captioning performed by vitac with that, mr. chairman, i'll rest, which this will be a part of the record i'm sure and out of respect for the committee's time, this was a multiagency investigation that involved many other agencies. atf, diplomatic security, the police department, rcnp and canadian intelligence service. thank you.

>> thank you, mr. swecker. i would ask witnesses, try to keep remarks as close five minutes and your full statement will be made part of the record. next witness, dr. michael braun, a managing partner, prior to that, mr. braun had a 33-year career in law enforcement. in 2008, retired from the u.s. dea as assistant administrator and chief of operations. during his time at dea, mr. braun had oversight responsibility for all operational programs and projects in afghanistan. in 2004 through 2008, the architect of the dea's significant expansion in afghanistan. also served as department of defense chief of staff for the interministry of the interior division, original authority in iraq. thank you for your service, and you're recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, chairman king. ranking member thompson, and other distinguished members of this committee for the opportunity to speak with you today about the growing threat of iran hezbollah and other related terrorist groups posed to our homeland. i applaud your initiative for calls this very important hearing. quite candidly, i'd rather talk about this threat today than as a future date, before a congressional oversight committee that's trying to get to the bottom of the next wave of attacks across our country where we could potentially lose

hundreds, even thousands. you're going to get the perspective of a career federal narcotics agent who served on both coasts. both the northern and southern borders, in the midwest throughout latin america and as you said, congressman king, in -- in iraq. iran, hezbollah and the quds force. the revolutionary guard corps, special forces unit responsible, a division responsible for foreign clandestine operations including assassinations pose a real threat to the our country, as i said. both these groups are now heavily involved in the global cocaine trade and as a result of that activity, they have come much closer into our neighborhood and even closer on to our doorstep. they are now operating and

working in close proximity and collaborating with mexican and colombia drug trafficking cartels not only in the western hemisphere but other locations such as guinea pasell in west africa. thanks to venezuela, and hugo chavez, these operatives from these very threatening terrorist groups are pouring into our neighborhood, into the western hemisphere. the hezbollah quds force are masters at identifying infrastructures around the world and leveraging and exploiting them for all they're worth. this has been their modus operandi for decades. if think for a moment they don't recognize the strategic importance of the illicit infrastructures that the mexican

and colombia cartels built over the last 60 to 70 years, infrastructures that support the weekly movement of tons of drugs, by jet and turbo craft, turboprop aircraft by fully submersible submarines cable of moving cocaine from the north coast of colombia into northern mexico, than they are simply ignorant or naive. that's all there is to it. there are many nasty by-products that stem from this growing confluence of drugs and terror. i'll tell you about one. congressman king, you already mentioned it. last month general clapper, director of national intelligence, testified before the senate committee on intelligence about the intel community's growing concern that iran may be capable and may be poised at hitting us here at home. as things heat up between our two countries. the key example he used to drive home that concern was the iranian quds force plot to assassinate the saudi arabian ambassador to the u.s., that the dea and fbi thankfully foiled.

that dea informant was being recruited by a quds force operative. the quds force operative believed that the informant was a member of the ultraviolet drug trafficking organization. fortunately, he wasn't. that event has been assessed by every three-letter agency in our government security apparatus and proven to be credible. that's why the dni used that example. can iran hit us here as home? you bet they can. how would they most likely do it? most assuredly, use hezbollah and the quds force. what really worries me is that the quds force controls iran's strategic missile program. so the big question is, will they be the holder of the keys to iran's future nuclear weapons arsenal? that's the same terrorist organization that made a concerted attempt to assassinate the saudi arabia ambassador right here in the united states

with a car bottom of all things. not a weapons system that would be used in a surgical strike. we really need to get focused and get down to some tough business, but get focused about addressing this very powerful threat posed to our nation. finally, you've done a great job since 9/11. all of you on this committee, and your predecessors, in keeping america safe. our military has done a great job as keeping us safe. our law enforcement and public safety personnel have done a tremendous job keeping us safe. i believe like many experts in this town that we're involved in a war unlike any we've seen before. it's a long war. unlike any other war there comes

a time when you need to make mid-course adjustments. i think that's what we're facing right now. there are some things we need to shore up gaps and i like forward to addressing those in this hearing. >> thank you very much for your testimony. next witness, dr. matthew levitt. in 2005, and 2007, doctor levin served as deputy secretary for intelligence and analysis at department of treasury and then at the state department counterterrorism adviser to the special envoy to the middle east regional security. prior to that, provided tactical and strategic analytical support and logistical support networks for middle eastern and terrorist groups. dr. levitt, you're recognized for five minutes. >> thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. just a few months ago i testified in front of the

subcommittee on iranian terrorist activities on american soil and will focus my testimony today on issues of hezbollah and refer members on issues of iran to that previous testimony. hezbollah has long leveraged global networks for support activities. the vast majority often informal networks are not called upon to carry operations but raise funds to procure documents you site add military equipment. the united states, hezbollah has long seen the united states as a cash cow. nonetheless, concern over the threat posed by hezbollah is well placed. though hezbollah has never carried out an attack in the united states, the fbi recorded,

i quote, hezbollah tanked with potential targets in the eyes and the fbi found such tasking appears to be intended as a venting tool to establish individuals loyalty to hezbollah and iran. whatever the purpose, this means hezbollah surveillance enabled the group to have off the shelf where it can dust off at a future date if it so desires and the fbi concluded many based in the united states has the capability to attempt to clear out terrorist attacks should this become the desired objective of the group. there are plots as we've heard clearly indicating general clapper testified iranian leaders say it's no longer crossing out carries out an attack on the united states. hezbollah has its own decision-making process and play not automatically jump to carry out an attack here in the united states even if asked to do so. recently several intelligence officials abroad told me that in recent attacks hezbollah and iranian attacks abroad, actually little iranian and hezbollah cooperation and actually some element of competition between the two. but to the extent that hezbollah believes the united states is involved in directly targeting our undermining the group, the

potential for hezbollah attack against u.s. interests abroad even in the homeland becomes more likely. it is possible if there is a confrontation with iran hezbollah would be called upon likely and could very well carry out an attack. reasons to suspect its own decision-making processes independent of whether or not there's a confrontation with iran could lead it to do so as well. many u.s.-led exposures with hezbollah activity. hezbollah believes the special tribunal for lebanon indicted for hezbollah operatives, one of them, brother-in-law, senior individual, said this is an american plot. hezbollah believes the united states is behind the unrest in syria and recently accused the u.s. embassy in lebanon of overseeing operations against syria. so as i look at the hezbollah threat to the homeland i break it down into four threat scenarios.

hezbollah does have networks to leverage to carry out an attack. has the ability to use people sent abroad it's traditional modus operandi and call upon -- with criminal elements and use them to facilitate an attack and finally we could see a homegrown violence extremist attack with iran or hezbollah simply calmed upon sympathizers to carry out active resistance as they call it in the event of confrontation with iran or hezbollah. according to a 1994 report, should the decision be to strike, hezbollah has presence to carry out such an attack. consider smuggled across the boarder from mexico in the trunk of a car. a guy who had training from lebanon from hezbollah, specialized training in weaponry, spy craft, counterintelligence, here raising money but could have done violent things if told to do. the north carolina is another example. as that case was tried, i had the privilege of serving as an expert witness, a plot

discovered some individuals talking about potentially assassinating the prosecutor and blowing up the courthouse. another of the individuals indicted in the charlotte case was mohammed dubouk. he's an iranian trained operative and intelligence specialist. we found out about the course from a senior u.s. government official that he was such a major player in the hezbollah organization, when he asked on five separate occasions to be allowed to be a suicide bomber they turned him down because he was too important. he was an individual here in canada working with the guys in charlotte. you could also have a point people who don't fit the traditional look of a hezbollah cell. fbi reported at one point a hezbollah, an iraqi shia cleric in texas. hezbollah is

looking for those who don't fit the profile. and operatives, consider a canadian passport lived in dearborn, michigan before he came to north america, involved in an attempt to hijack an airplane. after that, involved in carrying out a terrorist attack in israel. asked by israeli judge, did you ever tell the canadians about your involvement in terrorism, he simply said, they didn't ask. all of us in the world, especially the west, have done it a lot more difficult for terrorist attacks. not only applying to al qaeda but hezbollah. one of the ways they tried to break out that problem set, leverage its relationships with criminal elements to carry out attacks as well. and finally, you could have a situation homegrown violence extremism, when we deported one of the people involved in the bombing of khobar towers in saudi arabia, u.s. government put out a warning we believe this could lead unknown individuals to carry out an

attack. in conclusion, by no means a forgone conclusion hezbollah will attack in the united states, but to the extent it believes its interests are threatened the likelihood grows and carried a significant number of attacks abroad including some targeting u.s. interests abroad. thank you for the opportunity to testify before you. look forward to your questions. >> thank you, dr. levitt. our next witness, associate professor in the securities studies program in the edmund a. wall school of foreign service at georgetown university. february 2009 to december 2011, professor served as deputy assistant defense for the middle east and in that role served as the senior policy adviser to secretary of defense for egypt, iran, iraq, israel and palestinian territories. saudi arabia, syria and yemen among other countries. his work has been published in foreign affairs and public policy.

doctor, you're recognized. in the interest of fairness, i'm not going to bang the gavel unless the ranking member insists i do. doctor, you're recognized. >> thank you. chairman king, ranking member thompson, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the iranian threat to the united states and specifically on the possible consequences of u.s. military action against iran's nuclear program.

although until recently i served as you mentioned as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the middle east i need to make clear to everybody i am speaking in my personal capacity not as a representative of the administration. president obama made clear that an iranian nuclear weapon is unacceptable and military force remain on the table, all options to prevent this. president obama made clear he prefers a peaceful solution and remains a window of opportunity to take advantage of unprecedented the pressure on iran who reach a lasting diplomatic outcome. precisely the right approach. force should remain an option. we have not yet reached the now or never moment for employing a military option against iran and peaceful is preferable and more sustainable. i base this on four arguments which i go into in much greater detail in the written testimony. first, nuclear threat is growing but not imminent. according to u.s. and israeli intelligence officials and independent assessments it would currently take iran four months to produce sufficient weapons grade uranium for a single bomb and year total to device. once iran supreme leader ayatollah khomeini decides to do so, several more years to design a warhead for a missile. iran is clearly positions itself

to develop the capacity, dni director clapper testified there is no hard evidence that khomeini made the capability to transfer into bomb. moreover unlikely to dash for a weapon soon. doing so, would lower stockpiles and at the declared facility even -- because international atomic energy agency inspectors would detect those move, the iranian regime is unlikely to break out until they dramatically strengthen a timeline or build the weapons in secret which could be years away. therefore they have not reached a decision for the use of military force. second a military strike could produce significant spillover risks. when and if a decision to use force is ultimately made it must be done in full appreciation of the consequences. iran will likely retaliate with missile strikes against u.s. bases in the gulf, proxy and terrorist against facilities in iraq and elsewhere and lethal aid insertion in afghanistan and harassment in the strait of hormuz. as other speakers noted, retaliation against the u.s. homeland is conceivable. however, even limited retaliation in the region could produce significant american

casualties and drive pressure from the united states for further escalation. although some believe an iranian response would are carefully calibrated, miscalculation could lead to escalation on all side and significant spillover risks. much higher oil prices and proxy retaliation including hezbollah attacks against israel and the prospect of american allies in the gulf dragged in. the unilateral strike against a muslim country would destabilize the region already caught up in the turmoil of the arab spring. third, a strike will only delay not resolve iran's nuclear challenge. short of invasion, occupation and regime change, there's no way use military action to ensure iran abandons its nuclear program. as american defense officials noted, a near-term attack on iran's nuclear infrastructure would not the program back at most a few years.

it should be noted a possible israeli strike would produce similar instability but with more limited effects on the program. meanwhile, in the aftermath of a strike, iran would likely attempt to rebuild its program in way harder to detect and more costly to stop. certainly an attack would motivate kicking out iea inspectors and rapidly rebuild the clandestine infrastructure. four, still time for diplomacy. unprecedented sanctions and iranian leaders signaled willingness to return to the negotiating table. it won't be easy but an opportunity exists for all sides to chart a new course and step back from confrontation. the immediate goal should be to reach an interim confidence building agreement that stops iran from enriching at the 19.75 percent level and ships the

stockpile out of the country in exchange for fuel for the tehran research reactor. the confidence building arrangement at the deeply buried enrichment facility near the holy city. this would go a long way towards easing israeli anxieties that drive a potential strike this year. a final diplomatic settlement, rights to a program under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty would be more difficult to achieve. unlike military action it is the only sustainable solution. as our diplomats work with other members of the p5 plus 1 to find a solution to the iranian threat, congress needs to avoid taking steps that boxes them in and limit creative options. for instance, insisting all activities suspended prior to negotiations or limited future enrichment under extraordinary safeguards will only make a diplomatic outcome more

difficult to achieve and make a costly and unpredictable military confrontation more likely. with that i conclude and look forward to your questions. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, doctor. as i stated, the full testimony of all the witnesses will be made part of the record. does the ranking member have the unanimous consent request? >> yes. i'd like to ask unanimous consent that a gentleman from texas mr. green be allowed for the purpose of questions witnesses during the hearing. >> i have no objection. in the interest of fiscal posterity, can we charge rent for the time he spends with us? >> given he's from texas, i'm sure he can accommodate. >> i'm prepared.

>> mr. braun, regarding the qods force and as i said, the title of the hearing is iran and hezbollah, but, of course, any offshoots, any variations of that also part of the scope of the hearing. do you believe that the irgc would be able to leverage the existing hezbollah network that operates in this country to potentially conduct a terror operation? >> well, if their past track record, you know, receives any weight whatsoever, then i would say, yes. it's, you know, it's what they do. the qods force helped stand up hezbollah many years ago. where you find one, no matter where you go in the world, where you find one you most assuredly find the other. i'm told that dea agents and other investigators are routinely bumping into both these threats as they are

looking or focused on criminal investigations working with under parts in austere places like the tri-border of south america. certainly in west africa and north africa. as i said, both of these groups, their modus operandi is to leverage and exploit them for everything that they're worth. so, you know, congressman king, i would say the answer to that is absolutely yes. they would tap into it. if i could just mention one other thing. i retired from dea in late 2008. and like chris and dr. kahl, i don't speak for dea. i no longer speak for our government. but i am a concerned citizen. what i can tell you is what i was saying as i had one foot in the door and one foot out the door in 2008 was there was a growing concern on my part that there was no doubt hezbollah, you know, had become heavily involved in the global cocaine trade. moving tons of the stuff out of the indian region into west africa, onward into europe and they are obviously making hundreds of millions of dollars behind that activity. but what concerned me most was is there were -- there was clear evidence there were signs that

caused me to believe that qods force might be directing and managing the hezbollah illicit cocaine trafficking, their operations. >> based on your dea experience, were you surprised or not surprised of the plot back in october where the iranians were going to use drug cartels to carry out the assassination? >> no, sir, it's something i've been preaching for a long time. i've talked with you and i've talked with you and other members of your staff as well as other members of this distinguished committee. i've talked with many of you over the years and your professional staff members. and i think, you know, you all know i've been talking about this for a long time. this growing confluence of drugs and terror over -- well over half of the 50 designated terrorist organizations that we have identified or so designated formally are now involved in one or more aspects of the global drug trade. this is a byproduct of our success in prosecuting the global war on terrorism.

state sponsorship in a large way generally speaking has declined. and we have significantly impacted and identified the funding streams to these groups from very powerful private donors. so these groups if they want to keep their movements alive are having to do other things to generate revenue. and it's -- they are turning to contraband revenue. >> if i can ask the staff to put back the photos we had of the terrorist in -- or the hezbollah operatives in charlotte who were trained. was this unusual for these operatives to be terror trained or was it your impression that was not uncommon for hezbollah operatives? were these an exception? >> i don't think it was anyone that was working the case thought it was unusual. these were things we found during searches and were later used as trial exhibits. but to see them on the rooftops

with rockets and ak-47s was -- we felt like vindication that we were going after a terrorist organization, not just a criminal group. and it was -- it could very much -- very quickly morph into something else. we saw that level of commitment. we saw that inspirational material. pictures of suicide bombers marching in review. death to america. death to israel. all that propaganda was present during the searches and introduced at the trial. >> i said in my opening statement that in conversations which a number of you had with our staff and also with other conversations with people of the intelligence community, they put the number in at least the hundreds of hezbollah operatives in this country. does anyone dispute that? is that too high? too low? >> i couldn't put an exact number on it. i know the 20 cases you mentioned are only those cases where there's a direct nexus to hezbollah mentioned in an

indictment. there are many more cases out there being investigated and many more that have been prosecuted where there's a nexus. but it was much easier just to charge criminal indictment, not go through the process of using intelligence information in a criminal trial which is a little cumbersome. >> does that number sound real to you? the hundreds? >> yeah, obviously, our focus is on new york city and we only see a piece of the pie. but if you can extrapolate those numbers, it certainly seems like a reasonable count. >> mr. braun? >> i would say, yes. and, you know, let me just mention one thing. with respect to the lcb or the lebanese canadian investigation that the dea led and worked with the department of treasury on, there were over 70 used car dealerships that were identified as part of the money laundering scheme for laundering the hundreds of millions of dollars of cocaine generated revenue,

much of which was tracked back to hezbollah. what concerns me, congressman, of all those used car dealerships that were involved in that thing, i ask a question. when the number was much lower at about 35 or 40, i said how many of those businesses -- i asked our investigators. how many of those businesses existed pre-9/11 versus post-9/11? the answer was absolutely none. so if, you know -- >> time is running over so i'll have to -- >> okay. >> go ahead. >> i agree with you. >> okay. dr. levitt? >> i think the number changes. it fluctuates. it's a significant number, but i also warn people that counting known hezbollah operatives doesn't capture the whole picture. there's a spectrum of sympathy support and then trained operatives.

and as i was getting at in my testimony, hezbollah can call on any of these individuals. their ability to extort people to do things they might not otherwise want to do. we've seen that activity in this country. as mitch said, almost all these people have relatives back home and that puts them in a position where they can be exploited to do things they might not have otherwise wanted to do. the numbers are maybe more than the number of cases. >> i recognize the ranking member. >> thank you. professor kahl, we've seen sanctions topple rogue governments in the past as an effective tool. one country that comes to mind is south africa. how do you see sanctions playing a role in addressing iran at this point? >> well, i think it's too soon to tell. i thth