>> thank you, mr. chairman, senator mccain, and members of the committee. i appreciate this opportunity to discuss the u.s. central command region. i have submitted a written statement and request it to be accepted into the record. >> it will be. >> it's my privilege to appear today alongside an admired leader and good friend, admiral bill mccraven. no two commands work more closely together than u.s. special operations command and central command. let me begin with what i see today in the region. the arab awakening is manifesting differently in each country. while we may hope for and certainly we firmly support all efforts for more democratic governments in the region, the awakening's origins are not necessarily a rush for democracy. rather, this awakening stems from a breakdown in the social contract between governments and their people. unjust or unresponsive regimes have fallen or are in the throws

throes of falling as is the case in syria. however, the transition to a democratic government is never easy, as we see in egypt. further, it is not clear what the resulting governments will look like. challenges remain, beyond the promise of the arab awakening. iran and its surrogates continue to orchestrate violence worldwide, as evidenced by its plot to kill the saudi ambassador here in washington, d.c. iran presents the most significant regional threat to stability and security. its reckless behavior and bellicose rhetoric have created a high potential for miscalculation. while we've made security gains in the fight against terrorists, the threat remains. al qaeda and associated groups continue to kill innocents from the lavonte to yemen and are adapting in the face of u.s. pressure. while we maintain our pressure on this enemy, we are nesting our military efforts inside four broad u.s. diplomatic objectives. first, support for each country's political reform to

adapt at their own pace. second, support for economic modernization that provides the people ownership of the future. third, a renewed pursuit of middle east peace, recognizing the status quo is not sustainable. finally, we stand firmly with our pretends from supporting regional security, territorial integrity of the sovereign nations and the free flow of commerce. as the military commander for the central region, my overarching goal so to prevent further conflict. we seek to deter those with hostile intent, and should deterrence prove unsuccessful, we provide military options to the president. as our president has said, our strong presence in the middle east endures, and the u.s. will never waiver in the defense of our partners, our allies, or our interests. the military challenge will be determined in how we obtain a

sustainable presence and operational flexibility in a physically constrained environment. although we are withdrawing some ground forces from the region, we are not withdrawing our support for longtime allies and partners. nor are we pulling back our commitment from a region that too many times has taken a commitment of american blood and treasure to restore stability. through persistent military-to-military engagement, our troops reassure our friends and temper adversary intentions. security cooperation activities, such as foreign military sales, international military education, security force training, and multi-national exercises are cost-effective means for building our friends' defensive capabilities, allowing us to operate in concert with allies and friends and to rapidly respond in times of need. a sustained joint presence with a pronounced naval character supported by embarked troops, special operations forces,

strong aviation elements, and an expeditionary army ready demonstrates our commitment to allies, underwrites regional stability, familiarizes our forces with the theater, and builds partner abilities to protect themselves all while with we're providing timely response to crises. there are some other key needed capabilities that we have. improved counter ied efforts to protect our troops from a pervasive threat, that extends well beyond afghanistan. information operations and voice programs to counter adversary information and recruiting on the internet. improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that enable us to locate an illusive enemy, and intelligence expertise to support our deployed elements. we also need specific resources that are vital to the afghanistan campaign.

coalition support funds. the commander's emergency response program. afghanistan infrastructure fund, and reintegration authority enable us to meet urgent humanitarian and infrastructure needs of a population that is increasingly secured by its own forces. forces we have been building and training through the afghan security forces fund. in conclusion, i appreciate the essential resources you provide, which enable us to carry out the strategy assigned to us. we ask only for what we need and what we request is critical, as we carry out the transition in afghanistan and continue on course to achieve our desired strategic end state there by december 2014, as laid out at the nato conference in lisbon. thanks to congressional support and to the sacrifices of our military families, our forces represent america's awesome determination to stand by our friends and maintain regional stability in defense of our values and interests. i look forward to answering your questions. >> general, thank you so much.

admiral mccraven? >> good morning. chairman levin, ranking member mccain and distinguished members of the committee -- thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and to represent the extraordinary men and women of the united states special operations command. it is an honor to command the world's finest special operations force, a force serves side-by-side with our broad military and interagency teammates. and i am proud to appear today with my good friend and next door neighbor jim mattis. admittedly, jim is rarely there, but when he's there, he's a great neighbor. with your position, i'll submit my written statements for the record and provide some brief remarks. i would like to give you an overview of emerging security challenges. secretary panetta recently outlined how he viewed the future joint force. he called for a low-cost, lean, technologically advanced agile, responsive, innovative, and efficient and effective forces able to address a variety of challenges and adversaries.

as i read those characteristics, i am struck at how accurately they describe your special operations forces and what we bring to our nation's arsenal. special operations forces have had a tremendous impact on our nation's security and never more so than during the last ten years of war. since 9/11, our forces have doubled in size. now it's 66,000. our budget has tripled to meet emerging demands. however, even with that growth, our $10.4 billion budget in fiscal year '13 still come comprises only 1.7% of the total department of defense budget. simply put, it remains relevant in high demand and offers an unparalleled return on the facing's investment. as we evaluate today's rapidly evolving strategic landscape, it is clear that the demand for special operations capabilities will remain high. our near-term focus is on winning the current fight against violent extremism. first and foremost, we will sustain our efforts in

afghanistan in support of isaf by continuing the application of soft's direct and indirect approach. the direct approach, lethal and concise, continues to degrade extremist leadership and their facilitation networks. the indirect approach, which i believe offers the greatest opportunity for victory, builds security and governance through efforts such as the village stability operations and development of afghan security forces. both the direct and indirect approaches continue to have daily positive impacts on isef's strategy. we continue to make this our highest priority. in addition to our efforts in afghanistan, we also strive to maintain persistent presence globally. today u.s. special operations forces are in 78 countries around the world, supporting u.s. policy objectives. in the pacific, africa, latin america, europe, and other regions, soft's unique skills, cultural knowledge, and the ability to work with partners creates effects far above our relatively small numbers. all of these international

engagements are done with the complete support and approval of the respective geographic commanders and the chief's admission. in addition to our forces -- in addition to our focus on winning the current fight, i am committed to strengthening our support to the geographic combatant commanders by reinforcing and enabling their theater special operations commands. as you know, the theater special operations commands are subunified of the sbbs and provide the commander his special operations. as the force provider for those capabilities, u.s. socom will ensure they have the human capital, the capability, and the expertise to meet the gcc's requirements. another important aspect is our ability to partner with other international soft units. since the development of service special operations forces in the 1960s and u.s. socom in 1987, our relationship with our partner around the world has strengthened each nation's ability to deal with their own

security problems. we must continue to build these relationships wherever possible. to win the current fight and strengthen our support to the geographic combatant commanders, it will be necessary to ensure our force and their families remain strong. my predecessor, admiral eric olson, established a task force to analyze the frame around the edges in our soft community. we confirm that a decade of war coupled with a high demand has exerted a physical and emotional stress on our force and families. i am committed to taking care of our people with the best support we can provide. i have put a general officer and my command sergeant major in charge of the preservation of the force and families. they're empowered to implement innovative solutions across the enterprise to improve the well-being of our warriors and their families. in conclusion, the demands on soft will not end in the foreseeable future. with your strong advocacy, we will continue to sustain a world class special operations capability. thereby providing the nation a

decisive edge and addressing the challenges that affect us today and will undoubtedly emerge tomorrow. it is an honor to appear before you today as the commander of the united states special operations command. you can take pride in what the men and women of special operations are accomplishing around the world, each and every day. thank you for your continued support, and i look forward to answering your questions. >> admirable, thank you so much. we'll try a seven-minute round for our first round. general mattis and admiral mccraven, first let me ask you about the fiscal year 2013 budget and the administration's recently revised strategy. does the 2013 budget request reflect the recently revised strategy? general >> yes, sir, it does. >> admiral? >> yes, sir, it the does. >> and general, do you support that budget request? >> i do, completely. >> absolutely. >> now, in the wake of the violence following the burning of korans in afghanistan,

including the killing of at least six american soldiers, secretary panetta said that this violence is not going to alter our commitment to get this job done in afghanistan. he added that, quote, our goal is that by the end of 2014, the afghans will have the responsibility to govern and secure themselves. general, following the violence over the koran burning incident, should we modify our strategy in afghanistan? >> no, mr. chairman. i don't believe so. i'm delighted to defend our strategy. i believe it is working. we should not allow a few criminals, malcontents, to define the afghan security forces. even their performance during these last two week, disciplined, restrained, standing by us is an indication that this is a force that's come a long ways. it's right now nearly at the 352,000 mark that we have set up.

it shows that the afghans are willing to fight for their country. we want it to be at 352,000 by october. we should be there within 60 days. we're on track, mr. chairman. >> how does the events which occurred, where we had some afghans killing americans and other coalition forces, and their own people, how does that strike you? is that a significant shift in any way in terms of either the afghan's willing to take on the taliban or the reliability of the afghan army? >> sir, treachery has existed as long as there's been warfare. and there's always been a few people that you couldn't trust. i'm one of those who has slept peacefully under afghan boys guarding me back in 2001. no force is perfect. i would just remind everyone that even jesus of nazareth had 1 out of 12 go to mud on him.

my point is that no matter what selection process you use, you're going to have somebody who doesn't cut the standard, doesn't make the standard. and in this case, the overwhelmingly positive response by the afghan security forces, even in the face of what was a very disappointing and unintentional mistake by the u.s. forces, it did not shake their confidence in us. it did not shake the teamwork. i think that right now it does not cause us any question about the overwhelming reliability. at the same time, prudent pressures -- measures taken with the full support of the afghan chain of command, unprecedented, i might add, absolutely

insisting support means that we're on the right track to address what is a bona fide insider threat concern. >> thank you. now according to "the wall street journal," united states is proposed reducing the size of the afghan national security forces from the 352,000 end strength goal for this year to 230,000 after 2014 as a way of reducing the cost of sustaining the afghan forces. why -- first of all, what's your reaction to that? is this something which we have decided upon? and why, if so, are we projecting the need for afghan troops two years in advance as the security force needs of afghanistan? >> i understand your question, mr. chairman. i completely support general allen's recommendation that we hold a 352,000 afghan security forces through 2015. while there can be any number of varying levels of maturity of planning or thinking going on, the conditions on the ground will have to determine the size of that force. but between now and 2015, i

think to sustain the gains we've made, especially after 2014 when our troops will have been largely withdrawn other than inviters, the 352,000 is a prudent measure. >> as far as you know, has a decision been made relative to that? >> i'm confident there has not been a decision made on that. >> now i want to change the subject a bit to the stability operations. some have accused afghan local police units of serious abuses against the populations that they're tasked to protect. i'm wondering whether or not you have a response to that. and i really works i think, ask you both, because you're both very much involved in the afghan local police and their support by our special operations and our general purpose forces. so first, general, what is your response to the criticisms that

we've read of the afghan local police program and then, admiral, i'd like to ask you the same question. >> as you know, chairman that, program sundayer the provincial governor's command. they're not on their own out there. they have u.s. special forces as advisors living alongside them. it is interesting that doing all these months of difficulty with this insider threat, as we called it, where we've had some of our troops attacked, not one of these troops living out of the very edges in small -- very edges of the battlefield in small groups has been attacked. we find that those forces are ethical. we keep a close watch on them. if we get any indication of unethical behavior, violent behavior taking advantage of their position, it's investigated immediately. and we keep a very close watch on it. >> thank you. admiral? >> yes, sir. as you know, general allen investigated some of these allegations had a joint

investigation with the afghans and they found the allegations to be false. and as general mattis mentioned, the stability program and the afghan local police in particular are, in fact, part of the minister of the interior. so that chain of command goes right back to the simple government and gives it some credibility from the tribal level, the village everybody's up to the central government. we think this is very important. there are currently 11,000 afghan local police and we are growing to about 30,000 over the next couple years, and we think this is an exceedingly important program for the stability of afghanistan. >> thank you both very much. senator mccain? >> general mattis, has the -- after all the sanctions have been imposed on the iranian regime, do you believe the regime has been at all dissuaded from pursuing a nuclear weapons capability? >> no, sir. i have not seen that.

>> general mattis, are there strong indications that al qaeda is making a comeback in iraq? >> yes, sir. notably in the western iraq area, but the threat is extending into baghdad. >> general mattis, general berg is testified last month that the assad regime and its military remaining "viable cohesive and effective force, the same hearing james clapper director of national intelligence testified that absent some kind of external intervention, assad will," "hang in there and continue to do as he's done." do you agree with general burgess and director clapper's assessments? >> sir, assad has chosen violence. i think his military is under more pressure every day.

the desertions rate is going up. but in aggregate, i general burgess' assessment. >> if current conditions persist, absent external intervention, how long do you think assad could remain in power? indefinitely? >> i don't think indefinitely, sir, but i would be very slow to put a time horizon on it. i think he's going to be there for some time because i think he will continue to employ heavier and heavier weapons on his people. i think it will get worse before it gets better. >> and recent reports of increased iranian involvement, as well as russian arms supplies make it worse. would you would say that assad's

crack down, specifically in recent events in homs, is gaining or losing momentum? >> he's gaining physical momentum, sir on the battlefield. i think he's creating more enemies. he's creating more international pressure against him. on the tactical battlefield, he is clearly achieving what he wants to achieve. >> i think we would agree that syria, out of the hands of assad, would -- in a chance to be free and democratic would be one of the greatest blows to iran, as far as lebanon is concerned, hezbollah, iran's closest ally, that it would be in america's strategic interest to see assad go. >> yes, sir, it will be the biggest strategic setback for iran in 20 years when assad falls. not if, but when. he's going to go. >> and fundamentally, we went to the balkans because ethnic cleansing and genocide was

taking place in bosnia and kosovo in the 1990s. do you see a difference between the kind of slaughter that's going on in syria now and the kind that was going on in kosovo and in bosnia, maybe a difference in scale but sort of the same kind of behavior -- actions and -- being taken by the government? >> certainly each situation is unique. but as far as the trend, i would not disagree with your characterization. >> under current conditions, would simply providing arms to the opposition to be sufficient to help them end the violence and to force assad to leave power? >> sir, providing arms is perhaps an option that would be a policy option.

i think we would have to do our best to determine who are providing the arms to and follow physicianes's oath of do no harm, to make sure that we're what we're doing is actually going to reduce the scale of violence ultimately. i mean it may go up for a short time. but i think you'd have to look at it very closely, because the longer this goes on, the more potential there is for al qaeda and for basically a full-scale civil war. >> have you seen any evidence that al qaeda is having any significant role in syrian opposition today? >> yes, sir, we have, in terms of the rather spectacular ied attacks. >> so every time i've seen one of these crisis, the first answer is we don't know who these people are. it could be al qaeda. i heard that in egypt. i heard that in tunisia. i heard that in libya.

we don't know who these people are and that probably al qaeda. you know what that flies in the face of, general? people who yearn for liberty and not being under the rule of an oppressive brutal dictatorship. so all of a sudden now we will again assume al qaeda. well, i just turned -- returned from a trip, egypt, tunisia and libya. and there is always the threat of extremism. but there's no doubt that people made the revolution we're not al qaeda. in fact, they're in direct repudiation of al qaeda. so, frankly, one grows a little weary of this, we don't know who they are and they're probably al qaeda. general, do you think we can find out who they are? >> sir, i think it's prudent to find out who your allies are and who your enemy is. >> it is prudent to stand on the side of freedom and democracy against one of the most oppressive dictators in the world? is it? >> no, sir. >> is that prudent? >> no, sir. >> isn't that what the united states has been standing for for a couple hundred years at least?

isn't that why we fought wars? so, frankly, i grow irritated and i grow angry when i see and meet these people who sacrificed their very lives and their family and are wounded, when i visit a hospital where a whole shipload of wounded young men have just returned. and i didn't see a single one of them that was al qaeda. not a single one. i didn't see a single one of them that died before my eyes that was al qaeda. so i suggest -- i suggest we find out who these people are and i guarantee you that you will find out that it's not al qaeda. it is not al qaeda. it's people who have the same yearnings that are universal and that's freedom, democracy, and our god-given rights. so i would hope -- i would hope we would spend some time with your unique capabilities in finding out who these people are.

i'm surprised you haven't tried to do that before. you should do it because this conflict is going to go on and a whole lot of people are going to die if we allow the status quo to prevail and the slaughter to continue because "we don't know who they are." >> thanks, senator mccain. general mattis and admiral, thank you for being here. thanks for your leadership. as i consider the records both of you have had and what you're doing now, i don't think we can have two better people in the position that you're in. and we ought to be very grateful to you for that. general mattis, i always look forward to your testimony because in some sense i feel when i read your stuff or listen to you that i'm black in a classroom because you do have a very developed sense of history. i want to read in the context from your submitted testimony, and i quote you, in over 30 years of supporting u.s. forces, in the central command

area of responsibility i have never witnessed it, change is the only constant and surprise continues to be the dominant force in the region. well, transformation is under way across the region as a result of the arab wakening, malign effort business other regional actors, particularly iran, to influence the outcome represent greatest immediate and long-term threat to regional stability. and then i'm skipping here. again, i thought interesting perspective. maybe we missed in all the tumult in the region. there is only one state in our aor actively seeking to destabilize the region and actively form violence, that is iran. i think that helps us put things in context. let me go back to something that senator mccain touched on. i want to ask you to go into it in a little more detail, which is this is about syria. can you describe in more detail

what is the extent of both iranian and russian assistance to the military assistance to the outside government at this time? >> senator, the russians provided very advanced integrated air defense capabilities. missiles, radars, that sort of thing that would make impositions of any no fly zone challenging. if we were to go that direction. in terms of iran, they're working earnestly to keep assad in power. they have flown in experts. they're flying in weapons. it is a full-throated effort by iran to keep assad there and oppressing his own people. >> so the iranians first to the best of your knowledge have some expert or high ranking personnel that have come from tehran to damascus to assist the syrian forces?

>> they have, sir. yes, sir. >> and what -- generally speaking, what kinds of hardware, what kinds of military assistance -- systems are they providing to the syrian army? >> they're providing the kind of weapons that are being used right now to suppress the opposition. they're providing listening capability, eavesdropping capability to try and pick up where they -- opposition networks are at. and they're providing experts who i can only say are experts in oppressing. they're pretty well schooled. they know how to oppress their own people in tehran. they have flown them into damascus to help assad do the same thing. >> okay, so, i'm generally in sympathy with the argument that senator mccain just described, the international community, for reasons that are both humanitarian and strategic,