actually in the treaty. we're hoping to do in july or what i'm hoping to do in july is push for negotiating a treaty we will be able to ratify but it will be up to the senate to decide if it wants to provide ratification or not. we're aware of the kind of treaties it it the senate is likely to ratify and we don't want to the participate in negotiating a treaty that we expect now the u.s. will never be able to ratify. so my goal is to negotiate one that will allow the u.s. to ratify it. >> yes, please. gentleman and then we'll go to you. >> my name's ryan with gw. and i had a couple questions. earlier, miss stohl mentioned legitimate arms transfers. i was wondering what you define or anyone as a legitimate one. the u.s. has end use monitoring through a couple different programs.

that could be maybe considered very legitimate. additionally, there's a lot of -- i mean, if it's self-regulated and it's not enforced, i mean, what kind of states will have incentive not to the actually report whatever might not be deemed legitimate? and then the last one is, as far as the cipriot method ol, is it like the payment, is it like the contract being signed or is it being delivered? because some contracts will have an opt out clause and it may never occur. >> rachel first and then paul. >> i'm going to take them in reverse order. so i think the point you just raised about are you talking about authorizations or actual physical transfers? that's still to be determined. and it does make a huge difference because you can have a license and never transfer something but you would have still reported it if you're just

reporting authorizations. so it may look like you know, 120 fighter aircraft went to country x when they never did. we discovered this in the register during the last review that some states were reporting authorizations and other states were reporting actual transfers. so in a way you're comparing apples with oranges. in addition, because of the time lag and paul can talk to this, the timeline lean you may not be capturing everything in a calendar year that actually is reflected in that calendar year. so there's a lot in terms of the reporting that the att will have to look at some of the existing instruments and try and figure out how to best mitigate some of the problems that have arisen from them and within them. in terms of enforcement, one of the aspects of implementation of the treaty will be to have national enforcement systems. and that sounds very obvious but

there are states that don't have any legal judicial infrastructures to actually address violations of laws with regards to export controls. you know, in this country, we always talk about there are so many laws but are they actually being used. victory irboots is a really good example. like he -- what he was actually convicted of had nothing to do with all the kind of glamorous crimes that he was accused of committing. so enforcement will have to be very specific at the national level. and there has to be -- that allows you to have some accountability that states can't just act with impunity. that kind of leads to what is legitimate, what is irresponsible. i mean, i think that what the treaty will probably have to decide is what is legal and what is illicit rather than using the words legitimate and irresponsible because that's kind of like you know art or

other things that you know it when you see it, but it's in the eye of the beholder. and so i think what the treaty will do is really define perhaps without a definition what is a legal transfer. you know, what are the state to state transfers that we're talking about. again, in a very general way because states will authorize sales in different ways, but basically using a national transparent predictable clear process. and that will help, going back to one of the earlier questions, that will help industries you know manufacturers around the world because they will then understand what is necessary from country to country to country in terms of abiding by particular -- by particular laws. hopefully, the criteria will somewhat define what would be responsible or legitimate versus irresponsible as well because you're saying that the treaty does not want to see transfers that are going to human rights

abusers or to commit other atrocities or you know, this whole list of societal and global ills. and so that will start to, again, kind of amorphously define those concepts without having to say the russian sale to syria is irresponsible. so you don't have to name them or give them as examples but you kind of start closing in on what kind of the global community would like to see in terms of arms transfers that are going forward. >> thank you. paul? >> the question on the cipriot methodology, we have two out puts. the one i related today relates to statistics and that only relates to deliveries. we have a qualitative output where we provide information on the supply the recipient, the order date of i particular deal,

the type of equipment being transferred, the number, the dates of deliveries if anything has happened and how many items on that particular deal have been delivered and where we can find it, and this is a challenge, information like the financial value of that particular deal, whether it includes particular missiles or training. so i guess the answer is to do with the two sort of outputs which are quite useful to put together in some cases. with regards to algeria and morocco, we've noted a steep increase in terms of the volume of deliveries to algeria. if you look at the orders, you can see reactions there. so i think if you put both parts of the data together, you can get interesting sort of findings on the concerns about racing and other factors there. i was going to add to rachel's comments. at the moment we have u.n. arms embargoes which tend to be treated as that's the baseline in terms of what's considered ig

legitimate if you're authorizing a transfer to an entity that's subject to u.n. security council sanctions, this enalready you've got a baseline there. as rachel said, there are other cases which i think many of us consider sort of on anointed grounds illegitimate. we hope the att will enable a building up by the states parties by other things agreed upon as being sort of unacceptable. >> and just to add to that, while we all recognize kind of the value of the u.n. arms embargoes many national laws do not reflect the il legality of violating a u.n. arms embargo. so you may be violating the embargo but may not be violating any national law where you're actually operating. there's a little bit of a disconnect. that speaks to the need for clear global controls that each state can say, a checklist. i have in that and the other thing. that's a perfect example where i think it's even italy maybe, there was a case where someone

was operating within italy and was violating a u.n. arms embargo and there was no law to actually you know capture the person and take them to court. >> okay. please. >> my question is do you think this treaty will end success? do you feel like the participants and suppliers will be willing to sign a treaty that goes against their own interests? because i believe so many countries that supply have like major interests. i'm just wondering if you have some ideas of persuading them or maybe forcing them and if yes, what are they? your thoughts. thank you. >> okay, so this is a broader request he about the chances of success in july of the att. i guess it's addressed to all the panelists and they'll probably have all kinds of different perspectives on it. we'll start with you, bill, since you will be one of the

negotiators. >> i'm hopeful and optimistic. the att has made more progress during the discussions than most people expected. it showed i think where sort of the common ground actually is that can be reflected in a treaty. in terms of will it will actually succeed in doing that, i don't know. but in terms of the likely people who are going to resist an att, i don't think it's going to be the exporters. they want to have an att because it provides a way for regulating the playing field, if you will, leveling the playing field and having a consistent set of requirements that they are able to understand and sort of deal with in and compete in because what they don't like is to have an unlevel playing field. this will be about leveling the playing field. what the att should do is level the playing field up to a higher standard rather than leveling it down but it will be i think about leveling the playing field. i think actually that the resistance to an att is going to come from some of the importers

in terms of they're going to not be enthusiastic about having the criteria we're likely to have in the treaty in terms of human rights and other things be applied to some of them. they're going to be afraid this can interfere with their ability to import the weapons. and we're going to have an interesting negotiation in july you know, about this. what i will say is in the voting on the different resolutions and stuff that they passed with overwhelming international support with only some 20 or so abstentions on it for a couple of them one no vote, the u.s., but that's a different story. but we, as i said, we strongly support negotiating a strong and effective treaty. >> took you awhile to get there. >> it's going to be the skeptics we're going to have to convince and that's what the negotiation will be about. and as to whether it's likely or not, i think it's possible. i'm optimistic, i'm hopeful but i wouldn't say that it's a sure thing. it's going to be a difficult

negotiation. there's not much time to do it in. four weeks may sound like a lot of time to you, but as somebody who negotiates multilaterally, it's not much time at all. >> anybody else wants to comment. >> no, i'm going to defer to the att experts. >> rachel, you want to say -- >> i mean that none of us would be engaged in this effort if we didn't think that there was a chance of success. and how you define success, i will leave to your interpretation. i do think that as bill said, i was amazed at how far we came even in a very short period of time in each of the prop comes. and even amongst the skeptics, there is a clear commitment to see where their road takes us. at the end of the day, it may not be an outcome that people live with, and frankly, i think a poorly written or an att that

doesn't do what it set out to do isn't worth having. so we're not just having this exercise so that in july on the 27th of july at the 11th hour we can say oh, we do have a treaty. so i think it's important to get the right treaty. to me, that's where the success would lie. that said, there has been an impressive willingness even amongst the skeptics to engage in this process. i think a lot of that can be credited towards the chairman himself. he is a very astute and experienced diplomat who has really done a remarkable job in building confidence and not in kind of a token way, but really allowing everyone to be heard and top feel like they're being heard. and i think that's an important role. i think a lot of times we think of the u.n. as this is very political organ, which it is,

but i think also it is very much driven on personalities of the people within it, and i think this negotiations, you've had consistency amongst the people involved in the deliberations and so trust has been built. so i think the if you would have asked me in july of 2010 if i thought it was possible maybe the first day i would have been a little more hesitant. i think i today am a little more glass half full than i would have been then. so we'll see. >> yeah, i think personalities do matter and we've seen it in a multitude of multilateral negotiations. let me shift a little bit the -- >> if i could just make one comment on something that rachel said. sorry to interrupt. i couldn't agree more with you, rachel, about the outcome needs to be a strong and effective trea treaty. the u.s. is not interested in having a piece of paper which doesn't do anything. it needs to be a treaty which does something. we don't want to have a treaty

just for the sake of having a treaty and so we can move onto the next negotiation. that's what we need to get out of july, a strong and effective treaty. >> paul? >> i was going to add from our perspective, for u.n. disarmament discussions, the fact it's being held in those contexts, the fact you're not seeing the traditional divisions global north, global south is an interesting dynamic and development. i think also the statement by the five permanent members of the security council last year was really interesting as well in terms of a step forward. so i think there's a few things for us have been surprising, as well. i remember when i first joined cipri, we had to write a paper about the att. it was skeptical. people inside said this will never fly and pointed to the u.s. skepticism. there's been remarkable progress and i think for us it's very interesting to see that die nax mick. one of the things we haven't looked at which we have way back in the league of nations time,

one of the dividing lines that made sure their efforts are international lili regulating control fell part was because they didn't have the recipients on board. there's a lot of agreement among the suppliers. there are a lot of recipient states in africa, asia and the americas that are pushing for this. it's very interesting the change there. >> i'd like to go back a little bit to the transfer in the data. you touched upon it a little bit these reactive acquisitions and these small arms races in certain regions that you see developing. i wonder if you could talk a little bit about that, and then i'd like to ask our colleagues here on the panel who are dealing with the controls, do you think that a treaty like the att who is to prevent irresponsible or destabilizing

transfers you know, give me, would you be able to give me good example of how that would work in practice? but maybe paul, you first on the different trends and regional security. >> okay. i guess the example i spoke about earlier of algeria and morocco is one we focused upon a couple years ago in the cipri yearbook before changes in libya where we had seen them emerging as a major importer. algeria was acquiring a lot of advanced equipment from russia and other countries. ostensibly they were justifying it with regards tore combating al qaeda and the mag greb. i'm not sure how aircraft are going to help in that regard. what we actually saw was then morocco turning to suppliers for naval vessels and aircraft and the re actiactive acquisitions l be able to track acquisitions by

algeria and compare them system by system with the moroccan acquisitions. because my focus with regard to sort of the import side is on russia, central asia and the former soviet space particularly of concerned about azerbaijan. not because they'll be hosting the contest. they won't be participating but more broadly, we've seen a dramatic increase in terms of azerbaijan's acquisitions despite it the fact there's an embargo. a number of states within the region are continuing to supply and assist it in developing its arms industry against a backdrop of bellicose rhetoric with regards to the potential for the use of force despite the efforts of mediation. armenia is beginning to talk about its going to start acquiring systems in regard to the azeri buildup. that's a hot zone of particular

concern. the other area in terms of reactive acquisitions where i'm not so concerned is southeast asia where we see buildup in advanced maritime systems and combat aircraft. at the same time, very clear descriptions of the threats they perceive in the region, in some cases explaining why the systems are being acquired. you can see roles for that. a lot of it there is very much the influence of the military and keeping up with the joneses complex as well as perhaps looking over a shoulder towards china and what's happening there, but i don't think they're seeing that as their main driver. that's very interesting to see the chinese response to our data and warnings for arms race. in that region, i'd like to see more developed security building mechanisms for sure and see them more robustly put in place. i guess of the three areas i'm talking about, that's the one where i think there's a number of understandable reasons for the current increase. i guess one could also point to

the fact we have a very decalculated modernization in that region. a lot of programs we talked about in the '90s where the asian financial crisis postponed a lot of those plans. now we're seeing that delay. what's being acquired now is more developed than it would have been then because that's what's now available. >> uh-huh. any on the sort of example or. >> i mean, i think obviously, the actual mechanics of the att haven't yet been decided but again, thesal continue to be national decisions whether or not to transfer. what the att will do is give states a process or outline what their process should look like. so that it is clear that you know, to get an authorization, you go to party x and you do what is ever is required. and these are the kinds of assurances, whether they're end

use assurances or other types of assurances that you would need, it would presumably make the system more predictable and then if, you know, again, it's unclear if the criteria will be absolute prohibitions, if they'll be should take into account if it should be kind of a middle ground or maybe a tiered approach that some are absolutes. presumably it would make the system more predictable both for the companies and countries involved in the exports but also for the recipients, as well. in addition, you know, in terms of then reporting on what's going where, i think there will be more predictability and more clarity in that to keep track of some of these arms buildup potential amps buildups or reactive purchases as paul was calling them. but it's not going to be the solution to you know, all of the ills that are related to the

arms trade. i mean, i think it's really just one piece of a big puzzle. and it could be useful as the register was in just identifying what will systems are going where and allowing states to get a better global picture. obviously, not in realtime but in a more regularized time frame than they would have before. so i think it's an important confidence-building measure, transparency measure, but also in terms of just early warning or those kinds of things, as well. >> right. >> yes, matt. >> in regards i just want to the build upon what rachel said. transfer controls are extremely important but it's one piece of the puzzle in terms of ensuring that weapons are used only by intended end users. there's also right sizing arsenals and destroying surplus stockpil stockpiles, improving stockpile security, there's strengthening border controls in regards tore man pads, which is one of my

main focuses. there's airport perimeter security. there's technical counter measures you know, possible technical counter measures for civilian aircraft. there's a host of measures that states can and should take to prevent unauthorized access to small arms weapons. >> okay. are there any other questions? if not, we will -- please. >> this question is for paul. >> marsha keller. paul, looking into the future, which regions do you see as problematic in terms of arms flows? >>. >> i guess i'll mention the one that i flagged at the beginning but didn't discuss is sort of east africa. there there's concerns for a range of reasons.

with regards to uganda, we're seeing a significant buildup in terms of acquisitions from russia. and as i said, the propness of some of those acquisitions with regard to the tasks at hand is unclear. so the acquisition of some advanced equipment i think the there's the issue of the money could have been better spent, let's put it that way. lack of oversight and discussion within the parliament in uganda is another concern being raised there. with regards to kenya, there's also been a number of transfers that have been used in the somali incursions. and i think that there you can see in that region there's the question of there may well be restricts on transfer controls by some states but also a desire to help them, to develop an ability to intervene to resolve situations themselves in the region. so i guess one of the challenges maybe it's not so much a concern but a challenge and striking the balance is one of the things i think is quite difficult. we're going to be looking at some issues with regards to

equipping undersecurity secretary foreign programs in post conflict scenarios with the lessons learned in terms of good and bad practice. that's a project we'll be taking on in the next couple months. and the preliminary work is looking at a number of cases from afghanistan and iraq to west africa and east african cases. i think that i'll have a better idea in terms of some of the concerns but also some of the ways perhaps to mitigate and to limit some of the concerns for particular regions in the coming months. we're using the data we have, plus a number of interviews with various stakeholders. >> okay. thank you very much. i think, yeah, joe. you'll get the last question for you. >>. >> thank you. i just wanted to ask as we look ahead to the negotiations in july, what do you anticipate will be key issues, key potential sticking points or in

the diplomacy between now and july? where do you think major efforts either need to be focused or you can expect to be focused? >> okay. thank you. >> i need to think about that for a minute. >> i'm going to give you the glib answer while bill gets into the specifics because obviously, i'm not negotiating the treaty. but i would honestly anticipate given my experience with u.n. processes that no word is too small to focus four weeks attention on. and that includes and or an or it or i. >> the difference between happy and glad. >> yeah. exactly. >> because there is one. >> but in terms of -- and that's just you know, i'm not trying to be cute but i think that you know, again, going back to how u.n. negotiations work and the personalities involved and you know if people woke up on the

wrong side of the bed, that can truly affect how things move forward. but i think the key and there will be key sticking points in all of the elements of the treaty but i think determining what the scope is both in terms of the weapons covered and the transaction is going to be a protracted debate. because there are those that want a very minimalist scope and there are those that want literally anything you could possibly think of now and in the future. and so some kind of balance will have to be made and a lot of this, of course, is compromise. i think the criteria themselves not only what those criteria are but the standards that are applied to them the kind of absolute prohibition through the you know, on balance we took it into account, i think, again, that's going to be key and i think the other kind of meat of this, i mean there's a lot of meat but the other kind of key

issues will be what does national implementation look like? how do you balance kind of what i said at the beginning, the what and the how. and to not be so general that you miss kind of helping countries who have very weak national control systems develop them but how do you not prevent had kind of, as bill said, you don't want to lower the playing field. you want to raise the playing field. so figuring out what that looks like at the national level i think will be challenging. so i think those three, that's going to be the bulk i think of the discussions. then we'll get bogs down in words like rights or principles for a long time. did that give you enough -- >> you didn't leave me with a lot of things to say. >> it was general. >> one thing that i think that we have not really gotten a very good handle on, most of the focus on the discussion has been on the exporting side, the responsibilities of the exporting states. we have spent less time and made less progress in talking about the rights and obligations of the importers, and also of the

transshipping states. we're going to need to make some progress in july on that because we haven't had that much discussion up until now. so it's been focusing mainly on the export side of the equation but it needs to address those other things, as well. i think the biggest -- one of the biggest tensions that exist in there i think is what lachal mentioned earlier, the tension between between having a treaty that is very aspirational in nature that tries to do lots of things versus having a treaty that actually is capable of being implemented by state's parties because there is a basic tension there. i don't think it's one that we have fully resolved. from the u.s. point of view, whatever comes out of this needs to, on the one hand does need to move the ball forward and do some aspirational things but it must be ones that states can actually implement so the that it is actually worth the paper

that the treaty is written on, it isn't just an empty document that does nothing. that's going to be a real tension there because i see some of the other discussions that have been going on particularly in the program of action context about the tension between what he states or what people want to do versus what is actually possible. i think that one issue that we're going to have to resolve is the issue about transparent sit in reporting because there are still states out there for whom reporting on international transfers is a taboo subject, notwithstanding the fact that you have to register, some of these states have never participated in the register on the imparting side. that's something we have to resolve because there are people who want to have a extremely detailed transparency and reporting requirements and other states, sorry, mandatory ones and other states who don't want to have any kind of reporting that is required under the treaty. and i think that we as i mentioned before we need to be careful of the basic attention