that hezbollah has routes with preestablished routes into the united states. would that be a correct statement? >> that would be a correct statement. >> and understanding the nuclear capability, the low-level radiation that -- nuclear material that actually would be needed for a dirty bomb, it could be pretty easily transported through those routes. would you agree to that? >> congressman, there are hundreds of tons of narcotics that take up large spaces that are moved across that border every single year. so moving a dirty bomb or any other weapon of mass destruction i don't believe would be all that difficult. if i could say one thing. >> yes, sir. >> i was not trying to imply in any way that i thought the qods force would do that. with that said, never say never, just as the doctor said. what concerns me is the same organization, the qods force,

that now holds the keys to the streenlic missile program may well be holding the keys to iran's nuclear weapons arsenal at some point in the future. that same organization that was responsible for trying to hatch this crazy plot to assassinate the saudi arabian ambassador right here on u.s. soil. that's what we need to be concerned about. these guys, obviously, are not at least always acting with a sound mind and sound purpose. >> your point was well taken, sir. and i understand that. that's what was my question about rationality of the threat. my time is expired. i yield back. >> thank you. gentleman yields back. the gentle lady from new york is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate the broad view of what the threat is in north america and i am going to be a little more parochial. i represent the border of canada in buffalo.

and we have four border crossings. we've had threats and problems in our area. i want to know whether there's an overall impression of the collaboration that's going on between the u.s. and canada with respect to, for example, the presence hezbollah has in front. do we have a gasp of what's going on in toronto? as much as i love new york city, mr. chairman, it takes me eight hours to drive from buffalo to new york city from my district. it takes me about an hour to get to toronto. even though it's a foreign country, it's closer and that threat is right there. could affect the people in my region as well. i just want to know the collaboration we have with the canadian government. is it adequate? do we have adequate resources to protect the northern border and what's our knowledge of what's going on in toronto? >> if i might, i mean, i think canada has declared hezbollah their number one threat. if i'm not mistaken. i think they are very much on top of what hezbollah is doing. we relied heavily on their

version of fisa material for our prosecution. they had some excellent evidence up there. they've been all over this very same group. so i think they are very much on top of hezbollah and the threat with hezbollah. there's regular contact with them and our domestic intelligence services and, of course, the agency. so i don't think there's any doubt that canada is very much attuned to the threat posed by hezbollah and the border crossings. but as mike pointed out, the leakiest border is the southwest border. there's no doubt about that. and that's where most of the drugs are coming across. that's where the well established routes are. and you can -- there are well established trade craft, concealments and that sort of thing. we can go through a whole hearing about how well they can hide material coming across the southwest border. >> and again, i'm very at tuned to the attention we give to the southwest board, and it's deserved. but i'm also concerned we neglect -- it's hard to say --

we had the lackawanna six case in my community. those people came over through canada. they walked in and got a legitimate driver's license and they did what they did. so that's why i'm concerned as well. these were u.s. citizens who collaborated with people from canada as well. so there's a lot involved, even in our pocket of the world. and again, southwest border needs protection. i want to make sure we have the adequate resources on the northern border because -- and we have a great relationship with canada. they are doing what they can. but i want to make sure that that's considered a high priority of our government, as well. >> if i can add, the canadians are great and we have done also wonderful things. their cooperation is wonderful. but when i was last before this committee, i mentioned i'm finishing a book on hezbollah's global presence right now. i've had the opportunity not only to interview u.s. law enforcement, but many foreign law enforcement intelligence agencies as well, especially in canada. on both sides of the border, people have told me they are

concerned about the ability even today for hezbollah operatives to be able to cross that border. again, i point you to the example of faisi ayub. it's in my testimony. he was involved in hezbollah hijacking before he came to canada. he was involved in terrorist activity after canada. at one point, evers living in dearborn going across the border. spoke to be officials along the northern border. several of whom expressed to me their concern that perhaps in the event that hezbollah decided to carry out an attack here it may not be someone in the united states but someone just across the border who could come across with documents either forged or illegally obtained but otherwise accurate. and do some things. but the good news is that people on both sides of the border are very attuned to this. their cooperation really is very, very good. so i think that has done a lot to minimize the threat. >> and the pentagon has proposed cuts to the niagara falls air is reserve station which is in

my district right on the border with canada. would you agree with this threat that exists in canada as well as in our homeland that it probably makes sense to keep a military presence strong on that border? >> honestly, i think it's apples and oranges. i don't know the military base there has anything to do with border security. i don't know. maybe it does. what i would want to make sure is the people who are involved in border security, border patrol, fbi, dhs, they have the strong presence there. but that base may have nothing to do with this issue. i don't know. >> thank you. i yield back. >> congresswoman? if i could just quickly say something. i -- before i was transferred back to dea headquarters for the third and last time, i served as the special agent in charge of the detroit field division for dea. i can tell you in those days, the dea, the fbi, i.c.e., all agencies shared great relations with our canadian counterparts and i believe that continues to this day. what concerns me about the

northern border is our obsession with defending the one yard line which has been, you know, which has been the southwest border. we need a defense in depth. we need to focus on shoring up the northern border and then going even further south into latin america as far as that border is concerned. if you look at the -- just the simple geographical enormity of the northern border, twice the size of the southern border if you look at the border patrol resources on the northern border versus the southern border, i mean, there are areas where folks could cross and by the thousands and no one would ever know it. that's what concerns me about the northern border. >> i agree. 100%. thank you very much. >> gentle lady yields back. the gentleman from south carolina, mr. duncan is recognized. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks for your willingness to hold this hearing.

the panel i think has done a fabulous job, along with this congress going back for the last year of really clearly showing that there is a clear involvement of the iranians, specifically qods force and their proxy hezbollah in this hemisphere. and others in the world are starting to take notice. there's an article, and i reference the center for army lessons learned. a gentleman, norman a. bailey who i believe has testified before congress, and he says this. the curious thing is that this interest in the hemisphere represents -- and this article is entitled "what are the persians doing over here?" curiousening -- curious thing is that this interest in this hemisphere represents the first time in the 5,000-year history of persia as a sovereign entity that such interest has been demonstrated. there's no affinity between the monarchist or islamic iran and the countries on this side of the atlantic. historical, cultural, political economic or otherwise. nevertheless, as we shall see,

the last few years have seen a totally unprecedented level of interest by iran in the region. that clearly sums up the question that we're talking about today. i want to thank mr. higgins for referencing a bill, hr-3783 that i sponsored. a bipartisan bill that passed out of the house foreign affairs committee, is headed to the floor for a vote. members of this committee hopefully will have an opportunity to bring some of the lessons learned from this panel and this hearing to the debate on the floor to pass this bill out and focus on the iranian threat and what the united states can do to counter that. when i said others are beginning to notice this threat, i'll reference univision's documentary recently which basically pointed out a lot of the things the iranians are involved in. in fact, cyberterrorism threat, using the venezuela consulate in miami and the resulting removal of one lady from that consulate back to venezuela.

there was an article today in the "jerusalem post" that talks about why congress suddenly cares about iran. the iran threat and latin america. that was just today in the "jerusalem post." so the threat is real. so i guess the question i have -- we've identified it. we're all on the same page, this is a real threat. so i ask the witnesses and i'll start with mr. braun, what can we do now? what can the united states government and this congress do now going forward? >> great question. i've got three things. what we need is interlocking counternarcotic and counterterrorism strategies. you know, as the bad guys have come together, agencies and institutions in this town that are focused on counternarcotics or counter-terrorism are drifting further and point. we need interlocking strategies. and we need singular funding streams because, as you know, congressman, that's what -- that's what drives agencies and

their strategies in this town. that's extremely important. the second thing that i would say is we need a -- we need to develop or focus more on a defense innocence depth strategy. we have been singularly focused almost on defending the one yard line. the southwest border. and there's -- i'm not saying that we didn't need to beef some things up there after 9/11. we most certainly did. but any strategy that is designed to defend the 1 yard line as you well know, former athlete, it's a strategy that's doomed to failure. right after 9/11, about 60% of all of dod's detection and monitoring assets in latin america went away. they were sent to other parts of the world. rightfully so. but most of those resources occasionally on a daily or weekly basis, they may filter back in but then suddenly they're gone again. we've lost too much capacity in our neighborhood to keep things in check. and we need to do a better job

at doing those things. and then i would finally say that we need to refocus on confronting or refocus on the traditional organized criminal types of activity. drugs, money laundering, arms trafficking, human trafficking. we need our federal agents and especially our federal agents and federal law enforcement personnel going head-on into these threats. because naturally they will, if they are engaged in that kind of activity, naturally they will become either directly or indirectly in contact with very powerful terrorist organization operatives and terrorists that are in our neighborhood. and let me remind you that that's exactly what happened. that's how that plot was foiled against the assassination plot against the saudi arabian ambassador.

there was a dea informant and his dea handlers that were focused on drugs and money that brought him into contact with a qods force operative that was directing our -- or that was communicating directly back with qods force central. we need to refocus on the traditional threats. >> you mentioned the word neighborhood. >> the time of the gentleman has expired. >> thank you. >> the gentle lady from california. miss hahn. >> thank you, chairman king. this has been a great hearing. i had to step away to actually meet with some port officials who are here this week with it the -- they're having a conference with ports all across this country. and my questions are -- i'm just going to throw the three questions out and then maybe you can all decide who would like to answer.

number one is, what keeps me up at night is our ports and what i believe is a lack of real attention from homeland security on securing our ports. wondering if any of you could comment on that. when mr. carvaak talked about dirty bombs, we, by the way, are scanning less than 3% of our containers that come into this country through our various ports. how easy would it be for this terrorist organization to infiltrate our homeland through our ports. i think they are the most vulnerable entryway into this country. but i'd like to hear what you have to say about it. also just talking about connecting the dots, and as you describe, that was how one of these plots was foiled was really connecting the dots. and i know we're making tough choices back here in terms of

spending cuts and funding opportunities going forward. you know, we had a committee hearing, i guess it was last month on the fusion centers and how important those are throughout our various cities in connecting the dots. for my perspective, los angeles and lapd, how much are our organizations talking to our local law enforcement on the ground? so kind of speak to the funding cuts that we've already proposed in terms of how does that affect these programs going forward? if somebody could speak about whether or not port security is kind of a hole in all of these operations. and the other thing i was thinking about when you are talking about these guys getting sba loans, which is amazing to me because one of the things i hear from my small businesses in my communities is how difficult it is to access sba loans. the amount of paperwork they

have to go through and the, you know, the collateral they have to put up. that's one of the biggest concerns for my small businesses is their inability to access small business loans. so are we sharing these kinds of concerns with our small business administration on the ground in the different cities where these loans are being processed? is this the information that we're sharing with the proper administration in the federal government? >> can i take a quick shot at that one? because i think it's a follow-up to congressman duncan's question about what else can be done. one of the issues with 9/11 was the compartmentalization of information and the failure to connect up the dots and everybody holding their information close. so what i think congress can do is break down those walls. continue to break down those walls and facilitate the use of technology. the banks and the insurance companies and the private sector are using information every day

to gather information to -- for marketing purposes. there's no reason why we can't break down those walls of data within the government and make matches and link up information and connect up those dots. and also making sure that law enforcement and the intelligence community has the tools. technology is moving ahead fast. and the ability to stay up with interception capabilities and that sort of thing needs to keep up with the technology that's out there. and i think the intelligence community struggles with that. so making sure that they have the right tools and breaking down the walls of information are two very important things to keep in mind. >> i'll just add, you know, for the research for my book, i spent a decent amount of time out in california, not only with lapd, fbi, long beach and also in terms of the ports at long

beach port, i'm actually very impressed with the work they're doing. there's an issue in terms of the ports and the 1 yard line and there are some excellent efforts being done by dhs with the support of the bureau. a good friend of mine and mr. swecker's on trying to deal with the container issues, not only when they get into our country but in terms there's going to have to be some risk analysis. in terms of connecting the dots, i have to say, i've been tremendously impressed specifically in southern california and elsewhere, as well. su asked about southern california, about the work of the fusion center there located out of the l.a. county sheriff's department. almost every time i'm there, they are working together all the time, and i think that's a world of difference from when i was working at the fbi pre and just through 9/11. >> just quickly, ports. they are -- i think they pose a significant risk. as you said, less than 3% of all the containers are being scanned. so how do you counter that? i would go back to a defensive in depth strategy. we need more -- those are all

emanating from other parts of the world. we need a defenses in depth strategy. we need more resources abroad to identify these threats, develop the intelligence, and then make sure that it's, you know, it's shared where it should be. with respect to fusion centers, they are great. the only concern that i have got is that so many of these things are regional in scope. so those that are utilizing them have got a regional snapshot of what's happening in the region. what we've got to get better at is connecting the fusion centers so that, you know, so that those who are using them, and need them the most see the most accurate photograph or picture, snapshot that they possibly can. >> gentle lady's time has expired. i thank her for the support she gives to the committee. i recognize the gentleman from missouri, mr. long, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman and all the witnesses for being here today.

dr. kahl, i'd like to ask you, given the geographical obstacles and logistical concerns, is israel even capable of striking iran's nuclear facilities by themselves? >> they are capable. it depends on what the target set is. but they would likely have to go after the natanz enrichment facility, the iroc heavy water plant, the pish fa shan iranian conversion facility and likely a number of other places. they would need dozens and dozens of aircraft to be able to fly 1,000 miles to those facilities. they don't have the military capability to do it. that said, they don't have the military capability -- i don't assess -- to set the program back very far. that is, they can get to their targets and drop bombs on their targets but senior u.s. defense officials have consistently said that they think israel, at most, could set the program back one to three years and the lower end of that estimate seems more likely to me. >> okay. one to three years. that brings up my next question. how many years has it taken iran

to get to this point in its development of nukes? >> they -- the nuclear program started under the shah, so it's been multiple decades, since the 1970s. >> so it's taken 40 years to get to this point. >> yeah. and our counterproliferation efforts both in the previous administration and this administration has slowed them down appreciably. they continue to make progress. progress that's troubling, but they continue to be slowed down as well. >> and an attack carried out by iran -- i mean by israel would only set the program back one to three years in your estimation? >> and i think the lower end of that estimation is more likely. >> what do they need to do to to the develop a nuclear weapon. >> well, there are several major components. the first is weapons grade

uranium. so far they've enriched a stockpile sufficient for about four bombs worth of weapons grade uranium but only to 3.5%. and then they have also a smaller stockpile of 20%. >> at 3.5% and they have to have it at what level? >> so they've enriched several tons worth of low enriched uranium at the 3.5% level which is the reactor fuel level. they have also enriched a certain amount of 20% uranium ostensibly for the tehran research reactor. to go up to weapons grade they would have to get that existing stockpile up above 90% which would take them somewhere in the neighborhood of four to six months. it's important to note if they tried to do it they would have to do it at natanz or fordo which means they get caught. the first is weapons grade uranium. the second component is they would have to have a weapons

design and have done all of the various experimentation and manufacturing to actually construct even a crude device and then they would have to figure out a way to deliver that weapon. you have a year estimate from a decision to be able to generate a testicle device and several years to put one on the missile. >> so you have to have the deliver system. >> the weapons grade uranium, weapons design and actually assemble it and the delivery system. >> there would have to be tests of the delivery system, right, or not? >> it depends if they're going to do an implosion device that is sophisticated enough to be put on the tip of a missile, they're probably going to have to test that. if they do a crude gun type device like the weapons that we deployed in world war ii, they might not have to test that. >> if your testimony you say and i quote i believe, meanwhile in the aftermath of a strike, iran is likely to rush to rebuild its nuclear program in a way that is

harder to detect and more costly to stop. what do you mean by harder to detect? and if they're capable of that, why are they not doing that at this point. >> >> the major reason is that iran remains a party to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. the iaea does does regular inspections to their facilities. which means currently it's actually very difficult for iran to break out and develop a nuclear weapon without getting caught. the concern some have expressed is that in the aftermath of an israeli strike, for example, which scenario you mentioned, iran would likely use that strike to shatter the international consensus currently isolating it and kick out the iaea inspectors which means the international community would have a lot more difficulty seeing what iran was doing and iran would have an easiest time reconstituting their program in secret. >> are they getting full access now? >> they're getting full access to the declared facility.

we don't know what we don't know and they're trying to get access with limited success to some of the facilities that might be related to weapons related research. >> my time is expired. if i had any time to yield back, i would. >> i thank the gentleman for yielding the back the time he doesn't have. but we appreciate the thought. the gentleman from louisiana is recognized. >> first of all, let me thank you all for coming in and sharing your knowledge with us and your experience and your recommendations for how we move forward. i guess part of my questioning, and maybe mr. braun or mr. swecker who both have recommendations, do you know if the recommendations you gave us, if they're currently being carried out or if the de and cia

and fbi and atf is refocusing on traditional threats and paying more attention to the drug trafficking? >> well, i think one thing you have to recognize, and what we talked about this morning is has punctuated that is the convergence of criminal activity and terrorist activity. terrorists need money, and they raise money through -- mostly through criminal action these days. so we've talked about anti money laundering statutes and regulations. we have talked about technology and we talked about breaking down these silos of information. i think all of those are under way. they can always get better. whenever you have agencies, you have walls, and it's harder to share information. so anything that facilitates that sharing of information is good. the fusion centers are good. the joint terrorism task forces are good. staying on top of current -- more current techniques -- i worked in the days when we had the fisa wall up, and you could

not share information between the criminal and intelligence. so i think it's infinitely better than it was on 9/11, but it's -- you know, it's not perfect. but i think what you've done with passing these enabling legislations, patriot act -- i know it's a bad word in some circles, has been tremendously valuable in updating these techniques. >> and i guess that's exactly what i was looking for, and i think the ranking member's point with that, was that it would be very helpful to have current members of the administration here to say if they're heeding those recommendations or how far they are on not compartmentalizing or focusing on the traditional threats. dr. levitt, you mentioned that hezbollah sometimes will resort to extortion to get things done. there are some who advocate for

profiling in our tsa, for example, and in a reverse manner of maybe not searching thoroughly elderly women or doing patdowns on children. do we then make them or expose them to a risk of being used as a mule of families being extorted to subject them to -- since they have less security things to go through, do we do the reverse and expose them to extortion? >> i don't know of any evidence where something like that has happened. i do worry about racial profiling has become a very charged term. there is much more to profiling than race, and has to be. it has to be intel-driven. we know in the charlotte case, for example, at one point as they were speeding across interstates from carolina to michigan and couldn't figure out how they were constantly getting tickets but time was money and they were being told to speed.

and they were getting speeding tickets. they assumed it was because it was racial froe profiling. it wasn't. so they hired white, blonde women to drive the trucks and told them time is money. speed up to michigan, and couldn't understand why the u.s. government was not profiling white, blonde women. it wasn't the case. but there is the potential that they will use people that are not part of the traditional -- not racial, but intel profile. >> correct. >> the extortion really is relevant to people who are from their community. mostly, as i said, because they have family back home and that puts them into a vulnerable position. >> and anyone who can answer this question, the employee at the small business administration who was bribed, do we have any of the demographics on that person? was that person a muslim extremist? what was that person? the nationality or demographics of that person? >> the person was lebanese. he didn't bribe the spa