or human rights abusers. the att is not a panacea, but it will make it more difficult to states exporting arms to those recipients to justify that. there will be more scrutiny about international arms sales and start to create noise about arms sales. so it gives states a tool in their foreign policy tool box. just again to plug sipri's work and the importance of transparency in arms transfer, it would be a lot easier if states just made this information available and we didn't have to dig quite so much. so presumably there will be a transparency aspect to the arms trade treaty that will hopefully allow this information to be presented in a standardized, consistent and regular manner,

which will make all this work easier. and so in conclusion, in my opinion the att needs to be practical and effective and we need to balance the very worthy aspirations and ideal concerning the arms trade with the reality of the goebbels arms trade, which we've heard from this morning. it's not going to help to have a treaty at the end of the day th that legitimatizes systems. or burden the trade so that nobody wants to be part of it. att is not about banning anything. it's about developing for the first time the rules of the game. it's about developing clear international standard for the global trade in arms.

so we will see how state do with that task in july. >> thank you very much, rachel. i think it was very helpful to provide a little bit of background to the att. let me turn to bill. how does the united states see thesish use? >> first let me start off by thanking sipri on its vital work on the subject of arms transfers over the years. discussions like today are particularly welcome because it means sipri is continuing to do its vital work and we're here to enjoy the fruits of its labor. i'm here not to address the transnational arms trade but rather to talk about two of the instruments that provides information, one that exists and one that is being created. conventional arms transfer are a crucial security concern for the

united states and weep have always supported effective action to control the international transfer of arms. the first resolution established a multi-step process to operationalize a voluntary register of transfers. by any measure the register has been a resounding success, establishing a global norm of transparency and accountability in military matters. during its 19 years of operations, more than 170 states have participated in the

register at least once, more than 140 have -- by reporting on both exports and imports, the register has captured the vast majority of the international arms trade in the registry in seven kalt grist. even though some states may have never participated inth register. one mistake that many make in considering the effectiveness of the register is look at the volume of the that's looking at the wrong end of things. the question whether it has contributed to retraining its

growth. i think it would be questionably be largest and more excessive and deto be ablizing statements would occur. the issue of irresponsible transfers brings me to my second topic, the arms trade treaty. the arms trade treaty will be quite different from the u.n. register as it is being created for a different reason and is based on different promises. the at&t is aiming to address the fact that there is no overarching international ins strum to regulate. it provides -- nations have the right to defend themselves. as we all know there's a dark side to arms transfers that can have devastating consequences to people in regions.

they can support terrorists, enable genocide and create and consistent pop live racial nightmares. the united states is committed to actively pursuing strong and robust treaty that contains the highest possible legally binding standards. we recognize an arms trade treaty won't be the be all ornd all, won't necessarily stop or deter terrorism. this means the only effective way to inhibit their activity is indirectly. all states must recognize the obligation to enact andin force laws within their territory that criminalize and punish those groups through their territory.

if the state claims sovereign capability, then they must work to develop such a capability. the united states is acutely aware of the key world arles transfers play in the national security of most states and must take this fact into account in designing the transparency's reporting regime. i can tell you as a state that one of the burd-- it does tack great deal of effort to do all the different roaring submissions we have to do. the reporting is not being done

for the ache of transparency of identity own stake but to judge how the treaty is being applied in practice. att should require state party to report to other state parties on either their fist transfer of afrms. state parties should rote -- the united states is open to the idea reporting to others might be required for only some the items a state is required to control. a good point to start would be the arms list. this can involve sensitive national security and commercial information and we don't want to have the att reporting serve irresponsible exporter about market opportunities.

>> these two instruments are designed to achieve different goals and they will have different national par miss pant pants. i expect participation at the register to far outstrip the at&t for years to come, once we actually have an att. i expect some countries who participate in the will not be part of the treaty. both enstrumts have an important role to play in the area of

international transfers. thank you. >> thank you very much, bill. i'd like to open it up to the audience. but maybe i take the prerogative of the chair here and ask for a little bit of background. one of the questions i had is how do the current efforts to try to control conventional weapons relate to efforts if the 70s, the cat talks? i wonder if anybody can talk a little bit about that. and the second i would have is, you know, it looks like states are recognized and rachel, you mentioned this in particular, too, the importance of transparency of reporting measures and at the same team wooif seen a decline in the reporting of measures. does any of the andists wants to --

>> bill? >> let me first address the decline in participation in the past couple of years. it is endisputable that participation has gone done. over the last couple of years it's declined to being in the middle 70s. the question is why you've had the decline. for my point of view, i think you've had the decline for a couple of reasons. one is the continuing failure of the register to include small armed weapons as an eight category. they are more threatened by the proliferation of small arms-like weapons. they're in the register as an optional eighth category, if you will, but it's only optional are

looking at the continue ug fuelier of the marge because. i think also that there's been turn over and earn el which affected their ability or willingness to go out and sort data to the register. i think that's lagged over the last couple of years. also the states are looking at the fact that we have an arms treaty situation and they're wondering what going to come from. i think wear waiting for that shoe to drop, if you will, to see what's going to come from that. now as i argued before, i think

it would be short sight id. but i think that some of waiting the at&t to see what the obligation is going to be under the at it. to roar data. >> okay. anything want to add anything? let me open it up ands please identify yourself and maybe we'll take a few questions. >> hi. can you talk about monopoly of force. it must be difficult to know how much is reaching the regime. and does it look as those monopoly forces is a gaining or losing? >> in general. >> a woman here in the front. >> good morning. i'm from the university of

georgia, international trade and security. welcome to the community. thanks for putting together a very interesting panel. i have two questions if you'll allow me. first one goes to paul and our att expert on the panel. you mentioned one of the trends, one of the worrisome trends in the arms market at the moment is that the capacity building type of transfers that we see more and more of, do you see that as a call for looking at strategic trade controls and how we monitor and control the capability building equipment as certainly that we need to look at with new eyes or from a different perspective? and how would that relate going to the discussion regarding the

arms treaty and the possible inclusion or at least reference to controlling components. the second question to you, matt, it quite fascinating to see our friend down south displaying his new purchase in such a youtubesque way but how do you perceive this type of media, tweeting and facebooking and youtubing these-- how can you evaluate this information, put anything together with anyone and -- >> paul work you like to take a stab? i was. >> going to add to bill's

comments on the register first. tracking the decline, we noted the decline has been at the nil reports. bill was suggesting you feel perhaps the relevance of the at&t, well, if i have nothing to report, sort of mean comes through. they're not pushing the value in those states. it's one of the things that i thi it keeb there. but i guess we do fewer -- we're not sort of tracking our database, the rifles, the ammunition and the smaller arms and light weapons. we have some evidence and information in the public database but i don't think as much as matt's probably finding with the illicit arms project. that said we also have a project

countering illicit trafficking, which looks at tools to help with trafficking by air and now a maritime dimension. they're looking at ways of exploring these particular issues. with regards to the trends in terms of transferring more than just the complete system but the means to produce the blueprints, components coming from different areas, think -- and i guess rich will agree, it talks to the att discussions in terms of the need of ensuring. when talking with european licensing, one of the things they tack into account is to what extent they have an ports control system in place. i think that's a key aspect there and something that's certainly worth flagging up.

for us one of the things it shows is is a buyers market money i i think some of the resent rip you're seeing transfers of the means to produce. i think that really talks to the att where in the discussion that i'm working there, everyone else is suppliers. i think it's much fuzzier and much more complicated and at that talks to her media point been we also use those as open source tooerls. it's the same problem with still images we've used as well. we have a private database where we keep some of the room urs, the cookier stuff as well as the things we think are really interesting but we can't verify. if we just have one image as matt showed there, we be might quite cautious with it but what

we found with the small team we have we're able to in many cases cross check and fairify from different services, and although there might be something from 2011 that we'd like to put in about it. we're happy to wait. we're happy to share, do you have information about such and such a transfer? we' . >> one of the goals of course would be to prevent diversion into the illegal market and most often that illegal market ends up being used by nonstate actors. so there is a link in the arms state treaty band some are seen

more desirable in other states in terms of allowing them to acquire weapons. states themsel. on the building of equipment and the technology transfer, that may, in fact, be within the scope of the arms trade treaty. if you look at the chairman's draft paper, it has been suggested that technology transfer and equipmenttom build weapon systems be included within the scope. a couple of cautionary notes about that. you want to make sure that you're capturing what you actually intend to capture, that if you have a very broad definition of what that could mean, it could be mean you're covering the e-mail exchanges about a weapons system without details that again, each one of those would be subject to criteria it would overburden the system. the key is to avoid the major loopholes that could be created where for parts and components

for example, or the technology where you could take apart say a fighter aircraft and send it piece by piece and avoid the stipulations or the obligations of the arms trade treaty. so you need to figure out how to avoid those loopholes but also to future proof the treaty in that new technologies being developed we haven't thought of yet would still be captured down the road. there's this is fine line between specificity and leaving things broad enough broad enough but you don't overly capture. >> matt? >> in regards tore data on end users, there are many different or nonstate actors. it depends on what you mean by nonstate actor. while i think it's important to clarify what we mean. ardless, it doesn't really matter because end users are rarely specifiednif data transfers. but also, there are very few

states that if you mean by nonstate actors if you mean unauthorized end users, criminals, drug cartels, et cetera, there are very few states that permit those types of transfers directly and those states that do don't publish data anyway. but what would be useful in terms of end user information to the extent that this doesn't compromise commercial sensitive information or propriety information is transfers to entities that develop a history of leakage or did i version. that would aid in plugging some of the holes that result in diversion to the black market. in regards to the excellent question about photo shopping in the age of social media, that is a real concern. and sometimes it's ves obvious, but most of the time i mean, the

technology out there to do that is sophisticated enough and readily available enough for the amateur looking at this, it could be -- they're not going to spot disparities. i think it's a capacity that we, the research community have to develop as we seek to make better use of this tool in this pursuit. >> if i could just say something about the att and the issue of the capacity-building transfers and what not, i agree completely with rachel. i think the att will need to he include this somehow in the scope of the items that are covered. the u.s. thinks it should include parts and components and technology transfers and what not. we need to be careful we don't make this overly burdensome on states to comply with. that gets at the treaty specifying the what's need to do, not the how states need to do it. in terms of what gets reported, there's not going to be

reporting on technology transfers and parts and components. yes, there should be a requirement for states to subject those things to national controls and integrate that into your national control system. because of the numbers involved i don't see there's any way to report on parts and components being transferred in the context of the reporting regime that the att is going to create. it's likely we'll just have an obligation on states to control the transfer of them but not to then actually report on the transfer of them. >> okay. yes, please. >> thank you. i had a question for mr. malzahn and anyone else on the panel that would like to comment on this question. the export controls in the u.s., the administration has taken a position that they're too strict and that you know, they're going to reform the process. they introduced many reforms

about three years ago which i'm not sure what the status of those reforms are, and the -- house committee just prepared a report two days ago reinforcing the message that industry is very unhappy with the export controls and they're going to be continuing to push for reforms. so i guess my question would would be, what are the implications going to be eventually for the arms market if export controls are reformed in the u.s., and where do you see that going? >> let me say a couple things about that. one, i don't work directly work in export control reform. i have colleagues who do. we talk with them. so they inform what we're doing in the arms trade treaty in terms of the substance of the discussion we've had at the prep comes and at the negotiation. at the negotiation, it's not going to be a case of the tail wagging the dog, not going to be the way the negotiation happens

that's going to directly determine what the u.s. is going to do in the export control efforts. it's going to be the other way around. what we do in the att reflects what is going on in the export control reform discussions. in terms of what's likely to come out of the export control reform, it's going to be i hope a streamlined more efficient less burdensome regulatory regime for u.s., you know, for u.s. companies or for companies which do business in the u.s. but it's -- and the effect it's going to have on the international arms trade i think that it remains to be seen. it certainly is not going to expand it the international arms trade. this is about how the u.s. goes about regulating the companies. we're talking about streamlining it and making it more effective, not about removing regulations or controls on them. it's not about decontrols. now, one thing i will say as far as complaints by u.s. industry about the overly burdensome nature of the regulations and stuff, i'll note that with this

incredibly burdensome system of regulation, we still are the largest arms exporter in the world in terms of i take industry concerns seriously but i have to keep in mind sort of the background all this is going on in. industry never likes regulation, never likes controls. on some level, it's interfering with their ability to you know, go out and maximize their profits or whatever. now there are responsible companies and what not, but it's the role of governments to regulate and control industries that need regulation and control. we think that the international arms trade in one in which we continue to need controls on. that's why we're doing an arms trade treaty. other countries recognize the same kind of thing. >> any of the other panelists want to comment on this issue? yes, please. >> yes. i work with the senate international trade and security, ega. more direct towards you, bill, as much as the state department, the american government supports

the att and is working rather diligently towards it, there's still the issue of passing it through congress. and a majority of senators have actually signed on to a letter saying they're against the att. >> not exactly. they're against a particular kind of att. >> right. so the in that sense, house do you expect that to move forward in congress and actually changing their minds because as much as it's a particular economy now still, write off the att in general? >> can you maybe explain what that particular kind of treaty is? >> yes. all right. there are two different congress it will letters from 45 republican senators from 13 democratic senators in which they express opposition to an arms trade treaty that would undermine the second amendment in the u.s. the administration couldn't agree with more. we're not going to participate in negotiating an att that would undermine the second amendment, the right of the u.s. on a national basis to decide for

itself the rights and abilities of its citizens you know, to buy arms and transfer arms internal. the att won't cover that all. it's about international transfers. it's about transfers between states. so i actually agree with the sentiments in the letter. he read both of them. what i see in there doesn't require me to do anything differently in terms of the negotiation for the u.s. because we're not going to allow an att to get into this. this is a door that the rest of the negotiation accepts that is closed that the att is going to cover international transfers, not internal transfers and not internal regulation issues related to, as i said, stuff that is involved with the second amendment, the right to buy arms and what not. so the i don't have a problem with the two congressional letters. again, it's not that they oppose an att. they oppose an att that the conflicts with the second amendment. in terms of the u.s. ultimately to ratify the att, i thinkh