u.s. veto. so that is more or less been on ice for a few months. the palestinians have withheld further action in the united nations as the discussions that the jordanians have facilitated have been ongoing. they have continued to do so even as those discussions have been paused. and we hope, although i don't think it would be -- i would go so far as to say necessarily that we are confident, we would hope that the palestinians would see the wisdom of continuing to refrain from this when through the general assembly or the specialized agencies. that said, we recognize that they may at a certain point change their mind. and we are very vigilant about all of the potential avenues that they might take from the general assembly to world health organization, iaea, and others. our posture is to underscore the consequences, not only to the peace process, to palestinian

interests, to the wider interests of the united nations should they choose to do that, and of course our relationship with the palestinian authority. but also to impress upon each and every member state that ultimately gets a vote in this regard, the consequences for the peace process, for advancing the goal ultimately of a two-state solution. we think these actions, in fact, would set that goal back rather than bring it closer. and, of course, to underscore to member states that we degrade and discredit the united nations when we allow countries or prospective countries, rather, to try to jump the queue and get a degree of membership or status that is not yet warranted. so we're very active, i can assure you, across the board in trying to prevent this. and if necessary confront it. but i think you know, and we

know, that the math is not in the united states' favor on issues of this sort when it comes to the entire membership. >> with regard to iran, the united states has i think been very effective in imposing tough sanctions on iran. and i strongly support that policy. both bilateral and multi-lateral, to stop iran in its tracks. i think everyone would agree sanctions seem to be having an impact on the iranian economy. the rial has probably deflated about 50%. do you see any evidence the regime is seriously interested in ending or even delaying its nuclear program? >> let me reiterate what i said, and this is the starting point for any discussion on iran. as president obama has repeated, the united states will not tolerate and will not accept iran with a nuclear weapon.

and we will take the necessary actions to prevent that from occurring. we think the surest way to underscore and rule out any future prospect of an iranian nuclear weapon is for iran to do as other countries have done, and that is to give up its nuclear program affirmatively and permanently. the best means of accomplishing that remains through a negotiated agreement. and that is why we have increased the pressure successively on iran with the aim of trying to change its calculus so that it comes to the negotiating table in earnest. the sanctions that we imposed in resolution 1929 at the u.n. security council was a huge step forward to substantially increase the pressure. the actions this congress have

taken, both through sosada and the mdaa that other countries in europe, in asia, and elsewhere have taken, have brought us to the point which you just described where iran is truly facing crippling economic pressure. and we do think that it is now very timely, as iran has said its ready to come back to the negotiating table, to test whether that pressure is now sufficient to change their calculation. i can't predict the answer to that question until we get there and have the opportunity for a series of discussions. if it is not, the pressure will increase. if it is not, we will take no option off the table. >> i just want to follow up. because experts on iran, such as kareem sajapoor, feel even if the iranians came to the table you couldn't trust them. they'll say one thing on monday and switch their position later on. he and others also believe that even if they came to the table, even if there were regime change and no one believes they will have regime change because this

regime is so ensconced, the next regime would look at libya, would look at pakistan, would look at north korea, and pursue their nuclear program. so i'd just be interested in a few minutes, because i think my time is almost up, how do you respond to people like kareem sajipoor and others who don't believe that the iranians would ever come to a table in good faith? >> well, first of all, the record is one to make those doubts legitimate. we have no illusions about iran's record at negotiations. having said that, the pressure on iran has never been what it is today. and it is only increasing. in the months to come, the cumulative effect of the pressure on the central bank, the european oil embargo, and

additional measures that we and others are taking, are going to tighten the noose to a point that it has never been thus far. and we believe that there is a reasonable potential for that degree of pressure to, in fact, cause the iranians to reassess their interests. and the relative importance that they attack to pursuing their nuclear program. can we be certain? of course not. do we think it must be tested? absolutely, yes. because it is the only certain way to end the program as opposed to delay it or set it back for a brief period of time. >> i think my time is up but thank you and i hope you're correct. >> thank you very much. we'll call the members. if you'll watch the timing very carefully. if you'll make your answers as succinct as possible -- >> is this red light what i should be watching? >> yes. >> okay, thank you. >> is the light working? >> yeah.

>> oh. it wasn't before. >> how long is the -- >> five minutes. and that includes their questions and your answers. so if -- sorry, i don't mean to be disrespectful. if your answers are too long, i can't get to their questions. >> is that what your call -- >> was i diplomatic? about that? i hope so. we're going to go ahead. mr. cole. >> thank you, madam chairman. usually the problem's the length of our questions, not the length of your answers, my experience around here. you mentioned in your testimony, ambassador, about libya. let me ask you a question. there was a lot of skepticism, i think, on the hill because the administration chose to engage in military activity without coming, honestly, to congress in any kind of formal way and asking for consent. looking forward at the possibility that something like that might occur in syria or might occur with iran, do you

think the administration, under those circumstances, would come to congress or should come to congress in order to receive authorization for the use of force in either of those two cases? >> well, sir, let me say first of all that i'm not a lawyer, nor am i the administration official responsible for those kinds of judgments or recommendations or determinations. but i will say this. what we did in libya was the right thing. we had the support of the international community, the support of the region, and we protected the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians that were at imminent risk of slaughter. the decision that the united statess security council took a year ago this week has proved its worth. gadhafi is gone. the libyan people are now working to constitute, under great challenge, a democratic

future, a democratic system. their transition is on track. we were able to accomplish this without a single loss of american life. in a shared operation of burden-sharing after the united states played a critical role in the early days. our nato partners and arab partners took the lead and sustained the operation with u.s. support. so i think that proved its worth. i can't speculate, sir, in all honesty, on where we may end up in any other circumstance or contingency. i know that the administration and the president fully and completely respect the role of congress in decisions on war and peace. and we will take the appropriate steps to consult and gain the appropriate authorization -- >> i would suggest to you there's a lot of bipartisan skepticism that that indeed happened. and honestly i don't think it did. and with all due respect to our allies, they didn't take the lead.

we did 65% of the sorties, 40% of the combat sorties, 79% of the refueling, 99% of the air lifts. so to pretend that this was anything other than a largely american operation through nato, that's my opinion -- now, let me ask you a question. i'll give you another one to respond on. again, going back to libya -- and i agree with you, look, gadhafi's a terrible person and i have no doubt the world's a better -- better off without him. but given the fact that he had suspended his nuclear program, his weapons of mass destruction, had turned over those materials to the united states, did not allow al qaeda to operate in his territory, had pulled back from what earlier in his career had been terrorist activity, if you were sitting in tehran or in north korea and you saw what happened to him after he did all those things, what incentive would you have to follow the same course and say we're going to get out of the nuclear weapons business? i would suggest there's probably

people in those countries arguing look what happened to him the minute he cooperated with the united states. >> no, sir. i would very much disagree with that perspective because in the first instance the reason why the united nations, nato, arab countries acted in the instance of libya was not anything to do with nuclear weapons. it had to do with an imminent threat to hundreds of thousands of civilians. >> i agree. the question is would we have acted if those weapons were there? there's serious slaughter going on in syria right now. but they also have a wmd cache and a different level of defense. and that seems to have some impact on the decisions we're making. >> i disagree. i disagree both because i think you're mixing apples and oranges in that comparison but also because i think the message to countries like iran, like north korea is that when you are as isolated as libya ultimately proved to be, when nobody in the international community would stand up and prevent the kind of

multilateral action that was taken against gadhafi, and that isolation is now building with respect to iran now more than ever, north korea, that's not a situation you want to be in. so i would actually take the opposite lesson -- >> we have a very different view. because if i were them, i would hang on to my weapons before i would abandon them given that action. >> so what is the conclusion you draw from that? that we shouldn't have done libya because it -- >> well, first of all, i would have liked to have a full debate on libya in the congress of the united states, which we did not have. to commit forces on that scale with no debate, no discussion, and no congressional authorization i think is unconscionable. that's my view. >> but going back -- you're making a point about nuclear weapons. would doing nothing in libya have sent a better message to iran and north korea? >> i don't know. my time's up.

i'd love to pursue it later. but thank you, ambassador. >> mr. rothman. >> thank you, madam chairman. dr. rice, it's great to have you with us. and thank you for your outstanding work at the u.n. >> thank you, sir. >> not only in standing strong for the united states of america and our interests but for the interests of the united states' most important allies and friends. thank you so much for your work, your good work, and effective work. i do have a question about unesco. and i understand the point that you were making that there will be consequences to the palestinians for going against the u.s.'s advice and directive not to pursue independence through the united nations. and then avoiding direct negotiations with the state of israel. the most important strategic ally and friend the united states has in that region. but what are the consequences, or what would the consequences be to -- under a waiver to unesco, the body that actually

voted in favor of the palestinians' request? i've got a couple of these, dr. rice. >> okay. >> madam ambassador, if you could. so i'm going to list them quickly. so consequences to unesco -- i know we have 22% of their regular budget. so that's a significant stick if we wanted to use it. also, do you know anything about the presence of russian troops in damascus? i read a piece the other day that the russians had landed in damascus. is there any truth to that? and if so, what were they doing there and what were their intentions? also, what are the -- if you can speak in public session about what the status is of negotiations between iran and the five plus one with regards to iran's nuclear program. where is that status? also, it's been said that the swift program -- are you familiar with that?

the society for worldwide interbank financial telecommunications, which has just said that they're not going to work with iran in passing money back and forth from iran to its customers, they're going to shut that down, that that will have a significant impact on iran. do you know anything about that, and can you comment on that? i have a zillion more questions. that's probably enough for now. >> let me see how many i can get to before the red light -- >> oh. and the status of the israeli-palestinian negotiations. [ laughter ] time's up, right? thank you, madam chairman. >> thank you, spoishlt for your kind comments about my service. let me begin with unesco. you say how do we ensure there are consequences for unesco. unesco the organization that is carrying out holocaust education and girls' education and literacy training and other anti-extremist programs are, as you know, a collection of international civil servants

doing this work on the ground. they're not the ones that we intend to punish. it's the member states individually who belong to unesco and belong to the general assembly and everywhere else that cast these votes. so we need to make that distinction. and that's part of the problem with the way our current legislation or law is drafted. it doesn't make a distinction. it's a very blunt instrument that ends up boomeranging against u.s. interests. it's not in our interests for these critical programs to go without 22% of u.s. funding. it simply isn't. if it were, we wouldn't have funded them in the first place and you wouldn't have been generous in your support of them. now, how do we punish individual member states? if that's our objective. we can discuss that. each of them, as you know, is individual, and we can discuss and consider how to ensure there are consequences there. i think that's difficult to do. there are many votes that are taken in u.n. agencies on individual issues with different

countries that we disagree with. but let me say a couple things quickly. you know, the same states that we may be very frustrated with in terms of their vote on unesco may be the very same states that are voting correctly, as over 130 countries did, on syria, for example. or that voted overwhelmingly to condemn the iranian-backed plot to kill the saudi ambassador here in washington. so for every vote that we would deplore there may be several that we would welcome. and so how you calibrate that in our relationship in dealing with individual member states is tricky. but we don't need to punish the entity and we don't need to punish ourselves. and we have talked about ways to make sure there are consequences for the palestinians. russian troops. i've seen the press reports. i've also seen very clear-cut denials from moscow about these reports.

i have not seen any information to corroborate these reports. that's all i can say on that. with respect to iran and the p-5 plus one, as you know, the iranians have said they're prepared to return to the negotiating table. kathy ashton on behalf of the p-5 plus one has said the p-5 plus one is ready to come back to the table. they're negotiating the timing and modalities. and so the expectation is that should happen before too long. and finally, on swift, i'm not the expert. and i certainly wouldn't want to get into a matter of technical interest that the treasury department is more expert on, but obviously, this is a positive step. it is one in a series of positive steps that have increased the pressure on the iranian banking and financial system in a way that i think is having real impact, real negative impact. >> thank you, madam ambassador. thank you, madam chairman. >> mr. dan.

>> madam chairman. madam ambassador, good to be with you. just following up on representative cole's comments, i was one of the few folks on my side of the aisle to support the administration's retroactive action in libya on the house floor. i thought it was the correct thing to do. obviously, i had some questions about how we conducted the operation but i thought it was the right thing to do. but in that situation we had u.n. support obviously, nato support, arab league support. and that's important. but with respect to syria we don't have u.n. support quite clearly. and it seems to me that as long as the russians and chinese have a seat at the security council table they're going to veto anything that comes up on syria that's meaningful. i guess the real question is if we really want to -- if we really want to make an impact on the iranians, certainly undermining the assad regime is very important. and at what point do we show the same resolve to the friends of

syria that the russians have shown to the assad regime? it's quite clear to me that the friends of the syrian regime are quite clear and resolute in their support, but those of us who are very concerned about what's been going on with mr. assad, we seem to be flailing about for a policy. we offer humanitarian assistance. but at what point do we consider supporting the rebels militarily? i'm not saying boots on the ground. i'm not even talking about no-fly zone impositions. but doing something to support the opposition. >> well, i appreciate the opportunity to address syria. this is an issue of utmost priority and concern. and clearly we are as appalled and disgusted with what is happening in syria as anybody else. the reality, though, is that each of these circumstances, syria, libya, yemen, egypt, tunisia, are different in very

important respects. not just in the ways you described, that there isn't an international consensus, that the russians and chinese have blocked action, that the arab league hasn't requested this kind of support, but they're different in terms of the dynamics on the ground. they're different in terms of the cohesion and the effectiveness of the opposition. you know, in libya you had an opposition that from the earliest days controlled a degree of territory from which it could push out. that's not the case in syria. and so our interest is and remains in seeing this government go, seeing assad go, and a democratic transition emerge as soon as possible. but the best way to get there in our judgment is not in this instance through the use of military force or even at this stage arming an opposition whose leadership and cohesion we know very little bit about. >> i'm not talking about us

engaging militarily. i'm just simply saying at what point do we support rebels militarily? i mean, it just seems to me that the alternative is to watch them all be slaughtered. >> sir, that's indeed the question i'm trying to address. and the answer is that we believe that the best approach is threefold -- one, to increase the pressure on the assad regime. and we have put strong sanctions. we have seen others do the same. the region. and we need to tighten that noose, point one. yes indeed, we do care about the humanitarian situation. and we are seeking greater access and providing humanitarian assistance. but third, we're trying to support the opposition, to unify and cohere both internally and externally. at this stage there is quite a distance to go in that regard and we think the best solution remains a politically negotiated solution rather than further militarizing the situation through the insertion of military aid to the opposition, an opposition which frankly we still know very little about. >> we made some of the arguments with respect to the libyan opposition, too. we didn't know a lot -- >> and we didn't provide them with arms. >> i want to move over to the unesco question quickly

following up on mr. rothman's comments about consequences. i guess there are all sorts of consequences here. but what are the consequences if we go back on our word? this subcommittee was pretty clear that if the palestinians went to the u.n., unesco, that there would be consequences. we said it, we meant it. and i thought that there have to be consequences. but what's the consequence to us, to all of us if we go back on our word? >> i appreciate the question. first of all, there are consequences, as we've just discussed, for the palestinians, which in our judgment is where the consequences ought to lie. the consequences shouldn't be on us or against us, the united states. that's self-defeating. that wasn't the intent of the legislation. and we now have a situation where in unesco and potentially other agencies a law that was intended to deter is having --

is failing to deter and then boomeranging on us. i don't think it's going back on our word or giving the palestinians a bye to take remedial action that protects u.s. interests while at the same time maintaining the legislative actions you've already taken that will in fact have consequences for the palestinians. >> thank you. mr. schiff. >> thank you, madam chair. and welcome, ambassador. it's great to see you. appreciate your superb job. i want to follow up on mr. dent's questions. i share his frustration, i think that of many americans, when we hear the syrian opposition say why has the world forsaken us? and i know we are trying. but it's appalling to see the kind of bloodshed that's going on there. and i've been very gratified to see the strong words that you

have spoken against what russia and china have done, particularly russia. recently there have been some statements by the russian foreign minister that they might be amenable to something that kofi annan is working out recently. the chinese have indicated they might not veto another resolution. do you see any meaningful movement on the part of either country? and if there's still time after that question, i'd love to get your thoughts on the situation in north korea. i was surprised, frankly, that kim jong un agreed as early in his tenure to resume discussions, but then of course very disappointed with the announcement of these satellite launches. does that completely scuttle the opportunity for discussion? do you see any new window with the invitation for iaea inspections? and how do you assess that situation? >> thank you very much, mr. schiff.

russia and china in the security council. their behavior to protect the assad regime has been reprehensible. and i think, frankly, they have heard that message from the entire international community, not just the united states and our western partners. the entire arab world and the majority of members of the united nations. soon after the second double veto the general assembly took up more or less the same resolution that was blocked in the security council. it was adopted by an overwhelming majority, over 130 countries voted in favor. a very small handful, i think about eight countries, voted no. and they include russia and china and venezuela and zimbabwe

and north korea and iran and syria. it was company that one would -- it's very unique company that russia and china typically don't like to find themselves in. that has been followed by continued strong action out of the human rights council and repeated international unity with the glaring exception of russia and china on issues related to syria. i think the combination of that kind of isolation has given them, particularly the chinese perhaps to a greater extent than the russians, some pause. they are both embarked on public relations efforts, particularly in the arab world, to try to mitigate the consequences of their actions. and i do think that should --

that the appointment of kofi annan and the efforts that he's trying to make provide a potential, underscore potential, point of convergence among the members of the security council. so we're discussing this week not a new resolution but a strong what we would call presidential statement to lend support to kofi annan's efforts. it will be interesting to see whether russia and china having supported kofi annan's appointment are able to agree on a statement. it would be the first unified statement out of the council of any substance since last august in support of what kofi annan is trying to accomplish. that will give us some indication potentially of where they're going on this. but i do think that with each successive effort to stand up to protect assad in the context of his atrocities it does cost russia and china in important ways that are not lost on them. let me turn, if my time permits, to dprk.

the north korean announcement on friday that they intend to do a satellite launch at some point in april was highly provocative. it's absolutely in violation should they do it of their obligations under security council violations. it violates in our view the february 29 agreement that was reached. the good news is that all of the key players, including all of the players in the six parties including russia and china have made very clear their opposition to this and their view that it would be a violation of north korea's obligations under international law. should they go through with it, it would certainly make any progress on the agreement that was reached very difficult and