and i think they are treated far too often as numbers, as nuisances, and as problems, and i think until they are treated as customers this is something senator cornyn says over and over again, we will have these problems persist. >> you see, texas never had that problem about having to worry about agencies following the attorney general's advisory memoranda on the subject because he had the ability to sue their butts if they didn't follow his directive. and senator cornyn, as attorney general cornyn, did that rather vigorously against government agencies and municipalities. a very different structure. >> i'm a federal worker, as i know many of the other folks in the audience are, and i think there's a hole in an otherwise wonderful day of program there's isn't more federal worker representation. just to comment on the last comment and responses. it seems to me that there's a widespread view that any delay or limitation in foia response is intentional obfuscation.

talking about a policy document sitting on the shelf and that specific document has been requested and the agency's refusing to turn it over, that seems true. if it's a case where there's a request made for all e-mails from the top three leaders of a department on a very broad topic over the course of the entire tenor of the leader, which is a case i've seen over and over again in my work, a delay is merely prioritization and attempts to fulfill that foia request while continuing to attempt to do the work that the agency is otherwise required to do. i do think that's a point that needs to be recognized. >> that's a good point. i added to my list two other factors for agency delays, records management issues because even if they know where -- sometimes they don't know where they are, they have trouble finding them, and the expansive requests are just very large. you've been very patient. yes, ma'am?

>> hi, i'm a student and i have one forward looking question for each of you, if you want and that is, what is the most important foia matter that will be brought before congress through the rest of this year? and how likely do you think it that is foia will be amended. >> great question to wrap up on, thank you. starting on the far end, krista? do you want to take a little no, you can handle this one. this is -- by the way, i should say, this is such a simple question for staff, for anyone in washington, for my dog in fact to answer about what congress is going to do this year. i mean, we could have stopped. yes. >> i would expect the most important foia issue that will come up is related to the post-millner reaction and

whether anything is done or not done. i know in the context of the cybersecurity legislation that's being moved that you know that's a very prominent issue and so i think that's a very real one that congress will face. as to the likelihood of something being passed i would say i don't know. >> tegan? >> i agree with krista, that is what is most likely to come up. what i would really like to see, and hopefully we will be able to do this this year, is to encourage more agencies with pro active disclosure because i think that would help requesters, it would help agencies because you wouldn't be getting requests for stuff that you've already released in having to go through files again and to your point earlier, we definitely recognize that foia agent -- foia offices often

don't have the resources they need. and i think from a congressional standpoint, even without legislation, one thing we need to do is to educate requesters to make the best requests possible because that can really streamline the process. professional requesters are people who do it all the time. i did it for three years. they get a format down that works very well but often if you're a private citizen and seeking information you might not have it in the right form or worded correctly, and that can cause excessive delays in something that we are looking to do especially with the citizens guide and with staff training on foia issues is to make it easier for requesters to make good requests, which also makes it

easier for the agencies to process. >> yes? anything? >> i agree with all of the comments that have been said. i think it's definitely post-millner and probably cybersecurity together, possibly separately. i would add another caveat, there may be another way how to address millner and doing changes to exemptions, too. another area where congress may explore looking at los angeles that deals with legislative exemptions in foia and figuring out i way to carefully craft that so as we're getting new exemptions there's some built-in protections for access to health and safety information. >> let me close with three observations. first, a point of personal privilege. we've talked a lot about oversight in congress, congressional staff. i was not here this morning, for which i apologize, but i did

want to say, back in the early '70s, when i was a young staffer, fully facial hair, hair on my head a wonderful sight to behold, we had oversight hearings and worked on legislation and one of our witnesses from the great northwest, young sue long, a statistician, in a battle with the internal revenue service came in and testified, and was really inspiring for the senate judiciary committee, and i think at that time kind of became my personal muse in my own commitment to pursuit of open government and foia. sue, i want to acknowledge that and thank you for that. secondly, on the subject of predict what congress will do, i think we've all suggested that it's impossible to do. but i can make one prediction, and that is, it is highly likely that next year during sunshine week, the washington college of law will, once again, host a program on freedom of information day celebration and the collaboration on government secrecy will assemble a fantastic panel that may even include some of our panelists yet again to discuss what congress did or didn't do in the intervening time and what the new plans for the new congress and new administration, whoever that might be, could be.

finally, i think the interesting discussion, sort of teeing up our next panel, which is the hot issue of today on the hill is millner and exception 3. stay tuned. it won't be long before the panel focuses on that subject. thanks to each of you for coming out here, for participating. very educational. very informative, and a lot of fun for me, too. thank you. [ applause ] >> tom i wanted to have a special thanks for the moderator and the four panelists today. to the best of anyone's recollection, this is the first time that all four corners of capitol hill has been represented, house, senate, majority staff, minority staff, to focus on foia matters and we know that foia matters coming up.

we hope we've establishes i a new cgs tradition, speaking of next year, and would extend a standing or sitting invitation right at this moment to you folks from each of your vantage points to come back because nothing is as good as having all four parts, bicameral, bipartisan of capitol hill represented. thank you very much for that. >> as this hearing comes to a close, we'll go live to capitol hill for coverage of afghanistan war commanding general john and we'll take a break. tomorrow, michael green, former member of the security council talks about south korea general security. gretchen morgenson looks at

freddie may and freddie mac to discuss after the expiration of washington journal on c-stan. >> follow c-span throughout the week. explore the literary and literary culture. >> you had calls going up and down the mississippi delta and the next morning between 600 and

#,000 men, white men pour into phillips county to begin shooting down blacks. >> and on american c-span 3, bruce lindsay on integration and north little rock high school. they seem to because the crowd is with us now. the momentum is behind us. >> these stories and others in little rock. this weekend on c-span 2 and 3. >> ronald reagan was living this hotel after delivering a speech. he's this close. he's 15 feet from the president. he shoots, six shots. the first one hits the press

secretary brady in the head and falls down. the second one tissued around to check on the president's progress. he yells, i'm hit. the path of the president is clear, wide open. hinckley has a clear view. >> march 30th, 1981, firing six shots. and on american history tv, this weekend on c-span 3. >> the second anniversary of the upper big ranch west virginia mine explosion that killed 29 and seriously injured two others, held in the workforce committee, this is close to

three hours. good morning. thank you for being with us today. on april 5th, 2010, the people of mt. cole, west virginia, suffered a tragic loss. around 3:00 in the afternoon there was a strong blast of wind that hit their backs, it was a chilling morning and a violent explosion that killed 29 miners and severely injured two more. as a nation, we continued to mourn the men and women who died since that day they have been searching for answers. how can can such a grat strof specific event take place. could it have been prevented?

what steps need to be taken to ensure that this tragedy never happens again. as part of the federal response, three teens were determine the cause of the explosion and internal review team to determine the actions and a team from the national institute of okay pay nation safety and health after examining 1,000 pieces of evidence, last december the report documents three events and a build of methane gas caused an explosion. coal dust fueled the fire that quickly spread throughout the mine. while this explains the physical cause of the disaster, its real

genesis and the reckless disregard and bearing responsibility for the miners. the investigation revealed numerous safety violations and keeping two sets of books and inspectors were on site and disabling multigas detectors that could alert miners to the methane gas that would contain the fire before it consumed the mine. federal prosecutors are bringing

justice to those engaged in criminal activity cecil roberts, whom we will hear from shortly, they are trying to do the right thing. bad actors continue to jeopardize the miner's safety. that's why we have the mine safety and health and administration when workers are needlessly put in harm's way, corrective sacks required to hold the mine operator accountable as we learn in startling detail and numerous safety violations and even more shocking are hazards that went

unnoticed altogether. and violating the approved plan. this proved to be a critical enforcement error once a roof collapse altered the air flow and allowed the build-up of methane gas. furth furthermore, it's difficult and almost unimageable. it later enhanced the magnitude of this disaster. creating a new category of flagrant violations never imposed against massey. technical support audits that outlined concerns with methane in the mine were never transmitted to the mine

operator. sadly, the list of enforcement lapses could go on as well. niosh states it could have possibly prevented the ubb explosion. there may be a number of reasons for these errors. some enforcement errors have plagued the agency for years and deadly mistakes are followed with a pledge to do better. upper big branch happened. tragedy strikes and enforcement regime goes on. administrator main, i hope you convince this committee and the nation's miners that this time it will be different, that this time we will learn from past mistakes and keep our promise to do better. i look forward to do this with our witnesses and i now

recognize miss woolsey for her opening remarks. >> thank you, mr. chairman. certainly as we examine the lessons from the upper big branch mine disaster, we can never lose sight that 29 families lost their brothers, their husbands, and best friends. almost two years ago this committee traveled to west virginia where we heard chilling testimony from the families of miners about the unbelievable conditions in that mine. most of which you listed in your opening testimony. a life-long minor and grandfather, one of the 29 miners who lost his life, testified that day. mr. long said, i'm asking for you all to please do something for the rest of the coal miners that's in the mines. i pray for it every night, every day. if you don't do something, something like this is going to

happen again. mr. long, we hear your cry. massey failed to prevent this strategy or shore up the mine roof to keep the mine ventilated and it failed to keep the mine rock dusted to prevent coal dust explosion. on top of the failure to follow basic production, it engaged in a pattern of destruction. massey gave foremen time to correct hazardous productions or kept mine examinings books and

engaged in a manner of intimidation if they tried to stop production to correct unsafe productions. these failures were the result of a culture where -- and he said it, wrongdoing became acceptable. where deviation became the norm. fw that operator fails, it's their responsibility to bring them back into line. there was a violation and failure to put this mine on the pattern of violation or apply maximum penalties. there was a failure to investigate managers who may have engaged in knowing and willful violations and mine plans were approved without

resolving previous concerns. we must examine why this happened. we have to know what broke. and finally reversed course and provided provided resources to put inspectors back into the mines but the new inspectors didn't have the needed experience and there were not enough technical specialists. violations went undetected, including critical violations highlighted in the latest report. the lead inspector had only 13 months experience and obviously missed a number of violations

that may have prevented this accident in the first place. while they fell short, it was not for lack of trying. they issued $1.3 million in penalties prior to the accident. the agency shut down parts of the mine 52 time in the previous year. by she's citations did not change massey's conduct. and 92% of all penalties prior to the explosion. what is clear, that m. shaw was no match for mass see or any other mining operation where corporate greed comes before the health and safety of the workers. today we recognize the entire system suffered the miners at upper big branch.

congress shouldn't have slashed miners for mine inspectors. and the weak enss were exploded in the law and hurt their workers. the law should have been much stronger because that is what it takes when an operator has little or no regard for their workers. we are prepared to work with our colleagues because the blood spilled by the miners must not be in vain and not forgotten and we must prevent all errors that led to the ubd disaster. in closing, i want to welcome our witnesses that will be here today. as well as representing ray hall

who have a lot invested in us getting this right. i yield back. >> thank you, gentle lady. pursuant to 7c, all committee members are permitted to submit hearing records that will remain open for 14 days. any material referenced during the hearing, let me add my welcome today to our colleagues in west virginia mrs. capito and ray hall are permitted to participate in our hearing and i hear no objection. >> we have two distinguished panel of witnesses. i would like to begin with our first panel. secretary of labor for the mine safety and health administration, joe main. mr. main has been a mine safety advocate for over 40 years. he worked with the united mine

workers of america from 1974 to 2002, including 22 years as the administrator of umwas occupational and health and safety department. he worked as a mine safety consult stapt welcome back mr. main. before i ask you for your testimony, let me remind you of our quaint but nevertheless lighting system that is green, yellow, red. pretty self-evident. we want to hear what you have to say. you're free to summarize as you wish. when we get into questions, i'll be asking my colleagues to stick to the five-minute rule so we can all engage in the questions. with that, sir, you're recognized it. >> thank you, chairman kline

appreciate the opportunity to report on the april #th, 2010 disaster. cause of death, 29 miners before the explosion and still needed to pro investigate the nation's miners. the tragedy which occurred a few months following my confirmation was the deadliest coal mining disaster in 40 years, has caused unimaginable grief and extends beyond that. we're doing all that we can. on december 6th, 2011, the investigation teen issued a

report. when fueled by excessive amounts of coal dust transmitted to a coal dust explosion. it was a result of a series of violation of basic safety which was disregarded in upper big branch. it was also the unlawful by massey which was intimidation of miners and concealing hazards from regulators. while the top management exercised fifth amendment rights, one official recently gary may a. superintendent at the time of the explosion recently testified that with standard practice at ubd to fix or conceal hazards before inspectors could observe them. he also stated when he was a section boss he would spread extra rock dust and make sure everything looked good when he was told that inspectors were on their way. the massey $10.8 million in

natural resources that required massey after the explosion paid the penalties in full. they conducted an internal review and released a report on march 6th and among the toughest in the nation and significant shortcomings in the roof control plans. the internal review also identified deficiencies in the adherence to answer policies and procedures, including deficiencies by previous internal reviews. the internal review revealed this was budget constraints and experienced staff which left district experienced deficits. this was particularly true with a roof control ventilation and

other specialists. we should not lose sight of the challenges at ubb were created by an operator that intentionally enabled our ability to enforce it. the accident investigation team findings that massey caused the explosion. we have reviewed the internal review findings and implemented recommendations with reforms before ubd. we know more needs to be done. and a safe workplace for miners. our most effective enforcement tools are the inspections which began immediately after the disaster. since april 2010 wech conducted more than 400 impact