operators are not stretched at the unique core of responsibilities. general maddus, all of us have the jut most respect for you, but we do not envy you. few of our military leaders have more on their plate, from supporting our friends in jordan and egypt, saudi arabia, and the uae, to keeping a watchful eye on the fragile but very different situations from bahrain, yemen, and lebanon. in afghanistan, we are at an impasse with president karzai on the negotiation of a strategic partnership agreement. which is critical to sustaining our goals and locking in lasting success. in pakistan, our relationship remains fraught by a series of setbacks and a lack of trust, largely arising from the fact that the country's intelligence service continues to support terrorist groups, such as the that hakani network that are ki americans.

in iraq, prime minister maliki continues to centralize power at the expense of the other political blocks, while the threat posed by al qaeda appears to be growing, along with the kinds of horrific, spectacular attacks like the one we saw yesterday. the iranian regime continues working to subvert iraq and many other countries in the region. its recent attempt to assassinate the saudi ambassador in washington, as well as israeli officials in southeast asia and the caucuses, suggest a growing and increasingly reckless threat. a threat that would spandex exponentially if they were to claim the nuclear capabilities. unfortunately, the international effort to impose crippling sanctions appear to have done nothing to dissuade around from its nuclear military pursuits. and then there's syria. after a year of bloodshed, the

crisis has reached a decisive moment. it is estimated that nearly 7,500 lives have been lost. syria today is the scene of some of the worst state-sponsored violence since the balkans. bashar al assad and his top lieutenants appear to be accelerating their fight to the finish, and they're doing so with the full support of russia, china and iran. a steady supply of weapons, ammunition, and other assistance is flowing to assad from moscow and tehran, and as the wo"the washington post" reported on sunday, iranian military and intelligence operatives are likely working in syria to support assad. the president has made it the objective of the united states that the killing in syria must stop and that assad must go. he has committed the prestige and credibility of our nation to that goal, and it is the right goal. the united states has a clear

national security interest in stopping the slaughter in syria and forcing assad to leave power. the end of the assad regime would sever hezbollah's lifeline to iran, eliminate a long-standing threat to israel, bolster lebanon's sovereignty and dependence, and remove a committed terrorism that is engaged in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. it would be a geopolitical success of the first order and a strategic defeat for the iranian regime. however, it is not clear that the present policy will be able to achieve our goals in syria. in recent testimony to this committee, the national -- the director of national intelligence stated that if the status quo persists, assad could hang on for the foreseeable future. and that was before homs fell. with each passing day, the international response to assad's atrocities is being

overtaken by events on the ground in syria. what opposition groups in syria need most urgently is relief from assad's tank and artillery sieges in the many cities that are still contested. but time is running out. assad's forces are on the march. providing military assistance to the free syrian army and other opposition groups is necessary, but at this late hour, that alone will not be sufficient to stop the slaughter and save innocent lives. the only realistic way to do so is with foreign air power and the time has come for it. air strikes would help to establish and defend safe havens in syria, especially in the north, in which opposition forces can organize and plan their political and military activities against assad. these safe havens could allow for the deliver of humanitarian and military assistance, including weapons and ammunition, body armor, tactical intelligence, secure

communications equipment, food, and water, and medical supplies. these safe havens could also help the free syrian army and other armed groups in syria to train and organize themselves into more cohesive and effective military forces, likely with the assistance of foreign partners. rather than closing off the prospects for some kind of a negotiated transition that is acceptable to syria's opposition, military intervention is now needed to preserve this option as credible. assad needs to know that he will not win. but right now, unfortunately, assad seems to think he can win and for good reason, i'm afraid. i look forward to hearing our witnesses' advice about how we can change the balance of power against assad, to as to finally end his bloodshed and brutal rule in syria. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much, senator mccain. let me call on you, general

maddus. >> thank you, mr. chairman, senator mccain, and members of the committee. i appreciate this opportunity to discuss the u.s. central command region. i have submitted a written statement and request it to be accepted into the record. >> it will be. >> it's my privilege to appear today alongside an admired leader and good friend, admiral bill mccraven. no two commands work more closely together than u.s. special operations command and central command. let me begin with what i see today in the region. the arab awakening is manifesting differently in each country. while we may hope for and certainly we firmly support all efforts for more democratic governments in the region, the awakening's origins are not necessarily a rush for democracy. rather, this awakening stems from a breakdown in the social contract between governments and their people. unjust or unresponsive regimes have fallen or are in the throws of falling, as is the case in

syria. however, the transition to a democratic government is never easy, as we see in egypt. further, it is not clear what the resulting governments will look like. challenges remain, beyond the promise of the arab awakening. iran and its surrogates continue to orchestrate violence worldwide, as evidenced by its plot to kill the saudi ambassador here in washington, d.c. iran presents the most significant regional threat to stability and security. its reckless behavior and bellicose rhetoric have created a high potential for miscalculation. while we've made security gains in the fight against terrorists, the threat remains. al qaeda and associated groups continue to kill innocents from the lavonte to yemen and are adapting in the face of u.s. pressure. while we maintain our pressure on this enemy, we are nesting our military efforts inside four broad u.s. diplomatic objectives. first, support for each

country's political reform to adapt at their own pace. second, support for economic modernization that provides the people ownership of the future. third, a renewed pursuit of middle east peace, recognizing the status quo is not sustainable. finally, we stand firmly with our pretends from supporting regional security, territorial integrity of the sovereign nations and the free flow of commerce. as the military commander for the central region, my overarching goal so to prevent further conflict. we seek to deter those with hostile intent, and should deterrence prove unsuccessful, we provide military options to the president. as our prth has said, our strong presence in the middle east endures, and the u.s. will never waiver in the defense of our partners, our allies, or our interests. the military challenge will be determining how we obtain a

sustainable presence and operational flexibility in a physically constrained environment. although we are withdrawing some ground forces from the region, we are not withdrawing our support for longtime allies and partners. nor are we pulling back our commitment from a region that too many times has taken a commitment of american blood and treasure to restore stability. through persistent military-to-military engagement, our troops reassure our friends and temper adversary intentions. security cooperation activities, such as foreign military sales, international military education, security force training, and multi-national exercises are cost-effective means for building our friends' defensive capabilities, allowing us to operate in concert with allies and friends and to rapidly respond in times of need. a sustained joint presence with a pronounced naval character supported by embarked troops,

special operations forces, strong aviation elements, and an expeditionary army ready demonstrates our commitment to allies, underwrites regional stability, familiarizes our forces with the theater, and builds partner abilities to protect themselves all while with we're providing timely response to crisis. there are some other key needed capabilities that we have. improved counter ied efforts to protect our troops from a pervasive threat, that extends well beyond afghanistan. information operations and voice programs to counter adversary information and recruiting on the internet. improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that enable us to locate an eus live enemy, and intelligence expertise to support our deployed elements. we also need specific resources that are vital to the afghanistan campaign, coalition

support funds, the commander's emergency response program, afghanistan infrastructure fund, and reintegration authority enable us to meet urgent humanitarian and infrastructure needs of a population that is increasingly secured by its own forces, forces we have been building and training through the afghan security forces fund. in conclusion, i appreciate the essential resources you provide, which enable us to carry out the strategy assigned to us. we ask only for what we need and what we request is critical, as we carry out the transition in afghanistan and continue on course to achieve our desired strategic end state there by december 2014, as laid out at the nato conference in lisbon. thanks to congressional support and to the sacrifices of our military families, our forces represent america's awesome determination to stand by our friends and maintain regional stability in defense of our values and interests. i look forward to answering your

questions. >> general, thank you so much. admiral mccraven? >> good morning. chairman levin, mccain, and distinguish members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and to represent the extraordinary men and women of the united states special operations command. it is an honor to command the world's finest special operations force, a force serving side by side with our broader military and interagency teammates. odayd with my good friend and next-door neighbor, jim matis. admittedly, jim is rarely there, but when he's there, he's a great neighbor. with your position, i'll submit my written statementses for the record and provide some brief remarks. i would like to give you an overview of emerging security challenges. secretary panetta recently outlined how he viewed the future joint force. he called for a low-cost, lean, technologically advanced agile, responsive, innovative, and

efficient and effective forces able to address a variety of challenges and adversaries. as i read those characteristics, i am struck by how accurately they describe your special operations forces and what we bring to our nation's arsenal. special operations forces have had a tremendous impact on our nation's security and never more so than during the last ten years of war. since 9/11, our forces have doubled in size, now that's 16,6,000. our budget has tripled to meet emerging demands. however, even with that growth, our $10.4 billion budget in fiscal year '13 still come prices only 1.7% of the total department of defense budget. simply put, it remains relevant in high demand and offers an unparalleled return on the facing's investment. as we evaluate today's rapidly evolving strategic landscape, it is clear that the demand for special operations capabilities will remain high. our near-term focus is on winning the current fight

against violent extremism. first and foremost, we will sustain our efforts in afghanistan in support of isaf by quonting the application of soft's direct and indirect approach. the direct approach, lethal and concise, continues to degrade extremist leadership and their networks. the indirect approach, which i believe offers the greatest opportunity for victory, builds security and governance through efforts of the village stability operations and development of afghan security forces. both the direct and indirect approaches continue to have daily pod impacts on ireceisef' strategy. this we continue to make this our highest priority. in addition to our efforts in afghanistan, we also strive to maintain persistent presence globally. today u.s. special operations forces are in 78 countries around the world, supporting u.s. policy objectives. in the pacific, africa, latin america, europe, and other regions, soft's unique skills, cultural knowledge, and the ability to work with partners creates effects far above our

relatively small numbers. all of these international engagements are done with the complete support and approval of the respective commanders and the chief's admission. in addition to our forces -- in addition to our focus on winning the current fight, i am committed to strengthening our support to the geographic it combatant commanders by reinforcing and enabling their theater special operations commands. as you know, the theater special operations commands are sub-unified and provide the commander his special operations commander. as the force provider for those capabilities, u.s. socom will ensure they have the human capital, the capability, and the expertise to meet the gcc's requirements. another important aspect is our ability to partner with other international soft units. since the development of service special operations forces in the 1960s and u.s. socom in 1987, our relationship with our partner around the world has

strengthened each nation's ability to deal with their own problems. we must continue to build these relationships wherever possible. to win the current fight and strengthen our support to the geographic combatant commanders, it will be necessary to ensure our force and their families remain strong. my predecessor, admiral eric olson, developed a task force to analyze the frame around the enls in our soft community. we confirm that a decade of war coupled with a high demand has exerted a physical and emotional stress on our force and families. i am committed to taking care of our people with the best support that we can provide. i have put a general officer and my command sergeant major in charge of the preservation of the force and families. they're empowered to implement innovative solutions to improve the well-being of our warriors and their families. in conclusion, the demands on soft will not end in the foreseeable future. with your strong advocacy, we will continue to sustain a world class special operations capability.

thereby providing the nation a decisive edge and addressing the challenges that effect us today and will undoubtedly emerge tomorrow. it is an honor to appear before you today as the commander of the united states special operations command. you can take pride in what the men and women of special operations are accomplishing around the world, each and every day. thank you for your continued support and i look forward to answering your questions. >> admirable, thank you so much. we'll try a seven-minute round for our first round. general mattis and admiral mcraven, first let me ask you about the fiscal year 2013 budget and the administration's recently revised strategy. does the 2013 budget request reflect the renal revised strategy, general? >> yes, sir, it does. >> admiral? >> yes, sir, it the does. >> and general, do you support that budget request? >> i do, completely. >> absolutely. >> now, in the wake of the

violence following the burning of korans in afghanistan, including the killing of at least six american soldiers, secretary panetta has said this this violence is not going to alter our commitment to get this job done in afghanistan. he added that, quote, our goal is that by the end of 2014, the afghans will have the responsibility to govern and secure themselves. general, following the violence over the koran burning incident, should we modify our strategy in afghanistan? >> no, mr. chairman, i don't believe so. i'm delights to defend our strategy. i believe it is working. we should not allow a few criminals, malcontents to define the afghan security forces, even their performance during these last two weeks, disciplined, restrained, standing by us is an indication that this is a force that's come a long ways. it's right now nearly at the

352,000 mark that we have set up. it shows that the afghans are willing to fight for their country. we wanted to be at 352,000 by october. we should be there within 60 days. we're on track, mr. chairman. >> how does the events which occurred, where we had some afghans killing americans and other coalition forces, and their own people, how does that strike you? is that a significant shift in any way in terms of either the afghan's willing to take on the taliban or the reliability of the afghan army? >> sir, treachery has existed as long as there's been warfare. and there's always been a few people that you couldn't trust. i'm one of those who has slept peacefully under afghan boys guarding me back in 2001. no force is perfect. i would just remind everyone that even jesus of nazareth had

1 out of 12 go to mud on him. my point is that no matter what selection process you use, you're going to have somebody who doesn't cut the standard, doesn't make the standards. in this case, the overwhelmingly positive response by the afghan security forces, even in the face of what was a very disappointing and unintentional mistake by the u.s. forces, it did not shake their confidence in it. it does not shake the team work. i think that right now it does not cause us any question about the reliability. at the same time, prudent measures taken with the full support of the afghan chain of command, unprecedented, i might add, absolutely unstinting support means that we're on the right track to address what is a bona fide insider threat concern. >> thank you. now according to "the wall

street journal," united states is proposed reducing the size of the afghan national security forces from the 352,000 end strength goal for this year to 230,000 after 2014 as a way of reducing the cost of sustaining the afghan forces. why -- first of all, what's your reaction to that? is this something which we have decided upon? and why, if so, are we projecting the need for afghan troops two years in advance as the security force needs of afghanistan? >> i understand your question, mr. chairman. i completely support general allen's recommendation that we hold a 352,000 afghan security forces through 2015. while there can be any number of varying levels of maturity of planning or thinking going on, the conditions on the ground will have to determine the size of that force.

but between now and 2015, i think to sustain the gains we've made, especially after 2014 when our troops will have been largely withdrawn other than inviters, the 352,000 is a prudent measure. >> as far as you know, has a decision been made to that? >> there is not a decision made on that. >> now some -- i want to change the subject a bit to the stability operations. some have accused afghan local police units of serious abuses against the populations that they're tasked to protect. i'm wondering whether or not you have a response to that. i really would ask you both because you're both very much involved in the afghan local police and their support by our special operations and our general purpose forces. so first, general, what is your response to the criticisms that

we read of the afghan local police program and then admiral, i'd like to ask you the same question. >> as you know, chairman that, program is under the governor's command. they're not on their own out there. they have u.s. special forces as advisors living alongside them. it is interesting that doing all these months of difficulty with this insider threat, as we called it, where we've had some of our troops attacked, not one of these troops living out of the very edges in small -- very edges of the battlefield in small groups has been attacked. we find that those forces are ethical. we keep a close watch on them. if we get any indication of unethical behavior, violent behavior taking advantage of their position, it's investigated immediately. and we keep a very close watch on it. >> admiral? >> yes, sir. as you know, general allen investigated some of these allegations had, a joint investigation with the afghans

and they found the allegations to be false. and as the general mentioned, the stability program and the afghan local police in particular are, in fact, part of the minister of the interior. so that chain of command goes right back to the simple government and gives it some credibility from the tribal level, village level up to the central government. we think this is very important. there are currently 11,000 afghan local police and we are growing to about 30,000 over the next couple of years. and we think this is an exceedingly important program for the stability of afghanistan. >> thank you very much. senator mccain? >> general matis, has the -- do you believe the regime has been at all dissuaded from pursuing any nuclear weapons capability? >> no, sir. i have not seen that.

>> general mattis, are there strong indications that al qaeda is making a comeback in iraq? >> yes, sir, notably in the western iraq area. but the threat is extending into baghdad. >> general mattis, at sad regime and its military remain a "viable, cohesive and effective force." the same hearing james clap bur said assad will "hang in there and continue to do as he's done." do you agree with general burgess and director clapburn's assessments? >> sir, assad has chosen violence. i think his military is under more pressure every day.

the desertions rate is going up. i agree with general burgess' assessment. >> if current conditions persist, absent external intervention, how long do you think assad could remain in power? indefinitely? >> i don't think indefinitely, sir. but i would be very slow to put a time horizon on it. i think he's going to be there for some time because i think he will continue to employ heavier and heavier weapons on his people. i think it will get worse before it gets better. >> and recent reports of increased iranian involvement as well as russian arms supplies make it worse, you would say that assad's crackdown especially fli recent events in homes is gaining or losing momentum? >> he's gaining physical momentum, sir on the battlefield. i think he's creating more

enemies. he's creating more international pressure against him. on the tactical battlefield, he is clearly achieving what he wants to achieve. >> i think we would agree that syria out of the hands of assad would in a chance to be free and democratic would be one of the greatest blows to iran, as far as lebanon is concerned, hezbollah. iran's closest ally that it would be in america's strategic interest to see assad go. >> yes, sir, it will be the biggest strategic setback for iran in 20 years when assad falls, not if but when. he's going to go. >> and fundamentally, we went to the balkans because ethnic cleansing and genocide was

taking place in was was and kosovo in the 1990s. do you see a difference between the kind of slaughter that's going on in syria now and the kind that was going on in kosovo and in bosnia, maybe a difference in scale but sort of the same kind of behavior -- actions and being taken by the government? >> certainly each situation is unique. but as far as the trend, i would not disagree with your characterization. >> under current conditions, would simply providing arms to the opposition to be sufficient to help them end the violence and to force assad to leave power? >> sir, providing arms is perhaps an option that would be a policy option.

i think we would have to do our best to determine who are providing the arms to and follow the oath of first do no harm to make certain what we're doing is actually going to reduce the scale of violence ultimately. i mean it may go up for a short time. but i think you'd have to look at it very closely because the longer this goes on, the more potential there is for al qaeda and for basically a full scale civil war. >> have you seen any evidence that al qaeda is having any significant role in syrian opposition today? >> yes, sir, we have, in terms of the rather spectacular ied attacks. >> so every time i've seen one of these crisis, the first answer is we don't know who these people are. it could be al qaeda. i heard that in egyptian. i heard it in india. we don't know whose