and the development of the local afghan local police has, in many respects permitted us to be successful in ejecting the taliban from the key terrain, the human terrain. we need to ensure as we develop the ansf, those forces are able to consolidate the hold on the population to present the reentry into those forces and those areas. that's essential. we intend to conduct comprehensive insurgencies in the east. the east will be well resourced. we will do them simultaneously. any suggestion we are going to hold in the east while we conduct in the south is not correct. the potential difference is whether i ultimately declare that the east will be the main effort, which permits me to shift other resources and rotary

wing assets to the east. i will tell you the rc east commander is fully capable of conducting aggressive operations against the insurgency and is well resourced to do so. i will continue to deny the enemy access into this insurgency, a population in the south, sir. >> let me real briefly, success in the east is going to be essential for success in the mission, isn't it because of the proximity to pakistan. >> in the south is crucial. >> i'm asking about the east. >> we have to conduct operations for some period of time. by virtue of the proximity of the pakistan border. we will continue operations there for some time. >> you talked a lot about the growth and afghan security forces. i, among others have been

impressed by operations an afghan local police. it's always my understanding that takes time. there is a clear time line, say 18 month to two years during which is special operations team has to live this that village in order to conduct the training and get those afghan local police off on the right path. to stabilize the area, as you have just been describing. i am concerned we are too focused on numbers here, particularly growth that will make it hard to stick. how are you ensuring that the quality stays there as we have had these tremendous increase in numbers? >> may i get a clarification? quality of the alp? >> yeah, quality of the troops and ability for them to stabilize in the south how they

have to hold their own to prevent the taliban from coming back so it's more than a numbers game. >> it's important that we continue as you have correctly pointed out, the process of the village stability platform that creates a community mobilization for the development of the afghan local police. we have 99 sights that have been approved ultimately for the location of the afghan local police and we are well on the way, we are over 50% of that in terms of the creation of the local police. most of those, the vast majority of those support the campaign. many of those village stability locations we began operations in them months ago. that progress is continuing. we are using our operators to be the core element for the creation of the platform to create the community mobilization to ultimately

embrace their own security, to be the trainers and ultimately the trainers. as time goes on, it is our intention to use afghan special operators ultimately to, just as we are in other areas, to transition our special operators out of there and move them on to other areas where they will continue the mission. >> thank you. mr. larson? >> thank you, mr. chairman. dr. miller, probably couldn't have been in that chair, in that position, i was sitting down here at that time, 2002 and '03 and the military at the time was telling us in afghanistan we needed to train 70,000 folks in afghanistan. we were going to do 10,000 a year for seven years or 7,000 a

year for ten years. somewhere along those lines. it's now up to 352,000. what can you tell me that's going to assure me that in july you aren't going to come back or even say after may in chicago, you aren't going to come back and say we meant 400,000. we went 450,000 security forces? >> mr. larson, there's in-depth analysis behind the number 352,000. i can't tell you it shouldn't be 351,000 or 353,000. very good analysis in terms of the requirement for the afghan national army and police. and other elements that could provide security.

now, sir, i guess i would turn it around and say if we had a recommendation from general allen saying the numbers should be different, i would want to hear that from general allen and want to bring it forward to the secretary of defense and forward to the white house. we have a lot of analysis behind the current assessment. it's based on not just an assessment of what the situation is in afghanistan and where it may go, but on a pretty good in-depth analysis of past efforts. so, i don't expect there's going to be a large dealt. if there were, i would feel obligated to ask general allen for his assessment and take it forward. >> i hope you would feel obligated to come to us as well? general allen? >> i am satisfied with the 352 number. the partnership relationship we

have now with the emerging ansf, ultimately our drawdown as they continue to grow to their full surge strength of 352, i think that's an adequate number. the issue isn't the number. the issue will be the disposition of the force on the ground. it goes back to mr. thornbury's comment about operations in the south versus operations in the east. we may see we'll have to thicken the defenses in the east over the long term if the safe haven situation doesn't change. itis less about the number than the longer term disposition of the forces on the ground to defend key population centers. >> i'm not asking this next question to get too much into the weeds on the sergeant bales incident. it's go to be elsewhere. with regards to the investigation related to command

in afghanistan, the situation on the ground he was operating in, not the situation, but the command structure in afghanistan, are there separate investigations going on, separate from the criminal case in afghanistan? >> yes. we'll conduct and administrative investigation and criminal cession. >> can you explain what administrative investigation is. >> it looks at the entire command and control process. how he was assigned, why he was assigned. it will look at command relationships and his involvement with that combat outpost. >> is someone assigned to do that? >> through u.s. forces, afghanistan. >> thank you. final, general allen, can you discuss the attrition rate for the afghan national army? the goal is 1.4. the current is 2% attrition rate.

it's not a lot but when talking 352,000 people, 2% gets to be a lot. >> it's improving. the latest number we 2.0, it's . it's only a tenth, but over a year, it's not an insignificant number of troops. we are working hard within the ansf to fair out reasons for attrition. a variety of those reasons are issues of pay, quality of life, leadership, the missions in which those forces have been involved. to their credit, ansf has embraced many issues and are studying them with great detail and removing corrupt commanders. they are ensuring they get out on leave, an important dimension of the moral. all those things, i think have pushed down attrition and very shortly, with the expiration of a presidential decree, those

individuals that go in an unauthorized absence are going to be held accountable for that as opposed to coming and going as they previously have done. it's part of a disciplined force, a professional force. we are seeing all of that improve on a regular basis. thank you for that question. >> thank you. mr. jones. >> mr. chairman, thank you so much. general allen, the last three years a former boss of yours has been advising on afghanistan, i cannot say his name but i will say he has great respect for you. i would like to use a couple words he used. recently in an e-mail, a brilliant soldier statesman talking about you, general allen and you are as honest as the day is long. those qualities uniform or out of uniform, you can't say anything nicer about an individual than that. over the past ten years, i have been hearing from the administration and those in your

position prior to you being here today. dr. miller, your comments and general allens are what i have been hearing for ten years. gains are sustainable, there will be setbacks, we are making progress but it's fragile and reversible. well, you know, going to walter reid and bethesda recently, i had a young marine who lost one leg and he said to me with his mother in the room. congressman, can i ask you a question? certainly. why are we still there? i look at this e-mail from your former boss and i would like to read a portion of it. attempting to find a true military answer to problems in afghanistan would take decades, decades, not years. drain our nation of precious resources with the most precious being our sons and daughters.

the united states cannot solve the afghan problem no matter how brave and determined our troops are. that gets me to the point that what is the metric? what is the event that the administration and general allen, you sir, are going to be candid with the united states congress and more important than the congress, the american people as we spend $10 billion a month that we can't pay for, the chinese is lending us the money we are spending in afghanistan. when does the congress have the testimony that someone will say we have done all we can do? bin laden is dead. hundreds of tribes in afghanistan and everyone has their own mission talking about the tribes. i hope that sometime in between now and 2014 if things are not

improving or they are fragile like they are now, somebody will come to congress and say the military has sacrificed enough, the american people have paid enough and somebody would shoot straight with the american people in congress. do you think what type of metric, i ask you both, what type of met trick you would see that you would come back to congress and say our troops have done everything we can declare a victory now. there's one thing we cannot do, that is change history. afghanistans have not changed since xexistence. i yield my time to you both. thank you. >> it's a very important question. i visited the wounded in bethesda as well. there are many of those young troops as the lance corporal you talked to the other day who are very, very dedicated to this mission. they want to see it successful.

they want their sacrifice to have meaning. i think this campaign is going to give it meaning. we are on track to have the ansf move to the lead. that's what we want success to be. >> general, if i may interrupt you one moment, if we get into 2014 and see president obama or a republican president and the afghans are not trained where they need to be, and we spending money and losing lives, will you be honest with the next administration and say to the next administration you need to stay to the timetable? we have done all we can do. you are not going to change history? >> congressman, i'll be honest with you now and i'll be honest with that next administration. it's my obligation, my moral obligation to ensure this force is resourced and committed into a strategy i think will work. i believe this will work. it's not about american forces

fighting right to the very end of 2014 and burying the burden of this campaign. this campaign shows the ansf will move to the front, the ansf will have the lead and ensure the population of afghanistan. if i think it's coming off the rails, congressman, i will let you know that. >> thank you, sir. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general allen, thank you for your testimony today. many noted corruption is in afghanistan and power brokers and mafias who co-opted the state. over the years we made occasional efforts of combatting construction like task force transparency. judging from recent news stories about billions of dollars in cash flown out of afghanistan, the former head of the kabul

bank going free and afghan army helicopters being used to smuggle drugs, it doesn't seem like we are making much progress. what can you tell us about successes to address corruption and do you believe it will address corruption especially the type that feeds on common people sufficiently to allow the afghan government to function after 2014. >> ma'am, that's a really important question. we should not be surprised there is corruption in afghanistan. after 30 years of virtually every institution in that country having been destroyed in some form or another, whether the communist cue or the taliban darkness, an awful lot relied on the whiles of network which are criminalized over time. the question isn't whether they exist or not. the question is whether we can

oppose the influence of the networks and restore a system of the rule of law and incredibility to afghanistan. i have no illusions about how difficult that will be. the effort that is we undertake to address those efforts, those influences, i think have begun to take shape in important and meaningful ways. since i have been in afghanistan through the use of task force transparen transparency, through task force 2010, which has done a great deal about contracting and ensuring transparency and contracting. excuse me. in direct conversation with president karzai, we have taken steps and president karzai appointed a commission to partner with us. for example, to begin the process of removing organized crime from borders, customs

depots. the process of doing that will recoup revenue to afghan coughers and reduce the thing you mentioned about the flying of cash out of afghanistan and president karzai who talks about this culture of impunity commissioned the presidential commission to partner with us. we are starting that process now. importantly as well, both of the security ministries, the ministry of defense and ministry of interior led by the ministry of defense completed something called transparency and accountability working group. this is the functions within the ministry defense. all the way from systems acquisition to personnel assignment. they are looking to remove criminal capture. it's a very important step as well, ma'am. >> general, i have a follow up

question. general petraeus cited this case as a success story over a year ago. has the afghanistan general been tried yet or high profile senior official who is were protects been tried? you didn't specifically mention this, but this was an afghan army surgeon general. >> short answer is no, ma'am. the longer answer is i went to see minister wardak. i wrote a letter to the president. i presented the evidence of this case to the palace and there is now a comprehensive investigation under way about the national military hospital, which we hope will ultimately result in irrefutable evidence for the prosecution of the commander of that hospital. they will determine if it's

tried through military jurisprudence. the investigation is under way at this time. it's a great step forward. >> it's been a year. >> the investigation has only been under way for several months. i'm glad to see that it is. >> thank you. i yield back. >> thank you. mr. forbes. >> general, we appreciate your being here. i support what you do. the only thing, sometimes up here we talk about winning and losing and asking questions it american people will say that's not really the question i wanted to ask. you know, one of the things, the realities we deal with is that congress spent $825 billion on the stimulus package and we are spending $345 billion on the interest for that. we are taking that sum out of national defense out of the country. as a result, carriers are going to be postponed. we are taking ships out of

commission. we are reducing weapons systems and force structure. everybody that comes up says we have to do that because of the budget we are dealing with. the question i hear from a lot of folks around when i talk ab you said earlier that the actions we had there made americans safer. you have the best person we have to articulate how that e's happened. how would you tell the average american what we have done in afghanistan has made them safer and how would you justify the fact we should continue spending money there as opposed to the ships, the weapons, the force structure that we see being reduced here? then the final one is this, what assurances do you see or what are your projections as far as 2014 to be able to sustain the investments we have put there? i'm going to give you the rest

of my time to respond to that. >> i may call upon my wingman here to give me a bit of assistance on the policy side of this. we remain in hot pursuit of any presence of al qaeda in afghanistan. there is some al qaeda in afghanistan but we want them on their back heels. they know we are in pursuit and aggressively look iing for them. when we find them, we will deal with them. it's the way americans will be safer. second, we are going to pressure the insurgency and create the opportunity to be the defeat mechanism because our goal beyond ensuring al qaeda cannot use afghanistan as a launching pad for terrorism is to provide the security to the state for the development of democratic institutions and economic opportunity. with a stable afghanistan,

americans are safer. with us in hot pursuit of al qaeda, americans are safer. i believe that americans can see that the results of the sacrifices that have been made by the american people have, in many respects a direct line relationship to 11 september, 2001. the taliban provided safe haven to al qaeda that executed the attack on the united states that day from the safety of afghanistan. it's going to be very difficult for that to occur today. it will be our hope that in the end, a stable afghanistan guarded by ansf will make it impossible to happen in the future. that's in the future. we'll continue to work at that, sir. you asked about the money for the support of the campaign versus potential decisions for trade offs. clearly, they are decisions that will be made by the secretary of defense with service chiefs and

joint chiefs. same people in most locations. i have to thank you all and the congress of the united states as representatives of the american people for having resourced this campaign. we really need nothing. we want for nothing, for the great support that you have given us. support that we have received through the cert program. the great support we have received in the armor that has been provided to us there the m-wrap systems. we have been very, very well provide provided for. i know the service chiefs remain in their way committed to continue to provide us the weapons system, capabilities and well trained troops necessary. >> general, i only have 30 seconds. could you hit the last part about what is your forecast on the economy in afghanistan and whether you feel that's going to be sufficient in 2014 to be able to continue and be able to

continue the investment we put there. >> i think we need to watch it very closely. as you know, there will be a conference that follows the chicago conference, it will be in tokyo, in essence, an international conference that we'll look to gain money for development over the long term. after bond two, the con fence that occurs last year, there was a committee to support afghanistan for a decade of transformation that follows the lisbon transition. that transformation, we hope will see the international community provide the support ultimately to the afghan economy in the period of time after 2014 so we don't ultimately have the experience of an economic security issue as opposed to a security issue and continued insurgency. >> thank you, mr. courtney.

>> thank you for your testimony. some of the comment that is have been made in this room and outside this room have focused on whether or not the president's time line he laid out is put at risk the policy and successes that you have fought so hard to accomplish in afghanistan. i would like to, again, if i could go deeper in terms of, you know, what's already happened in terms of troop recovery and drawdown. we now have completed initial 10,000 troop drawdown. i want to ask, general, now that we are some months past that, are you, in any way, do you have any concerns about whether or not that reduction in force has hobbled your efforts that you have been describing here this morning as far as accomplishing this transition to the afghan national army. >> the 10,000 that came out last

year, i'm in the process of making the decision with respect for the 23,000 that will come out. i will be balancing in those decisions the amount of combat power versus the headquarters and the general manning and some of the task forces et cetera. i have to tell you, those will be difficult decisions. i believe we can make that. >> the 10,000, which again is faded, was that concentrated on the headquarters? >> many were and they are gone. they were gone by the end of 201 u. >> when we talk about the leadership that is critical for the afghan military, one way you stimulate leadership is with carrots and sticks. certainly, as we saw in iraq, having a time line can be a healthy thing in terms of also, when you are trying to accomplish a transition.

again, you are telling people they can't be dependent or count on the u.s. to always be there to provide their own security goals. i guess, i wonder if you could talk about that a little bit. about whether or not having a time line is incentive for the afghans to up their game. >> it has, indeed, sir. the -- the value of the lisbon transition process is that it is a process. it is something that is measurable. as you know, the lisbon transition process occurs over five tranches of terrain that comes off the map and goes into afghan sovereignty. each one of those tranches is acomp anied by detailed conversations and conferences between isaf and ansf to ensure

the forces are red dou take over the lead for security, not to be finished for security, but lead for security. it has, i believe, a seriously focused conversation both in terms of the development of the ansf and resourcing. in that sense has been positive. >> thank you. i would like to turn briefly to another topic, which when i visited with you last fall, we talked about our group did, which was the issue of safe havens in pakistan and the challenge that that poses with, you know, all the good intent and great success in terms of training up afghans if the taliban can operate with impunity in and out of pakistan that really provides, you know, a real weakness in terms of accomplishine