this weekend on the presidency on american history tv -- >> think of the fdr memorial. it wasn't just three redesigns. it was three plus designs before they got to a final plan. and so i think that we shouldn't be afraid of looking at this issue, because we are building something for the centuries. and we want to get it right. >> with the eisenhower memorial designed by frank garia opposed by the family, discussed the planned memorial. watch sunday part of american history tv this weekend on c-span 3. this week on the civil war, american history tv visits the mariners museum in newport news

virginia. hosting a civil war navy conference in early march to mark the 150th anniversary of the battle of hampton roads when, for the first time iron clads battled during the civil war. first, author and naval academy professor craig simons talks about the war along the coast. then the recovery and identification of human remains from the u.s.s. monitor, which faced off with the css virginia in 1862. this is about 90 minutes. >> well, it is my great pleasure to introduce our opening session here for the battle of hampton roads weekend, 150th edition. craig symonds is from the united states naval academy, where he taught u.s. history and civil war history for 30 years.

he thought he was retired. then he went back. and he is teaching there again. and he is a native of anaheim, california. earned his b.a. at ucla, masters and ph.d.s from the university of florida where he studied under the late john k. mann. in 1970s he was in the navy, navy officer and first ensign ever to lecture at the naval war college in new port, rhode island. after his naval service he remained at the war college as a civilian professor of strategy from '74 to '75. an award winning author of 12 books, maybe by more, by now, but who is counting right. editor of several others. and has written over 100 scholarly articles and professional journals in popular magazines. from 2005 to 2007, he lived here too. he was the chief historian for the u.s.s. monitor center here at mariners museum and helped us get everything right. so if something you see is right out there and you love it.

thank craig for it. he helped us out with that a lot. and he helped oversee the promotion of it as well. traveling around the country. telling the story of the u.s.s. monitor to all who would listen. as i said, even though he thought he retired, you can't keep him still. he returned to the u.s. naval academy for this academic year, class of 1957, distinguished professor of american naval heritage. he also is still much in demand everywhere around the country as a speaker on civil war topics. spoken at civil war round tables in 27 states, two foreign countries. gives tours of battlefields. we don't think he sleeps. he does it all with the incomparable, mary lou. and so, thank her for lending craig to us here at the mariners museum. so, with that, i am going to turn it over to our wonderful opening speaker. [ applause ]

>> thank you, anna. that is about the nicest intro duction i've ever had. i really appreciate that very much. and congratulations to dr. holloway. anna holloway, and to this wonderful institution for putting together this weekend. for those of our guest whose are watching this at home on c-span, let me make a plug here for this museum. if you have not been here, this is worth the trip. everybody in the room knows that already. some of you at home may not. let me argue, you should come out here and make a visit. my job this morning at the podium is to talk about the civil war along the atlantic coast. seems an entirely appropriate subject for this event, marking as it does the 150th anniversary of the most iconic naval confrontation of the american civil war here in hampton roads. that was a centerpiece of a

broader war from washington, d.c. down to key west. but rather than talk about the battle in particular, which others will do today, i'm going to try to establish some context for that battle and describe the war of which it was such an important part. i am going to start by talking about the blockade. now this is a subject that often gets only passing attention from some civil war scholars. most acknowledge there was a blockade during the civil war. they might mention the anaconda plan. they might note in passing that blockade was never fully effective. and then move on to discuss again the peninsular campaign, shiloh, gettiesburg, emancipation, all the other iconic issues that make the civil war a traumatic turning point in our national history. in part perhaps this is because to many the history of the blockade seems a rather, well,

tedious subject. and to many, it was. certainly for the thousands of men, tens of thousand of men. who spent their days bobbing around off the coast of the south-atlantic where they swatted mosquitoes and marked of the days on a calendar. let me make an attempt to rescue them from an historical footnote. in assessing the union blockade, it's important to appreciate that it was different from any that had ever been attempted previously. to be sure, the british had employed blockades against the french and their war with their cross channel foe, with the americans in the revolution in the war of 1812. but the purpose of those blockades was to blockade enemy warships to prevent those warships from getting to sea. the object of the union blockade against the confederacy was very different and far more ambitious.

it was, in lincoln's words, to prevent the entrance and exit of all vessels. all vessels of any kind, from any port, or any river mouth, along 3,500 miles of hostile coastline. that was a ludicrously ambitious objective. and because of that -- lincoln's proclamation provoked ridicule in the south, skepticism in europe. after all, according to the international laws of war, a naval blockade was not legally binding on any neutral. unless the blockading power stationed a competent force. that's the important phrase there. a competent force off every harbor that was under blockade. you couldn't merely say that a coastline was under blockade. you had to station a squadron off every one of those 189

navigable harbors and river mouths. without that, merchant ships of any neutral power were free to trade, no matter what proclamations abraham lincoln might issue. many observers on both sides of the atlantic thought it could not be done. and even if it could, there was the legal problem. lincoln's pronouncement could be a recognition of the confederate government. after all blockades can be against foreign powers. did lincoln mean to imply the confederacy was indeed a foreign power? well whatever the long-term consequences of that legal complication, the more immediate problem was making the blockade perfected. gideon wells, who i saw wandering around the passageways

earlier today, union secretary of the navy, dispatched the handful of war ships that were available, a total of 12 of them, down to blockade the south principle seaports, ordered home all the vessels then currently overseas on distant station patrol, embarked on a crash program to require new ships. to oversee the acquisition of new vessels wells appointed a man, george d. morgan, competent, experienced businessman who happened to be wells' brother-in-law. as you can imagine there was some squawking about this. in congress. principally because morgan took a 2.5% commission for each ship that he purchased and ended up with quite a pile of money. but in the end his efficiency quieted most criticism and morgan ended up buying 89

vessels at $40,000 each. pretty good bargain. they were converted. several north principle ports, new york, philadelphia, elsewhere soon there were 264 ships by end of 1862. rapid, to that moment, unprecedented mobilization of naval resources. and the blockade, no more than a fatuous notion in april, was on its way to becoming a reality. now as a collateral responsibility, to stopping trade, the union navy also sought to seize big chunks of coastal land along the atlantic coast. the need to do this came from logistical practicalities of maintaining a blockade of steam powered warships. those war ships had to be resupplied regularly with food, fresh water and, of course, coal. at the outset, the only naval bases that the union had available to do this were at the extreme ends of the blockade.

here in hampton roads, virginia, and 1,000 miles to the south at key west, florida. ships blockading charleston roughly halfway between the two had to steam about 500 miles north or 500 miles south to get more coal, burning up about half of what they could carry to make the trip. for the long run, this simply would not do. they needed a closer refuge if the blockade was to become effective. and this led to several efforts to grab sections of the confederate coastline. and the first such effort took place on the carolina capes. the geography of the carolinas made it a natural sanctuary for both blockade runners and armed vessels of the confederacy attempting to conduct commerce rating. the barrier islands offered natural protection to the north carolina sounds. and the several inlets into the

sounds not only offered the confederates sanctuary for their blockade runners, but also a hiding place for privateers and commissioned commerce raiders. in fact, so ideally suited was this area to this kind of activity that it was used both during the american revolution and the war of 1812 for much the same purpose and, in fact, even before that, in the 18th century, by pirates. here is a little-known fact. blackbeard himself was killed on the bathe river in pimlico sound right about here in 1718, by british warships. erecting coastal forts. and the problem with the confederacy was that for -- one of the problems for the

con f confederacy was that the civil war took place at just that moment in history when sea-going -- up to 1861 -- beginning of the american civil war. bet on the fort. first of all, they didn't sink. they were made generally of stone, not wood. and like the ships, they could support bigger, more accurate guns. but the advent of steam propulsion, in the several decades before the civil war, which made ships a moving target, and rifled guns in the decade just before the civil war, rifled guns for firing explosive shells which gave the ships a greater offensive power, all of that changed the relative balance of power between ships and forts. especially since a lot of ships built by the confederates in the

first few days after succession were made of log and art rather than heavy stone. when in august of 1861, the union sent a naval squadron, commanded by cylus stringham to attack the rebel forts guarding the carolina capes. the outcome was kind of a shock to both sides. the idea was stringham's warships would bombard forts hatteras and clark, right down here, the entrance to hatteras sound, under the cover of that bombardment, union soldiers led by that lion of war, benjamin butler, would land on the beach and storm the fort. this was the first serious attempt the united states had ever made to conduct what today we call a joint operation. landing on a hostile shore. as might be predicted, not

everything went as exactly as planned. one of my favorite slides i will show you today is this one. i have no idea what this fellow is up to. it looks to me as if he is going to catch that boat coming ashore. here is the army and navy cooperating together in a combined operation. it didn't really matter, though, because the forts under attack were overwhelmed by that heavy union naval ordinance and soon even before butler could get his men to line up, ft. hatteras surrendered, and the union gained access into the north carolina sound. this its a bracing victory for the north. and an even more consequential one occurred three months later in november of 1861, this one aimed at port royal in south carolina, a little further down the coast. located almost exactly halfway between charleston and savannah,

port royal was ideally located to constitute a base for the south atlantic blockading squadron. this time the naval mission would be led by captain now flag officer and later rear admiral samuel francis dupont, who emerged as really the first union naval hero in this war. almost the first union hero of either service. dupont's plan was pretty straight forward. as in north carolina his warships would assault the rebel forts, guarding the sound. and then once they were suppressed, then the army could come in and take possession. i've been tempted to say a little something about the navy winning the battle and then the army coming in and grabbing the glory, but i won't do that here today. so on november 7th of 1861, dupont led a column of nine union ships into the sound. they proceeded in traditional. time honored pattern of line ahead formation.

passing up the middle of the channel between the two forts, and turning to port, to pass ft. walker, one by one, at a range of about 800 yards. half a mile. and after the third pass, the federal gunners had disabled most of the fort's guns. the defenders were down to only about 500 pounds of powder. and accepting what seemed to them to be inevitable. confederates hauled down their flag, evacuated the forts and o andshore islands. this important victory did a lot to lift the incubus of bull run off the psychological backs of northern citizens. strategically it provided the base it had to have to make the blockade effective. as a union naval base. indeed it is hard to imagine how

the north could sustain the blockade at all without the base of port royal. so, what was it like then to serve on this blockade? as it became increasingly effective and now sustained by bases along the south atlantic coast? the next several slides, by the way, are from the sketchbook of charles ellory stedman, who was the ship's doctor on the u.s.s. huron, one of the vessels on the blockade. he kept a sketchbook, which provides just about the only contemporary images of the blockade that we have today. the union sailors who kept the watch and fed the engines and manned the guns on these blockading vessels, from virginia to texas, found life at sea mostly an endless tedium of routine. they spent interminable days focused intently on the horizon off to one direction, or into

the harbors in the other direction, to catch just a trace of black smoke that would indicate a vessel firing up the boilers, preparing to get under way. alas, day by day, week by week passed with no sign of a blockade runner offshore or vessel in port trying to come out. soon enough, time began to hang very heavy on the watchers. night, though, was the most dangerous time. for that was when the blockade runners were more likely to attempt to slip in or out of port. in the middle of a moonless night or perhaps, during a rain squall, maybe both. a slightly darker shadow would become visible off in the complete darkness. remember, everybody is running blacked out now. they can't be seen at night. wary of firing into a friend because it might actually be another one of the blockade ships. an officer on the deck might light up flares, red, blue, certain pattern inviting the response.

do you know the code for tonight on the, on the, night signals? if the appropriate response was not forthcoming that probably led to a rocket being fired into the air. then everybody beat to quarters, sailors, feet pounding on the boards as they ran to the guns, bumping into each other in the darkness trying to haul the guns out. firing a shot into the dark, the blinding flash of the muzzle blinding them for just a few moments until they could see nothing at all. and then as suddenly as it all began, it was over. more often than not, their runner escaped, the men angry about their missed opportunity and the officers frustrated. kind of a schizophrenic lifestyle then. weeks of nothing and then moments of frenetic activity. there was some relief from this existence. periodically, a supply ship would show up from port royal, bringing supplies to the blockading vessels, food, coal, other supplies. and they would be ferried

over in row boats like this. you can imagine the disaster, that that had -- on boats rocking about in a busy harbor. less frequently, individual ships would be returned to port royal for repair on their engines or more serious repairs. in port royal, the union established floating machine shops. if you were last night, watched harold's talk, he showed a slide, drawing, etching of one of the floating machine shops in port royal. in fact, i think i may have one as well. not as good, though. now for the men on board these ships, the return to port royal meant a chance to go ashore. not like liberty in new york city. still it's solid ground under your feet. that's a nice break. and those visits ashore also allowed union sailors their first glimpse of southern slavery. black refugees along the

south atlantic coast frequently flagged down passing vessels or even rowed out in canoes or rafts to seek asylum with union blockaders. this is stedman's sketch of one family coming aboard. most, i suspect, were not as well dressed as this fellow seems to be. when this happened. many of the younger men, most, perhaps of the younger men were taken into the naval service. other families -- elderly people, women, children, were then colonized along the coast on offshore islands where they made up a kind of a rehearsal for freedom as one historian has called it. in sustaining themselves, growing vegetables for their sustenance. and growing cash crops for export managed to make a tidy little profit. meanwhile, the men who volunteered for naval service became part of the crews, first

truly integrated military force in american history. there were of course black soldiers in the civil wars, we all know. but they were deployed in segregated regiments. hard to do that on a ship. ships are crowded places. so, of course the crews were truly integrated. about 15% of the crews. 15%, 18% were made up of african-americans. many of them as former slaves. known in the vernacular as contrabands. now for the confederates, the blockade was more than a nuisance. blockade running, in fact, was their logistical lifeline to sustain their armies in the field. early on when the blockade was still quite porous, opportunistic blockade runners made tremendous profits for their endeavors. but it was unorganized and ad hoc. a few argued that blockade running should be organized by the government, managed. but such a notion ran contrary to the anti-government laissez faire values.

burdened as they were with fighting a war for survival, decided to leave blockade running to the entrepreneurs. that, in hindsight was clearly a lost opportunity for the south. for instead of bringing in the kind of materials the confederacy desperately needed, the profit-driven blockade runners brought in what was lucrative. cliche, blockade runners and what flashes into our mind is rhett butler. they brought in bonnets, perfumes and such nonsense. that was not quite literally true. but it was true that the market more than the needs of confederate armys often determined the cargoes. the pattern of trade, indicated on this slide, usually began in england, france, belgium, with legal merchantmen shipping their goods in traditional transoceanic merchant ships, carrying them to a port nearer to the united states. saint george bermuda, nassau,

bahamas, and havana, north coast of cuba. there the cargos would be transferred from the big, fat merchant ships into sleek, narrow, specially designed blockade runners. many modeled after the clyde river steamers. so-called, so-called, clyde steamers. low, fast, side wheeled or propeller-driven vessels painted gray to blend with the sea at night. once under way from one of these interim ports, they become subject to capture from the moment they left british or spanish waters. every speck on the horizon was a potential foe. they maneuvered from discovery. they also tried to time their voyages so they appeared just over the horizon offshore at dusk, so they could make that run into the final port at night. thomas taylor, served as a super cargo or owner's agent on board

the english built steel hulled blockade runner, which i think i showed you earlier, and have a picture here. this is the ban hee. he is making the run into wilmington, north carolina, he wrote "nothing i have ever experienced can compare with it. hunting, pig sticking, steeple chasing, big game shooting, polo. i have done a little of each. all have their thrilling moments. but none can approach running a blockade. okay. pig sticking, anybody? help me with that one. the banshee made four runs into wimgton, as it turns out, but her luck ran out on the fifth attempt when she was spotted well out to sea by the armed army transport ship, fulton. more about that in a minute.

hulled by the fulton's second shot, the unarmed ship rounded to and dropped her flag in token of surrender. now the experience of the banshee was kind of a metaphor for confederate blockade running, generally. despite several successful and very profitable voyages, she ended up, after all, a prize of the yankees. her number of successful runs, four, turns out to be the average number of successful runs for blockade runners in the south atlantic coast. and even with her eventual loss, and the loss of that last cargo, the initial runs that she made yielded a substantial profit for her owners. of course, every ship that escaped through the blockade as the banshee did four times was fodder for the opposition newspapers in the north, who attacked the navy, and secretary wells in particular. james gordon bennett, publisher and then editor of the

influential new york herald, a particularly virulent critic, who excoriated the navy regularly. the capture of the banshee by an army transport -- that wounds me, by the way -- filled bennett with glee. his editorial the next day was blistering in its treatment of the naval department. the ship defied every ship in our navy to capture her. but when she was at last run to ground it will be noted, it was not by one of our naval vessels but by an army transport. this was simply more evidence as far as bennett was concerned that wells was as obstinate as he is ignorant. and that he should be removed at once in favor of some competent person. secretary wells in the audience here this morning? i don't want to get into trouble here. lincoln, however, whom bennett described as a great deal more

kind than just, stood by his embattled secretary of the navy who remained in the cabinet for the duration of the war and in fact the duration of the lincoln presidency. the newspaper stories did not deter lincoln or wells in their purpose, but they did bother the men on the blockade. this sketch, by the way, which is also from stedman, shows the men on the huron staring out over the horizon in a rainstorm, their eyes peeled, looking for every possible sign of a violator. and his sarcastic caption, if you can't quite read it at the bottom reads the reprehensible want wants of vigilance in our black aiding vessels seen new york papers, 1862, 1863, 1864. they were tired of hearing this. the confederacy sought to break the blockade in several ways. they knew they couldot