i would suggest it's probably more in the foreign relations state department realm. pretty absent as far as mil to mil. >> i would venture that in terms of cooperation on anti-piracy, there is a clear benefit even on a tactical level to the chinese because now they're operating their navy in an area that they weren't operating in before. we welcome collaborative efforts, but i don't think we should look at that as some statement of national intent here. and i just hope that -- i know this is principally a diplomatic question. but i hope that we might be able to pursue ways to encourage china to help us resolve these larger issues, whether it's korea, whether it's burma, but particularly in this region where they clearly have geographic reasons and strategic reasons to be further involved. even in a place like afghanistan

where we know they've now started to move in economically. but we need to hear more from china. admiral, i think my time's going to run out. i want -- i have a question. i'd just like in a general sense to hear your policy with respect to officers who handle classified information that might, even on a temporary basis, end up in the hands of foreign nationals. is there a policy if that were to occur? >> yes, sir, absolutely. i mean, anybody that transfers classified information, you know, without the approval of the u.s. government, without the process, falls under the uniform code of military justice for violation -- >> what about just for negligence they left something laying around. >> same thing, sir. >> thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thanks, senator webb. senator mccaskill, i really

apologize. i think senator blumenthal in terms of original arrival is on the list first. >> i'll wait. >> if senator mccaskill has another -- >> absolutely not. go ahead. >> thanks. senator blumenthal. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. i want to add my thanks to both of you. and the men and women under your sle leadership for your really extraordinary service which i had the privilege to see a bit firsthand during my second trip to afghanistan last february with senator mccain and senator graham and others of my colleagues. and as i mentioned to you, admiral mcraven, i was particularly impressed by the really remarkable achievements of our special operators there. the numbers tell a powerful story, but so do the more anecdotal information, particularly about turning over a lot of this work and training

the afghans themselves, which i think is a really unprecedented achievement in our military history in terms of special operations. and i hope that we all keep sight of that work and also, general, the work that all of our men and women there are doing despite the incidents that may sometimes cloud the clearer picture that we should have and the appreciation we should always maintain of their service and sacrifice and the achievements are a real success there. so i want to begin by asking, admiral, whether you are satisfied with the work that is being done in terms of turning over that it sha-- turning over training that function to the afghans themselves of the night raids, the special operations forces and what we can do, if anything, to help you in that

very qucritical part of your mission. >> yes, sir. i've actually been very pleased with the progress. we have a number of efforts ongoing and have for quite some time in our partnership with the afghans. the u.s. special forces has had a collaborative effort with the commandos. some of our other special forces have partnered with the afghan partner unit. these are the forces that predominantly do the direct action raids and are leading on those direct action raids. we also have our nato-sought brethren. across the soft spectrum, if you will, it is all about the partnership and it is all about the afghans leading in that partnership. and our progress certainly over the last year has accelerated dramatically. and i'm very pleased with the glide slope we're on right now. >> you know, one of the

impediments, i think, to understanding generally in the american public about how successful we've been, not just in targeting and taking out those elements of the al qaeda and taliban leadership, but also with the very, very small number of civilian casualties that have occurred. and i know these numbers, at least i was told they were classified, but they are -- are really powerfully impressive. i would just put a pitch to you that if we can declassify some of these information, it would really, i think, enhance the appreciation and understanding in the american public in general. and i want to move to a topic that has concerned me for a long time. the ieds, the continued flow of ied bomb making material from pakistan, which is the source of the vast, predominant part of

the components that go into the roadside bombs and, of course, the roadside bombs themselves cause the majority of casualties, both injuries and deaths, to our troops. we had testimony recently from director clapper, the director of national intelligence, and from lieutenant general burr jusz. director clapper very specifically said that his view is that pakistan is not making a significant effort to stop the flow of those bomb making components. i wonder if either of you have any views on that topic. >> senator, the -- it has been an area of frustration. it has been a serious topic of dialogue with us. they have passed the laws now that will enable them to make arrests that they could not make before in this regard. they've also put together

they're counter-ied strategy here in the last few months. ened and i need to get back in pakistan and talk with them more about it. there is some reason for more optimism today than if i was testifying last year. but i need to do more home work before i can give you a complete answer. statement, pakistan as you know, it's called the federal administered tribal area for a reason up in the north there. it's a very unique status that it's had since pakistan became a country. their level of sovereignty over everything that goes on there has also been at times nebulus. i hope to get a report in a month or two or three at most where i really think we're at. are we seeing real progress or not. >> i appreciate your care and caution in commenting on the

work that the afghans and most particularly the pakistani forces are doing in this air ra. my view is that they have not yet made a significant effort to stop the flow of amoan yum calcium nitrate and other bomb components based on everything i have seen and heard. i would appreciate any additional update you can give me at an appropriate time. and in the time i have left, to turn to a subject that really concerns all of our men and women in uniform. the proposals for changes in the retirement and health care systems. you, in particular, general mattis and admiral mcraven, work with some of the most dedicated career professionals in our military. and i am greatly concerned by the potential impact of some of

these proposals on the ability of our military to attract the quality of people. and they are people of truly extraordinary quality, as you know better than i. but i have been very powerfully impressed by the kind of people we are tracking. could you give me any concerns you have about these proposals and the ability of our military forces to attract and keep the kind of career professionals we have now? >> sir, i guess i'll start on this and then turn it over to general mattis. i mean, we see right now our recruiting goals in terms of the special operations forces are -- are up from previous years. and i think if you polled a lot of those young men and women coming in, they probably wouldn't cite the health care and the retirement benefits as the reason that they are

joining. however, it could very well be the reason that they stay after a certain point in time. and so i think as we move forward, we need to do some very, you know, prudent and careful looking at the retirement and the health care system so that we keep those experienced noncommissioned officers and officers in and take care of them for the service that they have rendered over their -- the life of their career. >> senator, i would agree with admiral mcraven. very few -- i've been on recruiting duty. very few come in and ask a lot about health benefits unless they're quite old and in the marines we didn't let them in, as you know from your service. on retention i think it's something we have to look at very carefully. that point i made to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines out in the field when i'm asked about it is, you will still have one of the best retirement systems no matter what because i'm confident that the secretary of defense and the

chairman will only bring forward those -- those proposals that keep us able to attract the high quality young men and women who look beyond the political rhetoric that goes on every day and sign up to defend this country. so i'm optimistic we'll find the right way forward on this, sir. >> thank you very much. again, i think it is so profoundly important that we find the right way forward. because our greatest asset is the people -- the men and women who serve and fsacrifice for us. as much as we may talk about the hardware and weapons systems, our people are our greatest asset. thank you very much. >> thanks, senator blumenthal. senator mccaskill, patience is once again rewarded. >> thank you, senator lieberman. correct me if i'm wrong, but i think the last time i checked the gdp without us in afghanistan is around $2 billion? and the gdp with us is around $16 billion?

does that sound about right? am i off there, general mattis? >> i'd hate to say it's right. but it sounds about right. >> right. and, by the way, thank you both for all of your service and your leadership. i have said repeatedly i am supportive of what we are trying to do in afghanistan. but i have become increasingly skeptical about the infrastructure projects that we are spending money on. and i have followed the saga of surp from my first days on this committee. i have watched it have successes and, frankly, one of the things i've noticed is that while everyone thinks the idea is good, we have yet to have really an objective study that shows the value of a lot of the surp money. now we have for the first time what i'm affectionately calling the son of surp.

which is the afghanistan instra structure project which is part state money and part dod money. which while not unprecedented in our history, it is very unusual for our military to be building major infrastructure while we're engaged in a fight on the ground. there's a reason for that, i think, in history. because i think typically the military would say, you know, the security needs are a problem. the sustainment is a problem. and it seems like we've blown over some of those considerations as we have engaged in some of this infrastructure building. i can give you anecdotally disasters in iraq. in fact, i am trying to compile all of the infrastructure we built in iraq and what the status is of it today. but i think everyone knows it's not a pretty picture. how much got blown up. how much was never utilized. how much was -- sits, you know,

crumbling. that's all incredible amount of resources of our country that we've invested. which brings me to the request for fy '13. for surp and aif. the projects that are being funded in fy '12 with the aif money, new iraq instructure fund dod requested. according to the briefing that my office has received, you will finish these projects with fq '12 money. yet here you are -- by the way, they're not going to be finished, some of them, until 2014. juxtaposition this with what we're envisions in terms of drawing down. now we've got requests for 2013, and i guess my question to you, general mattis, would be what are those for? what is the almost $1 billion that we're requesting in surp and aif?

what major projects are we going to build beyond the ones that the fy '12 money is going to finish and how many years forward are we going to be working on those? how many contractors will we leave on the ground as we try to manage our transition out of afghanistan and then i'll get to sustainment. >> senator, i need to go back and take part of that question for the record. so what i give you is absolutely accurate. i will tell you, ma'am, that we would not disagree that we've had significant problems in the midst of a war trying to do something you point out we've not done before. however, we've also gone through a very rigorous scrub year by year now to try to reduce it, what is actually necessary, not what is good to have, what is absolutely necessary to the counterinsurgency campaign. it's a different kind of war that we fight today. the enemy has identified our strengths and has decided to fight us in a way that does not

lend itself to us using our strengths, our mechanized divisions, our aircraft carriers as the tool to win. they are enablers, but what we have to do is reach the people. and the reason we're in afghanistan, of course, and i know that you've supported us over the years on this, is to keep it from becoming, again, a terrorist safe haven for attacks on us. part of what we're trying to do here is take a vote that was turned upsidedown 30 years ago and bring it back into a way forward that at least provides the most basic services. we're not talking about things that -- that perhaps at one time some more idealistic people were coming in with a much broader idea about what we could do there. so let me get back to you on -- on this what the major projects are. and i'll give it to you in great detail. i would tell you that the afghan -- afghanistan infrastructure fund was an

attempt to break out of surp to give more fidelity to you for your oversight. i have no reservations about providing this. if it can't stand the scrutiny that you give it, then we'll change it. >> well, and i understand. i do think that part of this, and maybe i'm being a little cynical here. i think part of this happened because major infrastructure was very hard to get the funds through the state department budget and generally congress, it's easier to get the funds from -- that's typically who's done this, as you well know. speaking of sustainment, we've got big projects that were funded through state that have not been sustained even in afghanistan. particularly, as you look at the power plant, you look at the power plant in kabul, and it is hundreds of millions of dollars. and it's sitting there idle for most of the time used for just overload situations. they're still buying electricity from the stands. i don't think they have the capacity or the resources to operate what we've built for them. that brings me to sustainment.

on the highway funds, i looked at some of the materials that -- that you all provided my office. on sustainment, on the roads, right now we've got hundreds of millions of dollars we're putting into road and bridge projects. which, by the way, as an aside, we desperately need in this country. and they're not going to get blown up while we build them. we're not going to have to pay off the bad guys to create the security in order to build them. there is no revenue in place right now to maintain or support these roads after we leave. in fact, there's not even a government road authority to focus on the network and operation. now, there's talk in the briefing that we received that, well, we think that they could. why aren't we requiring that at least the government of afghanistan -- i mean, to me it has a lot more credibility that somehow the government is delivering these services, which ultimately is the theory behind it, right? we're trying to make the afghanistan government look like

it's a real government to the people of afghanistan so they like them better than a taliban. why aren't we requiring that the government do that first? that the government provide some kind of gas taxes or some kind of revenue that would -- that would maintain these roads or at least a governmentwide authority that would allow them to operate a system of roads and bridges in afghanistan before we put hundreds of millions of dollars of american taxpayer money into these projects? >> senator, they're very good questions. i won't tell you i have all the answers. but we are consistent with your view right now in everything we're doing. if they cannot sustain it, we're not going to build it. and if it can't be sustained by the afghans, in other words, we're not talking about us providing the sustainment, then it's not going to be part of the program. but i think, too, we have to remember where we started there.

even finding educated people. i mean, there's not a big bench of people that we draw from. but i'm simply outlining the problem. we owe you a solution. i will get back to you with more specifics about the way ahead here. >> i don't want anyone to misinterpret my willingness to pull some of this money out and put it in the highway trust fund in this country as not supporting what our military is trying to do there. but, you know, as we are transitioning out, it's almost like the two views are not matching up here. that we're continuing it shae i know what the problem is, general, honestly? we can do this stuff. afghanistan can't. our military, let me give you all credit as leaders of an amazing organization. you tell the people under you that we want to do something. you know what? they're going to do it. so we can build these roads. we can build this power grid. we can contract. we can do all this. and it is a can-do attitude that

is so part of our culture that i think sometimes there is a sense of denial about not whether or not we can do it, but how this ends up at the end. i want to tell you, i believe with every intellectual capacity i have that this is not going to end up well on these infratruckture projects. that it's not going to be a good ending. that there are not going to be roads and bridges and cars and that the afghanistan government is not going to have a good handle on this. especially in light of the time you all face in terms of us drawing down. so i want to -- i want these things to match up. i want to be realistic. and i do think this part of the coin strategy needs even more examination. because, you know, i listened to prime minister netanyahu talk about walking like a duck and quacking like a duck and looking like a duck and it being a duck last night. this really looks like nation building. in every essence of the word. and i think there is more nation building here than there really

is coin. that's my bias at this point. but i am certainly willing to be talked out of that bias with good objective proof points. >> let me try, senator. if i can't, we'll have to change something. >> thank you. thank you very much, general. thank you, admiral. i will call on senator hagan. >> thank you. thank you, madam chairman. >> i was looking around to see who else i could call on. i guess it's just you. >> last but not least. general madison, admiral mcraven, thank you so much for your testimony today but even more so for your service to our country. i agree with senator mccaskill, we certainly do have a can-do attitude and we can do great things. admiral mcraven, thank you for coming by yesterday. i did want to go over a question that we talked about. several public reports have indicated that you are seeking several new authorities to give you more control over the deployment and utilization of the special operation forces.

for example, t"the new york times" recently reported that you want authority to deploy the special operation forces without going through the traditional force generation process managed by the joint chiefs. as i said, i know we've discussed this. but if you could also go over again, are you seeking authorities that would provide you with additional control over the deployment and utilization over the special operation forces? >> i appreciate the question. i appreciate the opportunity to set the record straight. as you said, there's been a lot in the news about this lately. every two years the joint staff goes through a staffing drill to look at the unified command plan, the ucp, which is -- defines the roles and responsibilities, missions of the come pat tant commanders. every year we go through the review of the forces for, the assignment of forces to those co-coms. what we have done is we are

anticipating in that staffing process. right now it is an internal process. my recommendations have not even gotten to the chairman, much less the secretary or commander in chief yet. i think it's premature to talk about what my recommendations are in an open forum. however, having said that, what i would like to set the record straight is that we will never deploy forces to a geographic combatant command without that geographic combatant commander's approval. we never fwo into another country without getting country cleergs from the chief admission. the chief admission always has a vote in whether or not u.s. forces arrive in the nation he or she is sitting in. so there is nothing in my recommendations now more will there ever be that talks about circumventing the geographic commander or the chief admission. >> i think it's important to set that record straight. so thank you. general mattis, the jordanians and the turks share the longest border with syria. they stand to bear the brunt of

any refugee flows out of syria. senior officials from both governments have publicly stated that president assad must go and they have indicated a willingness to receive the syrians fleeing from the conflict. but there's been little discussion about what the jordanians and the turks are willing to do to support an arab or western efforts to aid or arm the opposition in syria. what is your understanding of the jordanian and turkish views on the situation in syria and would they support the provision of nonlethal and/or lethal assistance to the syrian opposition? >> thanks, senator. i don't want to speak for them. i'll give you my -- my view of it. i don't think they want to see the opposition armed right now. i think they want to see a more defined end state. they want to know better who it is they're arming. again, i don't want to speak for them. i think that the refugee flows would be very disstabilized in

either country, but especially so in jordan if they came into jordan because of the internal dynamics in the country there and our inability to get the middle east peace process reenergized that might give some view of a palestinian state. that would take some of that pressure off the country and leave only the refugees for them to consider. as it stands now, i don't think they want the refugees inside jordan. i think they want to set up the camps inside southern syria and help them there. and i know the king would do that. >> is anything like that going on? there are humanitarian efforts under the red cross, the red crescent. certainly both governments are looking toward what they can do for refugees, yes, ma'am. >> thank you. admiral mcraven, concerns have been raised in the past that the heavy concentration of special

operation forces in the area op responsibility is degrading the cultural and language expertise of special operations personnel who have been traditionally focused on other parts of the world. you told the committee last year that one of the command's top challenges is to better understand the people and conditions in the places that we go. how are you addressing the tension between the demand for special operation forces and the need to maintain regionally aligned expertise elsewhere? it's a big world. yes, ma'am, it is. as i mentioned earlier today, we're in about 78 countries globally. so as we develop our -- particularly our special forces, u.s. special forces, officers and ncos, part of their career path is to get language and cultural training. as you well know at ft. bragg this is the center of excellence in terms of ncos and officers.

right now we have a pretty robust program that looks across the globe, if you will, at our cultural and language requirements. and i'm pretty satisfied with where we are. the issue is, as general mattis well knows, about 80% of my forces are in sentcom. that doesn't diminish the effort we're putting into cultural training or language training with respect to other folks deployed globally. it will be a function of balancing and probably reemphasizing some languages and some cultures as we move from a sentcom centric environment to a more globally balanced environment over time. >> thank you. from time to time, there are reports of iranian support to the hoothies in northern yemen. given the ongoing search by al qaeda in the arabian peninsula the matter of iran's involvement in yemen has been getting less

press. general mattis, can you update me on iran's activities in north yemen? and are they continuing to provide materials, support to the hoothies. >> they are providing material support. compared to last year at this time they're providing more to include weapons. not just money. but interestingly, they are also trying to influence now the non-hoothie tribes and invite their political leadership to tehran on expense paid vacations, basically, to meet with certain leaders there. it's very interesting what you sand i have seen over years with hoothies is now expanding in yemen. frankly, i think tehran sees a lebanese hezbollah kind of mental model for where they want to go down there. >> have the saudis raised concern with you about iranian involvement in yemen? >> yes, sir. >> what's your assessment of the new government in yemen? are they interested in continuing to cooperate o