concerned about. these guys, obviously, are not at least always acting with a sound mind and sound purpose. >> your point was well taken, sir. and i understand that. that's what was my question about rationality of the threat. my time is expired. i yield back. >> thank you. the gentle lady from new york is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate the broad view of what the threat is in north america and i am going to be a little more parochial. i represent the border of canada in buffalo. we have four border crossings. we've had threats and problems in our area. i want to know whether there's an overall impression of the collaboration that's going on between the u.s. and canada with respect to, for example, the presence in toronto gop we have a gasp of what's going on in toronto? as much as i love new york city, mr. chairman it takes me eight hours to drive from buffalo to new york city from my district. it takes me about an hour to get to toronto. even though it's a foreign

country, it's closer and that threat is right there. could affect the people in my region as well. i just want to know the collaboration we have with the canadian government. is it adequate? do we have adequate resources to protect the northern border and what's our knowledge of what's going on in toronto. >> if i might, i mean, i think canada has declared hezbollah their number one threat. i think they are very much on top of what hezbollah is doing. we relied heavily on their version of fisa material for our prosecution. they had some excellent evidence up there. they've been all over this very same group. so i think they are very much on top of hezbollah and the threat with hezbollah. there's contact with them and our domestic intelligence services. and, of course, the agency. so i don't think there's any doubt that canada is very much attuned to the threat posed by hezbollah and the border

crossings. but as mike pointed out, the leakiest border is the southwest border. there's no doubt about that. and that's where most of the drugs are coming across. that's where the most established routes are. and you can -- there are well established trade craft, concealments and that sort of thing. we can go through a whole hearing about how well they can hide material coming across the southwest border. >> and i am very attuned to the attention we give to the southwest border and it's deserved. but i'm also concerned we neglect -- it's hard to say -- we had the lackawanna six case in my community. those people came over through canada. they walked in and got a legitimate driver's license and did what they did. so that's why i'm concerned as well. these were u.s. citizens who collaborated with people from canada as well. so there's a lot involved, even in our pocket of the world. and i read the southwest border needs protection. i want to make sure we have the adequate resources on the northern border because -- and

we have a great relationship with canada. they are doing what they can. i wanted to make sure that's a high priority of our government as well. >> if i can add, the canadians are great and we have done also wonderful things. their cooperation is wonderful. when i was last before this committee, i mentioned i'm finishing a book on hezbollah's global presence. i've had the opportunity not only to interview u.s. law enforcement, but many foreign law enforcement intelligence agencies as well, especially in canada. on both sides of the border, people have told me they are concerned about the ability even today for hezbollah operatives to be able to cross that border. again, i point you to the example of faisi ayub. he was involved in hezbollah hijacking before he came to canada. he was involved in terrorist activity after canada. at one point living in dearborn going across the border. talked to u.s. officials along the northern border. several of whom expressed to me their concern that perhaps in the event that hezbollah decided

to carry out an attack here it may not be someone in the united states but someone just across the border who could come across with documents either forged or illegally obtained but otherwise accurate. and do some things. but the good news is that people on both sides of the border are very attuned to this. the cooperation is really very good. so i think that has done a lot to minimize the threat. >> and the pentagon has proposed cuts to the niagara falls air reserve station in my area. would you agree with this threat that exists in canada as well as in our homeland that it probably makes sense to keep a military presence strong on that border? >> honestly, i think it's apples and oranges. i don't know the military base there has anything to do with border security. i don't know. maybe it does. what i would want to make sure is the people who are involved in border security, border patrol, fbi, dhs, they have the strong presence there.

but that base may have nothing to do with this issue. i don't know. >> thank you. i yield back. >> congresswoman? if i could just quickly say something. i -- before i was transferred back to dea headquartered for the third and last time, i served as the special agent in charge of the detroit field division for dea. i can tell you in those days, the dea, the fbi, i.c.e., all agencies shared great relations with our canadian counterparts and i believe that continues to this day. what concerns me about the northern border is our obsession with defending the one yard line which has been, you know, which has been the southwest border. we need a defense in depth. we need to focus on shoring up the northern border and then going even further south into latin america as far as that border is concerned. if you look at the -- just the

simple geographical enormity of the northern border, twice the size of the southern border if you look at the border patrol resources on the northern border versus the southern border, i mean, there are areas where folks could cross and by the thousands and no one would ever know it. that's what concerns me about the northern border. >> i agree. 100%. thank you very much. >> gentle lady yields back. the gentleman from south carolina, mr. duncan is recognized. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks for your willingness to hold this hearing. the panel has done a fabulous job along with this congress going back for the last year of really clearly showing that there is a clear involvement of the iranians, specifically qods force and their proxy hezbollah in this hemisphere. and others in the world are starting to take notice. there's an article, and i reference the center for army lessons learned. a gentleman, norman a. bailey who i believe has testified

before congress, and he says this. the curious thing is that this interest in the hemisphere represents -- and this article is entitled "what are the persians doing over here?" curious thing that this interest in this hemisphere represents the first time in the 5,000-year history of persia as a sovereign entity that such interest has been demonstrated. there's no affinity between the monarchist or islamic iran and the countries on this side of the atlantic. historical, cultural, political or otherwise. nevertheless, as we shall see, the last few years have seen a totally unprecedented level of interest by iran in the region. that clearly sums up the question that we're talking about today. i want to thank mr. higgins for referencing a bill, hr-3783 that i sponsored. a bipartisan bill that passed out of the committee. members of this committee hopefully will have an opportunity to bring some of the lessons learned from this panel and this hearing to the debate

on the floor to pass this bill out and focus on the iranian threat and what the united states can do to counter that. when i said others are beginning to notice this threat, i'll reference univision's documentary recently which basically pointed out a lot of the things the iranians are involved in. in fact, cyberterrorism threat, the venezuela consulate in miami and the resulting removal of one lady from that consulate back to venezuela. there was an article today in the "jerusalem post" that talks about why congress suddenly cares about iran. the iran threat and latin america. that was just today in the "jerusalem post." so the threat is real. so i guess the question i have -- we've identified it. we're all on the same page, this is a real threat. i'll ask mr. braun, what can we do now? what can the united states government and this congress do now going forward?

>> great question. i've got three things. what we need is interlocking counternarcotic and counterterrorism strategies. as the bad guys have come together, agencies and institutions in this town that are focused on counternarcotics or counterterrorism or drifting further appoint. we need interlocking strategies. and we need singular funding streams because, as you know, congressman, that's what -- that's what drives agencies and their strategies in this town. that's extremely important. the second thing that i would say is we need a -- we need to develop or focus more on a defensive depth strategy. we have been singularly focused almost on defending the one yard line. southwest border. and there's -- i'm not saying that we didn't need to beef some things up there after 9/11. we most certainly did. but any strategy that is

designed to defend the 1 yard line as you well know, former athlete, it's a strategy that's doomed to failure. right after 9/11, about 60% of all of dod's detection and monitoring assets in latin america went away. they were sent to other parts of the world. rightfully so. but most of those resources occasionally on a daily or weekly basis, they may filter back in but then suddenly they're gone again. we've lost too much capacity in our neighborhood to keep things in check. and we need to do a better job at doing those things. and then i would finally say that we need to refocus on confronting or refocus on the traditional organized criminal types of activity. drugs, money laundering, arms trafficking, human trafficking.

we need our federal agents and especially our federal agents and federal law enforcement personnel going head-on into these threats. because naturally they will, if they are engaged in that kind of activity, naturally they will become either directly or indirectly in contact with very powerful terrorist organizations, operatives and terrorists that are in our neighborhood. and let me remind you that that's exactly what happened. that's how that plot was foiled against the assassination plot against the saudi arabian ambassador. there was a dea informant and his dea handlers that were focused on drugs and money that brought him into contact with a qods force operative that was directing our -- or that was communicating directly back with qods force central. we need to refocus on the traditional threats. >> you mentioned the word neighborhood. >> the time of the gentleman has expired.

>> thank you. >> the gentle lady from california. >> thank you, chairman king. this has been a great hearing. i had to step away to actually meet with some port officials who are here this week with the -- they have a conference with ports all across this country. and my questions are -- i'm just going to throw the three questions out and then maybe you can all decide who would like to answer. number one is, what keeps me up at night is our ports and what i believe is a lack of real attention from homeland security on securing our ports. wondering if any of you could comment on that. when mr. cravaak talked about dirty bombs. we, by the way, are scanning

less than 3% of our containers that come into this country through our various ports. how easy would it be for this terrorist organization to infiltrate our homeland through our ports. i think they are the most vulnerable entryway into this country. but i'd like to hear what you have to say about it. also just talking about connecting the dots, and as you describe, that was how one of these plots was foiled was really connecting the dots. and i know we're making tough choices back here in terms of spending cuts and funding opportunities going forward. you know, we had a committee hear i hearing last month on the fusion centers and how important those are throughout our various cities in connecting the dots. for my perspective, los angeles and lapd, how much are our

organizations talking to our local law enforcement on the ground? so kind of speak to the funding cuts that we've already proposed in terms of how does that affect these programs going forward? if somebody could speak about whether or not port security is kind of a hole in all of these operations. and the other thing i was thinking about when you are talking about these guys getting sba loans, which is amazing to me because one of the things i hear from my small businesses in my communities is how difficult it is to access sba loans. the amount of paperwork they have to go through and the, you know, the collateral they have to put up. that's one of the biggest concerns for my small businesses is their inability to access small business loans. so are we sharing these kinds of concerns with our small business administration on the ground in the different cities where these loans are being processed? is this the information that

we're sharing with the proper administration in the federal government? >> can i take a quick shot at that one? because i think it's a follow-up to congressman duncan's question about what else can be done. one of the issues with 9/11 was the compartmentalization of information and the failure to connect up the dots and everybody holding their information close. so what i think congress can do is break down those walls. continue to break down those walls and facilitate the use of technology. the banks and the insurance companies and the private sector are using information every day to gather information to -- for marketing purposes. there's no reason why we can't break down those walls of data within the government and make matches and link up information and connect up those dots. and also making sure that law enforcement and the intelligence community has the tools. technology is moving ahead fast. and the ability to stay up with interception capabilities and

that sort of thing needs to keep up with the technology that's out there. and i think the intelligence community struggles with that. so making sure that they have the right tools and breaking down the walls of information are two very important things to keep in mind. >> i'll just add, you know, for the research for my book, i spent a decent amount of time out in california with fbi, long beach and in terms of the ports at long beach port, i am actually very impressed with the work they are doing. there's an issue in terms of the ports and the 1 yard line and there are some excellent efforts by dhs with the support of the bureau. a good friend of mine and mr. swecker's on trying to deal with the container issues, not only when they get into our country but in terms there's going to have to be some risk analysis. in terms of connecting the dots, i've been tremendously impressed, specifically in southern california and elsewhere as well. you asked about the work of the

fusion center there located out of the l.a. county shferiff's department. almost every time i'm there, they are working together all the time, and i think that's a world of conference from when i was working at the fbi pre and just through 9/11. >> just quickly, ports. they are -- i think they pose a significant risk. as you said, less than 3% of all the containers are being scanned. so how do you counter that? i would go back to a defensive depth strategy. we need more -- those are all emanating from other parts of the world. we need a defensive depth strategy, more resources abroad to identify these threats, develop the intelligence and then make sure that it's, you know, it's shared where it should be. with respect to fusion centers, they are great. the only concern that i have got is that so many of these things are origregional in scope.

those utilizing them have a regional snapshot of what's happening in the region. what we've got to get better at is connecting the fusion centers so that, you know, so that those who are using them, and need them the most see the most accurate photograph or picture, snapshot that they possibly can. >> gentle lady's time has expired. i thank for for the support she gives to the committee. i recognize the gentleman from missouri for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman and all the witnesses for being here today. dr. kahl, given the geographical obstacles and logistical concerns, is israel even capable of striking iran's nuclear facilities by themselves? >> they are capable. it depends on what the target set is. but they would likely have to go after the natanz enrichment facility, the iroc heavy water plant, the iranian conversion

facility and likely a number of other places. they would need dozens and dozens of aircraft to be able to fly 1,000 miles to those facilities. they don't have the military capability -- i don't assess -- to set the program back very far. that is, they can get to their targets and drop bombs on their targets but senior u.s. defense officials have consistently said that they think israel, at most, could set the program back one to three years and the lower end of that estimate seems more likely to me. >> okay. one to three years. that brings up my next question. how many years has it taken iran to get to this point in its development of nukes? >> they -- the nuclear program started under the shah, so it's been multiple decades, since the 1970s. >> so it's taken 40 years to get to this point. >> yeah. and our counterproliferation efforts in both in the previous administration and this administration has slowed them

down appreciably. they continue to make progress. progress that's troubling, but they continue to be slowed down as well. >> and an attack carried out by iran -- i mean by israel would only set the program back one to three years, in your estimation. is that accurate? >> and i think the lower end of that estimate is more likely. >> okay. what does to take to -- what do they need to do to develop a nuclear weapon? >> well, there are several major components. >> right. what are they? >> yep. the first is weapons grade uranium, that requires them to enrich to above 90%. so far they have enriched a stockpile sufficient for about four bombs worth of uranium, but only 3.5%, and then they have a smaller stockpile of 20%. >> at 3.5% and they have to have it at what level? >> so they have enriched several tons worth of low enriched union yum at the 3.5% level, which is the reactor fuel level. they have also enriched a

certain amount of 20% uranium, ostensibly for the tehran sector. to go to weapons grade, they would have to enrich up above 90%, which according to independent estimates, would take them somewhere in the neighborhood of four to six months. it's important to note, if they tried to do it, they would have to do it at plants that are under inspection, so they would get caught. so the first component is weapons grade uranium. the second component, they would have to have a weapons design and have done all of the various experimentation and manufacturing to actually construct even a crude device. and then they would have to figure out a way to deliver that weapon which is why you have an estimate of about a year total from a decision to be able to generate a testable device and several years to be able to put one on a missile. >> so you have to have the delivery system. >> you have to have the weapons grade uranium, you have to have the weapons design and you have to have -- and you have to have -- actually assemble it and you have to have a delivery

system. >> and there have to be tests of the delivery system, right? or not? >> well, it depends. it depends, you know, if they're going to do an implosion device that is sophisticated enough to be put on a tip of a missile, they are probably going to have to test that. if they do a crude gun type device, like the weapons that we deployed in world war ii, at the end of world war ii, they might not have to test that. >> in your testimony, you say, and i quote, i believe, meanwhile, in the aftermath of a strike, iran is likely to rush to rebuild its nuclear program in a way that is harder to detect and more costly to stop. what do you mean by harder to detect? and if they're capable of that, why are they not doing that at this point? >> well, the major reason is that iran remains a party to the nuclear non pro liberation treaty. and while they're not always very cooperative with the i have aea, the iaea does do regular inspections to their declared facilities. which means currently it's actually very difficult for iran to break out and develop a

nuclear weapon without getting caught. the concern some have expressed is that in the aftermath of an israeli strike, for example, which is a scenario you mentioned, iran would likely use that strike to shatter the international consensus currently isolating it and kick out the iaea inspectors, which means the international community would have a lot more difficulty seeing what iran was doing and iran would have an easier time reconstituting its program in secret. >> are they getting full access now? >> they have full access to the declared facilities. we don't know what we don't know. but they get full access to the declared facilities, and they're trying to get access with limited success to some of the facilities that might be related to weapons-related research, the parchin facility is one example of that. >> my time is expired. if i had any time to yield back, i would. >> i thank the gentleman for reeleding back the time he doesn't have, but we appreciate the thought. the gentleman from louisiana, mr. richmond, is recognized. >> first of all, let me thank

you all for coming in and sharing your knowledge with us. and your experience and your recommendations for how we move forward. i guess part of my questioning, and maybe mr. braun or mr. swecker, who both have recommendations, do you know if the recommendations you gave us, if they're currently being carried out, or if the dea and cia and fbi and atf, for example, is refocussing on traditional threats and paying more attention to the drug trafficking? >> well, i think one thing you have to recognize, and what we talked about this morning is punated that is the convergence of criminal activity and terrorist activity. terrorists need money, and they raise money through -- mostly through criminal action these

days. so we've talked about anti money laundering statutes and regulations. we have talked about technology and we talked about breaking down these silos of information. i think all of those are under way. they can always get better. whenever you have agencies, you have walls, and it's harder to share information. so anything that facilitates that sharing of information is good. the fusion centers are good. the joint terrorism task forces are good. staying on top of current -- more current techniques -- i worked in the days when we had the guyso wall up and you could not share information between the criminal and intelligence. so i think it's infinitely better than it was on 9/11, but it's -- you know, it's not perfect. but i think what you've done with passing these enabling legislations, patriot act -- i know it's a bad word in some circles, has been tremendously valuable in updating these techniqu techniques. >> and i guess that's exactly what i was looking for, and i

think the ranking member's point with that, was that it would be very helpful to have current members of the administration here to say if they're heeding those recommendations or how farther on not compartmentalizing or focusing on the traditional threats. dr. levity, you mentioned that hezbollah sometimes will resort to extortion to get things done. there are some who advocate for profiling in our tsa, for example, and in a reverse manner of maybe not searching thoroughly elderly women or doing patdowns on children. do we then make them or expose them to a risk of being used as a mule of families being extorted to subject them to -- since they have less security

things to go through, do we do the reverse and expose them to extortion? >> i don't know of any evidence where something like that has happened. i do worry about racial profiling has become a very charged term. there is much more to profiling than race, and has to be. it has to be intel-driven. we know in the charlotte case, for example, at one point as they were speeding across interstates from carolina to michigan and couldn't figure out how they were constantly getting tickets but time was money and they were being told to speed. and they were getting speeding tickets. they assumed was because it was racial profiling. it wasn't. so they hired white, blonde women to drive the trucks and told them time is money. speed up to michigan, and couldn't understand why the u.s. government was not profiling white, blonde women. it wasn't the case. but there is the potential that they will use people that are not part of the traditional -- not racial, but intel profile. >> correct.

>> the extortion really is relevant to people who are from their community. mostly, as i said, because they have family back home and that puts them into a vulnerable position. >> and anyone who can answer this question, the employee at the small business administration who was bribed, do we have any of the demographics on that person? was that person a muslim extremi extremist? what was that person? the nationality or demographics of that person? >> the person was lebanese. he didn't bribe the spa official, just created fictitious information in the application so it was a -- it was basically loan fraud. there were -- there was bribery of another bank official to open a bank account and allow them to basically create false identities and create a bust-out scheme with the bank -- with a checking account. >> and what were the -- who was that person? what was he? >> leeb niece. >> the bank officer? >> oh, i'm sorry, i don't know the demographic of the bank

officer. >> thank you. and i yield back. >> the gentleman from pennsylvania, mr. meehan. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you to this very distinguished panel for your presence here today, and frankly, for each of you, for the continuing work you do and dealing with the issue of the concern that we all share about the expansion of the influence of iranian-inspired revolutionary forces throughout. some of you have already participated in a series of hearings that we've held in our subcommittee on counterterrorism and intelligence. and in particular interest to that was the expansion into south and central america and the involvement. i apologize to the extent that you may be going over some areas that have been covered previously. unfortunately, we are -- at another committee i had to participate in. but i want to expand a