senate has confirmed a replacement or specific departure instructions are given. as i've traveled in so many countries over the last five, six months, a number of you have told me that, you know, your time will be up in the spring or in the summer. but we don't know if will get people confirmed in the current political climate. we don't know who will or won't get confirmed in some last-minute deal that might be worked out before the congress basically goes out for elections. so we very much encourage you insofar as possible to stay. we need you. we look to you. and there is no country in the world that can do without you. now, obviously, there are many other important issues that i haven't touched on. we can, i'm sure, look forward to hearing about those from the speakers today but also at the

town hall later this afternoon. the simple truth is we have a lot to do. but we have a great team, a great team out in the field and a great team here in washington. i look forward to seeing you at lunch and then later this afternoon along with my colleagues to take your questions. >> we'll have more live events coming up for you. join us today at 3:00 p.m. eastern for a hearing on the impact and treatment of traumatic brain injuries. with a look at federal, state, and private efforts to prevent and treat such injuries. live at 3:00 p.m. eastern on c-span3. and the road to the white house winds through illinois tomorrow. join us for election results and candidate speeches as the polls close here on the c-span networks. and our facebook question of the day involves the 2012 campaign. we're asking you about women voters in the republican party. we welcome your comments at

facebook.com facebook.com/cspan. this is c-span3 with politics and public affairs programming throughout the week. and every weekend, 48 hours of people and events telling the american story on american history tv. get our schedules and see past programs at our websites. and you can join in the conversation on social media sites. the japanese ambassador to the u.s. says his government still has concerns over the damaged fukushima nuclear power plant. his remarks came one year after a powerful earthquake and tsunami set off a nuclear crisis. and despite concerns, the ambassador also discussed japan's progress in rebuilding efforts. this is an hour and 15 minutes. >> ladies and gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us today. my name is michael oslin. i'm an asian fellow and scholar here at aei and also direct the japan studies program. we're obviously very grateful at this busy time today ambassador fujisaki with us to kick off

what i hope is going to be a robust and extended discussion here among our expert panelists primarily on some of the things that the ambassador brought up, which is lessons learned, have there been lessons learned, what are they, where do we go forward from here, and as we sitting in america try to understand japan's own response over the past year to the disaster of 3/11, how do we see our role and what we've done together. obviously, there are a lot of familiar faces in the audience today. so this is going to be more a discussion i think among friends and people who know each other rather than something very formal. but we've assembled probably the most knowledgeable people on japan in washington here for this discussion. and i think though russ may profess shock, there's no question these are the turn-to people when we want to understand what's happening on politics, on security issues, on economics. you know them all, so i'm going to briefly introduce them.

we'll go in this order, asking each of them to give five to seven minutes of comments. then we'll open it up for discussion. we'll end promptly at 2:45. sitting to my immediate right is ambassador russ demming, who served 38 years in the department of state dealing primarily with japan affairs, serving both here and in tokyo as well as in other areas of the world before winding up as ambassador to tunisia. most importantly for our purposes, russ, as you may remember, came back to the state department to head up the japan desk just days before the quake and was literally the man on the spot, though in d.c. next to him, dr. sheila smith from the council on foreign relations and formerly the east/west center and also boston university, one of the truly well-informed and insightful scholars of japanese politics, of alliance relations between japan and the united states, issues and really everything that gets to the core of how

japan and the united states work together in the world. batting cleanup, mark namer, who now heads up the japan desk at the state department, so dealing with the follow-on effects from 3/11, but probably the leading person in his generation on japan affairs in the state department, having served there as well as in other parts of the world and most recently in baghdad. so we're very happy to have you back and handling affairs from foggy bottom. without further ado, i'll turn it to russ, then we'll go to sheila and mark. >> thank you very much. it's a pleasure to be here. thank you for organizing this. let me speak briefly about my perspective, having come back to a position i had 20 years earlier a few days before the earthquake. i think, you know, when the earthquake hit, we approached this with a great degree of humility. we've been through our own crisis management issues over the last three years -- katrina, the gulf oil spill, the haiti

earthquake and even just a month before the christchurch earthquake in new zealand. we learned a lot of lessons about how to manage a crisis, and we knew how did i feel it was. and so when we went into the, as i said, with humility but about with a lot of experience and lessons learned that we hoped would be useful. before we got -- when i got to the state department at 7:00 a.m. on the friday morning of march 11th, which was about four or five hours after the earthquake, it was already apparent that the dimensions of this. and we organized a task force. and instructions came immediately from the white house, from the secretary of state, from the secretary of defense, do everything you can to help japan. and that was not simply rhetorical, but it meant that we could push aside some of the normal bureaucratic legal and accounting obstacles and do what we had to do, worry about how we paid for it later on. and the amount of dedication across the u.s. government was

simply amazing, not just from the foreign affairs agencies but from the domestic agencies. people really did mobilize and really did step out. three areas of our focus. first, the obligation we have to account for and support american citizens and our embassy in tokyo immediately organized teams to go up to the area. i must say the japanese employees in our embassy played an extraordinary role with the local railroads cut down, subways, many of them instrumented for up to 24 hours, people walked two or three hours to come to work to help out, to get up there. and that part of the operation i think went very smoothly. second, to do everything we could to help japan on the humanitarian side of the equation. we recognized immediately, of course, that japan was not haiti, had tremendous resources of its own and a lot of experience in dealing with this kind of crisis. so our role would be supplementary, not basic human needs. and in this regard, our great

asset was the u.s. forces in japan and the close relationship between them and the japanese self-defense forces. they worked together both in exercises and in indonesian earthquake and very close ties between the two. and our military immediately mobilized to send 22,000 people up to the earthquake area, primarily to clear sendai airport to make available our aerial assets, ships, search and rescue, for moving things around. that part of the operation really broke new ground. it was the first joint task force the japanese had put together and certainly the first u.s./japan task force. while there were bumps in the road, it worked well. lots of lessons learned for the future, but it was i think a standout operation. and third, the nuclear issue. first we didn't quite understand the dimensions, but over the first 24 hours or so it became clear that this would be the

center of our attention. the u.s. and japanese nuclear industries have a long history together. the reactors at fukushima are based on u.s. design. we knew a lot about them. our nuclear industry had worked together over the years. our nuclear regulators had worked together. so there was a natural contribution the u.s. could make in this regard. and we had a big stake in the outcome, of course, not only tens of thousands of americans in japan and the area potentially affected by the nuclear problems but also our mutual stake in safe nuclear energy and to make sure that we could manage this issue as effectively as possible. and, indeed, that became the center of our effort ts. the first ten days, frankly, were quite kay kaye ottawaic. there was lack of clarity on the japanese side, who was in charge, lack of information. we had trouble coordinating. but after we got through that task force set up in tokyo, the

coordination began to work very effectively, and that coordination continues to this day. so in those three areas i think we did a pretty good job. quickly, lessons learned. first and most heartening was the tremendous amount of good will in both countries toward the other. the outpouring of american support here mo, more than $200 million raised by americans, the number of former jets that reached out to their former communities to help, the number of alumni of u.s. forces in japan, the families that served there over the years, just the strength of human bonds between the u.s. and japan that had been under the surface really came to the surface and was terribly heartening. a similar feeling on the japanese side. the warm response on the japanese side to the efforts made by the americans.

now more than 80% of the people in japan support the u.s./japan alliance, an historic high, and it's important to build on this good will for the future. second, lessons to be learned on responding to disasters. we did a good job together, but a lot more we can do and we need to do a lot more joint training and exercises and learning to reach out to other countries, perhaps regional responses, as well, to bring people together on humanitarian disaster relief. and third and perhaps the most difficult challenge of all is how do we put together in both countries and more broadly a broad energy policy that brings together the need to continue to develop efficient use of fossil fuels and environmentally friendly use of fossil fuels, work on stimulating more renewables and also making nuclear part of the mix. it's got to be part of the mix in the midterm. nuclear energy is under crisis because of lack of public support around the world, and the u.s. and japan i think have

a lead role to play there. i'll stop there. >> rust, thank you so much. sheila. >> thank you so much. unlike my colleagues on the panel, i'm not a government official and can't speak to the internal coordination between the united states and japan. so i thought today i'd offer a few observations i've had over the year. one of the things i think this audience appreciates deeply, but one of the greatest assets of the last year was the opportunity that we all had to witness the resilience of japanese society. i think it's deeply felt not just in the united states but around the globe, that japan's response to the triple disasters, to this unprecedented crisis, was remarkable, even though there's cry kri teak of specific moments of decisionmaking or specific actors or specific institutions. overall, it was a tremendous show of the japanese social resilience. in my mind, there were tremendous acts of courage obviously by individuals in toho ka and beyond, but it was also japan's social institutions that

shined. volunteerism was at its highest. japanese corporate leadership was actively demonstrated in response but also in the follow on energy crisis that occurred. but i also saw, you know, local governments responded well, and many of the institutions that we haven't seen of postwar japan were particularly strong, nongovernmentable npos, et cetera, were at the fore front of response. i also took deep confidence in the fact that it was younger japan, it was the next generation of japanese leader, the faces that we saw in many of the aspects of the last year's response to the crisis that i think is most hearening to me as an educator about japan's future. the other point the ambassador made, and i think ambassador demming has reinforced, is the scope and scale of this particular crisis was unprecedented, the 9.0 earthquake, the tsunami and the nuclear meltdowns. i think all of us who live in

societies with nuclear power, all of us who live in societies with repeated and much-expected natural disasters have an awful lot to learn from the japanese response. if you haven't seen it yet, jeff bader's article on foreignaffairs.com will give you a really interesting insight into the white house response and his assessments of the crisis response in japan and bilaterally u.s./japan. but i think in japan there's an awful lot of critique going on right now of japan's own government's response to the crisis. i caution all of us outside the country to give it time for the empirical analysis, the political analysis, and the scientific analysis to really run its full course, because these are the kinds of challenges and problems that all of our societies will face. the other piece of this, it's not specific to march 11 events themselves, but of course as those of us who watched japan fully realize that you have to but march 11 event and this last year of reconstruction recovery in the context of japan's

broader public policy agenda. i think that's what many of us are hopeful that some of this new analysis will come to light, but we also have to understand that the global economic conditions confronting japan today, all of us, in fact, including the energy market, are going to determine the extent to which japan's recovery will be successful. the fiscal health of japan, of course, is a topic of great concern. prime minister noda himself is addressing this issue as we all sit here today. but i think japan's larger tasks of rebuilding in post march 11th japan are really about building a society and an economy that will be more globally competitive going forward. one of the aspects of japan's response or of the last year of response in japan that gets most attention -- and of course i write about it because it's something that i watch carefully -- is the extent to which japanese broader government institutions mets the challenge. i'm not here to catalog mistakes

or lay blame on one side or the other of the political fence. but i think japan has gone through a very protracted political transformation, one that is not yet over, and i think we have yet a lot to see about how this crisis is going to affect the transition itself away from single-party dominance into a more competitive political marketplace in japan. and some of the institutional prescriptions i think that you've heard discussed in japan in this year since march 11th i think are going to help in that transition process. very broadly speaking, though, the japan that i see, especially the public policy debate in japan today, i think we re flekts a much more deeply -- some people like to talk about an insular japan, but i don't think that's the right way to interpret the conversation that is building in japan tuld. i think you see a much more reflective japan, a japan that is in the wake of march 11th much more willing to ask questions about some of the institutions that have not been

examined so closely. the nuclear field, of course, gets most attention. but i think there's broader questions afoot in japan today about relationships between local and national governments, about corporate, private, public sector partnerships and choices that japan has ahead of it. and i find that one of the great tunnels that has emerged in the wake of march 11th. let me conclude with a couple of thoughts here. especially for those of us outside the japan, and that is it is absolutely important that the lessons learned process of studying what happened in japan on march 11th and afterwards is not just japan's exercise. it must be not only a u.s./japan exercise but a global exercise as well, because all of our societies and the resilience of all of our societies will depend on what we learn from the events and the aftermath of march 11th. the second cautionary piece, especially for our japanese colleagues, is as you critique and think and prescribe changes

for the future, i think it's equally important to recognize what what japan did right both in the early days after march 11th and in the months since. finally, and this is from the global perspective and clearly from washington's perspective, but i think it pertains also to the regional response to japan's crisis, and that is a strong japan is what all of us will depend on. japan's recovery has immense implications nor global economy, for the stability of asia pacific relations, and for the partnership with the united states. we can't imagine a future in which a strong japan is not part of that future. so i think our policy team will work very hard to support and sustain the kind of cooperation we've seen over the last year to make sure japan re-emerges. thank you very much. >> sheila, thank you. [ applause ] >> and, mark, maybe you can actually talk a little bit to

what's going on today and that part sheila was just mentioning. >> great segue, sheila. thanks very much, everyone. happy to be here. i'm really glad sheila mentioned this idea of an insular japan. as we heard earlier from ambassador fujisaki as he sort of listed all the really daunting challenges that japan is facing as it proceeds with its recovery, really one shouldn't be surprised that one of the common narratives right now that's out there about japan both in the region and the world is that japan is just more focused on dealing with issues at home, it's naturally going to be more preoccupied with addressing its pressing domestic issues. i would like to use my time briefly today to make the argument that, in fact, japan is as engaged as ever on the international stage, as engaged as ever with the united states and with its neighbors. and so i guess i would add, ambassador fujisaki gave us seven ps, and i would add an

eighth, proactive. japan is remaining very proactive in the international community, onld contrary to some of these conventional wisdoms out there, has not, in fact, ceded its position on the international stage. i would go through some of the areas of which we would call our global partnership with japan is succeeding and making headway in any number of areas that the united states is very focused on. afghanistan, for example. japan is the second largest donor there. $5 billion over five years and is poised in july to host a major donors conference in tokyo. pakistan. again, japan is the second largest aid donor after the u.s. same with iraq. i think japan is something like $5 billion, but again, second only after the u.s. in terms of its financial support for that country. in terms of other pressing issues around the globe, iran, for example, japan and the united states share the goal of the abandonment of iran's

nuclear program, and japan has participated fully many the u.n. sanctions regime as well as implementing unilateral sanctions of its own, and this in spite of the challenges it faces at home in terms of its energy situation. regionally, dprk, north korea, burma, both countries in which japan and the u.s. are in close, virtually daily contact to address the pressing issues there, whether it's the north korean missile programs or in burma the issues of democratization and economic liberalization. in terms of the specific security alliance with the united states, i won't go into too much as ambassador demming already described the immensity of what the u.s. and japan undertook post 3/11. but i will say i think what 3/11 really did for our count two countries and our alliance was to knit us, lash us even closer together, because when you have two forces such as ours sort of going shoulder to shoulder into

harm's way together, i think it was an experience that both forces never could have duplicated on the training field, never could have duplicated in some, you know, war gaming room, doing a tabletop exercise. really, this was a remarkable historic effort, and i think we'll see the fruits in the years ahead as our two countries perform even better and more closely in terms of our joint and other operations. economically, i'll just be real brief. i don't think this is news to anyone, but the u.s. and japan remain vitally connected economically. that hasn't changed after 3/11. japan remains one of the top investors in the u.s. the u.s. remains the number-one investor in japan. japan is our fourth largest trading partner. and as we pursue engagement across the board, whether it's in trade, investment, or in other areas such as science and technology cooperation, cooperation on things like environmental protection, fighting infectious diseases, promoting cooperation in space, when you name it, these are areas in which our researchers

and scientists on a daily basis are in close touch, are working together unabated, and really 3/11, if anything, has drawn us closer together. real quick, in concluding, i would raise one issue of concern to me personally, being the beneficiary a long time ago of a student exchange program. and that's the number of students from both our countries, in each other's countries is is relatively low. and i think we can do better. there is about 6,600 american young people in japan right now. i think it could be twice that, three times that. right now there's about 25,000 japanese young people and other researchers here in the u.s. that number is on the decline. japan used to be the number one sending country of students to the u.s. now it's fourth behind china, india, and south korea. i think this is an area in which we all need to work harder. i think the fact all of us are here today means we care about the relationship. certainly i would implore all of you to do what you can to try and stem the tide, the reverse

tide, of young people in both countries. i think our future depends on this. as secretary clinton said, our goal is to create a new generation. we need to build stronger bridges between two countries in the years ahead. thank you. >> marc, thank you very much. [ applause ] we have just under 20 minutes for q&a, but the same rules apply. ask very brief questions and identify yourself so we can get in as many as possible. i'll take the moderator's privilege and ask the first if i can. i'd like to ask rust to compare what you saw happening after 3/11 on the japanese government side with what happened after kobe in 1995. a lot of what we talk about is the issue of -- and the ambassador mentioned one of his ps was preparation, to be prepared. and of course the devastating kobe earthquake was one in which there was a whole host of different circumstances.

and i'm wondering if you can give your perception to us of did japan do bert, worse, or because it unchanged? >> i think there was a marked contrast. i happened to be in tokyo in 1995 during the kobe earthquake. and japan was really completely unprepared for that kind of emergency. you remember the time the governor of that prefecture wanted to keep the self-defense forces out of the prefecture because of his own pacifist tendencies. there were no regulations in place to allow the self-defense forces to control highways or otherwise take emergency actions. and that, along with the sarin gas attacks of the next year, i think, were a major impetus in japan to putting in place emergency legislation, a process that began by prime minister hashimoto and things continued under prime minister koizumi and has continued to this day. so japan was much better

equipped, the emergency response much better. the self-defense forces did a tremendous job. we focused a lot on the 22,000 americans or more than 120,000 self-defense forces mobilized overnight to go up to the stricken area, and they did a tremendous job. not just the self-defense forces. people may criticize tepco, but the workers on the ground, historic -- you know, putting their lives at risk, going back into the reactor all the time. the tokyo fire department, tremendous human risk, put water on the reactors in very horrible conditions. and as others have talked ab, the outreach of the japanese overall. it was a much better response. i think as i said we need to be very cautious in our criticism of how japan responded because the crisis was unprecedented, triple crisis, and i think the japanese did a much better job than in 1995, learned a lot of lesson. >> that's great. thank you.

why don't we open it up to the audience now for questions. start over here. >> thank you. ambassador demming, you touched on this briefly on energy policy at the conclusion of your remarks. for any of the panelists, could you all talk about the future of japanese energy policy, the japanese ambassador gave us some insight on public opinion toward nuclear power. how does one reconcile that public opinion with japan's? >> it's a major challenge, i think. i mean, one can certainly understand the public emotions after this event. and, you know, the problem has been that these reactors, as i understand it, go off cycle about every 15 months on a regular basis for testing and maintenance. and as they've gone off cycle since march 11th, they've been

not able to come back on cycle because local governments have exercised essentially a veto over that. seems to me it's a matter really of political leadership both at the national and local level. nuclear from my point of view is indispensable in the midterm, certainly for japan. before this crisis, japan was aiming to have 50% of its electricity production nuclear by 2025. that target is gone. but it's not going to -- whatever is substituted for nuclear will take a long time to develop, not just in japan but you were a europe and the u.s. we have to overcome these obstacles. the new generation is much safer. some of the problems that developed at fukushima would not develop under the new generation of nuclear power. >> we should probably mention one of the reasons the crisis in terms of the loss of electricity production wasn't as severe as it could have been is because of voluntary reductions on the part

of businesses and individuals. if you look at this sheet, and it's number ten, i'm not exactly how you interpret, if it's kilowatt hours or megawatts, maybe megawatts, but you can see from december 10 to december 11, it's decreased. that's not normal production. there's already been a voluntary one year drop in usage. whether that can maintain when nuclear is now only providing 7.3% down from 31%, i mean, this is a significant issue that i don't think this's quite yet an answer to. we should recognize sheila, to chime in with what she was saying on the strength of social structures, this probably saved japan. it certainly saved japan from rolling blackouts and from what could have been the government having to be much more heavy handled in determines who would get electricity and who wouldn't.