you know what that flies in the face of, general? people are fighting for liberty and not being under the rule of an oppressor dictatorship. so all of a sudden now we will again assume al qaeda. well, i just turned -- returned from a trip egypt, tunisia and libya. and that is always the threat of extremism. but there's no doubt that people made the revolution we're not al qaeda. in fact, they're in direct repudiation of al qaeda. so, frankly, one grows a little weary of this we don't know who they are and they're probably al qaeda. general, do you think we can find out who they are? >> sir, i think it's prudent to find out who your allies are and who your enemy is. >> it is prudent to stand on the side of freedom and democracy against one of the most oppressive dictators in the world? is it? >> no, sir. >> is that prudent? >> no, sir. >> isn't that what the united states has been standing for for a couple hundred years at least?

isn't that why we fought wars? so, frankly, i grow irritated and i grow angry when i see and meet these people who sacrificed their very lives and their family and are wounded when i visit a hospital where a whole ship load of wounded young men have just returned. and i didn't see a single one of them that was al qaeda. not a single one. i didn't see a single one of them that died before my eyes that was al qaeda. so i suggest -- i suggest we find out who these people are and i guarantee you that you will find out that it's not al qaeda. it is not al qaeda. it's people who have the same yearnings that are universal and that's freedom, democracy and our god given rights. so i would hope -- i would hope we would spend some time with your unique capabilities in finding out who these people

are. i'm surprised you haven't tried to do that before. you should do it. because this conflict is going to go on and a whole lot of people are going to die if we allow the status quo to prevail and the slaughter to continue because "we don't know who they are." >> thanks, senator mccain. general mattis and admiral, thank you for being here. thanks for your leadership. as i consider the records both of you have had and what you're doing now, i don't think we can have two better people in the position that you're in. and we ought to be very grateful to you for that. general mattis, i always look forward to your testimony. in some sense i feel when i read your stuff or listen to you that i'm black in a classroom because you do have a very developed sense of history. i want to read in the context from your submit the testimony, over 30 years of supporting u.s. forces, in the central command area of responsibility i have

never witnessed it, change is the only constant and surprise continues to be the dominant force in the region. well, transformation is under way across the region as a result of the asia wakening, malign effort business other regional actors, particularly iran to influence the outcome represent greatest immediate and long term threat to regional stability. and then i'm skipping here. again, i thought interesting perspective. maybe we missed in all the timult in the region. there is only one state in our aor actively seeking to destabilize the region and that is iran. i think that helps us put things in context. let me go back to something that senator mccain touched on. i want to ask you to go into it in a little more detail which is this is about syria. can you describe in more detail

what is the extent of both iranian and russian assistance to the military assistance to the outside government at this time? >> senator, the russians provided very advanced integrated air defense capabilities. missiles, radars, that sort of thing that would make impositions of any no fly zone challenging. if we were to go that direction. in terms of iran, they're working earnestly to keep assad in power. they have flown in experts. they're flying if weapons. it is a full throated effort by iran to keep assad there and oppressing his own people. >> so the iranians first to the best of your knowledge have some expert or high ranking personnel that have come from tehran to damascus to assist the syrian forces? >> they have, sir. yes, sir.

>> and what -- generally speaking, what kinds of hardware, what kinds of military assistance -- systems are they providing to the syrian army? >> they're providing the kind of weapons that are being used right now to suppress the opposition. they're providing listening capability, eavesdropping capability to try and pick up where they opposition networks are at. and they're providing experts who i can only say are experts in oppressing their pretty well schooled. they know how to oppress their own people in tehran. they have flown them into damascus to help assad do the same thing. >> generally in sympathy with the argument that senator mccain just described, the international community for reasons that are both humanitarian and strategic really just can't, shouldn't sit

back any longer and watch assad do what he's doing. my own sentiment is i suppose eventually he'll fall. but when there is such a disproportion of military power between the government and the opposition, he can really, as you suggested earlier and senator mccain did, hang on there for a long time and the killing can go on for a long time. we actually saw this in the balkans in some sense in the '90s before we finally got involved and stopped it. and i don't minimize the difficulty of getting involved here. but i do want to say that your answer to the last question which i appreciate does -- let pe say this. some people say if we get involved or some of our arab allies get involved or people are in the european union to provide weapons to the opposition army that we will be militarizing the conflict.

but the conflict is already militarized. the iranians and russians are providing a lot of military support to the assad government and the opposition is -- doesn't have much of that at all. has the white house asked you as head of centcom to prepare any contingency plans for possible assistance to the syrian opposition? >> senator, i would prefer to answer that question in closed hearing if i could, sir. >> okay. and i hope chairman had to go away to another meeting. i hope we'll have an opportunity to have a closed hearing before this is over. i know for the record that i don't believe, i don't believe senator mccain believes we should do this on our own. i hope we can help organize something. i gather that the saudis and others are actively thinking about at least supplying some weapons to the syrian opposition.

let me move to another area. this also goes to iran. i have heard reports that the iranian regime is now involved in more actively in malign activities in other countries in the region. and in a way that poses some threat to our forces in the region. and i want to ask you to talk about that. i'm thinking particularly of yemen but beyond syria there are other areas where in your aor that you feel iran is beginning to threaten our forces. i would like to hear about it. >> sir, they're fighting a shadow war every day. moving weapons into sudan. they're sending them into yemen. they are trying to make deals there bypassing out money and ordnance to the various families in yemen. they take their first steps to

some kind of a democracy in their future and come out very good election. we see what they're doing in damascus. they recognize that their link will be cut to hezbollah if mr. assad falls. so we see this throughout the region. they have never gotten along that well, the iranians, with the taliban. and, yet, they're willing to help the taliban to some degree to fight us in afghanistan. and we also see their mischief in all around the world, of course where they attempted to kill an arab ambassador. this is an on going effort. it is something we have to accept as part of the scheme. and we certainly take a lot of prudent steps to maintain our own force protection. but we also see them trying to find their way in and take advantage of anything that any of these asia wakening causes

that come up. they tried it in cairo. i think they were pretty well rebuff there. the iranian revolution is not being seen as an example for any of the arab nations in their awakening. so it's not completely successful. it's highly concerning. >> my time is about up. i'll ask you briefly, is all this activity in the region by iran evidence of the fear that people including in the region have that they really have ambitions and they want to stretch out across the region or is it -- can we not conclude that? >> sir, i think one of the reasons we're seeing the unity of the gulf cooperation council right now and the way the arab league is banding together and becoming actually a force for initiating operations whether it be in libya or in other areas, there are concerns about damascus.

i think what we're seeing is the whole region is becoming aware of this sort of effort on iran's part and it is causing a more unified opposition to them, almost akin to 1948 in western europe when nato was formed out of a fear the soviet union and their forces. >> so very significant parallel. thank you very much, general. senator brown is next. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you both for your service. admiral, thank you for taking time to come in. i know we -- i think it was senator levin references the afghan local police program which i had an opportunity and honor to observe as a soldier this summer and go out and visit the special forces and see that program at work and visit many of the villages and speak with the tribal leaders and also the soldiers that were there. and to me, it's the program we should have implemented from day one. the value for the dollar is

incredible. the amount of i could co-operation between the tribal leaders and people of the villages and the special forces is unheard of. it's never happened like it's happening now. that check and balance. when one village is actually coming to the aid of another village when they're being attacked or harassed. it's never happened. that is because of the advent of a simple road connecting the villages. that's why it's very important to continue with the infrastructure in that region. you get from point a to point b, see what the other village is doing. create trade with that village. come there and be the safety and security for that village and vice versa. is that your observation those type of positive activities as a result of the -- our involvement in the afghan local police program? >> absolutely. afghan local police program is one component of the platform or operation which really kind of looks at security governance and

then economic development. and the afghan local police are part of that security aspect at the village level linking the village to the district and then the xridistrict and the provinc and the province to the central government. >> general, regarding -- i also had the opportunity as a result of my military duty to actually go to the detainee facility and actually participate in a -- in a board, so-called board to determine whether that detainee should be released. it was not dissimilar to our drug boards and other types of boards that seem to be in concert with everything that i've been taught as a jag and i find it fascinating and i also found it a little bit troubling especially troubling potentially troubling, i should say, because the strategic partnership agreement with the afghan government is absolutely important. something we need to get signed

and implemented right away. because it puts to bed the notion that we're packing our bags and leaving. however, accelerating of the transfer that detainees to afghan customer presents real concerns for me. i don't -- i don't think they have the capacity at this point based on my personal observations to assume the security of these detention facilities. and i found it was one of the best run facilities i've seen ever. i've been down to gitmo. my old senate district back home, i was responsible and participated in getting funding for three or four prisons. is that, general, your understanding and position as well? are you concerned about that transer if and whether they can hand that will? >> yes, sir, we are. we're in negotiations with them now. ambassador crocker is leading the negotiations. general allen right alongside him. i think the most important thing is that we figure these things

out or a process for figuring them out and not go into an agreement. what we want is the right agreement. as you point out, we want to make certain we're not turning people over before the afghans are ready to take care of them. and then we end up with abuse or some failure in tirnlz erms of take care of them. i know they're expanding it and also -- i mean i've seen the caliber of afghan corrections officers, soldier who is manning it. i have to be honest with you, i have deep concerns. you know, i want to monitor it very, very closely along with you and i know ambassador crocker and general allen were obviously working that through. regarding iraq, i am concerned as others are about the vacuum that is created and as you know al qaeda and iraq is carrying out more attacks this year than it did the entire second half of last year.

do you think there is a security vacuum there now since we left? or what? >> it's not a security vacuum, senator brown. but it is a less capable iraqi security force without our capabilities there. they're scrambling to try and fill in the gaps. we're working with our small footprint there to help them fill in those gaps. but it is -- it's a concern i know for the iraqi government and it's a concern for ambassador jeffries. >> do you think al qaeda is making a comeback in iraq? >> yes, sir. they are. it's not significant. it won't threaten the government. it will kill a lot of innocent people. >> and what about the favoritism in the iraqi government for the majority shia political party? do you think that's fueling another insurgency potentially and does this play right into our al qaeda's hands to create that instability? >> it's not playing into al qaeda's hands yet. and i think that the -- there has been some progress back into a political dialogue here in the

last couple of weeks that i think is back on the right track. so it's -- i give you a cautious optimistic view of. this but it's very, very cautious at this point. >> regarding syria, do you see them moving over to syria to fight against the syrian regime and how do you think this affects our understanding of the assad opposition? >> al qaeda is trying to increase the chaos because they like ungoverned spaces. i don't think they have a moral bone in their body. they're simply opportunistic. i don't think that they characterize or represent or define the opposition to assad. that they would try to take advantage of it, i have no doubt. it's in their genes. they do not define the opposition to assad. >> admiral, can i just touch base? can you comment on the -- sometimes i feel not often understood but equally effective contributions of the guard and

reserve elements and so common. and how do you view their role now? how are they doing? and how do you view the role in the future? >> sir, thank you. the guard and reserve has been absolutely essential to centcom's capability and fight over the last ten years and really since the establishment of uso in 1987. we have two reserve units, the 19th and 20th special forces groups that do phenomenal work for us in afghanistan. we have the 193rd, special operations wing which flies the unique guard and reserve assets. so we are very strongly enabled by the guard and reserve across all components, all service components of special operations. and we expect that they will continue to be well resourced in the years to come and play a vital role in the u.s. special operation. >> and you welcome that role? >> absolutely, sir. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thanks, senator brown. senator reid? >> thank you very much, senator lieberman and gentlemen, thank

you for your extraordinary service to the nation and to the men and women that you lead with such distinction and their contributions also. general mattis, you indicated that the most significant threat in your region is iran. and given the issue of strategic focus where if you have limited resources you have to keep maximum pressure on the key threat. can you comment about what could happen if we either coordinated or supported or encouraged or even participated in military operations with syria with respect to the iranians? would this be neutral in terms of our efforts? would this disrupt international collaboration? would this create unanticipated and unwarranted advantages to the iranians? >> sir, i think that if we went into providing options, whatever

they are, to hasten the fall of assad, as long as those were put together in a coalition, international form, it would cause a great deal of concern and discontent in tehran. >> but the one area that would be problematic would be something that was perceived as unilateral or so dominated by the united states that this lack of international collaboration could undermine our intentions and our motives? that's true? >> i think international collaboration will be essential to the successful outcome. >> so in effect, we're working on, as we speak, pulling together that international context for effort that's are directed to what many have said and we hope the ultimate demise

of the assad regime. is that a fair characterization? >> yes, sir. >> let me take it one step further. there's been discussion of ande havens. operation on the ground, let's assume that could be done. it would seem to pose some problems. first, the syrian military forces are very well organized and robust and fairly proficient. i don't know how long they would tolerate those safe havens. but second, given safe havens, it also implies, some would have to go in and organize training and organize literally an army. that could take months if not years. are those considerations being thought through carefully? and what it would mean in terms of commitment and resources?

and, again, deflecting efforts away from other more serious threats? >> sir, i've not been directed to do detailed planning on these. i would prefer to take some of this in the closed session. but it would require regional or surrounding state support to do something like this. i've looked at the maps and there are no terrain limiting features where we could create the safe havens. in other words, you would have to create them using military forces. it's not like the mountains of northern iraq where the kurds could be up in that area against saddam hussein helped up in that area against him. it would be a significant commitment of resources, of course the international aspect could reduce our commitment if we got sufficient from others.

>> thank you very much. and for both of you gentlemen, one of the difficult points negotiating strategic framework with afghanies is persistence of president karzai to resist operations at night, even his own forces. can you, admiral, comment on how critical this is to us and is there a way to somehow be leery of his concerns but continue to be tactically effective? >> sir, we think the night raids are essential for our task force to go after high value individuals. high value individuals that we pursue during the course of a 24-hour period or days or weeks. generally bed down at night. they are much more target ablg at night. in fact, i think if you look at it tactically, what you find is the afghans are actually much safer if we target an individual at night because there aren't so many people out and about the

whole villages. what we have done to reduce the afghans anxiety on this is the afghan special forces are in the lead on all of our night operations. i think this is an important point. i know it is an important point that general allen and general mattis made and ambassador crocker to president karzai is these are his force that's are, in fact, surrounding a particular compound, trying to call out the specific individual and the first forces through the door. and we think that is the best way to reduce the afghan's concerns. but it is a critical tactical component wlaf we do every day in afghanistan. >> general mattis, do you have any comments? >> i would just emphasize that there is less chance of collateral damage of innocent people being killed. i think that on itself on the moral level, besides the military efficiency aspect dictates that we continue these operations so long as the enemy

keeps an active force in the field. >> thank you. one of the principle assumptions going forward is that we will be able to operate with the afghan national forces both their police forces, special forces and army forces. at small unit levels which means essentially small groups of u.s. and nato personnel imbedded with larger units and this is particularly something that your special forces, soldiers and other operators do. the recent attacks by afghan military forces against american forces, really the one-on-one sort of violence, to what extent has that caused you to re-evaluate that approach and that assumption? >> sir, i think as general mattis mentioned, we have not had any what we refer to as green on blue incidents with

respect to our partner relationships from the special forces with the afghans. but that's not to say, again, as general mattis mentioned that there couldn't be treachery in the ranks. i think we're always cognizant of that. we built the partnerships over many years. we have great respect for our afghan partners. and way think that this strategy of partnering with the afghans is absolutely essential to victory in afghanistan. >> general mattis, any comments? >> senator, these a & a is defined by the boys that fight loyally alongside us. the casualties are routinely higher than ours, significantly higher. they're doing much of the fighting now. and there is an increasing need for us to have mentors among them as they take the lead. so this will be something we'll take every prudent measure. but at the same time, it eventually comes down to the trust between young men fighting

alongside each otheren that is characterized by a high degree of trust, overwhelmingly. the tragic incidents become understandably what we hear about. >> thank you. thank you. >> thanks, senator reid. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, general mattis and admiral for your distinguished service to our country. general mattis, i want to ask you about the recidivism rate from guantanamo. the associated press ran a story yesterday which i believe is misleading and the headline was "not so many guantanamo reoffenders." the story said that far fewer detainees released from the guantanamo bay rejoined terrorist activities than previously reported. however, before this committee, this is an issue that i've questioned many individuals about. last year director clapper said that re-engagement rates from former guantanamo detainees confirmed or suspectsed of re-engaging was 27%. in fact, just three weeks ago he

was before our committee again and he actually said that the re-engagement rate of those who had re-engaged were, we've confirmed, are in the fight or suspected to be re-engaging was actually increased close to 28%. i believe it's 27.9%. and, of course, we've heard the same testimony from secretary gates as well as secretary vickers that the way that we calculate the recidivism rate is not just those who are returned but those are just who have suspected of returning to the fight. one of the big issues we have, of course, is that it's difficult to determine who has re-engaged because we're so poor once they have re-engaged of reconfirming, we can't always reconfirm who's out there, who's back fighting us again and often we find them whether we encounter them in the battlefield or elsewhere. and so i want to ask you about

two, in my view, one terrorist re-engaging us is too many. and the reason we've tracked both those who re-engaged is a more accurate reflection we are with re-engagement rates. two individuals i'd like to ask you about, general mattis who have re-engaged in the fight that, is al-shahiri and another detainee. one became a leader in al qaeda in the arabian peninsula and another in the taliban and afghanistan. both of these former gitmo detainees have been actively evolved against us and our allies. can update the committee on the status of these two former good ju good juan tan moan detainees? >> thank you, se