clothing -- we are waiting for the next clothing item -- in both those cases, there were people in the middle of the aircraft over the wing that actually stopped it. that actually saw those things. while i can't point to specific incidents other than that general one i talked about, i can assure you they are out there. that they have happened and they are stopping things. it is effective. i hope that helps. >> if i can take a shot of that, as well. i'm aware of my airline specifically, of a couple of cases where a federal flight deck officer was instrumental containing a threat to the cockpit. that's as far with that as i can go. i think the idea that we haven't

had any cockpit breaches, we tried that. we did it from 1987 to shortly after 9/11. we lost 3,000 americans. we learned that day this is a horrible, horrible experiment disarming the cockpit of commercial airliners that have been armed from the dawn of commercial aviation until this day with that one brief period, i don't think it's wise. i don't think it makes any sense to go back to that failed experiment. >> i think once this has happened where you no longer have individuals that are going to come onto your aircraft and fly down to cuba, and you're going to have an extended negotiations period to where the aircraft will be returned back to the states. that paradigm's gone. that doesn't exist any more. the one we live in p now is that the aircraft will be used as a

weapon of mass destruction. we have to assume any assault on the cockpit is to take it over and use it to harm an even greater number of people. >> before that question, could i add one extra comment with regard to the numbers? i'm coming from the inception of the program. we ran a survey, we did it through the winston group who surveyed the american people. it came up 85% of those surveyed said that they thought their airline pilots should be armed. we ran two other surveys. one apa did and one alpa did. between 80% and 85% of the pilots surveyed said they thought pilots should be armed. at the time of 9/11, we flew over 30,000 flights per day. we had a little over 100,000 commercial airline pilots. if you take that 80% number, for example, we expected that 80,000 pilots thought that pilots should be armed and something north of 50,000 or 60,000 pilots

would probably actually volunteer to be armed. we don't have that many. we have a significant number, but not enough for the deterrent value we tried to create with this program. >> i'm from senator barbara boxer's office. my question, you mentioned that the air carriers expressed early opposition and concern. i was hoping you could speak to their current position on the issue and whether or not it's changed? >> i'll have to defer the current position to my colleagues who are still flying actively. i'll tell you that at the time one of their major concerns, if you owned an airline and you wanted people toe come fly with you, would you display an attitude of we have a problem and we're addressing it or display an attitude that we don't have a problem? to draw more people to fly with

you? that was the synopsis of their concerns in that ata letter. there are other specific concerns like how are we going to handle pilots when they are going from one place to another, and where are we going to store their weapons? and other concerns they didn't want to deal with. in the airline industry, everything you have to think of costs money. >> if i might add on to that, first up as a californian, thank you to my senator. senator boxer has been for this program. our former ceo had an article that mentioned it in the american way manage that's put in all the seats, seatbacks, touting the success of the program. there have been times when under certain security situations, it's been murmured, and i'm sure other folks from other airlines could probably repeat this, some management said, i wish we had

enough fdo on that flight. the view of it has really changed for the positive. one of the greatest compliments to this is, to the program is, when we go out and talk about it, i hear people say i didn't know pilots were armed. they are quiet professionals. they are doing their job, performing their duties. they are there as that last line of defense if need to be activated. if not, they are vigilante. again, thank you to the senator. >> give me a brief history lesson what you call the experiment of '83 to o'03 and wy the guns were removed. i want to understand it better from your perspective. >> several things.

airline pilots were dawned from the dawn of aviation through '87. they were required to carry firearms whenever there was u.s. mail onboard, which is a large number of flights. there was a requirement that existed in place for airline pilots to carry the guns. in 1987, it actually was in late 1986, there was a cockpit takeover that people don't know and don't remember, where a guy broke into the cockpit of a pacific southwest airlines bea-146. it's an airliner with about 100 people on it. he had a gun. he shot the pilots and killed them and crashed the airplane and everyone died. so we had a situation here where we had an unarmed cockpit and the result was the loss of an airplane and all the passengers. the faa response to that -- and by the way, that guy was not a

pilot. this was bt a problem with a pilot at all. pilots were trying to live. the faa response to that was to then require pilots to then begin going through screening. pilots were then effectively disarmed. prior to that point, pilots often carried hand guns in their flight bags. some estimates up to 60% of pilots depending on the airline carried hand guns in their flight bags. as of 1987, there were no more armed pilots. they went away. it's really inexplicable why the faa chose that course of action. a rational course of action after that horrible murder would have been to say, wait a minute, we need, if p only those guys had guns in their flight bags, we might have saved these people. we need to get more armed pilots. we need to figure out a way to encourage more armed pilots.

the faa's response was completely irrational. i'm not sure anyone can explain why they took the action they did. pilots predicted at that time there would be attempted cockpit takeovers, more and more. captain victor sarosini predicted to his wife, there will be attempted cockpit takeovers because of this. he died on september 11, 2001, when his boeing 767 was flown into the south tower of the world trade center. the other important element of this thing to mention is up through august of 2001, the regulation in the federal aviation regulations under which we all operate, the regulation existed that allowed pilots to be armed. there was a provision that would

allow an airline if they chose to go through a process to arm their pilots. no airline did. i think, frankly, it was kind of an anti-gun sentiment that existed. that regulation kind of disappeared in a horrible coincidence and irony and disappeared in august. not that it was being used, but it at least existed, then september 11, 2001, of course we had the attacks and shortly thereafter, we rearmed the pilots again. >> my name is mark weiss. i worked with these gentlemen with the allied pilots association. you asked about other countries.

culturally, arming not just pilots, but often time population or even police officers is against the thinking in many other cultures. it was also not their airliners and their population that was attacked on 9/11. if you go back to the idea of what happened in london with the liquid bombers, that was not an attack in the uk, that was an attack on a number of u.s. and canadian-based carriers. the so the whole thinking has changed as to why u.s. arms their crew members. the other thing is, if 2 you take a look at the way pilots are trained, trained in layers of safety. layers of security. it's been happening that way because it's a learned experience to prevent accidents,

to mitigate negative experiences, and what you've done is you added another layer of security into this equation. it's hard to prove a negative. you wouldn't take out a layer of security or layer of safety training that you've done with your pilots. by doing what they are doing here is that they say it's abhorrent to take that away. >> i think one of the things to point out, mark, is when we talk about these incidents, remember, we have to be right every single time. the terrorists have to be right only once. >> i asked the question for my own purposes. from 2003 to january 2007 was the aviation policy advisor for the house homeland committee and worked with several of you in that capacity. i think my question was a rational one in p terms of trying to get a grasp of the

value added of this program and how you have advanced over the years. i think it's a perfectly rational question and was for my own knowledge. thank you. >> i agree. >> did we help you answer the question good enough? >> let me ask a question. i was looking at tsa data. apparently last month they reportedly confiscated 200 guns. help me understand, what do i make of that and how does that fit in with the discussion we had here today? >> you want to take a crack at it? >> when you look at probably the vast majority of those confiscations, and i get the reports on those, too, where somebody inadvertently leaves it in their bag, i don't know the difference between somebody accidentally doing or testing the system s, but the fact those are caught doesn't mean things aren't getting through.

that's just what's been caught. we have issues in the airline industry also with the dea examining how many drugs are being brought onboard an aircraft. if something can be smuggled own an aircraft, fill in the blank what you want it to be. it could be narcotics, it could be a firearm, it could be an edged weapon. it could be a lot of things. to assume we are catching 100%. we are more vigilant, but not infallible in this case. a lot of the cases of what you're seeing, there are a large number of people that have a concealed carry and forget to take themselves out of that mindset when they come to the airport. we've all seen it, there are people out there testing the system. there are people always actively testing the system. to think we have a static defense, a wall up that can't be penetrated is a fallacy. >> you could interpret that data, if they are confiscating 200 guns, there is potentially something to worry about because people are trying to get guns on

planes. >> yes, sir. >> absolutely. the other argument that i think is important to remember, we are trying to, the theory under which we are operating is that we are going to make the cabin of a commercial airliner a completely weapon-free zone. there's going to be nothing there that one person could use to harm another person. we try to do the same thing in completely locked-down federal penitentiaries. we control extremely carefully who gets in, who gets out, everybody gets a strip search. every time we do a shakedown on a federal pen we find all kinds of weapons. so it's just unrealistic to think we can ever produce a security system ever that will make a public venue like airline travel weapon-free. it's just an unrealistic thing to do.

in fact, the record of failure or success, however you want to look at it, that the tsa security screening has amassed, is virtually identical to the one that existed before 9/11. it's an incredibly difficult thing to find everything one person can use to hurt another person and make sure it never find its way on to the airliner. it's an impossibility. it's a sill why i thing to think we'll ever get there. we won't. >> this might sound counterintuitive, but probably the most successful security system is one that assumes failure with multiple layers. you have to assume certain layers will fail. you might fail on the background check when you buy a ticket or at the screening of the passenger or at the cargo. having all those multiple layers in there means somewhere along the line you'll catch it. it's a lesson learned in aviation. that's why on aircraft there is redundant hydraulic systems,

redundant systems in fuel, electrical systems, things that back up. when you're up there in an aircraft, you can't open the window and ask for help. what you have is what you have. i think the best security systems assume a level of failure. and have backups in there. that's a lesson we learned in p a lifetime of aviation. >> i'm going to go back and ask our panel here, just your last thoughts saying if you have guns. any last questions? >> one more question. i heard the facility in new mexico mentioned several times as far as training goes. is that the only training facility, and if not, how many training facilities are there across the country? >> that is a primary facility. there are two recurrent

facilities. the reduction in the budget is going to condense those and possibly bring it down to just two. the problem we have there is the pilots that are being armed from hawaii toward the east, you have people all over. remember, these pilots are doing this on their own money. they are traveling to these destinations. it's becoming more and more difficult to get to these locations, to pay for the participation. counter that to the administration budget that says we actually don't want all these people that are willing to pay $10,000 to participate in the program. we have shrinking facilities, and desire not to accept these people that want to participate and spend their own money to do it. >> why is it only the federal

government's responsibility to provide onflight security? why can't we create a partnership with the airline industry itself to provide its own security? >> if it's all right, i'll address that. conservative limited government, folks, would like to see private property protected by the owner of that property. that's fine. i probably personally tend to think that way myself. however, among the -- in the realm of what is realistic, of what can be done and what will bring -- there are all different kinds of people who think in all different kinds of ways onboard and get this thing accomplished. that's just not going to happen. there's one way for a pilot to carry a firearm and protect his

passengers, his crew and the people on the ground. that is if he gets a background check, psychological evaluation, becomes deputyized. then and only then can he carry firearm and protect passenger and crew. if we do away with this program and hope in some panacea some think is the best way to go about doing it, there will be no more armed pilots. >> when you cross multiple state lines, it will require a federal jurisdiction to allow you to operate a weapon through that. we've something similar to this with safety. airline margins dependent upon how the airline operates and uses their airline, but to ask one airline to do something and another one, they are going to say it's costing me too much

here. i need to cut it back over here. we've seen that with safety items. with traffic collision avoidance systems being mandated, ground proximity avoidance systems, safety elements being added to aircraft. with the federal involvement, you have standardization and jurisdictional issues. >> is there any way for the airline industry to have to pay for this instead of the tax payer since we are providing security for the airline industry? >> i guess i would -- >> a tax payer is going to pay for it one way or another. >> ultimately, what the tax payers are paying for is the security of this nation. a legitimate function of the -- i think everyone would agree, i hope, a legitimate function of the federal government is to defend the nation from attack.

we were attacked on 9/11. the weapon of choice was a commercial airliner. it is the federal government's responsibility to protect us and keep us safe from attack. that's the reason we created a federal government in 1787. the primary impetuous for doing that was to protect the nation. i think it's a legitimate responsibility to make sure cockpits are defended so airplanes can't be used as weapons against our country again. >> based upon the current federal budget for this program to be $22 million, the amount of money each pilot is paid to participate in the program, i would suggest as i have done on the hill, that the pilots are paying for the program right now. way far and above whatever the federal government is paying right now. if you look at over $400 million spent by pilots, $22 million to

$25 million by the federal government, pilots are paying for it. >> i'll go down the panel and see if there are last thoughts or comments before we close. >> i'll just remind you this has been an uphill battle for ten years. little over ten years. it was an uphill battle to get the program initiated. there's great resistance to that. there's been great resistance during this last ten years. in the procedures outlined by the tsa that has discouraged pilot participation. we'd like to see the fund iing not increased to attract more into the program to achieve the current effect we had intended for in the beginning.

>> our greatest compliment is when somebody said they didn't know the pilots were armed. the fact they are spending their own money to participate in the program, tells you they are concerned not only their own safety but the safety of the passengers behind them. i always get asked, are we going to get there okay? if imp's okay, i know you're okay behind me. don't worry about it. this program is the most cost-effective deterrent out there, period. this has the potential to expand incredibly and still be very, very cheap as you add more and more pilots, the cost per program drops. if we had a couple more individuals we would be down to maybe $7 a flight. it's cost effective. it's an incredible program. at this juncture right now, considering that our security systems are porous, and to assume that we are going to start dismantling our security system and saying we don't need this, we don't need this is a

big problem. it puts us in harm's way. >> my thoughts are that airline travel is something virtually nearly every american enjoys at some point in his life. most americans, lots of americans travel all the time. when they board, they're trusting me. they're putting their trust in the pilots. the people in that cockpit. as mike said, once we're airborne, that's all they've got is us and what we have onboard. the redundant safety systems we have. it is irrational to say that we trust these pilots with our lives, but we are reluctant or unwilling to, as the obama administration has suggested, we are going to try to limit or

prevent their ability to defend that cockpit with a firearm. it's proven to be safe, proven to be effective. i don't know how many federal government programs can make that claim. >> let me sum this up with just one observation. i work on all the homeland security issues broadly speaking, from everything in the air to what's going on in local communities. to me, what's disturbing about this issue is i do see this as a larger pattern of behavior on the part of the government. this is not the only area where we've seen this happen. for example, immigration an enforcement, where states have wanted a partner with the federal government, as in this program, helping the federal government do its job. there is a program called 287-g. in a sense they do a similar process. they deputize law enforcement officers. that program has been largely killed off by the administration. there is a provision in the law that established the tsa which

allows airports to opt out of federal screeners. as a matter of fact, there are a half dozen or airports set up to do that. they run their own security. it's every bit as effective as tsa screeners. the administration's been an active obstacle to expanding that program, to giving people the options. if we are going to go to a process where the federal government is going to do everything to protect us, what's going to happen is we are going to wind up being less safe. we are going to wind up being less free, and it's going to wind up costing us a lot more money. we, as a nation, the people that live here, have a part to play in protecting ourselves. it's finding that balance and

preserves our freedom. it allows the common defense that that's important. i think there are two really key factors here. i call them right and responsibility. there's goodness in having the people that are responsible for themselves take ownership of that responsibility. katrina, for example, the most effective responders in katrina were the victims. there are people in that own community that cared about their community who did more and were more effective organizing a response than anybody else. it's people in the local walmart who opened the doors and said we'll help our citizens. that is anything much more effective than anything fema did. if you look at the surveys of katrina, 80% of the people helped said the most effective responders were people that were nongovernment organizations. i'm not saying there is not a role for fema, not a role for

homeland security, but when you take responsibility for yourself, you bring a certain energy and commitment and knowledge to that that somebody else can't. in this case, the pilot that flies that plane and that airline, they care about that airline. they care about that pilot. they are going to give it a degree of commitment that nobody else really can because they have a sense of ownership. exercising that is a very important part of free and open society. when you're owning infrastructure or doing things in the public space and performing a public good, is there a sense you have an obligation not just defending your own hearth and home, you have an impact on the lives of people. you have a responsibility to exercise the right to defend yourself with a degree of due diligence.

and professionalism. what you see on the federal flight deck officer program is you really see a quintessential example of doing that exactly right. you have people taking ownership of their own responsibilities and acknowledging that and taking it on. and you have a program which ensures that you have the level of professionalism that they're going to exercise that right responsibly. if we can't do something like this in our own defense, then i'm not sure what we can do. the simple fact is when you're at 10,000 feet and alone in the cockpit, see something, say something, just doesn't cut it. let me thank you for coming today. if you found this program worthwhile, we archive our programs on heritage.org. tomorrow the link will be up and folks can link back to it. we have a paper o