government but ultimately good for the region as well, for pakistan and even for iran. so i think we just, the ground is just different in afghanistan now. these tragedies recently notwinstanding which have, in fact, complicated the issue. i believe that the president, president karzai, and his government, still remain committed to a strategic partnership and we will pursue that. i hope i got to your question. i apologize. >> let me ask you, you testified that iran is playing a role in the counterinsurgency. what role is iran playing, and how important is entering this strategic partnership in terms of not only the interests in not having it become a -- afghanistan become a safe haven for al qaeda again, but also as a blow to iran. and their influence in the region? >> well, just as -- great

question. just as nature has a vacuum, so do geopolitics, and should the united states leave afghanistan, should isef, nato leave afghanistan that would create, in my mind, for all intents and purpose as geopolitical vacuum. ahead, however, of the nsif being ready to take over full security. what the strategic partnership does is it puts the region on notice that the presence of the united states in the international community, in afghanistan is suppressens -- a presence rear awe suring to the afghan people, to the afghan government it buys the timeliness for the afghan government to go through process of reform necessary for as president karzai has said to get at this culture of impunity with respect to corruption. it buys time for the afghan national security forces to continue their

professionalization. a stable afghanistan is in the interests of the region, and while the iranians may not be happy about an american presence there or a western presence, nonetheless, the afghan people desire it, and that presence ultimately works to iran's benefit as well, because it will affect the cross-border flow of narcotic, the cross-border flow of weapons and human trafficking. the afghans are a little over 1.5 million afghan refugees in iran might be able to go home in a stable afghanistan. it's in their interests as well. >> just to be clear. as you know, general, doctor, we have great concern about the iranian regime, and it is in our interests that we form this strategic partnership in terms of thwarting their interests in that area. we do not want them to fill that power vacuum. isn't that true? >> that's correct. the spa would do that. >> that's important to the security of the united states of america and ow allies? >> absolutely, ma'am. >> thank you both, and thank you

for your service to our country. >> senator, if i could just add very quickly -- first two reiterate the importance of the strategic partner and enduring commitment and how that is not only essential for a security within co perceptions of taliban including iran and others. we've seen iran play both sides of the fence. they have to the afghan government and they've provided some support to the taliban. if they see it in their interests to stir the pot and so forth, i think that -- that -- i think that the strategic partnership, the advancement of the asf and clear expression's commitment will have to cause hem to recalculate and that's essential. >> we all want iran to have to recalculate. so thank you both. >> thank you.

senator? >> thank you, mr. chairman and thank you dr. miller and to general allen. i thank you for your service, and to the support i know you get from your wife and your daughter. it's a family affair. dr. miller, if i may. as you know, i have serious reservations about the state of security of the afghan forces. the afghan people know war and had their military rebuilt by multiple foreign powers. according to recent rand reports sponsored by the army, the soviet goal, 315,000 to build their afghan troops to 315,000. they never got there, because the afghan military was plagued with corruption, illiteracy and desertion. those are the very same problems i understand we're facing now. our goal has been stated as to build the afghan security forces to 352,000 by october of this year. yet general berg ies testified they rely on us.

is the afghan army built in the 1980s, it did not last. what is your assessment of how long our afghan army will endure that we're trying to build now and will they be able to secure the country without our help once we leave? >> senator, i was searching for the precise figures. i'm sure general allen has them in his head and i'll just say that to date, our experience is that for the afghan national army that their monthly attrition rates are below -- are coming down. they're not quite to the targets that we would like to have, but they're coming down and are very close, and for the afghan national police, they have a period of at least several months where they have been below that attrition rate. that's just one indicator of their sustainability. there is -- there is no question that sustaining, growing this

force and then sustaining it as a quality force is going to be a continued challenge, but as general allen said, it is not just the -- not just the path to transition. it's the -- it's this -- a competent and capable ansf is the path to sucticess, and so a we continue to provide resources, as we continue to have our partner with them and as we transition to mentor them and then over are time as we move to strategic overwatch, this is going to continue to be an essential mission, and it's one that i know that this committee and the congress has watched closely. metrics don't capture all of what's going on but they capture some elements and we are committed to continuing to provide the best information we can on those metrics. but we've seen very substantial growth in quantity, and we've seen general allen is better

able to speak to it, but by the indicators that i've seen, we've seen also improvements in quality and as that force is, grows up to the 352,000 level, sometime before october of this year, that focus on quality and that quality on training is going to be -- it's going to need to be sustained not just for the rest of this year but for many years to come. >> that's what i was afraid of. yeah. that's what i've been hearing. that's the problem i have with this and if i may, i'll ask general allen. i respectfully have a respectful disagreement on our mission there. with that being said, i just, i respect the jobs that you all do, in very adverse conditions, i really do. but i just -- i have concerns. what i will say is that, general, i've always said we should really be here rebuilding america. so many needs here in our country rather than the money we're spending in afghanistan, and i've been there. i've had the honor of going twice. once as a governor and to thank my guardspeople for the job they do, and then back as a senator.

sir, i did not see an improvement over the five-year lapse had had been. i saw deterioration. i came to some of the conclusions because of what i experienced, but i will say this. i did not see things b s gettin better despite the best efforts put forth. president karzai endorse add code of conduct allows husbands to beat wives, reduces the rights of women in divorce cases. there have been more u.s. troops killed by our afghan allies than the al qaeda or taliban last month. the wartime commission on contracting in iraq and afghanistan estimates that wasted fraud averaged abouts 12ds million eve$12 million every day for the past four years. that would go a long way in west virginia. i can assure you. we've given $85 billion to rebuild afghanistan. many project, not sustainable. we could have built nearly six

new elementary schools in this country. this just goes on and on. so my question would be, sir, why do we continue to give this country more money for nation building, and i know that's -- there's a group of people that make this decision, and i'm sure they don't want me to refer to that as nation building but i don't see it any other way than nation building and what effects do the large infrastructure projects have on the insurgency jie was there at the time general petraeus was just preparing to rotate out, and i had asked the same question there. so i question i'll put that same question forth. >> i think the large infrastructure programs do carry a risk, as you point out, of a long-term operations and maintenance tale, but i think we're only now beginning to understand. but the infrastructure programs

that have been supported by the afghan infrastructure fund, for example, which ultimately will connect the northeast power system and the southeast power system. will work to raise the level of the dulla down, where repair the hydrorotors of the dam and install the third turbine. while they are heavy construction programs it has the capacity of delivers capacity to the population from kabul along route 1 to kandahar and the pashtun population of the south that would otherwise not have been available to them. and it has been, i think, an important contribution to our ability to eject the taliban from the population in the south. the bridging strategy which has been underway for electricity in kandahar for some period of time

harks provided us the ability to electrify businesses and provide electricity to the populations that the taliban couldn't have hoped, kwocouldn't have even imagined providing. it's given them opportunity. opportunity to support a. >> guest: and pursue economic opportunity that would otherwise not have been possible. >> look-d. go ahead, sir. >> my time is running out. the other thing which really took me over the top was that the only country that was successful or is trying to be successful in extracting any of the minerals they have such as copper is china. china doesn't have a boot on the ground, hasn't invest add dollar there and i know they're expecting to us give them the protection that they're needing and the infrastructure for them to extract that mineral, that their country will profit by. that's just beyond my comprehension that we could be doing that there when we should be taking care of america. >> senator, if i could just

answer that last piece. it is very much in our interests, our vital interest to ensure that al qaeda doesn't find sanctuary in afghanistan again. and in order to do that, that the taliban not -- >> sir, if i may, al qaeda has presence everywhere else. you said yourself that there's very little presence of al qaeda. but you're going to go everywhere in the world? now we're going to police the whole world and set up shop? >> no, sir. but that is a sign that this campaign has been successful, and afghanistan was, as you know well, it's a source. it's a source of the attack on the united states on 9/11, stow is different, and because of our history there and our commitment there, it is different. but i wanted to say was with respect to the economic development of afghanistan, we are making in addition to the afghan infrasturr fund making relatively other investments compared to the stakes that we

have, and what we should insist upon is that we have a level playing field. not that it's tilted in our favor, but that for the economic development of afghanistan that we have the opportunity to compete in our businesses, have the opportunity to compete, and while they may not win every one, i believe that they will win their share. >> thank you so much. my time is up, and i truly just appreciate your service. i really do. >> thank you. >> thank you, senator. senator? >> thank you, mr. chairman. dr. miller, you testified earlier this week on the house side that it would cost between $5 billion and $4 billion a year to sustain the afghan security force at approximately the current end strength of 352,000. the afghan government has total revenue of under $2 billion. so even if the afghan government

were to devote every dime that it has to the afghan security forces which obviously would not be feasible it doesn't cover even half of the cause. since the afghan security force s had the linchpin of the strategy, this is the key issue, because the afghan government cannot afford to sustain its own forces. now, i know that the administration is trying to get commitments for long-term funding from other governments, but when i look at most of the european country, they have budget problems that are worse than our own, and they haven't met even the nato established targets for defense spending, much less the contributions for the afghan national security forces.

so that leads plea me to the qun of how long do you pro sdwlaecn to bear most of the costs of pay forge the afghan security forces? are we talking about ten years? or 20 years? can we realistically expect that the afghan government is of going to be able to sustain the cost of its own security forces? >> senator collins, the afghan government, i believe, can, will, and should pay a share of the cost of the ansf, and i believe we'll see a commitment from them to do so, but you are correct that it will not be for the near-term, perhaps for the

mid-term, it will not be a majority of those costs. you are also dlaect this administration is working hard to ask other countries, other i isef contributing countries to make commitment to the sustainment of the imf, and we're, in a sense, at the front end of that process, but we're looking to get all the commitments that we can and be able to have a conversation about that at the chicago summit. chicago nato summit and follow that with more of an economic focus at the other summit. before i would come back up to the senate or to the congress and ask for resources from the american people, and ask you for that, we'll do everything we possible to making sure that,

the amount that it can. that we've done everything possible to get contributions from others and then ask for the amount that we believe is necessary to sustain the ansf at a level that will be -- that will provide for stability in the country and provide for the reduced risk to the united states. >> it just, when i look at the numbers and look at how poor afghanistan is, it just seems to me that we're looking at a never-ending commitment. i'm not saying that ths won't contribute, but when they're entire budget is less than half the cost of sustaining the troops right today? that's troubling. i want to turn to another broader issue. general allen, your opening statement was so eloquent and moving. and the story you told of the

incred sacrifice of our troops is inspiring. it's inspiring to all of us who are aware of those sacrifices, and how patriotic our troops are, and how much we ask of them. it also gives me some hope when aye hear you say "i'm confident that we will prevail in this endeavor. i believe we will be successful." but then i step back, and i recall that i heard very similar assessments from our commanders for ten years now that were making progress, that they're helpful we will be successful in the end, but that the games are fragile and reversible. and i also repress reports of a new assessment by our

intelligence community, and i realize this was a classified assessment and that you cannot address it publicly in detail, but if the press reports are correct, they're very discouraging. they're very pessimistic about what the new national intelligence estimate says. one report in the "los angeles times" quotes an official as saying that last year's surge may be unsustainable. it goes on to say that the intelligence has cast out about the stainability of the broader objectives of improving governance, developing a competent ansf, reducing corruption, reaching conciliation and eliminating the safe havens in pakistan. an official goes on to report that the afghan government in kabul may not be able to survive

as the u.s. steadily pulls out its troops, and reduces military and vilfederal assistant. general, i know you cannot discuss the classified assessment, even though so much of it appears to have made its way into the press, but tell me why those concerns are wrong, in your judgment? why are you optimistic that ultimately we will be and prevail which would seem to contradict these reports. i know our troops are terrific. and that they will do anything they are asked, and even more. i know your own leadership is brilliant. i just wonder if this is doable. >> ma'am, if i didn't think it was doable, i would tell you. and i'd tell you very quickly,

because i wouldn't want to spend another life in this fight if it wasn't doable. we did disagree, and i'd be very happy to provide you a classified response as to why we did. it wasn't just the commander of isef who disagreed. it was the u.s. ambassador, commander of centcom and the supreme allied commander of europe. the issue was more in the assessment about the future than it is about the present. and i evaluate our success in the future by the success i'm seeing in the present. and i'm confident that if we continue on this trajectory with the kind of capabilities that we have, with the kinds of successes that the afghan national security forces are achieving, that we can prevail in this. i can go -- i can't unfortunately go into the details here, but i believe we can illustrate why we differed

in that particular assessment, and i have to be quick to point out that i know a number of those analysts, and every single day as the commander i benefit from the magnificent work they do in producing intelligence necessary for me to make decisions, so i appreciate that. you touched on a number of them and unfortunately did get into the media. there were a number of areas that we believe, that we see right now, that gives us hope that in the long-term assessment which begins in '14, the start point for that assessment is just different than we see it now, and i'm very happy to give you our view on that, ma'am. >> thank you. i would welcome that and, again, thank you so much for your leadership and your personal sacrifices. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

>> senator collins request for an updated classified rebuttal. is that correct? >> yes. >> is that something you'll give us for the record? >> yes, sir, we will. be glad to, chairman. >> thank you. thank you very much. senator blumenthal is next. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i want to thank you for your service, general allen, and for the eloquence and the power of your responses today, and my wish is that more americans could hear them firsthand, and they contain some very powerful information that you shared with us during my last visit. information how the success of our special operations, our night raids, particularly the very low rate of civilian casualties. the high rate of successfully seeking targets and degrading

the leadership of the insurgents, taliban, al qaeda. you've noted in your -- in materials provided that the ied rate of interdiction and success, tleefrt at least on ou declining. at least over the past month. it's fair to say, is it not, they seek to rely more on the ieds as they find themselves less successful in engaging us in direct attacks. is that correct? >> that is correct, sir. >> and we've heard testimony from others including director clapper, that pakistan has made -- and i'm quoting, i think from him and from the legislation that i sponsored that requires pakistan to make a more significant effort.

that he has seen no and others testified to the same affect. would you disagree? have you seen a significant effort? >> at a classified level i can tell thaw pakistan has taken steps on a couple of important areas. but on the whole, with respect to the reduction of the flow's calcium ammonium nitrate which is the principle precursor, if you will, to the homemade explosive that inflicts so many casualties. we have not seen the level of cooperation or action that we have requested or desired. >> i think you answered ply questimy question well. any other information i would welcome as well. and i gather that we are also making progress, i've heard,

from? ra v heard from general ra vivero, troops dismounted in terms of here and may jfk have new iterations of that gear. >> there's terrific work done in that regard, and your leadership and leadership of the committee has done an awful lot. everything from the undergarment, which is saving lives and troops' futures, to improvements in the armor applications. the armored kits for the matvs and mraps, and the hyper image capabilities to the sets for improvements in intelligence to permit us to attack the network. all of these have contributed to reducing the vulnerability of

our troops producing the casualties, but the casualties are still too high. >> still too high and, you know, having seen as you have done far more than i, the result of these absolutely insidious bombs, the effects on our war fighters. >> absolutely. >> come back absolutely unacceptable. so i thank you and commend you for the tremendous leadership that you and others in our marine corps and armiened other bran have done in combating it. i want to turn for a moment to some of the problem areas that you've identified and others in this effort going beyond the military terrain, so to speak. you've identified the human terrain. which includes the problems of corruption. in the karzai administration. and that's a challenge that has to be addressed, in my view,

and, i think, perhaps others. perhaps yours as well. so i wonder if you could tell us whether you believe there's progress in that area? >> senator blumenthal, you know we have a line of operation within the campaign plan which seeks to diminish and reduce the influence of corruption on those aspects of our relationship with afghanistan that could compromise our mission. to that end, we have task force shafafia, transport, and with respect to contracting, reducing vulnerabilities to money flowing directly into the pockets of the insurgents themselves. task force shafafia is working closely with our own embassy, with the inner regency here in the united states, with the international community on a series of initiatives which

ultimately can provide support to reducing corruption. we have recommended and elicited activities for afghanistan initiative, which i believe it did receive favorable consideration by the department of defense, and i believe it's being considered for a full-blown interagency approach. we think that the afghan threat finance sell which it's an inner agency sell in afghanistan and task force shafafia, the u.s. embassy, british embassy and others to include partnership with the drug enforcement administration, fbi, department of justice. it's helping us create a synergy to get after corruption. specifically to your question, sir. president karzai who has publicly spoken frequently about this culture of impunity, which must be addressed in order for afghanistan to shrug off the corrosive effects of corruptio