really just can't -- shouldn't sit back any longer and watch assad do what he's doing. my own sentiment is i suppose eventually he'll fall. but when there is such a disproportion of military power between the government and the opposition, he can really, as you suggested earlier and senator mccain did, hang on there for a long time and the killing can go on for a long time. we actually saw this in the balkans in some sense in the '90s before we finally got involved and stopped it. and i don't minimize the difficulty of getting involved here. but i do want to say that your answer to the last question, which i appreciate does -- let me say this. some people say if we get involved or some of our arab allies get involved or people in the european union to provide weapons to the opposition army that we will be militarizing the conflict. but the conflict is already militarized.

the iranians and russians are providing a lot of military support to the assad government and the opposition is -- doesn't have much of that at all. has the white house asked you, as head of centcom, to prepare any contingency plans for possible assistance to the syrian opposition? >> senator, i would prefer to answer that question in closed hearing if i could, sir. >> okay. and i hope chairman had to go away to another meeting. i hope we'll have an opportunity to have a closed hearing before this is over. i know for the record that i don't believe, i don't believe senator mccain believes we should do this on our own. i hope we can help organize something. i gather that the saudis and others are now actively thinking about at least supplying some weapons to the syrian opposition.

let me move to another area. this also goes to iran. i have heard reports that the iranian regime is now involved in more actively in malign activities in other countries in the region. and in a way that poses some threat to our forces in the region. and i want to ask you to talk about that. i'm thinking particularly of yemen but beyond syria there are other areas where in your aor that you feel iran is beginning to threaten our forces. i would like to hear about it. >> sir, they're fighting basically a shadow war every day. they're moving weapons into sudan. they're sending men into yemen.

they're trying to make inroads bebepassing out money and ordinance to various in yemen. they take their first steps to some kind of a democracy in their future and come out very good election. we see what they're doing in damascus. they recognize that their link will be cut to hezbollah if bashar assad falls. so we see this throughout the region. they have never gotten along that well, the iranians, with the taliban. and, yet, they're willing to help the taliban to some degree to fight us in afghanistan. and we also see their mischief in all around the world, of course where they attempted to kill an arab ambassador. this is an on going effort. it is something we have to accept as part of their nois op ran motis operandi. and we certainly take a lot of

prudent steps to maintain our own force protection. but we also see them trying to find their way in and take advantage of anything that any of these asia wakening causes that come up. they tried it in cairo. i think they were pretty well rebuffed there. the iranian revolution is not being seen as an example for any of the arab nations in their awakening. so it's not completely successful. but at the same time, it's -- it's highly concerning. >> is -- my time is about up. is all this activity in the region by iran evidence of the fear that people including in the region have that they really have ambitions that they want to stretch out across the region or can we not conclude that? >> sir, i think one of the reasons we're seeing the unity of the gulf cooperation council right now and the way the arab league is banding together and becoming actually a force for initiating operations, whether it be in libya or in other

areas, there are concerns about damascus. i think what we're seeing is the whole region is becoming aware of this sort of effort on iran's part and it is causing a more unified opposition to them, almost akin to 1948 in western europe when nato was formed out of a fear the soviet union and their forces. >> so very significant parallel. thank you very much, general. senator brown is next. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you both for your service. admiral, thank you for taking time to come in. i know we -- i think it was senator levin referenced the afghan local police program which i had an opportunity and honor to observe as a soldier this summer and go out and visit the special forces and see that program at work and visit many of the villages and speak with the tribal leaders and also the soldiers that were there. and to me, it's the program we should have implemented from day one. the value for the dollar is incredible.

the amount of cooperation between the tribal leaders and the people of the villages and the special forces is unheard of. it's never happened like it's happening now. that check and balance. when one village is actually coming to the aid of another village when they're being attacked or harassed. it's never happened. that is because of the advent of a simple road connecting the villages. that's why it's very important to continue with the infrastructure in that region. you get from point a to point b, see what the other village is doing. create trade with that village. come there and be the safety and security for that village and vice versa. is that your observation those type of positive activities as a result of the -- our involvement in the afghan local police program? >> absolutely. as you know, the afghan local police program is one component of the platform or operation which really kind of

looks at security governance and then economic development. and the afghan local police are part of that security aspect at the village level linking the village to the district and then the district and the province and the province to the central government. >> thank you. general, regarding -- i also had the opportunity as a result of my military duty to actually go to the detainee facility and actually participate in a -- in a board, so-called board,, to determine whether that detainee should be released. it was not dissimilar to our drug boards and other types of boards that seem to be in concert with everything that i've been taught as a jag, and i found it fascinating and i also found it a little bit troubling especially troubling, potentially troubling, i should say, because the strategic partnership agreement with the

afghan government is absolutely important. something we need to get signed and implemented right away because it puts to bed the notion that we're packing our bags and leaving. however, accelerating of the transfer that detainees to afghan custody presents real concerns for me. i don't -- i don't think they have the capacity at this point based on my personal observations to assume the security of these detention facilities. and i found it was one of the best run facilities i've seen ever. i've been down to gitmo. my old senate district back home, i was responsible and participated in getting funding for three or four prisons. is that, general, your understanding and position as well? are you concerned about that transer if and whether they can

handle that well? >> yes, sir, we are. we're in negotiations with them now. ambassador crocker is leading the negotiations. general allen right alongside him. i think the most important thing is that we figure these things out or a process for figuring them out and not go into an agreement. what we want is the right agreement. as you point out, we want to make certain we're not turning people over before the afghans are ready to take care of them. and then we end up with abuse or some failure in terms of how we take care of them. i know they're expanding it and also -- i mean i've seen the caliber of afghan corrections officers, soldier who would be manning manning it. i have to be honest with you, i have deep concerns. you know, i want to monitor it very, very closely along with you and i know ambassador crocker and general allen were obviously working that through. regarding iraq, i am concerned, as others are, about the vacuum that is created and, as you know, al qaeda and iraq is carrying out more attacks this year than it did the entire

second half of last year. do you think there is a security vacuum there now since we left? or what? >> it's not a security vacuum, senator brown. but it is a less capable iraqi security force without our capabilities there. they're scrambling to try and fill in the gaps. we're working with our small footprint there to help them fill in those gaps. but it is -- it's a concern i know for the iraqi government and it's a concern for ambassador jeffries. >> do you think al qaeda is making a comeback in iraq? >> yes, sir. they are. it's not significant. it won't threaten the government. it will kill a lot of innocent people. >> and what about the favoritism in the iraqi government for the majority shia political party, do you think that's fueling another insurgency potentially and does this play right into our al qaeda's hands to create that instability? >> it's not playing into al qaeda's hands yet. and i think that the -- there has been some progress back into

a political dialogue here in the last couple of weeks that i think is back on the right track. so it's -- i give you a cautious optimistic view of. this but it's very, very cautious at this point. >> regarding syria, do you see them moving over to syria to fight against the syrian regime and how do you think this affects our understanding of the assad opposition? >> al qaeda is just trying to increase the chaos because they like ungoverned spaces. i don't think they have a moral bone in their body. they're simply opportunistic. i don't think that they characterize or represent or define the opposition to assad. that they would try to take advantage of it, i have no doubt. it's in their genes. they do not define the opposition to assad. >> admiral, can i just touch base? can you comment on the -- sometimes i feel not often

understood but equally effective contributions of the guard and reserve elements and so common. and how do you view their role now? how are they doing? and how do you view the role in the future? >> sir, thank you. the guard and reserve has been absolutely essential to centcom's capability and fight over the last ten years and really since the establishment of uso in 1987. we have two reserve units, the 19th and 20th special forces groups that do phenomenal work for us in afghanistan. we have the 193rd, special operations wing which flies the unique guard and reserve assets. so we are very strongly enabled by the guard and reserve across all components, all service components of special operations. and we expect that they will continue to be well resourced in the years to come and play a vital role in the u.s. special operation. >> and you welcome that role? >> absolutely, sir. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thanks, senator brown. senator reid? >> thank you very much, senator

lieberman, and gentlemen, thank you for your extraordinary service to the nation and to the men and women that you lead with such distinction and their contributions, also. general mattis, you indicated that the most significant threat in your region is iran. and given the issue of strategic focus where if you have limited resources you have to keep maximum pressure on the key threat. can you comment about what could happen if we either coordinated or supported or encouraged or even participated in military operations with syria with respect to the iranians? would this be neutral in terms of our efforts? would this disrupt international collaboration? would this create unanticipated and unwarranted advantages to the iranians? >> sir, i think that if we went into providing options, whatever

they are, to hasten the fall of assad, as long as those were put together in a coalition, international form, it would cause a great deal of concern and discontent in tehran. >> but the one area that would be problematic would be something that was perceived as unilateral or so dominated by the united states that this lack of international collaboration could undermine our intentions and our motives? that's true? >> i think international collaboration will be essential to the successful outcome. >> so in effect, we're working on, as we speak, pulling together that international context for effort that's are directed to what many have said

and we hope the ultimate demise of the assad regime. is that a fair characterization? >> yes, sir. >> let me just take it one step further. there's been discussion of establishing safe areas and safe havens. operation on the ground, let's assume that could be done. it would seem to pose some problems. first, the syrian military forces are very well organized and robust and fairly proficient. i don't know how long they would tolerate those safe havens. but second, given safe havens, it also implies, some would have to go in and organize training and organize literally an army. that could take months if not years. are those considerations being thought through carefully? and what it would mean in terms of commitment and resources? and, again, deflecting efforts

away from other more serious threats? >> sir, i've not been directed to do detailed planning on these. i would prefer to take some of this in the closed session. but it would require regional or surrounding state support to do something like this. i've looked at the maps and there are no terrain limiting features where we could create those safe havens. in other words, you would have to create them using military forces. it's not like the mountains of northern iraq where the kurds could be up in that area against saddam hussein, helped up in that area against him. it would be a significant commitment of resources. of course, the international aspect could reduce our commitment if we got sufficient from others.

>> thank you very much. and for both of you gentlemen, one of the difficult points negotiating strategic framework with afghanis is persistence of president karzai to resist operations at night, even his own forces. can you, admiral, comment on how critical this is to us and is there a way to somehow be leery of his concerns but continue to be tactically effective? >> sir, we think the night raids are essential for our task force to go after high value individuals. high value individuals that we pursue during the course of a 24-hour period or days or weeks generally bed down at night. they are much more targetable at night. in fact, i think if you look at it tactically, what you find is the afghans are actually much safer if we target an individual at night because there aren't so many people out and about the

whole villages. what we have done to reduce the afghans' anxiety on this is the afghan special forces are in the lead on all of our night operations. i think this is an important point. i know it is an important point that general allen and general mattis made and ambassador crocker to president karzai is these are his forces that are, in fact, surrounding a particular compound, trying to call out the specific individual and the first forces through the door. and we think that is the best way to reduce the afghan's concerns. but it is a critical tactical component of what we do every day in afghanistan. >> general mattis, do you have any comments? >> i would just emphasize that there is less chance of collateral damage of innocent people being killed. i think that on itself on the moral level, besides the military efficiency aspect, dictates that we continue these operations so long as the enemy keeps an active force in the

field. >> thank you. one of the principle assumptions going forward is that we will be able to operate with the afghan national forces both their police forces, special forces, and their army forces. at small unit levels which means essentially small groups of u.s. and nato personnel imbedded with larger units, and this is particularly something that your special forces, soldiers, and other operators do. the recent attacks by afghan military forces against american forces, really the one-on-one sort of violence, to what extent has that caused you to re-evaluate that approach and that assumption? >> sir, i think as general mattis mentioned, we have not had any what we refer to as

green-on-blue incidents with respect to our partner relationships from the special forces with the afghans. but that's not to say, again, as general mattis mentioned, that there couldn't be treachery in the ranks. i think we're always cognizant of that. having said that, we have built the partnerships over many years. we have great respect for our afghan partners. and way think that this strategy of partnering with the afghans is absolutely essential to victory in afghanistan. >> general mattis, any comments? >> senator, these a&a is defined by the boys that fight loyally alongside us. their casualties are routinely higher than ours, significantly higher. they're doing much of the fighting now. and there is an increasing need for us to have mentors among them as they take the lead. so this will be something we'll take every prudent measure. but at the same time, it eventually comes down to the trust between young men fighting

alongside each other. and that is characterized by a high degree of trust, overwhelmingly. the tragic incidents become understandably what we hear about. >> thank you. thank you. >> thanks, senator reid. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, general mattis and admiral mccraven for your distinguished service to our country. general mattis, i want to ask you about the recidivism rate from guantanamo. the associated press ran a story yesterday which i believe is misleading, and the headline was "not so many guantanamo reoffenders." this story said that far fewer detainees released from the guantanamo bay have rejoined terrorist activities than previously reported. however, before this committee, this is an issue that i've questioned many individuals about. last year director clapper said that re-engagement rates from former guantanamo detainees who were confirmed or suspected of

re-engaging was 27%. in fact, just three weeks ago he was before our committee again and he actually said that the re-engagement rate of those who had re-engaged were, we've confirmed, are in the fight or suspected to be re-engaging was actually increased close to 28%. i believe it's 27.9%. and, of course, we've heard the same testimony from secretary gates as well as secretary vickers that the way that we calculate the recidivism rate is not just those who are returned but those are just who have suspected of returning to the fight. one of the big issues we have, of course, is that it's difficult to determine who has re-engaged because we're so poor -- once they have re-engaged of reconfirming, we can't always reconfirm who's out there, who's back fighting us again, and often we find them whether we encounter them in the battlefield or elsewhere.

and so i want to ask you about two. in my view, one terrorist re-engaging us is too many. and the reason we've tracked both those who re-engaged is a more accurate reflection we are with re-engagement rates. two individuals i'd like to ask you about, general mattis, who have re-engaged in the fight that, is shahid al-shahiri and another detainee. one became a leader in al qaeda in the arabian peninsula and the other became a leader in taliban and afghanistan. both of these former gitmo detainees have been actively evolved against us and our allies. can you update the committee on the status of these two former i'll lustrohusbanlustrous guant detainees?

>> thank you, senator. al-shari, he is the number two man in yemen. he is the number two military commander right now. he's engaged in active operations. and we can confirm that. on zakir, he is a taliban commander in afghanistan. and, again, engaged with us. i can get back to with you more specifics on what we picked up in a classified setting, ma'am, not today. but i can get back to you. >> just to put it -- i look forward to having more detail on that but just to put it in perspective, both of these individuals are engaged in activities to kill americans or our allies, are they not? >> that's correct, senator. >> and so i can't imagine how frustrating it must be, obviously, for our troops to re-encounter one -- someone we've had already in detention. and so one of the concerns i've had is what do we do if tomorrow

we recapture them in terms of where do we detain them, to interrogate them? and we -- admiral mccraven, you testified before the committee last year that, for example, if we got them, we couldn't hold him in afghanistan. we needed a place, a long-term detention facility that that would be helpful. can you help me, both of you, where are we on that and what would we do if we captured the two individuals we talked about again tomorrow in terms of interrogating them? where would we hold them under the law of war? have we solved this problem? have we moved forward at all on it? >> senator, i am confident that we would be able to hold them. each case is looked at individually, so i cannot tell you in advance how we would do it. but if we -- i'd just -- if they're listening, i suggest they don't sleep well at night because we're after them.

and we will hang on to them if we get them. i'm not quite certain where we'll put them. but we will be interrogating them. and we will -- if they're alive, and we will do our best not to see them on the battlefield again. >> but we don't have a designated facility because we're essentially not taking anyone else in guantanamo, as far as i understand it, pursuant to the administration's policy. >> there is not a designated facility, no, ma'am. >> one of the concerns i have, we can't hold them on a ship if we have to hold them in long term detention. you would both agree with me on that principle? >> yes, ma'am. >> completely. >> so it's not clear where we would put them if we captured them tomorrow? >> no, ma'am. we have captured, you know, some people and we have been able to facilitate their transfer to a detention facility.

>> well, i would hope that we would not bring those two individuals to the united states of america because i'd have a hard time explaining that to my constituents when we have the availability of the guantanamo detention facility. i would hope that wouldn't be an often given how dangerous those individuals are. do you think that's a good option, bringing them to the united states? >> that is a policy decision, ma'am. it certainly an option for the president to consider. >> well, why wouldn't we just use the facility there's secure at guantanamo? >> yes, ma'am. i'm probably not the right person to ask the question, ma'am. it's a policy decision. and i have no reservations as long as we have a facility as far as where we put them. >> admiral, is there anything you'd like to add on this? >> ma'am, in the case of syrian, you know, if they are captured in yemen and afghanistan respectively, then obviously we have agreements with both

yemenis and the afghans that they could be held in their country of origin. so right now, for those two individuals, i think that would be the likely solution. >> admiral, i just wanted to follow up briefly. when you were before the committee last year for your confirmation hearing, i asked you about ayman al zawahiri. i asked you the scenario if we caught him tonight in pakistan where would we place him for long-term detention? and last year you said you weren't sure what we would do in that circumstance. has anything changed since then? >> no, ma'am, nothing has changed since then. >> okay. certainly we couldn't put him in afghanistan. i mean, we can't take individuals who we captured outside of afghanistan, for example, in pakistan or yemen and bring them to afghanistan for detention. >> that's our practice now, is

not to do that. that's correct. it would take a government-to-government agreement, i think, to do something like that. >> we already have existing issues where we're trying to resolve with the afghans on the secure way to deal with the detainees that they have now. and so thank you, both of you. thank you. >> thanks, senator. next is senator nelson. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and let me add my appreciation for your service, as well. thank you. i've got a number of concerns about our presence in iraq at the current time. i don't think that i have a clear understanding of what our mission is there. it's further complicated by the fact that we've got questions about the new embassy which is of significant -- in terms of size building with significant number of se