members to submit both those questions and opening statements. i'd like to thank each and every member of the panel for being with us, commend you for your service to this country and urge you to continue to look for ways to improve what you and your agencies are able to do to better serve and better spend more efficiently spend and use the taxpayers' money to provide a safe transportation environment for all of us. again, thank you for being here and we're done. this is c-span3. with politics and public affairs

programming throughout the week and every weekend, 48 hours of people and events telling the american story on american history tv. get our schedules and see past programs at our web sites. and you can join in the conversation on social media sites. we are live this morning on capitol hill as the senate armed services committee will hear from military commanders who are in charge of cyberspace, missile defense, the nation's nuclear arsenal, space operations and other areas. cyber command was created in 2010 to develop crippling cyber attacks on the u.s. this hearing should get under way shortl

good morning, everybody.

today's hearing continues a series of posture hearings that the armed services committee is conducting on our combatant commands with the context of the fiscal year 2013 budget request and the president's new strategic guidance. today we receive testimony from the u.s. strategic command and u.s. cyber command, a subsundayified command of the u.s. strategic command. let me welcome general robert kaler, the commander of the u.s. strategic command and general keith alexander, the commander of the u.s. cyber command and thank them both for their service to our nation. we also want to thank the fine men and women who serve in these commands for their dedication and service to our nation and a special thanks to their families. strategic command manages nine missions across the department of defense. these missions range from satellite and space situational

awareness, missile defense, and electronic warfare to combatting weapons of mass destruction. stratcom coordinates the activity of u.s. cyber command across the department of defense, unlike combatant commands, which are regionally folk you, stratcom's missions are global. that capability needs to be preserved as we continue to reduce the size of these forces and modernize the infrastructure at the department of energy that supports this mission. general kaler, here are some of the issues that i hope that you'll address this morning. first, are you satisfied with

the direction we're taking in our nuclear force posture and with the department of energy's role in maintaining our nuclear stockpile so that we can continue to reduce its size without testing while ensuring the stockpile remains safe and meets military requirements? second, do you believe we are on a sustainable path to protect our space assets and to reconstitute them if necessary given the congested and contested nature of space? third, the department of defense has allocated a block of the electromagnetic spectrum that connects our space, cyber and electronic warfare assets to our fozs. stratcom is the lead combat ant command for synchronizing spectrum operations. how concerned are you about the pros prospect of losing spectrum

and what are you doing to preserve access to it? fourth with the cancellation of the operationally responsive space program, are you worried about our ability to field low-cost but rapidly deployable satellites that can fill capability gaps between large national intelligence satellite collection systems and the department's airborne surveillance platforms? fifth, what is your strategic vision for the combined use of space and cyber? these two dough mains are integrally linked but we have not seen a plan for integrating capabilities and operations. let me now turn to cyber command for a moment. there's much for us to examine in this increasingly important and complex but still new mission area. not only as it affects the department of defense but the government and economy as a whole. general alexander has stated

that the relentless industrial espionage being waged against u.s. industry and government chiefly been china constitute, quote, the largest transfer of wealth in history, close quote. the committee needs to understand the dimensions of this technology theft and its impact on our national security and prosperity. the armed services committee has focused for some time on the need to develop comprehensive policies and frameworks to govern planning and operations in cyberspace. what are the rules of engagement if we are attacked by another nation? what is the doctrine for operations and deterrence in war fighting strategies? the administration has made progress in these areas, is reflected in recent strategies and in the development of comprehensive legislation to improve cyber security but much more needs to be done.

as a still developing subunified combat ant command, the committee needs to understand the current and planned relationships between cyber command and stratcom and the other combatant commands. the defense department is considering the establishment of component cyber commands at the combatant commands. weep need to know what command arrangements would apply to these potential components as well as the authorities and the missions that stratcom has delegated to cyber command and those that it plans to retain. general alexander has stated publicly that he believes he needs additional authorities to defend the networks information systems of the rest of the federal government and those of critical infrastructure. the committee needs clarity on exactly what authorities general alexander might be seeking and whether they go beyond what the

administration has requested in its legislative proposal to congress. general alexander has also often stated that the department of defense does not in fact have a unified network but rather 15,000 separate networks or enclaves into which cyber command has little visibility. the committee needs to understand what can and should be done to correct what seemed to be an urgent and critical problem. the department of defense has conducted a pilot program with a number of major companies in the defense industrial business or dib as it is called and multiple internet service providers like or isps like at&t and verizon. they provide signatures of known cyber penetration tools and methods directly to the dib companies or to the isps that

provide the dib companies their communications services. the companies then use these signatures to detect and block intrusion attempts. carnegie mellon conducted an independent assessment of the dib pilot for dod and concluded that nsa provided few signatures that were not already known to the companies themselves and in many cases the dib companies by themselves detected advanced threats with their own nonsignature-based detection methods that probably is not known to the nsa. and so we need to hear from general alexander on his view of those issues as well. we thank you both again for your service, for your being here this morning and we call on senator mccain. >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me thank our distinguished witnesses for joining us this morning and their many years of service to our nation.

u.s. strategic command is in the midst of pivotal change has we proceed why the modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and nuclear try add and further imbred cyber defense and cyber attack and the core mission competencies of 21st century warfare. nuclear modernization i'm encominged even with the unpress didn'ted level of defense spending uncertainty, the department has maintained its commitment of modernizing the try add of nuclear delivery vehicles. unfortunately the same cannot be said for the national nuclear strurt administration and proposal to abandon or delay key elements of their plan. modernization is universally recognized as essential to the

future viability of the nuclear weapons complex and a prerequisite for future reductions. it's now been over a year since the treaty entered into force and we don't see any sign of the administration keeping those commitments. the core of the strategic

command mission is deterrence, however as frequency, sophistication and intensity of cyber related incidents continues to increase, it's apparent that this administration's cyber deterrent policies have failed to curb those malicious actions. the current deterrence framework, which is overly reliant on the development of defensive capabilities has been unsuccessful in dissuading cyber-related aggression. whether it's a nation state probing our military network, or criminal networks' theft of intellectual property, we must do more to prevent, respond to and deter cyber threats. the inevitability of a large scale cyber attack existential threat to our nation and does little to influence the psychology of attackers who operate in a world with few if any negative consequentials for their actions. last july general cartwright, the former vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, criticized the administration's reactive strategy for operating in cyberspace saying, quote, if it's okay to attack me and i'm not going to do anything other than improve my defenses every time you attack me, it's very difficult to come up with a deterrent strategy. i look forward to hearing from our witnesses if they believe that a strategy overly focused on defense is sustainable and whether they agree more must be done to defer and dissuade those who look to hold u.s. interests

at risk via cyberspace. the senate will soon begin debate on cyber security legislation. the central themes in that debate will focus on how to improve information sharing across the spectrum and whether a new governor bureaucracy will improve our cyber security. have i proposed legislation that first focusses on removing legal hurdles that hinder information shari sharing. if a timely response is ef sense, how would another layer of bureaucratic red tape be helpful? while a secured act does not give new authorities to the national security or u.s. cyber command, few will deny that those institutions, not the department of homeland security, are most capable of guarding against cyber threats. unfortunately other legislative proposals favor prematurely adding more government bureaucracy rather than focusing

on accomplishing the objective of protecting our cyber interests. general alexander, during an fbi sponsored symposium at fordham university, you stated that if a significant cyber attack against this country were being planned, there may not be much that either cyber command or nsa could legally do to discover and thwart such an attack in advance. you said, quote, in order to stop a cyber attack, you have to see it in realtime and you have to have those authorities. those are the conditions we put on the table. now, how and what the congress chooses, that will be a policy decision. in a fight where the threat can materialize in mill i seconds and quick action is essential, i look forward to better understanding what authorities you believe are needed to protect the united states interest both at home and abroad. the department of defense is requesting nearly $3.4 billion

for cybersecurity in fiscal 2013 and almost 17.5 billion over the future years' defense program. the cyber budget is one of the only areas of growth in the dod budget because of broad agreement that addressing the cyber threat must be among our highest priorities. ive thank the witnesses for appearing before the committee today and look forward to their testimony. >> thank you very much. senator kaymer -- i mean general kaler. excuse me. >> thank you, mr. chairman. if it's okay with you, i'd like to have my statement admitted to the record. >> it will be part of the record. >> sir, senator mccain and distinguished members of the committee, thanks for this tonight to present my views on the united states strategic commands missions and priorities. very pleased to be here today with general keith alexander, cyber commandes commander and of course as both of you have

pointed out, cyber is a critical component of our global capabilities. without question, mr. chairman, we continue to face a very challenging global security environment marked by constant change, enormous complexity and profound uncertainty. change and surprise have characterized the year that have passed since my last appearance before this committee. over that time, the men and women of strategic command have participated in support of operations in libya and japan, have supported the withdrawal of u.s. combat forces from iraq and have observed the arab spring, the bold operation that killed osama bin laden, the death of kim jong il and the succession of kim jong un, the passage of the budget control act and the adoption of new defense strategic guidance. through this extraordinary period of challenge and change, stratcom's focus has remained constant, to deter, detect and prevent attacks on the united

states, our allies and partners and to be prepared to employ force as needed. our priorities are clear, deter, attack, partner with the other commands to win today, respond to the new challenges in space, build cyberspace capability and capacity and prepare for uncertainty. transcending all of these priorities is the threat of n e nuclear materials or wednesdayons in twednesdaapons the hands of extremistextremist. conflict will likely be increasingly hybrid in nature, encompassing, land, sea and hybrid space, cross geographic boundaries, involve multiple participants. i think it's important to note the same space and cyberspace

tools that connect us together just last month the department of defense released new strategic guidance to address challenges. it describes the way ahead for the entire d.o.d. but i believe many portions are especially relevant to stratcom and are broad assigned responsibilities. for example, global presence, succeeding in current deterring and defeating aggression, including those seeking to deny our power projection, countering weapons of mass destruction, effectively operating in cyberspace, space, and all other domains and maintaining a safe, secure, effective nuclear deterrent are all important areas in the new strategy where stratcom's global reach and strategic focus play a vital role. these are important responsibilities, there are real risks involved in the scenarios we find ourselves in today. it's my job to prepare for those

events and to advocate for the sustainment and modernization efforts we need to meet the challenges. in that regard, the fiscal year 2013 budget request is pivotal for our future. we're working hard to improve our planning and better integrate our efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction, proceed with our n delivery, command and control systems, mod vearnize the complx that cares for them, improve resilience of our space cape ibilties and enhance our situational awareness of the congested, competitive and contested domain. we need to improve the protection and resilience of cybernetworks, increase cape ability and capacity and work across the inner agency to increase protection of our critical infrastructure. enhance our isr cape babilities.

we need to get better at electronic warfare, we need to practice how to operate in a degraded space and cyberspace environment. we need to improve our understanding of our adversaries, we need to review our plans and improve our decision processes and command relations, all subjects the two of you touched on in our opening comments. in short the new national security reality calls for a new strategic approach that promotes agile, decentralized action from a fully integrated and int interdependent and resilient joint force. these are tough challenges but the men and women of stratcom view challenges as opportunities, partner with other commands to forge a bet, smarter, faster joint force. we remain committed to work with this in committee, the services, other agencies and our international partners to provide the flexible, agile and reliable strategic deterrence and mission assurance capabilities that our nation and friends need in this increasingly uncertain world. mr. chairman, it's an honor and

privilege to lead america's fine evidence men and women. they are our greatest advantage. i'm enormously proud of their bravery and sacrifice, and i pledge to stand with them and for them to ensure we retain the best force the world has ever seen. in that, i join with the secretary of defense and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and other senior leaders, my colleagues, other combatant commanders in thanking you for the support you and this committee have provided them in the past, present, and on into the future. before i close, mr. chairman, i would like to pause and remind the committee that stratcom is headquartered in the great state of nebraska. and i wanted to take this opportunity to thank senator ben nelson for his service. senator nelson will retire at the end of the congress and during his service he has worked dill gently to better the lives of our troops and strategic offices. those who work at the air force base are well aware of his deep commitment to them. on behalf of your fellow nebraskans at stratcom, senator,

we off our thanks. thank you for this opportunity. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much, general. thank you for your reference to general ben -- now i call hem a general and you a senator -- to senator ben nelson. we all feel very much the way you do and grateful for your reference to him. thank you. general alexander? >> chairman levin, ranking member mccain and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the community to appear before you today. i'm pleased to appear with general bob kehler, and i echo his comments all across the board, including with senator nelson. i would start up front by echoing some of those comments which is, is it a privilege and honor to lead the soldiers, sailors, airmen, civilians of cybercommand in nsa. we have great people. thanks for what you do to get those great people for us. i'd like to thank you and your colleagues to your support and

helping the command move rapidly forward in our efforts to address emerging threats and concerns to our nation. i need to thank all of our partners throughout d.o.d., dhs, and the fbi, and the endeavor to build capability and capacity. cyber is a team sport and we could not have come this far and accomplished as much as we have without them. many changes and substantial progress have been made since i last spoke to the committee almost two years ago. cyberspace has increasingly become more critical to our national and economic security, and chairman, you brought up one of the quotes about the greatest transfer of wealth. i think that is absolutely correct. we are seeing increased exploitation into industry, government government, other government agents and the tlehreat of intellectual property is astounding. i'll address part of that

shortly in comments coming up. ly eye also think that the threat has grown in terms of activists, nation state actors. the chairman emphasize cyber has area of investment and a liner defense budget. the task of assuring cyberspace access and security has drawn attention of all of our nations' leadership. u.s. cybercommand is a component of a larger u.s. government-wide effort to make cyberspace, one, safer and a form for vibrant citizen interaction, reserve our freedom to act in cyberspace and defend our vital interests those of our allies. cybercommand is charged to direct the security, operations and defense of the department of defense information systems. but our work is affected by threats outside d.o.d.'s networks. threats the nation cannot ignore. what we see both inside and outside d.o.d. information

systems underscores the imperative to act now to defend america in cyberspace. the american people expect broad and efficient access to cyberspace. military and civilian sectors rely on accessibility, increased inner connectedness of information systems, growing sophistication of cybercriminals and foreign intelligence actors has increases our risk. last spring, international strategy for cyberspace the president confirmed inherent right to protect ourselves against attacks in this domain as in traditional domains. he said, when warranted, the united states will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as you would to any other threat to our country. cybercommand exists to ensure the president can rely on the d.o.d. information systems and has military options available to defend our nation. the president and secretary of defense recently reviewed our nation's strategic interests

issued guidance on defense priorities. in sustaining u.s. global leadership, priorities to 21st century defense, the secretary focuses on protecting access throughout the cyber domain. the u.s. cybercommand role is to pay attention how nations and nonnation state actors are developing asymmetric capabilities to conduct cyberespionage and attacks. d.o.d. recently added detail to that position in accordance with the president's strategy the department further explained our deterrent posture to congress in a cyberspace policy report last november. d.o.d. components especially cybercommand, worked to dissuade others from attacking our planning to attack the united states in cyberspace. we worked with a range of partners, u.s. governmental lies, private industry, strengthen defense of our citizens, the nation, and allies in cyberspace. i wanted to assure you that all of our work is performed to

safeguard the privacy and civil liberties of u.s. persons. these responsibilities are very much on our minds. in establishing the co-com relationships you asked about our relationships with other commands and i'd like to establish a. dress that. first establishing a cybersupport element at each of the six geographically-based cocom. u.s. centcom is operation pmg u.s. paycoms is partially operational and others are on the way. the purpose is to provide technical expertise and cape ability and improve capabilities to the cocom planning efforts. our goal to ensure each has full suite of cyberoptions to choose from and understanding of effects these options can produce in aor. chairman, you also asked about the standing rules of