afghanistan. very tough policies on national security with predator drones. guantanamo. tougher sanctions on iran and great caution on arab-israeli issue. so you don't have a transformational approach. you don't have nixon in china, an administration asking three basic questions, what do we want from iran, what does iran want from us, and how do we both get what we want?

those three questions were critical to the kinds of transformational diplomacy that proceeded the kissinger-nixon gamut to china and detente. the questions may be asked but is there a to actually operationalize them, a breakthrough strategy when it comes to diplomacy with iran. finally i'll point out the obvious. we as a country have entered the area of incognito. in the matter of a year, we have seen both our friends and our enemies literally go the way of the do do. the arab world is two experience, two authorize taerns, acquiescence, egyptians, tunisians and add ver sarls

-- adversarloufriends are gone, traditional enemies with whom we have actually found a way to more or less co-exist. we are in a new experience. the arab world preoccupied as it is may well offer up an opportunity for non-arabs to play a greater role. three countries. frankly right now our position to be much more consequential to the future of this region than any single arab country. israel, iran, and turkey. those three countries are still capable of acting, and i'm not suggesting always for the good, in ways that can change the nature of conflict or peace making in this region. just a said of observations. i have the moderator's prerogative. i'm going to ask each of you the

question i presume is on the minds of everyone in this room and most of official and unofficial washington but i want to do it in a very provocative manner. so here is the question. by the end of this calendar year, will iran's nuclear sites, by the end of this calendar year, will iran's nuclear sites be struck in military action. i'm going to be very hard on this one. i want a yes or no from each of you initially, and i want a one -- if the answer is no, i want a one sentence, maybe two sentence explanation as to why. will israel or the united states strike iran's nuclear sites by the end of this calendar year? and if not, very briefly, why not? i would gladly give you my view after you give me yours.

so why don't we begin with you. yes or no. >> no. i think the risk for a military confrontation is higher than it has been in the past. let's not forget we've been seeing this movie about five times now just in the last decade of israel just being about to do it and then not doing it. but i do think we're probably still less than 15%. if, however, there is another round of talks and they fail, then i would change my prediction. >> but by the end of the calendar year, you and i will be having -- all of us will be having more or less a version of the same conversation. there will be no unilateral military strike against iran's nuclear sites. >> from the israel side. >> i'll take the easy way out and say yes. it's safer to say yes. >> that's the easy way out. >> don't have to explain it. >> explain.

>> i see an escalation of rhetoric and i see all the players basically pushing themselves further and further to a corny. all it takes is a little spark. i don't see with all of this uncertainty how these unpredictable sparks can be stopped. >> ephraim. >> are you a moderator or -- >> both actually. >> my answer is no, because i believe that certain point it will be clear in this town that the dangers of israeli strike are bigger than to take economic action against iran. >> we have two nos and one yes. i will then add my answer, which is no. it's possible but not probable for one simple reason. for israel this is not a

discretionary war at the moment. but for most of the world, including the united states right now, it is. the basis for a discretionary war, which carries this kind of -- these kinds of consequences against the returns of what could actually be achieved, the balance is simply not compelling. so i will say no. no strike between now and the end of the calendar year. now, one final question. this has been an uplifting session filled with hopes and pi so i'd like to ask each of you, is there any good news? a single piece of significant consequential good news that you can identify for us? gaith, why don't we start with you? >> a piece of good news. when you have transformation, fluid situation, yes, full of danger and risks and unknowns

but also full of possibilities. we're not the only ones not clear on what's going on . all the players are in a series of tensions. that's a way of engaging, playing on insecurities. some of the things we were thought impossible in the past, limiting iran's soft power, limiting iran's influence in some of its players are now open. the question for us is as we look at this, do we take a very conservative view and just do a minimal situation or are we going to be more risk takers and take the kind of bold moves that will allow us to have more influence. if we sit spinning out of our control. there are things we can do. of course, we don't own the issue, we're not the main influencer but we can do a lot to put our interest in a stronger position once the dust has>> you've challenged us on t issue, which is really unfair

he middle east to follow some good news. that's really not what we're supposed to be doing. but if i were to say something, i would say again what i said early on. there is far greater realization in the administration and levels of constraint than existed before. i do also believe that by 2013 there will be more political space to take more courageous action. the question is can conflict management be successfully pursued in 2012, making sure nothing further deteriorates in order to get out of the political season we're in right now, in order to have at least a little more boldness and political space to address the issues in 2013. but if i could pick a fight with my fellow panelist, i would say i think one of the frames -- there's two frames i think has been dominating the conversation. a little here but generally in town. options between bombing iran and having an iranian bomb.

i think there are far more options on the table. we should have a discourse that gives space for that. we're not at a point in which such negative options are the only ones remaining on the table. the other one is as we analyze and correctly point out iran's influence is reduced in the region, we also do the opposite of again putting iran as if it is the most important factor in the region. saying that if we can get hamas out of iran, i'm not saying it wouldn't be a bad or good thing, but it's not as if these problems didn't exist before iran was involved in it. iran is not that central. we're permitting this entity to gain far more influence and role than it deserves even when we also correctly point out its soft power is reducing. i think in some ways it's become an ability to escape inevitable responsibility of addressing the real problems, because it's so much easier to point to actors

and not put plame but onus of analysis. >> if you look plainly at the big picture, no good news, only bad news. we can't have the privilege of being pessimistic, so i will point few sources of hope. the first one is that the iranian people didn't say its last word. i do believe that, again, american's inside i believe the revolutionary situation can be created in iran. it's possible. it's almost unavoidable. the question is when, not if. this is something i believe i can strongly believe will change the original pick. one thing. the second, i believe there is another people, which is mine, i

believe they will choose another government. the third one, third one -- >> three optimistic points. that's almost unfair. >> when you hear the fourth one, i'm not sure you will agree. now, i still believe that the palestinian leadership pragmatism will be strong enough to confront and overcome the trend of radicalism in the region. i know the person, the people and i believe in their wisdom. if everything fails, i have still the strongest mrlt power between the the atlantic. this is my fourth optimism and

even cynical of my optimism. >> thank you. my own answer to my own question is things could be a lot worse. so let's go to your question. please identify yourself. yes. wait for the mike, please. >> thank you. >> thank you, i'm a former u.s. government employee. mr. sneh, you put a lot of emphasis in your remarks on the islamic mention in the region. and you spoke about an ideology of islam term that's normally used in connection with political systems or movements such as communism. could you elaborate? using the same terms, could you refer to an ideology of christianity? >> can you explain better last

point? >> well, you say islam has an ideology. does another one of the great religions, christianity, which also represents a billion people also have an ideology which could be more or less dangerous or neutral. >> i don't think it's a comparison here. today there is no overlap and political ambition. the problem is in our region and broader region the fact that a religion is translated to a political and imperial ambition. that's the point. not only by iran. that's the change. imperial ambition, it's the

nature of international relations. but motivated by religion, it gives it, i would say, a more reckless and relentless and brutal style. whenever you see television you watch it. you can't see television without the combination of how religion, politics and imperial politics is transformed to unimaginable brutality. >> >> barbara calculator from islamic council. thank you for an interesting question. this is for minister sneh. when israel looks at the down sides of an attack of the iranian nuclear program, do you

consider the casualties it would cause in iran in terms of bombing sites full of radioactive and other materials have they done a study to look at the numbers of people who would be killed and injured in iran if it were to mount such a strike. is that even a factor in israel's calculations? thanks. >> i have to be careful in answering the question because on the gray line between ethical question and operational questions. but i can assure you that israel is very, very careful to avoid that kind of damage. >> how do you describe releasing radioactive -- >> both between moral and political discussion which i'm

not allowed to enter. you know, i have so many wonderful answers to give you, but i can't. >> yes, in the third row here. >> as a follow up to that question, obviously there has been a tremendous amount of analogy and analysis of what would happen with a nuclear iran to the arab countries, along the persian gulf, western europe and maybe united states through venezuela hourks do you deal with those realities of a nuclear iran? >> yes, sir. es one. >> maybe possible -- >> could you clarify the question? >> we talk about the fallout of it by israel and united states on iran, but also i think people

are getting the serious reality of nuclear iran. i know sunni countries along the persian gulf are extremely concerned as well as the united states in the region with a nuclear iran with the government we have in place in iran. >> i don't think there are any elements that necessarily would view a nuclear armed iran as a positive. on the contrary i think it's an endless list of negatives that would come around if you had further spread of nuclear weapons in the region. but we have to take a step back here because that's not what we're discussing. we're not discussing whether iran should or shouldn't have nuclear weapons. what the negotiationers being focused on is whether there should be any enrichment in iran and under what circumstances. we are taking this issue to a far higher level of hysteria that it doesn't deserve to be at right now. iranians have a very impressive and mighty arsenal of zero nuclear weapons right now.

that is not to say we shouldn't be careful and we shouldn't be very prudent in trying to look at every option. but what we're not talking about is weapons. what we're talking about, either containment or hitting a nuclear capability. now, in the analyze of some states nuclear capability is the equivalent of a nuclear weapon. in the vast majority of states that is not the case. that's where you have differences in analysis and perspectives here. i believe at the end of the day if we permit ourselves to view nuances we increase our decision making space. we can find ways to resolve this issue. instead of forcing ourselves into a fabricated choice to think we either have a bomb or accept a bomb. we're not there and we shouldn't be there. we're not there yet you say. we'll be there very quickly if we rush towards that type of framing. we don't have to. we can take a step back and take a look at nuances and open up issues and see the options that

do exist. >> let me offer a brief comment. this is an important point because it cuts to the core of the motivational character of the regime. why would a regime want nuclear weapons? while history is not a great guide here, it rhymes rather than repeats, outside of the five permanent members of the security council that all have nuclear weapons, only four countries possess them, deliverable nuclear devices, four, north korea, india, pakistan and israel. now, i would argue to you these are countries, three for sure, israelis don't quite fit the model but to some degree maybe, they married profound insecurity -- profound insecurity with an element of grandiosit grandiosity. fundamentally insecure at the same time, which i would argue is the worst conceivable

marriage when it comes to individuals and in the lives of nations. and you know, sitting in tehran, if, in fact, you argued and they heard ephraim, who argued we must change the regime, then the best hedge against that would be the possession of a weapon, which raises the cost of regime change and also north korea your own capacity to realize your ambitions. so it's circumstantial, but i find it frankly very compelling. and the north koreans wanted a bomb. we couldn't stop them. the indians, pakistanis, israelis were the first to develop. all of them ended up with a deliverable nuclear weapon. i think the preponderance on the motivational character at the minimum iranians want the pa