located there, perhaps not even functioning in a security role outside of the embassy. and the embassy continues to be expanded and i understand perhaps the state department now is in charge of establishing what our mission in iraq is. can you, either of you help enliten me about what our mission truly is in iraq today and how that might relate as well to the providing of security by contractors and the continuing expansion of ability -- of a building that seems to be gargantuan in size already? general mattis? >> sir, as far as our mission in iraq, it's going from a military-led effort in iraq over the last eight years to a state department-led mission under the ambassador. there i do have a lieutenant general with a small footprint

on the ground, part of the office of security cooperation in iraq. and they are engaged in everything from the sale of certain military equipment providing contractor-led training, to organizing the iraqis who want to go to military schools in the united states. we maintain those relationships. that's what they're doing. as far as the security contractors, sir, who actually protect the embassy, those come under the u.s. embassy, under the state department. but having been there recently, they're simply doing the guard duty you expect in a high threat area. as far as the sides of the building, senator, i'm really not confident to respond on that question, sir. >> but it is big, isn't it? >> it's big, sir. >> thank you. >> in trying to understand the role of the contractors there

and providing security, in other embassies in other countries, are we required -- do we require ourselves to provide security or do we look to the host nation to provide security? >> sir, the host nation provides the external security outside the grounds. inside the grounds, it's sovereign territory and we do that. we do it with generally contract guards, many of them are long serving guards there. and then inside the embassy building itself, you have marine security guards. >> is that the way it works in iraq and baghdad? >> yes, sir, it is. >> the iraqis provide the external security? >> they do, sir. >> and if our personnel are moving from one place to another, who provides the security? >> that security is provided by our own contract guards. >> what level of security would the contract -- with the iraqis provide externally to the

embassy? >> in that zone when you go there, sir, you see there are checkpoints set up some blocks away. they have patrol that's go by. it's not just for our embassies, it's for other embassies in town, as well, as they provide the diplomat the tick security that is expected around the world. here in washington, d.c., some policemen can provide it because the threat is very low. in a place like baghdad, prudent measures require iraqi army, iraqi police to do the external security in a much more visual, obvious way. >> okay. turning back to iran. we all know the threat in iran is real. would you discuss the relationship of iran to syria, to hezbollah?

and on "60 minutes" secretary panetta said there was a red line for us. i know in the discussions between mr. netanyahu and the president in the last several days there seems to be some closing of the gap on our different ideas about dealing with iran and the growing concern. what actions, military or otherwise, should we be considering in connection with iran? i don't mean to put you in a classified position, but just generally could you give us your idea? >> yes, sir. the iranian threat is basically along four lines. there's this nuclear program where they're enriching more uranium than they need for any peaceful purpose. and that went through denial and deception. they have tried to keep that program going.

the iaea has tried its best to monitor it. they've had an unfortunate visit there recently. the second threat is the long range rocket and ballistic missile threat. that one has the attention of all of our friends in the region. as far as how they protect against that. the third threat is the maritime threat. and so we're going to have to be prepared to keep the sea lanes open. and the fourth threat is what we call the kuds force, their secret service, they're surrogates, proxies like lebanese hezbollah and other terrorists that they fund. and on that one it's largely a police and intelligence driven effort as we try to contain that but also our special forces work that issue very, very closely. so four basic threats and we look to how we can check each one of those working alongside some of the most enduring, long-term partnerships we've had in some of the countries out there.

>> well, since this is a budget hearing, in your opinion, does the current budget proposal deal sufficiently with the kinds of threats and the responses that we are now providing to those threats? >> it absolutely does, senator nelson. i can say this though because i'm first among equals when it comes to the combatant commanders. basically, if i need something, i go to secretary panetta and i get it. so i'll just tell that you i'm well resourced, sir. >> admiral, from your perspective? >> sir, i'm also extremely well resourced. >> you don't think that the budget was prepared under different assumptions and the circumstances have now changed with regard to that? >> no, sir. >> admiral -- general? >> we'll always have to adapt, sir. but right now i think the strategy is well supported by the budget. >> and if circumstances were to

change to where military action was required, would we be having to change circumstances then, as well? >> senator, active operations along those lines would be very expensive. obviously, that's one of the characteristics of war. we're doing everything we can to try and deter war, to keep the stability, the peace, or what path of peace in the middle east one more year, one more month, one more week, one more day to allow secretary clinton and the diplomats to convince iran this is not in their best interest to go the way they're going now. >> one more question if i might, mr. chairman, on the budget. would that apply to -- in any engagement that we might have in syria, as well? very expensive, probably not provided for in the budget. >> i'm absolutely certain it would apply, sir. >> admiral?

>> yes, sir. >> thank you, gentlemen. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator nelson. senator cornin. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for your service to our country. i want to focus a little bit on iran, not surprisingly in light of your testimony, general mattis, where you say that their reckless behavior and billacose rhetoric create a high potential for miscalculation in the region. and another area of your testimony you say it's perhaps -- represents perhaps the greatest immediate and long-term threat to regional stability. i wonder if you would agree with the characterization of a think-tank here in washington, the centers for strategic and budgetary assessments when they define iran's strategy as anti-access, anti-denial strategy. and designed to take advantage

of the -- they say, of the unique geographic attributes of the persian gulf rather than confront the u.s. forces directly, iran could attempt to use ballistic missiles, terrorist proxies to coerce gulf states to deny u.s. forces permission to operate from their sovereign territory. without going on to describe that further, i wonder if you would agree with that characterization of iran's strategy or if you have a different way you would characterize it. >> senator, i would agree that any access area denial is their modus operandi as they look toward active operations if it comes to that. but i would also add that to the two threats they outlined i would add the ballistic missile, long-range rocket capability they have. >> if the united states had a

reliable source of oil from a friendly source, would we be as concerned about iran's threat to block the strait of hormuz? >> i believe we would be, senator, because of the vital interest to the world economy which would have immediate and significant impact on our own -- and our own way of life if one nation, iran, the only nation that threatened to close those straits did so. >> and just to list the areas in the middle east where iran has its very clear fingerprints, i think it's help follow to remind ourselves from time to time just how they operate in lebanon through hezbollah, a terrorist organization, and the west bank and gaza. we know that iran is reportedly

receiving funding -- or hamas, i should say, has received funding from iran. we know, of course, that in iraq that iran was the source of many of the explosively formed penetrators that killed united states servicemen and, of course, in afghanistan and now in syria. is there any other place that i left off the list that iran's fingerprints are most obvious? >> absolutely, sir. i would add yemen. i would add -- they've tried to get involved in the internal aspects of -- in bahrain of the shaking out there of the opposition to the government and the efforts by the government to engage that opposition, we believe, iran is probably trying to undercut that because they would not want to see the elements get together and come up with a bahrainy solution. in kuwait, they had the spies

captured. they've gone all over the place, sir. they enjoy this sort of thing. i would add that in gaza, however, hamas pulling out on assad i don't know what the effect is going to be on iran continuing to fund them since they've just pulled out support from assad when obviously tehran wanted them to continue supporting assad. so we'll have to watch and see what happens there. >> what do you think that iran's reaction would be if the -- if there was a coalition forces that intervened in syria to stop the bloodshed there and the assad regime? would they sit quietly on the sidelines? >> no, sir. they would try through their proxies and surrogates to do some mischief there. i don't think you would see anything overt. i think they would try to keep

their fringer prints off it since it would get them cross. wired with an international organization of some kind, coalition of some kind. >> i know you eluded to al qaeda activity as opportunistic in the region. and part of their activity is to create sectarian strife and conflict. but it strikes me that although al qaeda is a nonstate actor that its goals are share a lot in common with that of iran in terms of creating instability and conflict in the region which then provides space for them to grow in power and influence. do you agree with that or do you have a different view? >> coming from two different directions, obviously, the al qaeda would prefer to see shias killed as they're doing in iraq, killing innocent shias there.

iran, on the other hand, heightens the tensions between sunni and shia from a shia perspective and, frankly, i don't know what the advantage they see accruing to them self for it. but it goes to your point. they're both doing the same thing. they just come from a different direction on it. >> well, i guess the challenge that the united states has is that israel has said they will do whatever they need to do in their national self interest to prevent iran from gaining a nuclear capability that would threaten their existence. secretary panetta has said that gaining a nuclear capability would be a red line. that iran would not be able to cross. the president of the united states said yesterday that his policy was not one of containment.

it was to stop iran. i'm wondering, where on this continuum you've talked, i think, eloquently about the delay for a day or a week or months, but do you -- having said that -- i think to senator mccain, that nothing that we have taercattempted so far by w sanctions appear to deter iran on this pathway toward a nuclear weapon. where do you see this headed? >> sir, i hate to speculate on something like this because in public i cannot make any casual statement. however, iran is obviously missed several opportunities to engage positively with the iaea to respond to the united nations security council resolutions.

they -- they're very much a problem. and i don't see this going in the right direction until the full effect of the sanctions can accrue. and i say until because even now as we see inflation going up, unemployment going up, the internal frictions have got to start telling here. at some point i think the iranian people are going to question, is this the right direction. so if we can keep this in a diplomatic, economic track and get full advantage of what the sanctions are doing and the international isolation is doing, this country basically lacks any significant strategic ally. there are some that have blocked for their own reasons resolutions in the united nations, regrettably, but i don't see them having allies and i don't count that little fella down in venezuela as a very significant ally. >> if i can just conclude on this, mr. chairman. so it sounds to me like we have

a race. one, to see if sanctions are successful in causing the regime to implode and, thus, deny their aspirations for a nuclear weapon. but if that doesn't occur fast enough there's another parallel track where they are on a pathway to achieve a nuclear capability. and the question is, i guess, for us and for the world, is who is going to win that race? sanctions or nuclear weapon? >> yes, sir, i'm not sure that iran needs to implode. i think that they can come to realization that this organization that's running the country right now with these cosmetic elections they're running, they're not real free and fair elections, that this leadership is not what those people deserve. and at some point they would say, we want to stop this program and somehow those voices would be heard in a way that

convinces them that this is -- they had the best we can do otherwise is to delay them. only the iranian people can stop this program. >> thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much, senator cornyn. >> thank you, let me begain the same place i began last year, with you, general mattis, but also this comment extends to admiral mccraven as well. if you look at these two gentlemen's records of service in the military, the ultimate reward of competent leadership is command. and you look at the number of times that command shows up on both of these leaders' military bio there's no two better people we could have in the positions that you are in. and you have my thanks for the contributions that you're making on behalf of our country. i'd like to clarify something

that -- just as a result of a discussion that has occurred during this hearing. i don't think it's accurate for the those who are pushing for a faster pace move toward military involvement in syria to characterize those, including myself, who have been asking for us to be very careful in terms of how we define the opposition movements as simply some reductionist statement about al qaeda. i have put the questions to general dempsey, i put it to director of intelligence clapper, my concern that we really move forward in a careful way to define how much of this opposition is domestic, how much of it is regional, and, indeed, whether or not al qaeda has been a player in that.

and i think this is -- in all of these situations we've seen over the last year, as -- general mattis, as you pointed out in your opening statement, a good deal of what has been going on has been, for lack of a better term, the rupture of the social contract such as it was in this region. and, again, as you said, it's not predictable. there's going to be democratic movement or democratic result in some of these countries. in fact, the implications of what has been happening are going to play out over years. we're just not going to see the quick resolution in a way that we can say there's a democracy or something else. and so it's very important to be careful in terms of what sort of military assistance would take place if it were to take place

and with whom. and i think i'm hearing that today, and i'm -- i'm glad that i am. one of the pieces that i think has been missing from this discussion, not just here, but in other hearings, is how we should be approaching china. and what we should be expecting and asking from china in terms of asking for their assistance in increasing the stability in the entire region. i think this is a good opportunity to get some feedback from you, general mattis, on this. we've been talking about iran. we've been talking about russia. there was a resolution proposed in the foreign relations committee that originally did not even mention china's participation, the veto with the security council. resolution, proposed security council resolution at the united nations. in the region, we, i think,

should be expecting more out of china in terms of stepping forward to attempt to -- to resolve some of these issues. pakistan calls them their most important friend. we've got the sanctions that we've been attempting to move on iran, and we're not seeing clear assistance there. with respect to the situation in syria, i've been asking, why -- why would they -- why would china not support the type of resolution that went before the security council? well, let's -- let's be honest here. this is a system of government that has not been afraid to repress its own people. probably the most glaring example of a repressive regime that's survived over the past 22, 23 years is the chinese regime that sent tanks and troops on to its own people at tiananmen square.

we hope their system has evolved beyond that but perhaps this lays la plays into the situation. general, can you give us an idea of what it's been like to -- to interact with the chinese in the region in which you're responsible? >> i can't give you too much on that, senator. i'll tell you on counterpiracy efforts, there's a collaborative effort, pretty fair -- at the low tactical level, ship commander to ship commander. no problems between us out there on the station in the gulf of aden. i noticed that on iran, that china did come out with a rather strong statement that iran getting a nuclear weapon was not in their interest and they did not support that -- that effort. so i don't have very much contact with the chinese in my region. it's very, very limited. i would suggest it's probably

more in the foreign relations state department realm. pretty absent as far as mil to mil. >> i would venture that in terms of cooperation on anti-piracy, there is a clear benefit even on a tactical level to the chinese because now they're operating their navy in an area that they weren't operating in before. we welcome collaborative efforts, but i don't think we should look at that as some statement of national intent here. and i just hope that -- i know this is principally a diplomatic question. but i hope that we might be able to pursue ways to encourage china to help us resolve these larger issues, whether it's korea, whether it's burma, but particularly in this region where they clearly have geographic reasons and strategic reasons to be further involved. even in a place like afghanistan where we know they've now started to move in economically.

but we need to hear more from china. admiral, i think my time's going to run out. i want -- i have a question. i'd just like in a general sense to hear your policy with respect to officers who handle classified information that might, even on a temporary basis, end up in the hands of foreign nationals. is there a policy if that were to occur? >> yes, sir, absolutely. i mean, anybody that transfers classified information, you know, without the approval of the u.s. government, without the process, falls under the uniform code of military justice for violation -- >> what about just for negligence they left something laying around. >> same thing, sir. >> thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thanks, senator webb. senator mccaskill, i really

apologize. i think senator blumenthal in terms of original arrival is on the list first. >> i'll wait. >> if senator mccaskill has another -- >> absolutely not. go ahead. >> thanks. senator blumenthal. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. i want to add my thanks to both of you. and the men and women under your leadership for your really extraordinary service which i had the privilege to see a bit firsthand during my second trip to afghanistan last february with senator mccain and senator graham and others of my colleagues. and as i mentioned to you, admiral mcraven, i was particularly impressed by the really remarkable achievements of our special operators there. the numbers tell a powerful story, but so do the more anecdotal information, particularly about turning over a lot of this work and training the afghans themselves, which i

think is a really unprecedented achievement in our military history in terms of special operations. and i hope that we all keep sight of that work and also, general, the work that all of our men and women there are doing despite the incidents that may sometimes cloud the clearer picture that we should have and the appreciation we should always maintain of their service and sacrifice and the achievements are a real success there. so i want to begin by asking, admiral, whether you are satisfied with the work that is being done in terms of turning over that -- turning over and training that function to the afghans themselves of the night raids, the special operations forces and what we can do, if anything, to help you in that very critical part of your mission.

>> yes, sir. i've actually been very pleased with the progress. we have a number of efforts ongoing and have for quite some time in our partnership with the afghans. the u.s. special forces has had a collaborative effort with the commandos. some of our other special forces have partnered with the afghan partner unit. these are the forces that predominantly do the direct action raids and are leading on those direct action raids. we also have our nato-sought brethren. across the soft spectrum, if you will, it is all about the partnership and it is all about the afghans leading in that partnership. and our progress certainly over the last year has accelerated dramatically. and i'm very pleased with the glide slope we're on right now. >> you know, one of the impediments, i think, to understanding generally in the

american public about how successful we've been, not just in targeting and taking out those elements of the al qaeda and taliban leadership, but also with the very, very small number of civilian casualties that have occurred. and i know these numbers, at least i was told they were classified, but they are -- are really powerfully impressive. i would just put a pitch to you that if we can declassify some of these information, it would really, i think, enhance the appreciation and understanding in the american public in general. and i want to move to a topic that has concerned me for a long time. the ieds, the continued flow of ied bomb making material from pakistan, which is the source of the vast, predominant part of