which will be something that the north vietnamese do a good job of continuing to get stuff from both sides. now, at this point, 1965, you enter the next phase of the war, the american war. as the north vietnamese called it. in 1965, the u.s. starts sending major forces into south vietnam. the soviets at this point

heavily colved, the north, again, they're continuing to prosecute their strategy the way they had before. you've got the political elements of it, but you've also got the military elements of it. and part of the political element of it, this deception and propaganda campaign, when the u.s. becomes heavily involved, the north tries to do everything it cando. a communist victory is inevitable. they also mask and lied about their motives and their actions. they did this wonderfully, wonderfully well. and they did everything they could do to discredit the u.s. actions in the war. and they were often aided in this by sympathetic elements in the western press, anti-americanism both in the united states and abroad, and they proved very, very successful here. and all of this that they're doing is made easier by the fact that most foreigners don't know anything about vietnam. and they don't know anything about southeast asia. and also you have this strange -- this really odd moral relativism that emerges of a narrative about the war, particularly on the western dialogue about the war. everything that america does becomes portrayed as something that's illegal, immoral. you can't do it. it's criticized. but the constant and just constant atrocities of the communists are just ignored. forgotten about. that didn't really happen. we won't talk about that. it's a very odd situation that emerges. now, but on the military side of it, again, when the americans come into the war, they have some problems about how to deal

with the americans. one of the problems they have is usair power. how do you deal with air defense? they had the brilliant idea, in some ways effective, just have everybody shoot at the planes as much as they can. start with that. but they moved quickly to get help from the chinese and the sovie soviets. they get soviet migs, ground defense stuff and build a defensive and very dangerous air defense network against the united states. now, the ground war, though, dealing with this is the most -- arguably the most important for our purposes here. and they have to figure out how to fit this ground war against the united states. again, the north -- the generals and the political leaders in north vietnam, they don't agree about how to do this. they fall into two camps here. again, you have the tan bloc that i mentioned in the beginning. they argued that you have to match american escalation and you've got to fight hard the whole time. you've got to do this hoping you can push the south vietnamese

regime over the edge before the u.s. builds up too much. they also wanted to increasingly commit north vietnamese army forces to the south and vc units to fighting the americans. they wanted to go to phase three very, very quickly here. now, general jiap has a different view. he's the head of the army, but he wants a slower approach. he argued stay in phase two. protract the war. drag it out. the u.s. will get tired eventually and leave anyway. it can be really bloody if we don't. so let's be a little more patient here. jiap loses the debate on strategy. the vietnamese decide they're going to go for the knockout blow. in july 1965, jiap launches an operation trying to cut south vietnam in half.

north vietnamese defeat at the hands of the american 1st cavalry division. they reassess. they said perhaps phase three isn't the right thing to did here now. they back away from phase three from conventional warfare. and they decide for a while jiap wins the internal debate about how to prosecute this war. as u.s. troop strength rises in decide, okay, we'll go back to protracting the war. well, concentrate our attacks and yes, we'll fight the u.s. some, but primarily we'll just fight on the periphery. we're not going to go for the big battle, the big blow. this only lasts a while. the north vietnamese reassess. when they're assessing, they do a very good job of identifying what we planned to do. they really assess the united states strategy very, very well. in 1965 they predict the u.s. will build up its forces there, protect its bases in the population centers, try to build up the south vietnamese army and south vietnamese government. and at the same time, they believed that the u.s. effort would be undermined by a lack of public support for the war.

and they also believed the u.s. effort would be undernimined by the fact the south army was weak. you've still got this rivalry in the vietnamese high command, how do you prosecute this war? general tan, again, who commands the communist force in the south, he believed that the u.s. would not have enough troops to do what westmoreland was doing, to prosecute the attrition war that he's going to do. and he believed that the u.s. would end up having the same problems and the same fate as the french had. and so he adopts a very aggressive form of phase two where he's really going to -- he's not going to go full conventional war against the americans, but he's going to very aggressively fight the arvn, fight the american army. and to provide the strength for this, the north basically moves to a point of the mobilizing the entire country for the war where north vietnam has to become a base for sending men, materiel and so on for fighting this war in the south. the problem with doing this, through 1966 and 1967, they

pursue a very aggressive form of phase ii. they're trying to keep the u.s. off balance, trying to end pacification -- american pacification programs, trying to break the army. but they suffer a lot of casualties doing this. and it isn't having the effect that they think it's going to have. they think they're going to break the american and the south vietnamese will by doing this, but it's not happening. and by the end of 1967, the north in a lot of ways, a lot of the leadership's becoming disillusioned. they don't seem to be winning the war. they're having to replace all their losses by sending troops from the north. they're beginning to see alienation in the south among

the southern supporters of the war because they look at all these north vietnamese forces coming down and they say this is just the north taking over. plus, the leadership in the south begins to fray. again, they're not seeing success. they're taking a lot of casualties. in may of 1967, general tanh, he looks at the situation. army. he thinks they can't protect the pacification efforts. what you'll get out of this is a decision once again by the north to go to phase iii. and he wants to launch these coordinated attacks all across south vietnam. now, when he comes up with this plan, what becomes known as the tete offensive. his idea, his push for this offensive becomes what will drive the next element of north vietnamese strategy. the north decides they're going to launch a massive offensive tied with massive uprisings all across south vietnam. they're going to do this at the beginning of the vietnamese new year at tet. they decided that now is the time to do this. they could defeat the u.s. militarily. and they would do this during a u.s. presidential campaign, and this would force the u.s. out of south vietnam. now, mao tse-tung, they talked to mao and the chinese. mao is very supportive of their doing this. and he believed just like ho did that the u.s. would be defeated here and that the u.s. would be

forced to withdraw. now, the plan for doing this is pro-pronged. one, military offenses in the rural area, some of it they did early to try and draw off american troops, but they'd also have uprisings in urban areas by other vc units. if this didn't produce a victory, they would hit more times, they would have follow-on operations. these operations would wear undo the enemy, and they'd get americans to surrender or american defeat or a negotiated settlement. now, the first phase of this begins in october of 1967. and they have limited uprisings along the cambodian border. attacks are bloody. they don't really achieve very much. in january of 1968, this offensive really kicks off. they use about 80,000 troops. they attack 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 64 of the 242 district capitals. again, it's all over the country. most of the attackers are vc.

2500 people. and there's several thousand others that will go missing. and this has an interesting effect on morale. it encourages the south to fight harder. in may of 1968, you'll see a new phase of communist attack. and there are other attacks in august. the final phase of tet is in mid-february of 1968, this lasts for three weeks. and all of this is extremely bloody for the north. and for the communist forces here. tactically and operationally, tet is an abject failure. the north suffers enormous casualties. you see it on the slide here. the vc is just decimated by this. and they're no longer able to in south vietnam, strategically, it's a great success because in some ways it shatters american morale and certainly undermines it.

they had no idea it would have that effect. the political effect in the united states that it did. but they get a good benefit out of it. after that, after this giap wins the strategy war again. he says no go back to phase ii. phase iii is too bloody. in september of 1969 ho chi minh dies. the party's secretary becomes the leader of the north. communist policy doesn't change because the leadership changed. they still want south vietnam. they still want french indochina. but at this point they will back off from the very aggressive phase ii and concentrate more on guerrilla war and try to rebuild their infrastructure, units and lick their wounds for a little while. now, what is important for them to be able to do this, one of the things that makes them able to rebuild after this is the situation in cambodia. now, cambodia is important in this war particularly for the communists grew the longer the war went on. they began using cambodia as a

base area in the late '50s and they benefited from the fact that the prince was pretty pliable, didn't have a great grip on the couldn't pri. he decided he would appease hanoi. this didn't work out very well. the communists basically turned his country into a war zone as a result of it. and they eventually went to supporting the khmer rouge fighting against cianouk. it becomes critical for communist supply efforts in south vietnam. now, in 1970, a general -- cambodian general overthrows

cianouk and starts fighting the communists. his new government -- his new government demanded that the communists leave in three days. they didn't. and here you have the intervention of the communists -- really a significant intervention of the north vietnamese communists in cambodia. you provoke a civil war in now, the nixon administration at this point decides also to take the war to cambodia and hit the vc base areas here, which is very effective. and messes up a lot of the north vietnamese plans and delays some of their operations for a year. but for the north, the real war for north vietnam is still in south vietnam. and the communists during this period in the early '70s will intensify their guerrilla activity, particularly in rural areas, the southern part of the country that's heavily populated. and again, they're still looking to build their forces, to destroy south vietnam. and so, again, build forces. defeat their pacification efforts, defeat the pacification efforts of the americans, expand their base areas. here's what they're trying to do. but the communists have their problems here as well. this war has gone on a very long time. the protracted nature has an effect on us, but it also has an effect on the communists as well. and their cadres are getting

tired. people are beginning to lose support particularly in the south, the communists fighting there. and it's increasingly difficult for the north vietnamese to recruit supporters in the south. land reform is happening in south vietnam is hurting their recruitment. the pacification programs are hurting them, and they begin to lose control of certain areas and so on. they see things happening that are weakening their position. but the u.s. at the same time as this is going on is drawing down its forces. and the communists looking at this, they smell victory. you know, giap was authorized to mount an invasion in 1972 before the u.s. withdrew. the north believed that the south vietnamese would collapse, the u.s. would be humiliated and that would be the end of the war. g argued, look, the arvn is too strong. usair power is too effective. don't go to phase iii now. just wait. the americans are leaving. again, he loses this fight. and the north decides that they're going to go to phase iii once again. they benefit from huge amounts

of soviet and chinese aid to do this. and they launch what becomes known as the easter offensive in march. 1972. and here again, the communists are fighting while negotiating. negotiations are going on while they do this. and here again, the communists, they go to stage iii. the invasion is launched in three phases. the phases are on your outline. it's poorly executed, it's heavily bombed and ends in failure. some of the sources will say the north suffered 100,000 dead during this invasion. again, it's difficult with the numbers to know. but they did get some benefit. they took parts of south vietnam that they hadn't controlled before and they will hold these when they negotiate our withdrawal. now, the failure of the easter offensive made the north vietnamese a lot more amenable to cutting a deal with us. with the united states and then getting out. they felt this was necessary for them to get what they launch

this large conventional invasion that topples the south vietnamese government that by this point had been pretty much abandoned by the united states. what kind of conclusions do we get from all of this? well, one, the conventional

wisdom of much of the american population here is false about vietnam. vietnam was not conquered by guerrillas. it was conquered -- it was certainly guerrilla warfare is is a big part of how the north wins this thing, but its armored corps of the north vietnamese army that overruns south vietnam. james wilbanks in leavenworth, he has the first rule of counterinsurgency. quote, if they're trying tanks, they ain't insurgents. which is a pretty good rule, i think. you also have here one of the keys that is key to this war, what is the value of the object? determining how much people will endure, how much they'll sacrifice for it. the value of the object is pretty important here to the north vietnamese. they're willing to play the blood sacrifice, basically whatever they have to pay for almost as long as they need to.

there are points when they wonder if they can win it. but they have an immense determination which is certainly always one of the north vietnamese strengths. now, also, the north vietnamese here prove, just like the

americans in the american revolution, that the strongest country doesn't always win. the vietnamese in every sense with weaker than the uors. their opponents didn't learn as much. now, conclusion of general giap in all of this is his quote right here is what really mattered. the human factor had been decisive. the moral factors. the naut as long as he had to. that was certainly important. but also support of the north vietnamese is very critic critical. they're weak compared to their opponents. if you're weak, it's very important to have powerful friends which they were fortunate that they did and all of these things are key to eventually producing the north vietnamese victory here in vietnam. well, thank you very much for your attention. we wail start promptly at 9:00. we are standing in oakland cemetery which was the original city cemetery that dates back to 1847. and it was the primary city cemetery until about 1895 or so. one of the reasons that 1873 is so important to this region and to this city is that the great yellow fever epidemic decimated the city and really changed the

course of the history of north louisiana and the city in particular. within two weeks, we lost a quarter of the population to the city inside the city limits. 800 to 1,000 people are in this cemete cemetery. if you pan over and you look at the top of that hill, that's the yellow fever mound. a common trench with 824 people confirmed in it. and then there are other folks who died and were either moved or put in here. it killed almost all the doctors, all the nurses. it killed many, many prominent people in this city. and it was devastating. the city was quarantined by railroad and by river. nothing was allowed to come in and go out. and money was raised, large amounts, from new york,

washington, from new orleans, from chicago. and it was a national event. now, nationally, reconstruction's going to last for another four years. in shreveport and northwest louisiana, shreveport is lucky in a way because reconstruction ends, the army leaves to save itself. and so redemption, as it was called, begins here. in this state. time. on the negative side, shreveport was thought to be an unhealthy place. and it its growth was stunted for many, many decades. it ends up returning, but it's going to take a while.

this is the monument and grave of the united states army corps of engineers first lieutenant eugene a. woodruff, allowed by their rules to become an engineer. he is sent here with a detachment during reconstruction in 1872 to clear the great log jam, and his brother was his second in command. he had a very good detachment. he completed the work that henry shreve began. they had to do herculean work to get rid of the log jam, ask they did it. they used nitroglycerine, first time it was used in a big project. in 1873, in august, while they're working, and pretty

close to finishing, knocking it out, blowing it up, tearing it up, whatever they needed to do, yellow fever broke out in shreveport. and the army ordered this detachment out. and eugene wrote his mother. he was a momma's boy. he wrote his mother, these people need help. i'm sending my men. i'm saving my brother george. i'm going to stay and help. so eugene stayed. and he and five catholic priests acted as doctors, because most of the doctors were dead. and eugene faithfully served. thought that he was going to be okay. felt okay. stayed with the same folks in this plot, and he with it very quickly, very quickly. sebe

by september 29th at 9 p.m. he's dead. city of shreveport wrote his mother and said, we would like to send his body home. and the telegraph lines are up. she says, no, that's where he wanted to stay. so they allow him to be in this lot. and eugene is one. of the true heroes. not only in reconstruction but in the city of shreveport and in the south as well. >> barksdale air force base is the home to the b-52 bomber. since their introduction in 1958 the base has housed one of the largest fleets in the u.s. military. >> you know when a b-52 enters a conflict the decisionmakers, america's leadership, they're serious. it just got serious if the b-52

entered the conflict because that says massive air power. >> it was the first nuclear bomber and designed during the cold war era and to project long range strike to our enemies during that era. that has graduated over the years and this weapon system has been modernized and upgraded to continue with the fight that meets us today. >> this is the b-52-h, conventional and nuclear bomber. a wing span of 185 feet. maximum gross weight is 488,000 pounds, fully loaded. that's with weapon and fuels. we carry up to ten different munitions on this jet, ranging from unguided to weapons, so graet weapons. they freefall out of the bombay, to guided weapons. that's your gps-guided weapons, and we also care air launch

cruise missiles. a whole bunch of modern weaponry on this jet. eight engines. each is capable of producing 8,000 pounds of thrust apiece. most aircraft don't have the engines hanging off like this. it affects the flying characteristic of the jet, in items of when you push the power up. the jets have a tendency to raise its nose. this is the bomb bay. it reduces the amount of fuel we can ware. we can carry up to 55,000 pounds of weapons. this is the bomb rack. this is where the weapons actually attack. typically in this configuration we're carrying gravity weapons

but depending on the weapon we can carry 27 internal gravity weapons. and if nuclear mission is required or conventional, we have conventional air launch cruise missiles or nuclear cruise missiles. we take their cluster racks out and put in a csrl, and it rotates drops one out and missile away. the fuel's loaded any way you don't see a bomb bay. it's designed for weapons and fuel. that's all there is to it. this is the bomb bay. you see above you labeled fuel tanks. it's called an integral fuel system so the fuel is part of the wings itself. the wings are fully loaded with

fuel. when the b-52 parked the wings are low because all the fuel is pulling it down. after landing the wings will be up in the air, almost six feet, because they don't have as much gas in the wings at that time. we can't go in the jet but two different levels. on the down stairs you have a nav garrett and radar nav garrett and they manage weapons, ensuring proper coordinates are in the weapon and ensuring the weapon hits the target you have the pilot and co-pilot. you can see the relatively small compared to the overall size of the of the jet. not a whole lot of room. five crew members is the standard crew complement. up to ten. but l of room. the pie lot and co-pilot on the

other side and the back facing backwards is where the electronic warfare officer is. that's all there is to it. it's an older weapons system. it gets the job done. still a very cable aircraft. all the money that goes into this aircraft is spent on modernization of the weapons system. we talked about the weapons, very modern weaponry and that keeps it enabled to accomplish the objective. >> last b-52-h was delivered to minot north dakota, 1962 and it still provides air power and dominance united states ars force needs top. b-52 has been around for many years and been in many conflicts. have vietnam, kosovo to the first desert storm to afghanistan, even to the second

flight over in iraq. it has been around for many years. our allies love us for that, of the capability that the weapons system brings as well as enemy fears us. always wants -- gives them that second thought, if diplomacy should break down, that the b-52s could be on their way. >> throughout the weekend on c-span 3, watch internal interviews about historic events on oral history. our history bookshelf features some of the best known history writers. key figures, battles and events during the 150th anniversary of the civil war. visit college classrooms during lectures in history. go behind the scenes at museums and history sites on american artifac artifacts. and presidency looks at legacy