hours you are in a plain, number of days you are at sea. deployments are the deployments and the future forces must deploy on short notice when the inevitable surprises strike and they will have to carry out the mission upon arrival, it does not matter whether it's combat or otherwise, and we will be under likely very austere conditions. it will require well educated leaders would can take the measure of a specific situation when they get on the ground and move out smartly. some of the guide posts to remember, no nation can go it alone today, at the asame time speak, that the most nation with the most aircraft carriers is not the nation with the good ideas, and they would need the ethical canadian forces if we are going to do well in the

world. we will have to work in coalitions and recognize that every country no matter how small has a roll to play. i got a note this morning where the marines were commenting about tonga and how the troops are doing a fine job and you think of little tonga providing troops to the fiercest province, and it's a reminder that all nations have a responsibility to turning this world over slightly better to our children. and fighting in coalitions is absolutely difficult as a former british prime minister put it the only thing fighting with allies is fighting without them. and that is understandable, but i tell you by the nature, canadian forces are probably more a tuned to fighting in coalitions than any other nations and they bring a certain ethical element that helps support the forces. while maintaining conventional

forces so they can dissuede conventional threats the forces cannot be built solely along conventional lines using iconic weapons systems we have learned about conflict and a number of things that we anticipate needing in future fights. insurgery -- as we fight the wars among the people. special operations forces must blend with conventional forces and precision fires will be needed and time sensitive targeting is critical if we are to take out the enemy with the least cost of lives and danger on the battlefield. intel operations, fusion, must be achieved in real time or the enemy will steal a march on us.

there were too many times we had the intel people in one room in the past and ops people in the other and it would be tough to get back and forth with the time sensitive information we needed. technology certainly will remain important, we want the best possib possible technology for our folks on the battlefield. and it's specially the -- if we can find the enemy, our forces have the comp tense and the ability to do close and destroy them. it's finding the enemy that is the challenge. also, technology that enables the human interface that creates networks among our own forces, whether it's air to ground, or the display of action able that data, so commanders in command posts are not just seeing a flood of icons and tons of e-mails and trying to figure it

out there, we have to have technology that does some of that sorting and displays actionable data. since approxima since if the data is no displayed it will not be acted on. and the wrong headed approach by america, i would pass on to you that technology we learned this hard way in the '90s will not solve all of your problems in war. combat, this kind of conflict, it will remain a social problem demanding solutions, and war's fundamental nature will not change. we have made few if any technical mistakes over the last ten years, i can be halged on that but the mistakes were more maturing and evolving steps that we got in step with. but we made thousands of human

mistakes. i believe that operations will be left properly in the trash bin. i recognize that nato trying to mature it and turn it into something useful of has a slightly different definition of what it means. the americans will have to leave it behind as far as the way we changed what was a good closed system targeting system, it did not work, it based a lot of its can -- it's success or future success. he had educated and trained for swift action against enemies who are not templatable, they will use problem solving, able to exercise mature initiative.

i is have a friend who run microsoft by the way and he does not like it when i say that. these young leaders will have to lead high performing small units in action often times because of cyber attack they will not have 24/7 connections with their higher headquarters they will be networked with technology, and we will restore those connections off and on. we look -- as we look forward toward the forces of the future, it helps to recognize three types of transformation, and this is what i learned ladies and gentlemen, when i got the phone call from the secretary general and i began studying how transformation has worked on or not worked for militaries in the past, the first kind is

reactive. you have to change quickly in the middle of war and you start making those changes. you adjust to those unforeseen challenges, and itnot easy, som of our civil war's greatest generals marched formations into the face of a rifled mini ball, and you look back and say, how could they not have seen it, they react eventually but it was not the greatest generalship of the time. if you look at world war i, they adapted in the middle of the war and they began using shock strategy, infiltrating forces and this sort of thing. they have to adapt there

reactively, the second form of transformation is what i like to call theology. it uses unproved theories of war, often bumper sticker level to what promises to be a highly attractive and cheap way to have warfare. the strategic bombing theory in the enter war period or it's has been transformation based on hope. it's been called revolution of military affairs, it promises something cheap, clean, very fast. that sort of thing. and when the technology does not work out, that these theologies are based on the proponents will call it bad luck or have another rationalization because war's realities did not permit full use of their theory. the third and best way to

transform forces is anticipatetory. what i found in every case of a military successfully modernizing, they are based on one thing. they all did one thing. they first defined the problem they had to solve. they defined it to a jesuit's level of satisfaction and they used that problem definition to guide everything that they did and they used experimentation, trial and error to get it right. i'll give you the example of the germans coming out of world war i, they recognized the problem, how do you restore maneuver on the battlefield, they took the shock tactics and adapted them and sent the condor legion and unleashed hell across europe have religion got the formation

right. the american naval war in pacifioryears in the 1920s that experimented thinking there was going to be trouble in the pacific for the first eight years, the u.s. navy lost its campaign every year, and in those days we ran war games not as expressions of american military might, but you could lose the war game. and they lost for eight straight years. they made fast carrier strike forces and needed assault troops and they needed logistics capability and then they began to win their war games and the result was a well executed campaign. that same navy did not identify the problem of long-range submarine operations and we lost a lot of boys as a result of that failure. ou can see what happens when failure of our long-range submarine operations we had to

adapt in the middle of a war. the anticipation method is based on a clear problem. einstein said if he had 60 world, he would spend 59 minutes defining the problem and then save the wod i think he was a pretty bright fellow, there's few nations in the world that can match the democracies because of the freedom of thought that we share. but it's still bloody way to change your military. but hope and theology also do not work too well so we are left with the third option, the anticipating method because it lefts on the problem of identification and rigorous experimentation. even if you do not get it complete

completely right, you do not want to get it you'll be adapting on more narrow lines instead of adapting to a warfare that was not rigorously figured out in advance, it's easier to adapt on the margins. you can see an example of this, with alexander the great. i went back a ways to try to understand it and he gets to what is now southwestern iran and he has won in open combat and in urban warfare and won in siege warfare and he won when the enemy had better technology, he gets to town, and his spies, his scouts come back, because he is going where? to the end of the world, to the end of the earth, to afghanistan and they tell him what the terrain is like and the tribes are like, and takes a perfect war fighting machine and changes it. why would a general take everything that has worked well

and taken it down and reorganized it. he anticipated that he cannot have all of his heavy calvary here and light infanty here and he would mix them up in what we would call combined arms teams and puts them under trusted officers who know his intents, they have light and heavy infantry and all kind of forces put together and he is anticipated and now he to fight with a transformed military. and i think more recently i was, excuse recipient of marines who got it right, they brought kc-130s. they can refuel helicopters and jets. they then bought in the 1970s, heavy lift helicopter that can refuel in the air then they began to train on a long-range

operations. i'm a one star and it's right aft after 9/11 and i'm called to get the marines together and he said the enemy will lose sharif and they cannot hold kabul and they will fall back on kandahar, can you get the marines together, land in southern afghanistan an i can do it becausin people i n understood the capability this would give us if we could rehelicopters long-range. the training and helicopters it came together and i gave a positive reply to the fleet commander. that is anticipate tory

transformation that unleashes our young officers that know what they are doing against the enemy. i was a naval task force commander in those days with six u.s. navy ships and the ship that guarded us was the hmcs halifax. she was our guard ship and we launched for and more troops to southern afghanistan with her guarding us. we have to work together in the world and i've been the recipient of not just transformation but of friendships between nations. the last point i want to stress and this goes to the young men and women wearing scarlet coats over here. we will have on find a way, even under the -- in the strategic age of fast communication of strategic communications, and all, we will have to find a way

to trust our young officers, our young ncos to be given commander's intent and carry it out and not a brittle control system that goes up to national capitols and big desks to make the most tactile situations, our young officers deserve the freedom to execute based on our commander's intent. i want to leave plenty of time for questions because i have great ones from the young people wears scarlet coats last time. i am looking forward to it again this time and see which one of you want to armme. thank you very much. [ applause ]

>> can you hear me? >> yes. >> i am with the media, i want to begin by saying that when doctors diagnosis a patient they keep their mouth shut until the diagnosis is made, because to do otherwise is unprofessional and ng matters of life. similarly people expect that when leaders of nations are dealing with other nations and millions people they should do the same. they should not give out any analysis without verification, now i say this because on february 1st there was a meeting in washington about the national iranian american council, which was attended primarily by hans blicks and rita parsy, former u.n. wminspector, and colin

cowell. what they went through was the november 2011 report which contain s and the fact that that intelligence came through and was not verified they said thlligce they had aboq way back in 1990s, theynhe u.n. council because it was not verified -- >> do you have a question here, because i'm trying to keep up with you young lady. >> one quick point, the point was made that japan has a lot of plutonium. >> what is your question? >> where do you stand clearly on iran, on the question of iran? >> on the question of iran? >> okay. and i understand the direction you were taking there. and i think this is absolutely one of the, you go to the heart

of how do we -- how do we challenge our assumptions and the intelligence and how do we come to a point of action, responsible action and not frozen by endless conversation, you have to always be open to new data. in the case of iran, they have not been transparent with the unite nations, and what you is have to look toward is are they willing to show a responsible face? i have not seen that today, further, when you look at the various threats that iran have articulated or demonstrated, articulated that they would close the strait of hormuz and demonstrated by trying to murder a arab ambassador two miles from the white house, they really did that. it was so stupid at first i could not believe it. but i saw the intel. when you see a nation behaving

in this wreckless way and you see a republican guard core navy that takes officers who have re policy level, rebutting the iaea, on what would have an opportunity to show good faith. i think you have to take that as indicative of their level of integrity and honesty and candor. i leave it at that. over to the political leadership to decide what we do about it. i present options. >> thank you. >> thank you. [ applause ] >> general, my name is mark fisher. several times in your speech you referred to the ethical canadian

forces, i wonder expand a little bit on why you did that, it seemed you were trying to make a point. >> thank you, the point i'm known for being rather blunt. and so there was nothing hidden to it. again, i have observed your forces over many years, i'm keenly aware of what happened in somalia, it doesn't define your forces, your forces are identified internationally. they can look at your forces and say that these are ethical troops. it's an imperfect world. we have to be prepared to use violence. i would like to tell the young people that they would never have to do it. it's not a significant moment when you draw down on your fellow man. if we don't have ethical troops who can execute violent action, then you lose the very moral

basis for what you're doing. and i'll just give you -- make the point here that there was a french gentleman who wonder around american 160 years, said america is going to be a great country if she's a good country. if ever ceases to be good, she'll cease to be great. observing some of the political diplomatic and military directions that you are taking, we would benefit from it. and i your ethical example is something strengthens the western democracy. you have shown to kandahar it esone to pay attention to. that's the only point i was making. thank you. [ applause ]

>> my name is dave. my question is, it just came out recently the friends of syria today there's actually a meeting where they're excluding russia and china this time with the idea of proposing an ultimatum to the assad government for a 72-hour chance to step down, otherwise, calling for intervention. now, the question becomes, the concerns expressed by james clapper when he testified that there's al qaeda involvement, they don't know to what degree yet, but in the opposition, and considering that everyone is turning their dush turning a blind eye to the reports by the arab league observers that the opposition has been bombing civilian buses, has been running operations, and this is being overlooked with the idea that,

are we supporting the opposition in syria? if we're supporting, overthrow the government, who's going replace them, right, an opposition that's infiltrated by al qaeda, so what's your stance on whether we can intervene on this 72-hour -- >> is this off the record or is there media present? >> media, thank you. dave, it's a very, very complex situation and i think the longer it goes on, the more apt we are to see extremists try to take advantage of that situation.pre extremists can come from any direction. the iranians are working to keep bashar assad in power. the opposition is not united,

it's gotten many different branches and i cannot tell you, with clarity, who all makes up the opposition or the leadership. so, we sit here with this -- especially on the heels of a regrettable veto in the united nations and the security wi an urge to do something, was, we have to follow the doctor's first rule, do no harm and it's a very difficult situation to sort out, and i think that, again, you really need to define this problem well and some of your questions i cannot answer right now, i don't know what would take over right away. but with that said, i think to the friends of syria, that there are efforts going on to try to address this without turning to the military instrument right away. and i salute those because, i fear that assad and his family,

the minority that benefited, what we have to do is recognize that there's a lot of pent-up h hatred and i fear that there's going to be a lot more fighting going on here in this very confused state. i'll tell you that i have been in riyadh, none of us are sitting here on our hands. we don't want to do something that will add fuel to the fire without a clear understanding of the outcome and i think your questions are right on target. thank you. [ applause ] >> yes, thank you for that inspiring presentation and the kind words that you have given the canadian forces. my question is, now more to the

operations, the instituted some 20 years ago. based on the current experiences, recent experiences that we had in afghanistan and iraq, do you see that three-wthree-wa three-war -- still as a valid contract? i understand where they fit. the question, are our soldiers and marines, the best forces to be trained for all three? in the past, we had been working in that. it seems to me perhaps that we should focus more on that third block than the first thank you. >> excellent question. i noted colin grays' work. i sat down with him the near-faultless strategist alive today in terms of taking complex

issues and what a marine infantry can understand. i would say that the three block war is a very valid construct. the fact that you can marry one singular form of warfare, we'll have to train for all three. your questions really drives the point home of what is the problem you're trying to solve? each country with its own culture and its own government, and its own way of looking at the war, has to decide that itself. no one has the corner on all of the wisdom. it may actually be the ones that are most needed. right now, i'm keenly in countermeasures craft and you can understand why, not something that the united states has put a lot of money into, frankly, so, as you look at this, the way i would come back

is, define the problem. and make sure that this construct meets what you think what you need. let me tell you what i think the problem is for the u.s. military, it's different for you -- how do we maintain nuclear sue peerty and conventional superiority, which behind they draw great confidence. i think we can do that, we can address that problem through the training of junior officers and create a force that can do those three things but if you don't get question right and i must tell you, you're fortunate not having to deal with the nuclear problem. to put it bluntly. but i would say, if you don't get that question right, you can start trying to answer it, which of the three to prepare for,