hoped an armored warship could achieve that objective. after the stunning success of the virginia, on the #th of march, sinking the cumberland and skong res, inflicting the worst defeat on the united states navy in its history until december 7, 1941. on march 8th. confederate authorities then agreed to build more, as many as they possibly could. they actually started a total of 52 of them. although the industrial bottle nick for them is availability of iron armor and maritime engine plants which they simply could not build themselves and had trouble getting in through the blockade. vicious circle. they did build some, however. and in january, 1863, two of them, chased off the union blockade squadron off charleston for a day or two. which prompt eed a confederate commander at the time in charleston to declare the

blockade had been lifted. though the was back in place again the next day. charleston authorities also tried to use, again, playing the technology card, semisubmersible david boats as thee were known. these have a steam engine plant. they don't generally completely go under water. just a little crest showing above the water so that stack had access to air. the forerunners of modern torpedo boats today. as well as we know, as a working submarine, the hl hundley which did sink a ship in february 1864. all along south-atlantic coast, the confederacy sowed torpedoes, today we would call mines. in the end however these innovative weapons and tactics while troublesome did not lift or break the blockade. and the union managed a few naval innovations of her own. like this one.

more about which of course, later today. by 1863, the blockade was becoming increasingly -- effective. whatever the perception in the anti-administration newspapers in new york and much of the confederacy, the difficulties of the southern economy were becoming -- impossible to ignore. to be sure many of the difficulties were the product of a collapsing internal transportation system and another problem was that many in south began to resent the fact that as one contemporary put it, blockade running was fast degenerating into an illicit and unpatriotic trade. with unconscious irony, i love this passage. confederate planters, planters, complained that the fabulous profits made by blockade runners were enriching a small class of monied men at the top of the

income scale. imagine that? small class of wealthy men making decisions for the whole society. what made planters think of that. the richmond enquirer, decried the unbecoming vanity, displayed by the wardrobes of the richest merchants unsuitable for a nation fighting for its survival. the way was for the government to regulate all trade. this of course flew directly in the face of that doctrine of state's rights. state rights i'm told to say. the increasingly desperate condition of the rebel armies and weakening confederate economy led to a popular clamor for the richmond government off to talk over regulation of trade entirely. in february 1864, jefferson davis got the confederate congress to pass a law that requires all outbound, blockade runners, to reap sserve half of

their space for government owned cotton. a month later he urged on congress, a law, forbidding importation of any high value and profitable luxury goods that had been the common cargos in the first two years of the war. it was a long list. i will share some with you. see if you can catch a hint of the theme here. here's what was banned, ale, beer, rum, brandy, billiard tables, furniture, carpeting, tapestry, carriages, lace, jewelry, dolls, toys, glass, fur, hats, capes, paintings, statues, wallpaper, bricks, roofing slates, perfumes, playing cards, and velvet. as well as any kind of wine including champagne, claret, madera, port, and sherri. now that is a violation of state rights. and of course there was considerable grousing about all of this. not only from the companies that stood to lose future profits from the importation of these

goods. but also from state rights conscious governors like vance in north carolina and joe brown in georgia. who believe that richmond was becoming altogether too intrusive in the lives of southern citizens. the key question here of course is, did it work? i promise you i would try to answer this question. and so i shall attack that. most historians who try to answer the question about the-- the legitimacy, the value, importance, impact of the union blockade do so by appealing to statistics. now, you have all heard the old saw, that there are liars and there are damned liars and then there are statisticians. and as we'll see in effort to answer the question by relying solely on statistics is as likely to breed scepticism about the process as to resolve the question.

since numbers can be used to make very different points. for example, let me give you two facts. here is one. during the civil war, a total of 300 different steam powered vessels attempted to run the blockade. including our friend. and those steamers made anch arage of four successful trips. that twiz rou that is two per vessel. 1,300 attempts to run the blockade of which over 1,000 were successful. in other word. statistics prove that steam powered blockade runners made it successfully through the blockade. 77% of the time. fact two, of those 300 steamers, union warships captured 136 of them. and 85 more were destroyed, run into the shore, by pursuing vessels or lost at sea, for a total of 221. thuls statistic tis -- thus sta

prove that 73% of vessels that tried to run the blockade were destroyed or captured. in other words, both statements are through. three quarters of all attempts to run the blockade were successful. three quarter of all ships that tried it were destroyed. a better way perhaps to measure the impact of the blockade is calculate how much the confederacy was able to up port during the war to sustain its economy. it must be acknowledged the confederacy did indeed manage to up port a sufficient number of rifles, cannon, powder, shot to sustain its armies for four years. the south imported at least 400,000 rifles. 3 million pounds of lead, 2.2 million pounds of salt, and statistics from a book, steven wise, undoubt lead correct in concluding that without blockade running the nation's military would have been without proper supplies of arms, bullets and

pounder. conceded. the fact that rebel armies managed to sus tatain did not m effects of the block aid were not felt elsewhere in the confederacy. coffee and tea. became luxury goods. so prized, one atlanta jeweler perhaps as a gag, set coffee beans into pins in mraps place diamond. the shortage of these and goods contributed to hoarding, to speculation, inflation, and affected civilian morale. more over in assessing the impact of the blockade it is necessary to consider not only what was brought in, but what was sent out. as a union assistant, navy secretary fox put it uin a conversation the rebellion was sustained not by what entered into their ports by what proceeded out. both before and during the war,

the southern economy was almost entirely dependent on its production of cash crops. for export. especially, of course, cane cotton. measuring how much the blockade affected cotton exports, turns out to be simple. in the last year of peace before the blockade was in place. the cotton states exported just under 3 million bales of cotton. and the first 12 months of the war, south exported just over 50,000 bales of bottcotton. over two years as union forces occupied more and more southern coast, cotton exports fell further. to be sure the price of cotton also went up as exports declined. if the price of cotton rose, so too did the price of goods south was trying to buy overseas, railroad machinery, modern breach loading rifles. in the end the south used stock

piled bales as armor for coastal gun emplacements. the economic historian, david sordham, the short fall in revenues from cotton rivaled if not exceeded the federal government's total expenditures on its navy for the whole war. given that relatively sum pull cost effective analysis, suggests that the union blockade was worth the effort. so, what its the bottom line here? i think it is this. that despite the apparently porous character of the union blockade, the cumulative effect of the reduction in the south cotton exports, the loss of its coastline, and eventually, the occupation of its major sea ports. seriously undermined the confederate government and its war effort. if the blockade was never airtight which it wasn't. it was constricting enough that south was

economic breath. i love that phrase. i borrowed it from william roberts in his book. that combined with the reduction in the size of the logistic base from which the confederacy could draw supplies for its armies, so isolated lee's indomitable army in virginia that in the end it had no choice but to surrender. now almost certainly the north could have won the civil war, without the blockade. but almost aster tenley the blockade made the war shorter and in doing so p of lives. now this weekend, of course we observe the attempt southerners made to lift that block aid by employing rev lougs earchnogy. and the union responds to that effort in producing an even more revolutionary warship. the union not only matched the south, in employing the weaponry. it went on to build more than 80 monitors, and the blockade

remained intact. thank you very much. i look forward to your questions. if you will come to the microphone right over here then they can get it on the tape for c-span. yes, ma'am. >> thank you. were all of the blockading ships steam-powered? or were some of them dependent only on sail? >> that is a great question. the short answer is they needed to be steam powered. it took them a while to figure this out. initially they did send sailing ships to the blockade. remember the union is gathering together whatever ships it can. sweeping harbors of philadelphia, baltimore, new york for anything that floats that will carry a gun. early on there were many sailing ships that attempted it.

sailing ships couldn't hold their position close in shore with the making tide for fear of running aground. late '62, certainly, '63, all sailing ships out of service on the blockade sent to do a mission overseas, touring the mediterranean, for example and all blockaders were steam powered. most famous sailing power ship was the u.s.s. america. had within ape very famous sailing race off the isle of white that we still compete for. america's cup. america was one blockading ship early. but sad today wasn't very good at it. so. yes, sir? >> could you speak to some of the details of the prize money system that would incentivize it? >> it was a great motivate tore

for sailors encouraging them to enlist at awe and stay enlisted in boring, tedious jobs off the southern coast. the way it worked was that any vessel captured by a united states warship, the value of that vessel sold at auction, the value of of its cargo sold at auction, assuming a legitimate prize, the value want to the cam t -- captain and crew. in late 1862 they kept aside percentage for widows and orphans of sailors lost at sea. as usual it want to, any of us who served in the military know this is how it works. most went to the officers. you know, the captain often got half off the top. then they, the officers themselves, shared another quarter in the war room. and then the final quarter was shared among the enlisted crew. if you made a cup of pretty good captures off the coast that could set you up for life.

there was real money to be made during this. and the rule of thumb was, any vessel in sight, at the time of capture, got to share. a bummer. if you were on the blockade, captured the ship, made all the risks, and every other ship you can see they get to share. that is no good. if the ship made it out of the blockade and you chased it for 150, 200 miles over the horizon and caught it and you quickly look around the horizon. nobody else in sight. that's yours. okay. sailors used to say sit is a shame that bullets and wounds aren't passed out the same way as prize money. so, anyway. that's the way it worked. so. yes. >> love that prize money. >> see. >> i'm up from florida. kind of wondered, the taking of the port of fernadina, how important was it, should it have been done sooner? >> yeah, one of the ports near

jacksonville, north florida, atlantic coast, early 1862 efforts by the union to gobble up pieces of the shore. there were several motives involved here. one was to have a safe haven, further south on the blockading squadron. one was to gobble up as much land as possible. part two after the emancipation proclamation and the legitimate prize of war that did not have to be returned to enemy, never mind fugitive slave law, an attempt to recruit sailors for the fleet. so there are several motives involved here. and the squadron that went down as part of dupont's command went to fernadina, pretty much a pattern, fort clark, hatteras, and shelled it ashore, confederates couldn't stand up to artillery, abandoned position, union went in and took occupation of the small village.

not a town or city. this was repeated all along the coast. the atlantic coast. the gulf coast as well. simply one of many such forays. whether it should have been done sooner, i'm not sure out could have been. remember the union is building up forces. by the time, late 1864 there are more than 30 ships off charleston. and blockade runners are still getting in and out. so dupont was loathe to take a half dozen ships from the blockade and send them off for other operations. so i've don't know that he could have done it any sooner than hehe did. yes. >> the question concerns the profits from the confederate blockade runners. wereypically invested in south, did some build fortunes overseas does any of it contr contribute to the postwar reconstruction of the south?

>> when entrepreneurs were making decisions, it was entirely their money. they did with it what they liked. apparently according to descriptions in the "richmond enquirer" they suited themselves up nicely and pranced around downtown richmond. but there was no fund, early on, that that money should go to the benefit of the war effort. or that it should establish credits overseas for the purchase of -- of weapons and other materiel. which is exactly why the confederate government felt that it needed to get involved in this. not only did it require certain percentages of the cargo to carry government owned cotton to get credits overseas so it could buy material to be brought in. but by late 1864, davis actually took over blockade running, the ships were commanded by confederate officers. and, all of that money, by then, of course, very late in the war. all of that money did go to the benefit of the confederate government. but by late 1864, the government was already in trouble financially.

the great assistance overseas was from the exchange company that advanced credits to, in liverpool, advanced credits to the confederate government to make purchases early on. blockade running, especially in the first, 2, 2 1/2 years of the war did not go to the benefit of the war effort it went to the benefit of the entrepreneur whose owned the ships and that of course was the source of the complaints. yes. >> i was wondering if you agree or disagree with the proposition that one of the great hidden effects of the blockade was the way it contributed to the destruction of the confederate railroad system, because of its disruption of the, intracoastal trade, quite apart from anything, dealing with external trade. >> absolutely true. i actually had that in my talk and took it out. you see anna lurking over here. i am over time. i removed that in interest of time. a very important point. i mention how one of the problems the south had was the breakdown of the internal

transportation system. that was a product of the blockade. much of the transcoastal trade went through what today we would call intercoastal waterway, you saw the intercoastal waterway. you saw the map of the north carolina sounds. once those sounds are occupied by union naval force, all of that has to be moved onto an overburdened confederate railroad system. a lot of the southern railroads are short lines with different gauges. this is long before it stabilized at 4'8 1/2". these are little pieces of railroads. the confederacy, a non-iron producing generally society often used railroads what was known as the strap and stringer. it was a wooden rail with a little thin layer of iron on the top. so you overburden those lines with heavier rolling stock now carrying three, four, five times as much as they're designed to carry and they'll break down, too. not only did the blockade

interrupt international trade, it interrupted internal trade as well because of the impact it had on southern railroads. we're out of time now. i'm sorry. we have to stop. i'll be glad to talk to anyone who wants to out in the foyer. thank you for your time. i appreciate it. i think we'll go ahead and get started here. so if you want to find yourself a good seat, we will begin this next very brief section. dave alberg has something really important to say and he's brought lisa stansbury with him to help him out. i think some of you may have met a couple of new faces here at the marinerss museum. they're up in the lobby. that's who dave alberg is here

to talk about. i've known dave for i'm not sure how many years now a lot. and he has been such an incredible partner to this institution running the monitor national marine sanctuary. their office is located 240 feet down. it's hard to go there to the visitors center. it's my extreme pleasure to bring david alberg up here to the stage. [ applause ] >> it worked. that's always a first test right there. good afternoon, everybody. thank you for coming out. we are here today to talk about the work noaa has been involved with in the last, gosh -- since 2002, really, to identify the two sailors who were recovered in the turrid of the "uss

monitor." those two men's faces are on display in the front lobby of the museum. they are on temporary display in the front lobby as we prepare a permanent display for them here. i can't think of a more fitting home for them than at the mariners' museum where they will be able to tell their own stories and the stories of their shipmates who we lost the night t"the monitor" sank. we manage 14 sites around the world in u.s. territorial water that is protect the marine environment. this is most notably important because it all began in 1975 with the designation of the "uss monitor" national marine sanctuary off the coast of cape hatteras. the designation of that one site have now grown into the premier

marine protected network in the world. it was done -- "the monitor" was discovered, of course, in 1973 by john newton. phil sheridan and gordon watts off the coast of north carolina, testing out new technologies and sonar with the monitor as their target. they found it on the high seas 18 miles off the coast of north carolina but outside of state waters and outside of u.s. territorial waters at the time. in '74, a year after she was found, the governor of north carolina requested that congress establish the monitor national marine sanctuary to protect the site and the rest is history. it was established on january 30th, 1975. which was the date -- the

anniversary date of the launching of the monitor. and what i want to talk about specifically and we'll be covering much of the history of the ship over the rest of the day. but i want to talk about the two remains. when noaa went out to recover the shipwreck and congress asked noaa after about a decade of monitoring the monitor. it was noted the ship is deteriorating, which is a notion that we fight a little bit against today trying to help people ask me, what is the condition of the ship? and i will point out that as a ship, it's in terrible shape obviously. but as an archaeological site, it's in pristine shape. 85% of the ship is still sitting on the seabed. it is a national historic landmark. but congress said, what is the plan? do you raise the entire thing? do you raise segments of it? do you leave it alone?

after discussions, it was decided that selected pieces would be brought up. between 1998 and 2002, the navy working with noaa and of course the navy was the workhorse in this effort bringing their professionalism and expertise and technical abilities began to recover those pieces of the wreck. and as noaa worked with the military, we acknowledged from the beginning that there was the likelihood that human remains would be found. and lo and behold in july of 2002, while the navy was removing overburden, if you know the story, the monitor sank upside down with the turret upside down. but the roof of the turret was just railroad rails. it was known from the beginning if an attempt was made to lift that with all that material in there, there was a high likelihood the roof would give way, spilling the contents of

the turret, which is something nobody wanted to have happen. navy divers began removing all that sediment. it was not soft silts. this material was the equivalent of concrete. as they worked down in july of 2002, they hit a layer and found the first set of human remains. i think if you talk to the navy team that was on board, that was a benchmark moment for them. for years working on this project, the challenges were technical and it was very much an engineering challenge, an archaeological challenge and suddenly it became very personal. and in talking with folks that were on the barge that were working that day, they have described it very much as it went from being an engineering feat to being one of recovering their shipmates. even though the uniforms may have been different by 111 years or 130 years at that point, this was very personal.

so excavation continued around . but at that point the decision was made to raise the turret. the turret came up, excavation was continued on the surface. and shortly after that, a second set of remains were found lying just underneath -- what did i just do? there we go. a second set of remains were found just lying underneath the first set, an individual named monitor 2. on the barge working with us was a team -- on organization that is now called the joint p.o.w. accountability command located in pearl harbor, hawaii. these are the individual who is heroically work to return to their families service members who are found from any war, found in the jungles of vietnam or the pacific, they bring them back. they work to -- with the navy to identify them and then return

them. there's really two teams. there's jpac itself who do the science. and then there is an office called the naval casualty office who -- not to simplify their work, but they're the ones that flip through the phone books and try to get back now that they've got information on who this individual was and get them back to the families. dr. eric emory was with us when these remains were found. and he participated with the excavation. but the removal of the human remains actually continued here on site at the mariners' museum and all the remains were sent back to hawaii to the jpac facility. jpac has released a report. it is considered an active case. but the work they have done has been extraordinary. but it also -- th