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tv   [untitled]    March 25, 2012 3:00pm-3:30pm EDT

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future world of cooperational humanism. power to the people. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> good job. good job. good job. good job. >> the genetic scientist that nailed down, you know, rough date for when the hiv epidemic starts describes tinderboxes and wet moss. most parts of the world there is not that much hiv. yet, in some places, there's a ton and it is incredibly destructive. understanding that these -- two categories exist and allows you to think okay, what are those factors to keep this virus
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moving? >> author craig timber tracks the history of aids. tonight at 9:00. part of a book tv weekend on c-span 2. every weekend american history tv brings you oral histories. first person accounts of the events and people that have shaped our history. recently we have been featuring oral histories from the vietnam archive at texas tech university in lubbock. now an excerpt from an interview with the oral history park director kelly crager. looking backward over the years, it will be filtered through the lens of 40 years of experience. and they have had times reflect on their experiences in the war.
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can filter. filter someone's memory in a way that you have to be careful to try to understand, i think, the jest many times what someone is saying as well as a spirit of what they are saying. but that -- you know no way means they are not reliable because they are being very honest and forthcoming and forthright. that there is just -- an immense amount of valuable accurate information we can get from these oral history interviews. i have -- another thing that comes up occasionally is that maybe we will touch on an interview, touch on a -- difficult topic. difficult subject for someone to deal with. and i'm sure you can understand it. when these people were thrust into a war and -- in their late teens, early 20s, you know,
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there's a lot of vulnerability there, i think. and there's -- oftentimes there is this unfortunate sense of loss and it can be difficult. what we try do is to use common sense and treat them with as much respect as we possibly can and try to help them get through any particular topic that may be of some difficulty. or if they would rather stop, we stop and move on to the next topic. those are -- those are two of the things i think that are most important. it was after these battles waged in november 1965 that north vietnamese forces began in guerrilla warfare. airing for first time on television excerpts from one of the television histories.
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lieutenant colonel george forrest, commanding officer in the first battalion fifth cavalry that came into n to support the seventh cavalry after the third battle. this is 50 minutes. >> we are in crystal city hilton, washington, d.c., 40th anniversary union of the la drang valley. tell us your recollection of arriving on the 17th, 16th, and on that tuesday, what did it look like to you? >> my unit unlike the other
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units we walked in. we had spent the night, previous night, at l.t. columbus. then the next morning went overland. owe the way in we could see some of the casualties, at least to the north vietnamese casualties as we got into the landing zone. jack smith characterized it as they had that blind combat stare. >> did you know what happened there? >> we did not. communications was poor. we were not on the frequency until we got -- actually got in. >> do you remember the then lieutenant colonel -- >> absolutely. >> saw that. >> absolutely. he was -- probably this
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monumental figure standinging in the middle of all of this chaos with did a total control of who he was, what he was, what he wanted us to do. without hesitation, told me this is where i want your unit, in the perimeter, and move out. so we basically did and deployed. some point later we came back, briefing from him on what had gone on and what he expect. what he anticipated would happen the rest of the day. the next night. >> he came in and addressed the company commanders? >> company commanders came in. part of his normal -- either morning briefing or afternoon briefing. we got there fairly early in the morning. >> what did he tell you? what did he say he thought would be happening? >> well, he knew that the north vietnamese forces were still there. that we needed to first of all do something policing of the battlefield to try to recover as
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many american soldiers, bod eeshgs as we could, try to get them back inside the perimeter. go through normal routine as -- a company once you go in line. establish your positions, put out listening posts, do all the kinds of military tactical things that unit should do. >> you stay there in the day and nig nig night. what was that night like. >> there were a number of probing attacks. we were on the western side of the perimeter. no real heavy pros. they were looking for weaknesses in their line. my company being first, we had
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ample supply of ammunition. we were a solid company. they didn't find too many weaknesses. >> tell me about your general feelings and your remembrance. what kind of commando was he? >> before -- >> before, yes. >> didn't know him. >> even if he had been there the whole time i didn't know him. he was a battalion commander of another battalion. remember, my unit was attached. >> i'm asking because -- did he make contacted with you all? >> didn't make contact with us because we didn't fall under his command until we were ordered to move out. that -- i can say the same about hal moore. hi not laid eyes on hal moore until the morning that we walked into the lv.
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his reputation being a tough battalion commander but -- i was in a separate brigade, separate battalion. we happened e and as i tell folks all the time being attached to a unit slyke being stepchild. you are the last to do everything. >> right. >> in my case, it works well. >> yes, it did. >> right. >> so -- you get through the night and then the decision is made to walk to albany. what do you know about that decision to walk? lifted. there's also a question of why you even wanted -- why people were going to go to albany. >> right. and in hindsight or do you want yeah, well -- on that particular morning, when the colonel calls you to the -- command post and the orders of the day are we are going to move out. we know that a portion of this unit is going to be airlifted out. and some of you guys are going
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to walk. now -- again, i -- i -- overlay my attachment mentality that -- obviously not going to fly out of the statute of them. so -- we -- we assumed that we would probably be one of the units that walked out. they think the concept was -- at that time we had also -- established communications with my battalion. and -- there was some discussion of marrying up with that battalion in balancian bany. that was an assumeings on my part. we were going to go -- once we got to albany, we would be airlifted back to my battalion so we would marry up with my battalion. now -- now after 40 years, i understand one of the reasons that we walked out is because there was not enough airlift, helicopter lift support, to fly everybody out. the months leading up to all ban write, there was lots of flying. most of the helicopters were at
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their 100-hour maintenance mandatory maintenance. a number of them were probably down. again, that's -- after i read the book. >> so -- you all move out and you are in the rear. >> mm-hmm. >> were you tasked with the rear guard? were you just in -- stepchild? >> no. again, but -- understanding in the military tactics, when you are the last unit, there are military missions, there are implied tasks and special tasks. and implied tasks are being the last unit. you are security. that was a given. that was -- ft. benning 101. being the last unit, rear security, more importantly security of my particular unit was paramount in my mind. >> tell me about your lieuten t lieutenants. >> good lieutenants. young.
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had 10 cs. larry hess. he was the one that was killed. terry martel. and -- terry martel was -- i believe, an rotc lieutenant from the ohio. my other lieutenant was jim patwa. he as from baltimore. and i have one platoon that was commanded by noncommissioned officer. and his name for whatever reason -- haven't been able to -- last night when we were talking, i kept trying to get these guys to refresh my memory so that when i did this interview it -- the other day, i would be -- up to speed on who was there. and then i had my -- an unusual scenario, my xo, was also on the ground with us. his name is don adams. and don is from atlanta. >> and your radio operator -- >> radio operators, again,
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were -- hersche fromality entown, pennsylvania. jimmy smith from north carolina. >> so you all -- you all move out that day and -- a lot of people said you were weighted down and the whole -- group was weighted down with a lot -- moving a lot of materials. >> right. a lot of -- well, you wouldn't say a lot. we had equipment that normally -- anticipateping flown out, soldiers carry a lot more stuff than they would if they had to -- to pack it. we normally have the canteen. two canteens of water and extra ammunition over there. but again, a lot of -- we had gotten resupplies. and so lots of the resupplies we had was -- we still had because we didn't do -- didn't expand an
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awful lot of ammunition that night. again, even -- the ammunition that we expended we replenished in the morning. so i -- i wouldn't say we were burdened down. it was an unusual load for an air mobile company to be carrying. it was unusual for an air mobile company to be walking around in the woods and normally what happened airplanes came and picked us up. and we got a free ride. i wouldn't say we were -- unusually burdened down. it was probably more than we were used to carrying. >> what 'twas training like? >> for the first part of it, it was -- fairly clear because -- because the -- initial walk-out was -- again, part of the lv x-ray. but as we move further -- get my directions. further north, the elephant
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grass became more prevalent. so that became an issue in terms of visibility. but other than that, relatively flat. and i -- i think when we went back in '93 and looked at it, it looked more like north georgia woods than -- than we imagined. with -- the elephant fwras. so the visibility was really limited in at least a portion of -- got to albany, there were these -- the terrain feature that sticks out in everybody's mind, enormous anthills which stood -- still don't know how, why, when, where, whatever. but -- but they became part of the terrain. but, again, i would imagine that visibility probably no more than 100 meters to the right or left or even to the front of the formation.
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so i think putt close. >> did that worry you? do you remember being concerned? >> no. every day that i was about that vietnam i was concerned. and not too much concern about me but concern about the welfare of those guys that depended on me to do some -- concern? absolutely. after all, we had -- just witnessed horror and -- some people probably talk about a letdown because we weren't more relaxed. i got to tell thaw -- the commanders or leaders were not relaxed. i know none of my ncos were relaxed. they were always cautious about what we did because we -- we didn't have the normal intel. we didn't have the kind of navigational aides. good map. >> right. >> to base you can lib point out what the terrain was. we were stumbling in the dark. >> one map. >> yes. >> and -- >> you had someone's -- make
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another map. >> right. we did some, yeah. and the reason was because, again, going back to how we got there in the first place, we were doing highway security on a past just south -- south. and our mission was to provide outpost highway security. we got a call that you are going to be airlifted into lv columbus for an operation. and -- no maps. not even the kind of communications that -- exchange of communications that you would normally get when you exchange units like that. so flying in, the -- chinook pilots -- again, we landed on lz. a non-secured lz and ch-47.
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>> we can go into detail another time. >> yeah. that's a whole other story. yeah. >> is on -- the two -- delta company up front. >> yeah. >> run into them and get them and cause the company commanders to the front. how did you feel about leaving the company and going that far up? >> man. reality and what i know now, okay, my thought process -- my thought process has changed over 40 years. you have to remember, i was a good infantry captain who -- if they said they want you to come up -- didn't go through a checklist how do i evaluate the commander. why is he not using the radio? no. it was okay, guys, off and on.
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off your feet, off your ass, on your feet. we are going forward. that's basically what we did. >> the conversation you all had up there when you got there. >> didn't really have a conversation. when i got to the position where we were actually starting to assemble to do the briefing, started to get incoming, mortified. my immediate reaction was don't know anyone in front of know and i don't know any of those guys on the side of me. the only comfort zone for me in this whole scenario is back down that trail where a company to the fifth is. so -- may response to the incoming fire was the reaction of -- i need to get out of here so that i can get back to position. again, i -- in hindsight now i think about it and was it a
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conscious thought of i need to go back and save my guys or was it a conscious thought, i'm scared as health. i need to get out of this particular environment so that i can get my thought processes together and do the things i was trained to do. and i haven't quite figured out what the answer was. but i think it was more train g training. i they it was more instinct, more response to a dangerous situation. this may sound melodramatic. i have to tell you, the safest place i believe for me on that battlefield on that particular day was back at a company. >> your guy. >> because i knew these guys. right. >> did you ask for permission? >> no. didn't do the traditional -- click your heels and -- salute three times and turn around and go. it was -- turn around and go.
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>> trap has sprung in the middle. >> how fast are you going? it is chronicled in my book. miles per hour -- i'm being facetious. >> were you sprinting full speed or drag these guys behind you? >> no, no. because these were -- i mane, i was young. but these guys were younger than i was. they had -- more equipment than i did. but -- again, because they were so good, i never had to look for them. whenever i -- wherever i went, they appeared. so -- my assumption was that these guys are right there with me. i'm -- and i'm -- i'm thinking that probably for a portion -- i would like to think that probably for a portion of that trip, that they were. i would hope that -- probably never get the answer to that. but i would hope that -- i
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didn't leave them. i would hope they were able to stay as close as they possibly could. but obviously was not enough because -- i got there and -- they didn't. so -- >> how long did it take you? ? was this a five-minute run? 30 seconds. you are traveling 560 yards. >> in my mind, in mine mind, saying forever, it seemed like forever. but in actual time it probably didn't take very long at all.
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600 yards, couple of football fields, three, four football fields. the actual -- to qualify it in minutes maybe five minutes, six minutes. >> what do you remember seeing? were you -- was it a trail? more of a trail? >> it was more -- yeah. it was more of tracing the steps that i had come up because -- again, not as -- this was not a conscious effort of if i don't stay on this trail or if i get off of this trail i'm going to get lost. i laugh all the time about -- paying attention to where you go. so you can always know how to get back. again, that's another one of those learned infantry officer
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things that they put in the back of this little computer and it is there. so i kind of retrace where i was going to actually -- to -- to see actions to the right and left, see guys fighting and -- firing those kind of things, that's a blur. these guys were looking at me like now that you are here, you have to do something, tell us what to do. >> what did you tell them? what did you do? >> guys, number one, we have just -- didn't have to tell them. they already knew. we had been ambushed. we need to execute the process we know to go about. the first thing, establish a position where we could be thoroughly secure. one of the first airplanes that landed in the makeshift perimeter that we had, medevaced choppers. when they came in i basically
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went over to the first bird that landed and talked to the pilot. basically said this is what happen order your way back in. if you can bring in the mission, water, medical supplies, whatever, we need, because we have been hit pretty bad. we are in good shape but i would imagine that the units in front of us are -- are having more problems than we are. combat effectiveness of my unit was probably 75%. and -- after having read the book, you -- kind of know what the guys up in front of me were like. >> yes. >> so it was -- the -- once we started to, again, get the wounded out and get supplies and whatever, then we concentrated on, again, accountability where everybody is. and -- >> can you describe how the physical layout of your perimeter -- how -- how far you
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set up. >> it was -- wide enough that we could accommodate at least plea platoons and i my weapon inside and headquarters. pretty good size. large enough that helicopters could at least come fairly close. i don't think then landed inside the perimeter but fairly close. inonly remember -- probably two sorties, maybe three sorties of medevacs came in. it was getting pretty late. the battle, 1:00, 1:30. by the time everything calmed down, getting dark. battle. i remember they came just at dark. when they -- and -- and so i'm -- if may recollection serves me the perimeter was big enough his company could fold in and didn't have on push out any
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further. >> tell me about -- the battle during the day, before the night, how intense does it get for you all? >> pretty intense because we got some -- pretty serious -- i will call them more than pros. assaults. i -- at least in my mind. assaults on our position. again, we were -- once you can re-establish combat integrity or unit integrity, whatever, an infantry company is a pretty formidable force if you are -- if you don't have to worry about rare security. because we are where we are, most of our efforts are outward. so we are in pretty good shape. again, so -- as i recall, the -- assaults on our position probably came from the direction of the ambush. we could pretty well concentrate
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most of our -- i did have indirect fire weapons to help us out. >> what about -- fire support? >> yeah. our -- again, one of the guys wounded in my -- initial assault was my artillery fo. but they hsh they had backup. their rtos, telephone operators, were killed fire support guys. so we did get artillery support particularly as we -- as we knew we were going to turn off the air coming in, we could -- we could do some -- night defensive fires to put them around the perimeter. so yeah, we did have -- because there were -- there was artillery at -- lz.
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probably in the book. >> still at falcon. >> yeah, yeah. right. >> tell me about that night. >> i guess about -- hour -- we were getting these intermittent radio calls from -- we initially thought it was probably the -- north vietnamese who probably captured some of our equipment and they were using our radios to try to get us out of our secure position back into the ambush area. but we were get thing -- and one radio call was fairly consistent. it was from the -- ghost 46. and if you get an opportunity to interview john, that will be -- because his experience is one that i cannot imagine. i cannot imagine how

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