give the order to send troops into north vietnam. between 1965 and 1969 there are 325,000 chinese troops here. at one time there was 170,000. this is critical in many ways. to the north, they want these chinese troops because the more there are in north vietnam, it acts as a trigger. if the americans come north there will be a war with the chinese. there are chinese troops in north vietnam. in the north vietnamese' mind this is a great option to have. when you think about american options when we talk about this next week, think about american options for dealing with this war, keep in mind the chinese presence here and the factor that that brings to the table. in 1964 the north decided to consolidate their control of the

central highlands. they're thinking that now they're getting prepared for what they think is going to be a final offensive against the south. after the gulf of tonkin incident and the fact that they couldn't negotiate a settlement, the north decided they had to start committing troops to the south. they believe they have to match any escalation that's going to ham in the south. they also tried to think, well, if we act quickly enough is what they're thinking maybe we can push the south vietnamese regime over the top before the americans are able to get enough stuff in here to prop it up. doesn't work quite the way they planned. that's certainly what they're thinking. at the same time they're trying to balance support from the communist block, the soviets and the chinese, because you had the split. in the '60s you're starting to get the soviet split which will be something the north vietnamese continue to get stuff from both sides. now at this point, 1965, you

enter the next phase of the war, the american war as the north vietnamese called it. they start sending major forces into south vietnam. the soviets heavily commit to supporting the north vietnamese. when the u.s. swrer convenience, it faces a completely new war. how do you counter american power? you have on one hand american land power. when the u.s. becomes heavily involved, the north -- again, they're continuing to prosecute their strategy the way they had before. you have the political elements of it but you've also got the military elements of it. part of the political element, there's deception and propaganda campaign. when the u.s. becomes involved the north tries to do everything they can to undermind the war. they try to portray the american mission as impossible. there's no way the americans can win. you can't do anything here.

you can make an argument that they're so successful that that's the conventional wisdom in much of the world. this is impossible. america can't win no matter what they do, a communist victory is not possible. they lied about their actions wonderfully well. they did everything they could do to discredit the u.s. actions. they were aided by western prayer, antiamericanism in the united states and abroad. they proved very, very successful here. all of this that they're doing is made easier by the fact that most foreigners don't know anything about vietnam or southeast asia. you have this really odd moral relativism that emerges about a narrative about the war particularly on the western dialogue on the war. everything that america does becomes portrayed as something illegal, immoral, you can't do it. it's criticized. but the constant and constant

atrocities of the communists are ignored, forgotten about. it didn't really happen, we won't talk about it. very odd situation that emerges. on the military side of it, when the americans come into the war they have some problems with how to deal with the americans. one of the problems they have is u.s. air power. how do you deal with air defense? have everybody shoot at the planes as much as they possibly can. you start with that. they move very quickly to get help from the chinese and soviets. they get soviet migs soviet ground offensive and have a dangerous air defense network against the united states. the ground war though dealing with this is the most -- arguably the most important purposes here. they have to figure out how to fight this ground war against the united states. again, the north, the generals and the political leaders in north vietnam, they don't agree about how to do this. they follow the two camps here.

you have the duan ton block. they argue you have to match american escalation and fight hard the whole time. you have to do this hoping you can push the south vietnamese regime over the edge. they also wanted to increasingly commit them to the south. they wanted to go to phase 3 very, very quickly here. general jopp, he has a different view. he's the head of the army, but he wants a slower approach. he argued, stay in phase 2, protract the war, drag it out. the u.s. will get tired and leave anyway. it can be bloody. let's be a little bit more public. jopp loses the argument. in july of 1965 jopp launches an operation trying to cut south vietnam in half. he mounts an attack from the highlands region of south vietnam. this results in the famous

battle of ijong. a lot of you have seen the movie "we were soldiers" we shows a stunning american north defeat. the north reassessed. they said perhaps phase three isn't the right thing to do. they back away from phase three from conventional warfare and they decide for a while jopp wins the internal debate about how to prosecute this war. as u.s. troops strength rised in 1965, the communist decide, we'll go back to protracting the war. we'll concentrate our attacks and we'll fight them some but we'll fight on the periphery, we won't go for the big battle. this only lasts a while. the north vietnamese assess here again. when they're assessing they actually do a very good job of identifying what we plan to do. they assess the united states strategy very, very well. in 1965 they predict the u.s.

will build up its forces, try to build up the arvin, the south vietnamese army and government. at the same time, they believed that the u.s. effort would be undermined by a lack of public support for the war and they also they believe the south vietnamese government was fairly weak. you still have thrive vi this r. general tan, he believed that the u.s. would not have enough troops to do what west mother moreland was doing. he believed the u.s. would end up having the same problems as the french had. so he adopts a very aggressive form of phase 2 where he's really going to -- he's not going to go full conventional war against the americans but he's going to very aggressively fight the arvin, fight the american army when he can.

to provide the strength for this the north basically moves to point of immobilizing the entire country for the war. north vietnam has to become a base for sending men, material, so on for fighting this war in the south. now the problem with doing this, through 1966 and 1967 they pursue a very aggressive form of phase 2. they're trying to keep the u.s. off balance, trying to impact american passification. trying to break the south vietnamese army. they suffer a lot of casualties doing this. it isn't going to have the effect it has. they think they'll break the american and the south vietnamese will and it's not happening. by the end of 1967 the north in a lot of ways, a lot of the leadership is becoming disillusioned. they have to replace all of their losses by sending troops from the north. they're seeing alienation in the south among the southern supporters of the war because they look at the north vietnamese forces coming down. they say, this is the north taking over.

plus the leadership in the south begins to fray. they're taking a lot of casualties and are not seeing a lot of success. in may of 1967 general tan, he looks at the situation. he thinks the u.s. is weak. he thinks they're unable to protect the south vietnamese army. he thinks they can't protect the passification efforts and so what you will get out of this is a decision once again by the north to go to phase 3. he wants to launch these coordinated attacks all across south vietnam. when he comes up with this plan to do this what becomes known as the ten offense. he's killed in an air raid, heart attack, depends on the source. his idea and his push for this offensive becomes what will drive the next element of north vietnamese strategy. the north decides they'll launch a massive offensive tied with massive uprisings all across south vietnam. they'll do this at the vietnamese new year. they decided that now is the time to do this. they could defeat the u.s.

militarily. they would do this during u.s. presidential campaign. this would force the u.s. out of south vietnam. mao, they talked to him and the chinese. they were very supportive. he believed just like ho did, that the u.s. would be defeated here and that the u.s. would be forced to withdraw. the plan for doing this is two prong. one, military offenses in the rural areas, some of this they did early to draw off u.s. troops. they would have uprisings. this is by main force vc and other vc units. if this didn't produce a victory, they would hit more times, they would have follow-on operations. this would wear down the enemy and they would get american surrender or american defeat or a negotiated settlement. the first phase of this begins in october of 1967. they have limited uprisings on the cambodian border. in january of 1968 this offensive kicks off. they use about 80,000 traps. they attack 36 to 44 pro vensal

capitols. 62 of the 64 capitols. it's all over the country. most of them are vc. the surprise they gets allows them to make some penetrations. the bloodiest fighting is in hua city. the nva troops seize. here they murder 2500 people and several thousand others go missing from it. this has an interesting effect on the south vietnamese morale. it encourages them to fight harder. in may of 1968 you'll see a new phase of communist attacks, there are other attacks in august. the final phase is in mid february of 1969. this lasts for three weeks. and all of this is extremely bloody for the north and for the communist forces here. tactically and operationally it's an abject failure. the north suffers enormous casualties. the vc is decimated by this. they're no longer able to field

battalion size units like they did before. the combat burden in south vietnam will fall to the north vietnamese army. strategically it's a great success. it shatters american will and undermi undermines it. they get a good benefit out of this. after that -- after this jopp wins the strategy war again. he says, no, we go back to phase 2. phase 3 is too bloody. in september of 1969 ho chi minh dies. duan becomes a leader of the north. communist policy doesn't change. they still know what they want. they still want south vietnam and french indoe china. at this point they will back off from some of the very aggressive phase 2 and concentrate on rebuilding infrastructure and lick their wounds for a little while. what is important for them to be able to do this, one of the

things that makes them able to rebuild after this, the situation in cambodia. cambodia is important in this war particularly for the communist grew the longer the war went on. they began using cambodia as a base area in the late 1950s. they benefitted from the fact that prince cianuk was pretty pliable and he apieced hanoi. the communists basically turned his country into a war zone as a result of it. they even eventually went to supporting the camarouge, the home grown cambodian communists. by the late 1960s the cam bonian port becomes critical for a communist supply effort in south vietnam. now in 1970 a general named la nau overthrows cuanau. his new government demanded that

the communist leave. in three days. here you have the intervention of the communists, a really significant intervention. he provoked in many ways a civil war in cambodia that becomes pretty, pretty messy and lays the foundation for some disasters afterwards. the nixon administration at this point decides also to take the war to cambodia and hit the vc base yars here which is very effective and messes up a lot of the north vietnamese plans and delay some of their operations for a year. the north, real war, is still in south vietnam. the come mu niss during this period they say will they intensify their communist fight. they're still looking to build their forces to destroy south vietnam. again, build forces, defeat their passification efforts of the americans, expand their base areas. here's what they're trying to

do. the communists, they have their problems as well. this war has gone on a very long period of time. protracted nature has an effect on us but it also has an effect on the communists as well. their cadres are getting tired. people are beginning to lose support for it particularly in the south. communist fighting there. it's increasingly difficult for the north vietnamese to recruit supporters. land reform is hurting their recruitment. the passification programs are hurting them and they begin to lose control of certain areas, so on. so they see things happening that are weakening their position. the u.s. at the same time as this is going on is drawing down its forces. the communists smell victory. jopp was authorized to mount an invasion in 1972 before the u.s. withdrew. the north believed that the south vietnamese army would collapse and the u.s. would be humiliated.

jopp argued, the south vietnamese army is to strong. the u.s. air power is to effective. don't go to phase 3 now. wait. the americans are leaving. he loses this fight and the north decides that they're going to go to phase 3 once again. they benefit from huge amounts of soviet and chinese aid to do this and they launch what becomes known the easter effective in march of 1972. negotiations are going on when they do this. the communists go to stage 3. the invasion is launched in three phases. the phases are on your outline. it's very badly executed. heavily bombed by the americans and ends in failure. some of the sources will say the north suffered 100,000 dead during this invasion. again, difficult with the numbers to know. but they did get some benefit. they took parts of south vietnam that they hadn't controlled before. they will hold these when they negotiate our withdrawal. now the failure of the easter

offensive made the north vietnamese a lot more amenable toward cutting us a deal with the united states and getting out. they felt this was necessary. they get the americans out and then they can get what they want. it also cost jopp his job as the head of the army. he keeps his political office but he no longer runs the army. the communists decide for a while that they'll put the emphasis on political struggle after the americans leave. they have to rebuild their army, which they do. in october of 1973 they decide they're going to make another offensive. they decide in 1976 is what they're planning for, they'll launch a new offensive. jop says, no, let's go in '75. for once he makes the argument to go to phase 3. they're not really sure if they want to do that. in december of 1974 they make a probing attack. they're trying to test if the americans would do what they promised they would do. support the south vietnamese regime and with air power, we don't do anything. the communists now have a green light. in march of 1975 they launched a

large conventional invasion. by this point the government had been pretty much abandoned by the united states. what kind of ever conclusions do we get from all of this. well, one, the conventional wisdom of much of the american population is false about vietnam. vietnam was not conquered by guerrillas. it was guerrilla warfare that was a big part of how the north wins this thing, but it's armored core of the north vietnamese army that overruns south vietnam. colonel james willbank is the head of history at leaf vin worth. he says if they're driving tanks, they ain't insurgents. it's a pretty good rule, i think. you also have here one of the keys to success or key to this war is what is the value of the object here. determining how much people will endure. how much they'll sacrifice for

t. the value of the object is pretty important here to the north vietnamese. they're willing to pay the blood sacrifice, basically whatever they have to pay for almost as long as they need to. their points when their will is here when they wonder if they can win it. they have immense determination which is certainly always one of the north vietnamese strengths. now also the north vietnamese here prove just like the americans in the american revolution that the strongest country doesn't always win. the have i et in mees in every sense are weaker than the united states and the coalition against them. yet in the end they're the ones that are victorious. also, the have i etta mees weren't super men. they made mistakes. sometimes they learned from them, sometimes they wouldn't. but, again, they're tenacious and they overcome their errors. their opponents didn't learn as much. now conclusion with general jopp in all of this. his quote right here is what really matters. the human factor had gene sies

sieve. the moral factors as klaus would call them. the vietnam to fight this out as long as they had to. that was certainly important, but also to support the north vietnamese they had. it's very, very critical. again, they are weak compared to their opponent, and if you're weak like the north vietnamese it's important to have powerful friends and all of these things are key to producing the north vietnamese victory here in north vietnam. thank you very much for your attention. we will start promptly at 9:00. lectures in history airs each saturday at 8:00 p.m. and midnight eastern and sundays at 1:00 p.m. we feature classroom lectures from across the country on different topics and eras of american history.

to keep up with american history tv during the week or to send us your questions and comments, follow us on twitter. we're at twitter.com/cspanhistory. there's a new website for american history tv where you can find our schedules and preview our upcoming program and see history tweets, history in the news and social media from youtube, foursquare. follow american history-tv weekly. c-span's 2012 local content vehicle city's tour takes our book-tv and american history tv programming on the road the first weekend of each month. march featured shreveport, louisiana with book-tv at the noel memorial library. >> mr. noel was a local man who

lived here most of his life and he started accumulating books when he was a teenager and continued until he was in his 80s. over his lifetime he accumulated over 200 now volumes. >> if we have a gem in the collection it is probably going to be this one. it's one of the books we're most proud of. it's in the original binding from 1699, and it was once owned by a very famous scientist. you can see he's written his name i. newton, and we're not pulling it out so much anymore because it is starting to flake away on the title page. >> at american history tv looked at civil war era medical practices at the pioneer heritage museum. >> pioneer medicine is a long stretch from what it is today. you consider that, the things that we take for granted today when we go to the doctor, things like the instruments being as germ-free as possible or the doctor has washed his hands

before he's decided to work on us, and we use the term loosely for doctors when we're talking early medicine. a lot of these doctors in our region were self-taught, or they had worked under somebody else who had been self-taught and they were getting ready to retire, so they would just learn as they went. >> our lcv cities tour continues the weekend of march 31st and april 1st from little rock, arkansas on c-span2 and 3. barksdale air force base is home to the eighth farmer wing which flies the b-52 bomber. since the b-52's introduction here in 1958 the bases housed one of the largest fleets of this aircraft in the u.s. military. >> when a b-52 enters the conflict, the decision-makers, america's leadership, just got serious. it just got serious if the b-52 entered the conflict because

b-52 says massive air power. it was the first nuclear bomber. it was designed basically in the cold war era to project global power and long range strike to our enemies during that era. now, that has graduated over the years and this weapon his sem has also been modernized and upgrade over the years to continue with the fights that currently meet us today. >> well, this is the b-52h, both conventional and nuclear bomber. it's got a wingspan of 185 feet. max gross weight of this jet, 488,000 pounds, fully loaded, that's with weapons and fuel. we carry up to ten different munitions on this particular jet, ranging from unguided weapons. gravity weapons, free fallout of the bomb bay, to guided weapons, that's your gps-guided weapons, j-dam, and we also carry air launch cruise missiles, so a whole bunch of modern weaponry

goes on this jet. eight engines. each engine capable of producing approximately 17,000 pounds of thrust apiece. that's kind of an abnormal design. most aircraft don't have engines hanging off like this as you see. it really affects a little bit the flying characteristics of the jet in terms of when you push the power up, the jets are going to have a tendency to raise its nose. this is the bomb bay. 488,000 pound gross weight. as we add weapons, it reduces the amount of fuel we can carry. we can carry up to approximately 50,000 pounds of weapons inside the bomb bay here. these are the bomb racks. this is where the weapons actually attach. typically in this configuration, we're carrying gravity weapons. but we can carry, depending on the weapon, 27 inpersonal

gravity weapons, and if the nuclear mission is required or, you know, conventional mission, we have the conventional air launch cruise missiles or the nuclear cruise missiles that will take these cluster racks out. and we'll put in what's called a csrl, a rotary launcher, and it attaches to the missiles them seems, kind of like a six shooter, rotate, drop one out and missile away. the fuel is loaded pretty much everywhere you don't see a bomb bay. this jet is designed for heavy metal, weapons, fuel. that's all there is to it. so this is the bomb bay. you'll see above you labeled fuel tanks. so pretty much everywhere. the fuel tanks are part of the structure itself. the wings are fully loaded with fuel. that's why you see when the

b-52s are parked, their wings are hanging low, that's because all of the fuel weight in the wing pulls them to the ground, whereas after landing, you do a long mission, the wings will be up in the air almost, you know six feet, and that's just because they don't have as much gas in the wing at that time. we can't go in the jet, but what you would see, two levels. on the downstairs, a radar reonsibility is managing the weapons, ensuring proper coordinates are in the weapon and really ensuring the weapon hits the target. on the upper level is where you have the pilot and the co-pilot you can see the cockpit area up here. relatively small compared to the overall size of the jet. most expect a cockpit to be bigger. not a whole lot of room there. five crew members is the standard crew complement, up to ten, overall, not a lot of room. so you have the pilot right here and the co-pilot on the other side and then the back actually facing backwards is where the

ew, electric warfare officer section is. so that's really all there is to it. you know, it's an older weapon system, but like we said, it gets the job done. it's still very, very capable aircraft. all the money that goes into this aircraft is spent on modernization of the weapon the different kinds of weapons it has, very mthat what keeps io accomplish the objectives, any commander intent out there. >> the last production b-52h was delivered to minot air force base, north dakota, the 26th of october, 1962, and it still provides the air power and dominance that united states air force needs today. it is considered icon of american air power. b-52 has been around many years, has been in many conflicts, range back from vietnam, kosovo, first desert storm, to afghanistan, even to the second fight over in iraq. so it has been around many

years, and believe me, our allies, they love us for that, the capability that the weapon system brings as well as the enemy fears us, and it always want to give them that second thought. if diplomacy should break down, the b-52s could be on their way. find out where c-span's local content vehicles are going next online at c-span.org/localcontent. you're watching american history tv all weekend, every weekend, on c-span 3. there's a new website for american history tv where you can find our schedules and preview our upcoming promise, watch featured video from our regular weekly series as well as access ahtv's tweets. history in the news and social media from youtube, twitter,