to lead. thank you, chairman. thank you ranking member smith. >> thank you very much, general accounts in the press about both our goals in afghanistan and the means to achieve those goals. i'm hoping that you can clarify the current thinking and what you are being told. first, can you tell the american people what our mission in afghanistan is, and are we succeeding? >> chairman, our mission is to keep the taliban from overthrowing the government of afghanistan and to provide the capacity for the afghan national security forces to provide the security to that government over the long term. but it's also to deny al qaeda safe havens in afghanistan. >> thank you. i have a siris questions here to further clarify what you just told us. following the security gains made in the south by the surge forces last year, does your

campaign plan still call for coalition operations to shift r? >> chairman, at this particular juncture we intend to consolidate our hold on the population centers in the south, ensuring that we have, it is my intention to examine the shift of the main effort to the east at this point about i've not made a final decision in that regard. we anticipate shifting resources to the east in any case because it remains there that the principal counterinsurgency fight will ultimately be shaped in 2012. >> does your plan call for a continued counterinsurgency mission? >> yes, it does, sir. >> to your knowledge, is the administration committed to this plan, and sustaining a counter insurgency mission? >> yes, it does, sir. >> in your best professional military judgment what level of forces do you require through

the end of the 2013 fighting season, and what are the associated objectives you would want to achieve with those forces? >> chairman, the answer to that question is a bit more complicated. we're in the process now, i'm in the process, of making decisions with respect to the recovery of the second phase of the surge forces. i anticipate that those decisions to have been made and for my submission of that recommendation sometime in early april. if we're going to spend preponderance of the high up tempo period of the summer of 2012 both continuing to fight the counterinsurgency, as i said to consolidate gains in south to expand the security zone around kabul, at the same time we'll be recovering the second phase of the surge forces, the 23,000. on 1 october we will have approximately 68,000 u.s. forces

remaining, somewhere around 40,000 isaf forces and probably by then 3352,000 ansf. because of the nature of the recovery of the force, because of the progress of the campaign that i anticipate in 2012, it's my intention to take the time following the recovery of the trge forces to exa insurgency, examine the progress that we've made in the development of the ansf, to see the posture of the battle space, as it has developed throughout the fighting season of 2012 and before the end of 2012 i intend to provide to the president a siris recommend gatioations for combat power i need for 2013 and 2014. it's not my intention to be able to make that decision today. it's going to require analysis, of the after the conclusion of the fighting season and the recovery of the 23,000 troops in

phase ii of the surge drawdown. >> thank you. have you been given assurances by the white house that you can have the forces that you believe you need through the end of the 2013 fighting season? >> i have been given assurances by the white house that we're in a strategic conversation, chairman. there has been no number mentioned. there has been no number that has been specifically implied. there's an excellent, i believe, strategic conversation that is going on that will account for my recommendation, the recommendation of the theater commander, and the joint staff in this process. and i'm very pleased frankly where with we are in that conversation now, sir. >> thank you. has the white house always followed your best military judgment? >> as the commander in t s, sir >> "the new york times" reported last week there's a growing belief within the white house that the mission in afghanistan has now reached the point of m

diminishing returns. do you agree the mission as reached the point of diminishing returns? if not, why is the progress you're make sustainable? >> i don't agree with the article. i read the article. i know that there -- the article was disavowed by people who were quoted in the article. we are making progress, chairman. we have made progress as dr. miller had indicated, for example, just in the last 12 weeks, the enemy initiated violence across the country as 25% less than it was during the same period of time last year. in the same period of 12 weeks the civilian casualties, for example, 74% less than it was during the same period of last year. the growth of the ansf has been dramatic. the growth of the ansf special operators has been adramatic. as the ansf continues to move to the fore in full partnership with us in the comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign, i believe that there is great potential for us to accomplish

all of these objectives. and i remain committed to the campaign and i remain optimistic with the right kinds of resourcing the comprehensive campaign, counterinsurgency campaign continuing as we currently envision it, that we will be successful. >> thank you very much. ranking member smith? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to follow up on that piece there. i think it's just a misunderstanding about the mission in somewhere it's going. we were transitioning, that is the whole point, to bring in other forces, it's not a mat that the mission is reaching a point of diminishing returns, it's a matter the mission is reaching a point of reasonable success, and for it to continue to succeed we need to make that transition. it seems like there's always an argument for more troops on our side if things are going well, that's evidence that we can't leave because, look, it's working, we have to stay there, if anything goes wrong, that's evidence that we have to stay longer and in greater numbers because, look, it's not going well. that's not the point of our

mission. as i said in the outset, nobody on this committee, nobody in this country wants a permanent presence in afghanistan. so you've got to take a step back and say okay if we don't want that and succeed in the mission that you general allen, clearly described, to make sure that the taliban do not return to power, that al qaeda does not find safe haven, how do we do that? logically we build up a force of afghan whose can make sure that does not happen. that is literally the only option. it is not an option for us to stay there forever in order to make sure that the taliban and al qaeda don't come back. therefore, we need to build up a local partner that can do that. and what we've described this morning, even some comments from the chairman show that we're making enormous progress on that. but we don't succeed until we make that transition. general, if you could -- you've mentioned some of the numbers a couple of times, but if you could lay out for us the progress that has been made in terms of the ansf, you know, all

security forces, both in terms of the national military, local police, i think that will give us some idea. as we've drawn down, you know, from relative number, i don't know exactly what the numbers are, there's 100,000 u.s. troops, we're coming down to mid-60s, i think by october, nato's drawn down a little bit give us an idea of how to that compares with how the ansf, domestic security forces have grown, if you could give us those numbers, that's a key part of the transition. >> thank you for your comments because i absolutely agree with you that transition to the the this mission over the long term. in january 2011, there were 155 battalion sized formations in the ansf, and 101 of those were ranked in the top three of the categories of measure for

capability effective with advisers, effective with part r partnersh partnership. in the year since then that number has grown to 138 battalions that have grown independent with advisers -- >> so we're tracking you went from 101 to 138 in the year? >> that is correct. >> great. >> it went from 155 battalion sized formations to 168 battalion sized formations. so the force has grown significantly in just a year, but it has also grown in its capabilities in just a year. we have seen that not just in the army but also in the afghan national police as well. we have seen the emergence of the afghan special operations capabilities also dramatically enhanced over the period of the last two years but in the period of last year as well, the nine commandos, the 72 special forces operational detachment alphas, the a-teams if you will, the

emergence of the special police units within the general directorate of the special units in the ministry of the indoteri. those units with advisers or partners continue to make progress and, as i said earlier, 89% of our operations are partnered operations today. there are operations on the ground, as we speak, right now, in afghanistan where afghan unit are in the lead with partnership, partnered operations with isaf forces. so we have seen that progress. we intend to continue to pursue that progress. among the four priorities that i gave to my commanders the day i took command, and those priorities i believe are operative, while we will continue with my first priority, pressure the insurgency in a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign, the second priority, which is only slightly behind it, it to do all we can do accelerate the movement of the ansf into the fore and we're go

fog continue to pursue that aggressively, mr. smith. >> one more question. president karzai made a number of comments, you know, being concerned about the u.s. troops, talking about returning us to our bases, ending night raids. by and large it seems to me those comments reflect domestic pressure, reflect the afghan constituents that president karzai is responsible to being concerned about the foreign military presence. while president karzai's aware of the importance of us being there he's aware most of the people in afghanistan look forward to the day when we're not. so number one, is that an accurate reflection in your view of what president karzai and some other domestic politicians in afghanistan are reflecting? number two this is for both dr. miller and general allen, how do you work that relationship? how do you make sure the transition continues to happen in a responsible way, not in a rushed way given that domestic political pressure? i will point out that domestic political pressure that president karzai and others in

the afghan government are feeling reflects the flaw and the strategy that says if things aren't going well, let's just stay there forever. there is the reality of dealing with the afghan population. how are you managing that relationship given those pressures? >> i think, if i may, there is no part of our strategy which intends to stay in afghanistan forever. in fact our strategy, part of the larger isaf strategy, agreed to ultimately with nato isaf and afghanistan in the lisbon conference of november of 2010 called for us to work through the business of transition moving the ansf gradually into the lead for security across the country in a process that will be completed by the end of 2014. the campaign accounts for that. and the campaign accounts for the drawdown of u.s. and isaf forces as the ansf moves to the

fore, fully fielded in the battlefield and that process is on track. and in fact, the reduction of u.s. numbers and the reduction of isaf forces in direct support of our isaf and lisbon transition goals of 31 december 2014. with regard to the voices that we hear in the afghan government, the afghan government is on a path towards sovereignty. this is the whole process that we're talking about with respect to the lisbon convention of -- anticipating security leave by 2014. we should encourage the voices of sovereignty, he courage actions within the afghan government that seeks sovereignty, the mou that i recently signed with the minister wardack was one of the greatest acknowledgements where they partner increasingly with us in a counterinsurgency, they will take responsibility for the

administrative detention of insurgents in the battle spacing, and american forces will cease detaining afghans for long periods of time and afghans will pick up that responsibility. that is appropriate. it is a great indicator of sovereignty, for example. with respect to night operations, we have been in a long-term conversation with the afghan government in that regard. i believe that just in the last three months we have come a very long way in creating greater capacity amongst the afghans to conduct night operations in a very credible way. we're still heavily partnered with them and will be for some period of time. but not only do our operations now, all of our night operations, are partnered with afghan partner unit forces, their own commandos, which are very good commandos, but we're in the process now of building 12 afghan strike forces of their own. as you know, sir, i have a number of strike forces that are detailed to me that operate under the control ultimately of jsoc and those are the stryke

forces famous for the success of the night operations, which have been enormously successful in shredding the enemy's met network of command and control. another step towards sovereignty. these are all steps towards a strategic partnership with afghanistan, which we hope ultimately to have completed before very shortly the heads of state of the 50 isaf nations meet in chicago hosted by the president of the united states. so i think we're on track, sir. and i think even though that there has been some domestic rhetoric from the president on departing the villages early, et cetera, i will say both our president and the president karzai had an extended conversation the other day, in fact they have spoken three times just recently where both of them were in full agreement that the lisbon-based process and formulation of transition is on track and they both support it, which calls for the complete ansf lead by close of business

on the 31st of december 2014, sir. >> thank you very much. just something quickly. got over time go ahead. >> let me say that obviously general allen said it all. i wanted to reiterate three points. the first is, commitment to continue the transition process across the elements that the general talked about, the second is the relationships. we have one of our finest commanders and finest diplomats in the country with general allen and with ambassador crocker. in addition to that, secretary of defense and the president have been in contact with president karzai multiple times even in the last couple of weeks. i want to emphasize also that the contacts at the next level down if you will, with the defense minister, with interior, the national skoourtedecurity a getting the depth is the

resilience of the relationship. third and finally, let me say that long-term strategic partnership is going to be vital, not just 2015 forward, but an understanding of us having that commitment is important to sustaining this relationship in the meantime. >> thank you. appreciate that. i know neither of you have an easy job. i think you're doing it well. there are no guarantees, but we have to transition to afghan sovereignty as quickly as we responsibly can. thank you. >> thank you. mr. bartlet? >> thank you both very much for your service to our country. i know that everything we read and hear is not necessarily true and stories get warped. but there is a series of events that give me some pause if they're true. i would like for the moment for you to imagine that you're a

taliban fighter and this is what you have heard. a number of months ago the president of the united states says that we're pulling out of afghanistan in 2014, we're gone. several months ago the secretary of defense says that in 2013 we're going to stop combat operations and just continue with security and training of the afghan forces. and that position is corroborated by the white house. and then just a few weeks ago i hear of a program that will give me 125 to $150 a week if i stop fighting and i can still keep my gun. now i'm a rational taliban fighter, what do you think might be a rational position that i would take with those facts in mind?

>> mr. bartlett, let me answer in two parts. first, i want absolutely clear that the lisbon transition strategy is still this administration's policy and still the direction in which we are headed. and that included a transition to afghan leadership throughout afghanistan by the end of 2014 and afghan responsibility for security throughout the country by the end of 2014. the u.s. and coalition at that time, we would expect would still provide some support, including train, advise, assist, and including the capacity for counterterrorism operations at that point in time. when secretary of defense and others have talked about the 2013 time frame, it is a milestone on the path and in 2013 we expect thatach of the tranches of transition that are to afghan lead that were

announced at lisbon will have begun so the final tranche will have begun in have begun in 2013. at that time, there will be afghans in the lead for security throughout the country n have f responsibility throughout the country as they will in 2014. in 2013, it will be a model. in some cases, partnered units as occurring today. in some cases trade advice and assist. in some cases maybetch. other cases there will be a more significant role for that period. this is part of that process and sometime in 2013, we'll see that milestone with the final tranche. that begins just as an additional round of transition we expect to occur by the end of

2014. >> if in the meantime we are offering the taliban fighter $125 to $150 a month to just stop fighting, he can keep his gun, do you think he might stop fighting and keep his gun knowing that we are leaving in 2014 and then he can pick up and fight, we won't be there? >> i don't reject that possibility but i want to offer two contrary points, if you will. the first is, if a fighter wants to pick up his gun at any point and time in afghanistan, that is -- that is likely to be a possibility. if you look at the availability of ak-47s, they have had weapons for a long period f of time. second, critically important,

what we stipulated, secretary clinton stipulated for fighter that is come off taliban come off the field as an outcome, they need to sever ties with al qaeda and agree to the constitution. if they do those things, the gun is silent and may come to fight on the other side and become part of the national security forces over time. so, sir, i think what i would hope and expect of a taliban fighter today is a commitment not just between now and 2013 or now and 2014 but during commitment to see ansf that general allen talked in detail about and what they are seeing is they are going to lose. if they care to -- if they want to come across reconciliation, they have the opportunity to be a part of the solution, not a part of the problem that the nsf

will solve. >> time expired. mrs. davis. >> thank you very much. dr. miller, in general, i want to thank you for your dedicated service. i want to follow up on numbers for a minute and sustaining the effort on the part of the afghan army. it's my understanding as you are speaking about the size of the battalio battalions, we are looking at a force of 352,000. after that, due to budgetry reasons and our own investment in that, we are looking at 230,000. is that a correct number that we are downsizing to that level? looking to anticipating, you know, going to that level? >> at this time, the only figure that is taken as given is that 352,000 as the target for the

size, the combined size of the afghan national army and the afghan national police for the ansf overall. we expect, at some point and time, the time is not determined, it's a topic of conversation both in the united states and with coalition with the afghans, at some point and time, it will make sense to reduce that level to a long term sustainable level. the point of time that makes sense will depend fundamentally on conditions on the ground. some of the calculations thatof which have been in the press, frankly some accurately and some not so a point and time the taliban is significantly reduced and the scale of the afghan security forces cope with that would be lower. that is neither the end number or any point in time is

determined at this point. people have talked about numbers. none of that is decided. we have not heard recommendatio recommendations. >> thank you dr. miller. i wanted to clarify that. if it's downsized to that level, the budget plays a role, but we have a lot of former afghan soldiers in the country perhaps without a job. is that something that we are looking at, that transition and what happens after that? >> general allen may wish to add to this as well. a sign of success down the road, it's not immediate but down the road would be the taliban was smaller, the afghan national security forces could be smaller and the challenge associated with that is reintroducing the forces back into the economy. the good news is that because h

through to become part of the nsf, they would be trained with respect to literacy and more capable of contributing to the economy. that demobilization process is something that needs to unfold over time and we need to have an explicit plan. >> yes. thank you. certainly literacy is a big thing here. we are talking first grade level for many, many of the troops and whether or not that is sustainable to have them continue to be able to develop that economy. general allen? >> we have continued to emphasize literacy and the soldiers that go through the police that go through basic training that obtain a first grade level is given the opportunity to continue that literacy training. certain leaders have a minimum standard of literacy. as you correctly point out, should there be and there will be a draw down at some point

from ansf to some number in the post 2014 period, there are options now for those soldiers that there wouldn't have been before. i imagine in a managed forced reduction, the plan remains to be developed. we have to think about it. there will be such aspects of the plan such as vocational training. >> all important, i agree. could i, in the remaining time ask about moral. you conveyed, i think, quite eloquently the feelings of troops, i think and, you know, how they see their mission. clearly, these kinds of setbacks can be devastating. i wondered if you could speak more to that and whether or not we are doing anything differently as we redeploy troops in looking at records and number of deployments.

this obviously is something that bears on everybody's responsibility. >> general, the expired. can you please answer that question for the record? >> i will, sir. thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman. general, my understanding from people who should know and it's been written about in the press was the original surge. the military commanders ask for a floor of 40,000 troops for the original surge in afghanistan. they said the best would be if we could get 80,000. they got approved 30,000, a 25% cut from what they said the floor should be. there are some people who believe that it has cost us added lives and time because that request was not agreed to. that was before your time. i notice in yesterday's wall

street journal, it says the plan and the result of that 25% cut was that the campaigns had to be done sub quen shlly. you had to do is south, then move to the east. yesterday, wall street journal says that it is delayed to make that transition from the south to the east because things are not wrapping up in the south as was planned and i take it from your answer to the chairman's question that is true. we are going to have to stay in the south longer than anticipated before we make the move to the east to deal with that region. is that right? >> we have to consolidate the hold on the population centers in the south. it is the spiritual heartland of the taliban. >> yep. >> that surge, those forces