fam program becoming a little bit more robust, have they been more supportive of the ffdo program? >> speaking with the fams, they realize the men and women that are federal air marshals, they do a fantastic job. they're on the road constantly. they have a very -- they have a tough life. and i respect highly what their fames do and please don't take away from in that i would be want to cut the fam budget or degrade the great people federal air marshal program do. i don't. they work in tandem. but i do agree with your analysis that the ffdo program was not embraced, shall we say, by the tsa. and that's why there is some discussion that i would like to see possibly in working with

congress and taking the ffdo program out of the tsa and possibly putting it in the doj. i think it might be the competing interests there might be alleviated. >> last round for questions, other questions? would you join with me in thanking the congressman. thank you very much. >> thank you to heritage. >> guys? so i'm very excited to introduce our panel. the one thing that all these gentlemen have in common is unlike a lot of folks in

washington and think tanks and stuff, these guys have actually done all this stuff for a living. so let me start with -- i'll introduce them all right now in order and then we'll kind of run down the murderer's row here and they can do their comments in turn and we'll open it to the floor for questions and comments. al aiken is a retired marine corps lieutenant colonel. veteran pilot, and a former pilot. are you still active? >> i'm retired. >> from american airlines. >> and he is -- he was one of the founders and principal leaders in pushing for the establishment of the ffdo program. mike kern is the executive vice president of the federal flight deck officers association. and that is a trade association which nationally represents the ffdos. he is the security director for the coalition of air line pilots association. he is the security chairman for the allied pilots association,

and he is also an american airline pilot. he's been flying for 14 years. and you're flying today, right? >> and tracy price is a commercial airline pilot for the past 25 years. 19 years as a boeing 737 captain for a major u.s. airline and who is a founding pilot in the chairman of the national organization that did help create the ffdo program. here you have a wealth of experience and not just flying but also with the program itself. i couldn't think of a better panel of experts and why don't we start with, we'll just go in order. is that okay. >> you want us up at the podium? >> it's really up to you guys. whichever you feel more comfortable. >> i'll just sit right here if it's okay with you. i'd like to discuss with you a little bit about the inception of the program, the history of it, and i'll tell you that the institutionful hli of arming pid

specifically the ffdo program sith beginning. i was chairman of the washington pilots for the allied pilots association back in september of 2001, and after the air space reopened, approximately four days later, i was on one of the first flights out of washington for dallas for our first board of directors meeting at wit we set policy at the apa with a goal to arm as many of the united states commercial airline pilots as possible to defend against another repeat of the 9/11 attack. there were other concurrent efforts going on at the same time. the alpa leadership, air line pilots association and they represent over 50 different pilots from over 50 different airlines, the some in the alpa

leadership said we cannot be wyatt earp and sky king at the same time. well, the vast majority of the alpa pilots disagreed with that. and that result the in the formation of a group called the airline pilots security alliance, apsa, but a captain named bob guidea. eventually my good friend captain tracy praise became president of that organization and grew it to well over 50,000 members about half of which were pilots but the rest were just cooks and bottle washers from all over america who thought their pilots ought to be armed. at the same time, senator bob smith from new hampshire with young brian darling working for him introduced legislation to arm america's airline pilots. that all resulted in the transportation security act of 2001 signed into law november 19th, 2001, and that's the act

that created the transportation security administration. here's what it said. the pilot of a passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier in air transportation or interstate transportation is authorized to carry a firearm into the cockpit if the undersecretary meaning the tsa approves, if the airline approves, if the firearm is approved by the tsa, and if the pilot receives proper training for use of that firearm. well, we went to work. and several meetings with the tsa and several letters to secretary of transportation norm mineta fell on deaf ears. they didn't want to have a thing to do with us. in fact, administrator john mcgow said i will not allow pilots to be armed. that will required a ten-month

extensive lobbying effort with congressional members and staff and although some in the alpa leadership leaned towards a limited program with 2% pilot cap and a two-year sunset provision that would certainly have killed the program very early on, an amendment by representative defazio removed those limits and hr-4635 was passed 310-113 in the house of representatives. in the senate, they always wanted a full-blown program. although there was opposition there, as well, from the airline transport association. they sent a letter expressing their concerns against the program and they signed it by 21 airline ceos. then the then tsa administrator admiral loy testified before

congress with those same concerns almost identical to that ata letter. in spite of that, the senate passed hr-5,05 overwhelming 90-9 with the one absent. that established the department of homeland security and flds of it the arming pilots against terrorism act which mandated the ffdo program. and here's its language. the undersecretary of transportation for security shall establish a programtom deputyize volunteer pilots of air carriers providing passenger air transportation. and it had some procedural requirements. it set a deadline of three months for the tsa to create the program and that same three months for them to start training pilots. now, notice i said the word passenger in there. that hasn't been in the previous language. that got slipped in late one

night just before passage which basically carved out the cargo operations. now, let me ask you a question here. isn't the boeing 767 full of fuel and boxes just as lethal a weapon as a boeing 767 full of passengers and fuel? well, so we had to circle back around and get the cargo pilots reinserted into that. it also required a three-month deadline for initiating the program but the tsa actually took five months. and in all of the meetings that we had with the tsa administration helping them try to design this program, they complained, in fact, the nut administrator of tsa admiral shore, complained in one of our meetings, he said we have such a short notice here. we only have three months. i said, well, admiral you've actually had 15 months. you decided not to create this program.

they also refused to accept a database that we handed to them with 10,000 volunteer pilots on a cd. they could have gotten them started contacting pilots and putting them into the program right away. they refused to accept it. they also refused to accept a program outline that we developed in concert with the fbi, some agents in the fbi that had designed a cockpit protection program. they didn't want to have a anything to do with that. we also started a professional standards program within the group of pilots that would eventually be armed. and they ignored that. they were also hostile to the design of the program itself and they designed it to discourage participation. they created excessive background checks that were redundant to the background checks that we already had just to become an airline pilot. checks with regard to security,

financial and criminal background checks. their initial weapon choice was inaccurate. we called it the barney fife pistol because it was a six-shot revolver and we produced a video that showed them that that was inadequate to the job. where we had enactment of terrorist actors that attacked the cockpit. and we were not able to handle them with either the six-shot revolver or the tasers that they asked us to use. and we ended up with a more appropriate weapon. also, the carriage procedures that they designed were illogical and unsafe. they required us to transport the weapon except when in the cockpit when we could carry it. the difference being carriages is on person, transport is in some sort of bag or other carriage method. no other law enforcement agency in the world carries transports or weapons in that fashion.

the administration's continued institutional hostility towards the program continues to this day as we can see with the administration's budget submission for 2013.to kl the py cutting the funding in half when the funding should be increased so that we can get more pilots into the program. we knew when we set out to design this program that we would have 0 spend the rest of our careers to protect it, and years and here i am again. and i'll turn it over now to captain tracy price to talk to you about the current program. >> thank you, al, i appreciate it. i'm going to be brief. i'll make really three main points. i want everybody to understand that arming pilots is not a new idea. it's been going on for a long time. arming pilots is safe. and armed pilots, arming pilots is an effective extremely effective method of securing an

airliner and it's irresponsible for the obama administration to propose to strangle this program to death. armed pilots, pilots have been armed from the dawn of commercial aviation to present date with a brief interlude from 1987 to shortly after september 11th. it was during that brief interlude, that was the experimental dangerous period in which we saw the september 11th attacks. so understand that pilots were armed from the dawn of commercial aviation through 1987. there was no regulation. there was no training requirement. and there was no incident. there was no record of incident or problem associated with pilots carrying guns for that long period of time. for a series of kind of silly reasons, pilots were disarmed in 1987. we saw the results of that on september 11th. that was the inevitable result of having a gun-free zone or an

undefended cockpit. and then we rearmed pilots in 19 -- i'm sorry, in 2003, the first pilots were rearmed. the program has been extremely safe. the armed pilot program or the federal flight deck officer program has proven to be extremely safe. it's a large program. the third largest law enforcement agency in the country. many, many, many armed pilots, the actual number is classified number but it's huge. the safety record rivals or is better than any other law enforcement agency in the country. armed pilots, there are all kinds of predictions when pilots were rearmed in -- after 9/11. there were all of these predictions of terrible host of consequences, pits were going to have -- get mad and shoot each other or pilots were going to have an accidental shootings. there were going to be all kinds

of issues associated with the problems. none of that's happened. the arming pilots program has proven to be extremely safe, not surprisingly, airline pilots are stable, responsible people that we trust with our lives every time we get on an airplane. we can certainly trust them with a handgun. the armed pilot program is, in fact, as has been discussed, the first line of deterrence and the last line of defense. if you're a terrorist group, the best day in history for you was september 11th of 2001. most successful attack in history probably of any terrorist group was that day. they'd love to repeat the performance. the fact that there are armed pilots, large numbers in cockpits that are unknown, nobody is exactly sure where they are provides an incredible deterrent, an effective

deterrent that has caused terrorist groups to look to other ways to attack us. and that is proof that the armed pilot program is doing its primary function of deterring future attacks. that's our main goal. we want to create the -- raise the bar of difficulty to the point where terrorists say you know what? we're not going to be able to use these airliners as weapons anymore. and we're going to look to other ways. and they have looked to other ways and that needs to be addressed. but we've plugged that hole with the armed pilot program of taking -- of cockpit takeovers in the airplane then becoming a missile. sl last thing i want to point out is there's all -- a lot of discussion and secretary napolitano has kind of irresponsibly suggested that we can rely on the cockpit door,

this new reinforced cockpit door that we have as the way to -- we can take away the pilots arms that pilots can be undefended as they were on september 11th of 2001 because we have this new cockpit door. there's flow such thing as an impenetrable door. the new cockpit door that we have is better than the old one. i will tell that you that door was in place when the first pilots were rearmed after september 11th. we got that new door almost immediately. but few were willing to bet the lives of hundreds of people on an airliner or thousands of people on the ground on that door not being breached. that's an irresponsible thing to suggest that we're going to bet the lives of thousands of people on a door holding up. and in fact, the door by necessity is opened in flight. it has to be.

food and beverage service, bathroom breaks, and there are operational reasons why pilots have to open that door in flight. so it's a terrible, irresponsible assumption to make that we can just rely on this cockpit door and everything will be fine. that's a terrible dangerous game to play with the lives of americans on boardard airplanes, airliners and on the ground. we've tried disarming pilots with disastrous results. that's the new kind of idea that we experimented with irresponsibly from '87 to shortly after 9/11. we saw the results of that when terrorists break in to a cockpit and find the pilots defenseless, there is no hope for the passengers on board that airplane. the armed pilot is the last resort, final line of defense that will save those people on board that airplane possibly

thousands on the ground. the u.s. military stands ready every day to destroy a commercial airliner filled with innocent passengers because the cockpit has been commandeered. it is irresponsible, it's the height of irresponsibility to not give those people on board that airplane the last resort, final line of defense of an armed pilot in that will cockpit. >> mike, i'm sorry. >> that's all right. >> what i'd like to do is touch on a few items in summary. and also point out a couple of things as we've walked along. there's a lot of assumptions with security. to assume that we're catching everything that's coming through through passenger screening, through cargo screening, through perimeter screening is simply a fallacy. daily, i get reports of different weapons, weapons found on aircraft from not only the

member airlines of the coalition of air line pilots association butlacy. daily, i gets reports of different weapons, weapons found on aircraft from not only constantly, this system is porous. things are getting through. we need a backup. when we assume that the cockpit door will be the final line of defense and we take away that capability of the pilots to defend an aircraft from being a weapon of mass destruction, we are not doing that. there is not a system that will help us to completely do everything. we are more vigilant than in the past, but not infallible. to assume to take the weapons away from the pilots is to assume in this case we caught everything up to the cockpit door and we're not doing it. we have at least recently, one incident where an offduty ffao, and i'm speaking vaguely on

purpose here -- was able to stop an individual from attempting to breach the cockpit door. our federal flight deck officer was present on that aircraft. i'm not going to mention what airline he was with. he had the presence of mind to intercede in that situation and subdue the individual. for the cost of $15 a flight, $15 a flight, we have an extra layer of security on there. an extra layer of security to protect us. nobody caught this in screening, nobody caught this person in passenger screening. nobody was aware this person was going to attempt to do that. now we are talking about taking the weapons away from pilots and assuming we caught everything. we already have evidence to the contrary. gentlemen we've evidence also in the last few years that terrorists have considered the fact that pilots are armed. in chatter, in their plans, there's been several reports that as terrorists consider ways of assaulting the united states, they also consider that pilots are armed. that is a deterrent to them.

there is evidence there are facts that prove that. we can't reveal that here. for the obama administration to cut this in half is simply irresponsible. to assume security is not porous is irresponsible. this program is effective. a couple of things that haven't been mentioned, it was noted pilots would be able to participate in this program at no cost. we have figured on average a pilot spends over $10,000 of their own money to participate in the program. over a six-year period. if you compare that $10,000 of their own money to take time away from home, to drop a trip, they are no longer paid for a trip, to pay for their travel, their training, that's to pay to go to the requalification, pay for their own ammunition. all these things are carried by the pilot. when you take that $10,000 and you multiply it time the number

of pilots, it's over $400 million, well above $400 million. compare that to the $22 million that the federal government spends for the program, the pilots are paying over 400 million to participate in the program. recently as of this year, they ran out of money to bring any more pilots for the program. there's over 700 pilots waiting to participate to spend 10,000 of their own money to be the last line of defense for this country. and they're being told, no, we don't need you. in fact, we're going to cut the budget back. we are cutting the budget back due to the program. there are several requirements for flight deck officers to participate. they have to requalify with their firearm every six months. they have to go to a recurring training protocol. this would reduce the number of facilities, increase the cost of the federal flight deck officers, limit the number of federal flight deck officers simply by cutting this budget. consider what i said. $10,000 per pilot is what they are spending over six years.

if you were to do a bar graph and look at the graph, the amount of money being spent to participate to be this last line of defense is enormous. the federal government is spending to run the program is incredibly small compared to that. why wouldn't you take these people? why would you not want these pilots armed? they're already on the airport, already willing to participate in this. the other aspect is the congressman made a comparison between the cost of a federal air marshal. knows numbers were numbers we received from tsa a while ago. i support the federal air marshal program 100%. as an aviator, as an airline pilot, i love it when they're onboard. i also want to see our pilots armed. for the price of an air marshal, $3,300 per flight, for the price of two in the front of an aircraft, you could fill up business and coach with federal flight deck officers on a 777.

that's 440 flight deck officers peppered across the system. amount of flights covered would be enormous. the two forces combined, federal air marshals, flight deck officers, provide that last line of defense. they need to be preserved. currently, where the administration is headed is to say we don't want you to spend $10,000 of your own money, pilots, thank you very much. we believe the cockpit door suffices, even though it opens and closed and at times has had problems. they are turning those folks away. that is a travesty. that puts us in jeopardy, puts the flying public in jeopardy. that is not only a misunderstanding of security in aviation, but clearly some of the comments i heard they are not front line people making these decisions. we are more vigilant than we have been in the past. we are not infallible. this current budget proves that this administration, the obama administration does not support this program. we have to go to the legislators for that support.

we are asking for their support in this. federal flight deck officer program is the most cost-effective program for counterterrorism that we have at $15 a flight. it represents the third largest group of federal law enforcement officers in the nation and a group of people willing to spend incredible amounts of their own money to protect the public, protect their airlines and protect themselves. any changes to this program right now would be done at the expense of all of us. >> thank you. again, questions from the floor, and again, if you would raise your hand and be recognized and state your affiliation and your name, that would be great. okay. >> brian darling, heritage foundation. my question is when you look back at the history of the creation of the program, this is not a partisan issue. the leadership of senator

barbara bach in california, many democrats stepped up in support of this shows it has bipartisan support. the overwhelming bipartisan vote in favor in the house and senate creating the bill was part of what brought it into being. my question to you is, maybe you could give us a little history of maybe the meetings that you had and the fact that congress overwhelmingly supported this on the record on numerous occasions, yet for whatever reason, this administration wants to end the program. >> it was favored by almost everyone in congress. of course it was early after 9/11 and we all had our emotions. we all knew what had happened. it was relatively easy to convince even those. we did not make this a gun rights issue because that's not what it is. it's the national security issue. that's what we ran it as. they understood that. so we had great support from folks who you would think would

actually otherwise be against it in both the house and the senate. there are a few holdouts, but i think our argument was convincing. so we did have, as brian said, solid bipartisan support for this. >> if p i might add, also currently in our visits on the hill, life is a bipartisan issue. people all want to see it preserved in terms of how we deal with terrorism. so we've seen a lot of support on both sides of the aisle. that's why this is such a disconnect. the context which we were approaching several members of the homeland security committee meeting, we had bipartisan conversations with counsel from both sides looking at getting additional funding just for the additional pilots that are in the pipeline right now. over 700. they were in agreement and we were working towards that. that's why this budget that came out was such a surprise because it was a complete disconnect from what we've been seeing up on the hill from both sides of

the aisle. >> winston packer. i wonder if you could k enumerate the success of the program in terms of numbers of incidents that you have of potential attacks you thwarted because of this program. are there other countries that have the fau program? >> is that directed at me? >> anybody. >> as far as armed pilots in other countries, no. we are unique in that case. for incidents, there were numerous incidents. some we've got to be careful about talking about because they are covered by sensitive security information. i talked about one in general from an offduty was able to stop something. if you remember the shoe bomber and underwear