so the logic of trying to give the moderates more platform and more opportunities to express themselves is to allow more places to find those symmetries. to isolate the world views, religious world views and the secular world views that find no room for any alternative at all. it's my view and anything else is simply unacceptable. so a more inclusive system creates the space for those kind of symmetries to happen. in that sense, you know, different religions and groups will find all kinds of common ground about moral issues. i think that's a significant virtue of inclusive political systems. in some ways i think the confessionalism, per se, is epiphenomenal of any other effects of inclusive or exclusive system. it isn't necessarily about religion or about a belief system but it's about a system that allows space for different

sets of beliefs, different world views, some of which may be religious or may not be. but i think it's that kind of space that i think inclusive systems can foster that can reduce extremism by allowing for the creation of space where that symmetry can be explored, where groups can talk to each other and have open debates and have discussions, et cetera. i found this in jordan and yemen and in the case of jordan i found much more moderation with islamist party in part because islamists found a lot of common ground with secularists, communists and liberals on a number of issues. now there are often political issues, so objection to the electoral system is the first one in the summer of 1993. the very first time all of these groups, islamists and communists had a joint press conference and it was a spectacle. it was spectacular. they should all be sitting there in agreement on this issue. it's one finite issue. that will bring me to another point in a second.

but i think open system creates the spaces where we can say i disagree with you, samer, but let's agree on this and push this issue together. and that is a positive thing for tolerance if we're going to talk about tolerance. it also brings up a point though that moderation or extremism isn't a single position on a continuum. so a group does not become necessarily moderate in all aspects of everything it does. and very often what you find is an inclusive system leads to the logic of political moderation, may have nothing to do with other kinds of issues. famously with islamists, very conservative positions remain on women. elaborate debates about justifications of the roles women can play, you know, what candidates will be fielded, et cetera, criticism of certain foreign policy issues, notions of what is the best economic system, et cetera. but not mistake to say that moderation -- to the extent we might find moderation and inclusive system, you know, don't assume that a single actor

will become more moderate across all issue dimensions. you have to unpack the different issue dimensions and say what issues are they moderating and on what issues have they not? and janine clark has done some really interesting work on jordan in particular, that the issue of women's participation is a red line issue for the islamic action front. it's an issue that they don't want to cooperate, even where it is an agreement, they don't want to have joint press conferences on issues. they want to maintain that separate space. i think there is a lot of really interesting things to unpack here. i'm way out of order, as usual. so the last point -- u.s. foreign policy, i had a similar reaction. there was a lot i found in agreement with the last panel and that was, you know, interesting to me.

>> i think samer laid this out beautifully. the u.s. has such a negative reputation in the region. and my point earlier about my question about jordan and legitimacy is jordanians tell me -- the same thing with the united states. sort of anything the u.s. is pushing is automatically going to be suspicious. any group the u.s. stands behind is automatically going to have a problem. i think the way the u.s. can speak loudest is by being hands off on the particular mechanics. but very supportive of processes in general. by being supportive of processes in general, that means not channeling vast amounts of money to the scaf and very little money to other kinds of things. being receptive to say what do you need? do you need training in this? do you need us to come in and help you learn how to be parliamentarians? sort of an open what can we give you? would you like from us? as opposed to let us tell you now how to be good democrats.

i think that will inherently backfire. even if there's a lot of common ground there. which there is an extraordinarily amount of common ground. i'll end with one point. i completely disagree with the idea that nobody predicted the arab spring. in fact, everyone predicted the arab spring. over and over and over. the problem is we didn't pick the exact moment. if you look through writings, the famous cassandra article on egypt was 1997, i believe, said this cannot be sustained. all of us who've been working in the region, we know of vast pockets of dissent. people just disparate for that moment. we didn't predict the moment. i'm not saying that we got it right. but there was, you know, the idea that everybody saw these as equilibrium states and they were repressive and nothing was going to ever change i don't think is quite fair either. i think it was somewhere in the middle. >> sam, before you speak, i think what dennis ross said is that the obama administration did a review in which most agreed it wasn't sustainable.

>> right. >> but that it simply was not about to change. and it was the rapidity and the surprise of the change that took them -- i mean, weeks after this thing was published this guy set himself on fire in much of the middle east. there's probably more agreement there than disagreement. sam? which is unusual in this field. i'd like to point out. please. >> first, thank you for inviting me here to speak. it's a great pleasure. especially as professor farr has indicated, i'm a former student of his. so anything i say you disagree with, you know who to blame for. anyway -- sorry. the two questions that -- the two first questions that were posed to us that i will comment on and then perhaps focus a bit on the situation in egypt towards religious freedom at the moment and how it will progress. the first question as the professor indicated is very hard to answer in the negative.

who possibly can argue that a fully inclusive free, fair, democratic system that makes room for everyone is good on the long run. the formation of the question takes into consideration, perhaps, all those criticisms that have been put forward towards the promotion of democracy under the bush administration or in general. the free inclusive, free and fair, takes into consideration this perhaps modern debasement of the concept of a free society to essentially mean a ballot box. we're talking about something more than that. it's highlights of the system we give room to others. whether it's islamic voices or religious minorities. indicating that no one will beside lined in this process. it also signifies a recognition of a time frame. perhaps problems will be there in the beginning but we're talking about the long run.

sure, no one would disagree with such a statement. the second statement, however, is perhaps a bit more problematic. the statement says that whether -- i got the same statement that the doctor received. whether a regime of liberal democracy including adherence to principles of religious freedom might serve to moderate or unleash the liberal radicalism of some of these voices. there's a couple of assumptions in this statement that deserve some consideration. the first of these assumptions, of course the statement indicates some form of qualification. some of the voices will either be moderated or will become more radical, and not all of them. but there is an underlying assumption that there is some form of relationship between religious freedom or the lack thereof and religious radicalization. that this form of relationship is one of negative correlation.

the more you have of religious freedom, the less you have of radicalization. that assumption, however, needs to be tested with the reality of the situation. as edmond burk indicated in the opening pages of his reflections on the revolution in france, it is circumstances and not abstract principles that trend in any political or civil policy whether beneficial or toxic to human beings. so in that light, the question is whether there is a relationship in the past between the emergence of islamism as a clear discourse and between the lack or the existence of religious freedom or liberal democracy. looking at the past, looking at the beginnings, the formations of the salafi movement in egypt, for example, 1912 and 1926 the establishment of the first salafi organizations in egypt.

the establishment of the muslim brotherhood in 1928. whether at that time the lack of religious freedom was important, whether it played a role in the formation of modern islamism, and whether thus by providing more religious freedom we will get a better situation. we find in the writings of those founders of islamism a lack of importance of that factor. true, they have many complaints regarding the west. colonialism. western interference. there are many there. when he views democracy, he views it rather in the negative and not as something he would complain about as to one of the reasons he would form his organization. so looking at the past might be something to consider about this statement. the second, however, assumption is also worth some consideration

of ours. there is an acceptance in the statement of the claim by islamism to be an authentic representation and interpretation of islam. now that islamism claims to be so is something that is obvious to anyone. that that claim is correct or that we should consider it as true is something, perhaps, that we need to think about a bit more. certainly, islamism is a modern phenomenon. its roots might not be traced necessarily into islamic jurisprudence. perhaps the salafis having much more an authentic claim to some forms of islam than the muslim brotherhood. but in the case of muslim brotherhood, those roots are hardly there or hardly evident to point to. so why should we care about religious freedom, then? am i arguing that religious freedom is only a nice concept that, yes, we should promote because it's a good human value?

certainly not. there is a value in religious freedom in this debate. and perhaps it was referred to here. by religious freedom here, i refer to the ability of people to bring religion to the public square. of making religious-based arguments in that open public square. however, there's an interesting, here, word that is missing that is, perhaps, taken into -- as a granted fact in the united states. and that's "diverse" religious views. the reason why religious freedom would be extremely important in egypt and in other countries in the region would be because of the ability of individuals to think differently. and then to collectively form an alternative to the basic assumptions. if there is no religious freedom in egypt -- was not allowed to

write and criticize the basic premises of islamic hiss toethi then the islamic state model will become the applicable model and the only one that is the only applicable one or the only one presented to people. if he's not allowed to criticize or offer a different interpretation of the islamic tradition in hadid, then the existing interpretation, the one dominated by the islamists will be the only one offered to the egyptian people. it is thus no surprise that being muslim would be only defined by how the islamists define a muslim. for this reason it is important to defend religious freedom and to work on bringing religious freedom as an integral part of building a liberal democracy in the region. let me now move from this to the present and the future and the situation of religious freedom in egypt. religious freedom in egypt is hardly a happy story.

there simply isn't that much of religious freedom in the country. certainly it is not saudi arabia. it is not iran. but the situation of religious freedom in egypt has been shaped by the dynamic relationship, interrelationship between the religious establishment, the state, the islamists and the general public. each of these has played a different factor or different role in the lack of religious freedom in the country. but it is how they operate together that creates this vacuum of freedom for -- whether religious minorities, intellectuals and others who think differently. that situation has, perhaps, worsened much more after the revolution. we've seen a dramatic increase in the number of attacks against the cops. but more importantly than the fact that there are -- an increase of attacks is the fact of the shape of those attacks. increasingly we see that the general public has participated

in those attacks. that your neighbors are angered by the fact that you are building a church. or that some christian girl, some muslim girl, has some affair with a guy from another religion. the participation of your general public, of your neighbors, is perhaps the most worrisome sign to the future of religious freedom in egypt. concerning the islamists and their role, i would perhaps look at two points. if time allows, of course. the first is how the muslim brotherhood has written very clearly about their view of the coptic church especially. the muslim brotherhood has been accused of not having a program. using slogans and not a program. they've given us a 96-page program that anyone can read and see their views on it. a page and a half on the coptic church specifically. that page and a half is extremely interesting to read.

first it says that -- it highlights an interest of the muslim brotherhood to take control of the christian endowments from the church. the reason they provide on this page 64 of the program is that the religious endowments should serve all egyptians, regardless of religion. nicely put, i would say. but more interesting is how they define the church role according to them. it is -- the church role is to take its place along with other state institutions in fighting the cultural invasion from the west. the church should cooperate with different state institutions and egyptian civil society to correct current deviant paths. that statement reminds me of a model that has, perhaps, become less relevant in the world. that of a national church model. the repression that the churches have suffered under communism, the attempt by the ruling regime

to control the official religious establishment, and thus use it as a way to control the religious minority, that i think would be something interesting to watch in the future. and more profoundly, in terms of the muslim -- or the islamic religious authorities and how the muslim brotherhood will deal -- as an interpreter or representative of islamic authority. the second interesting thing to note or dynamic to note in the future will be this relationship between the muslim brotherhood and the salafis. how -- whether the muslim brotherhood's used to the fact of being the guys on the right or the guys on the more extreme, how will they deal now with the fact of being challenged from the right? how will they deal with the question of their base -- possibility of losing their base to the more radical salafis.

so the dynamic relationship between the muslim brotherhood and the salafis will not only tell us a lot about the future of politics of egypt but it will also be extremely important in how the fate of religious minorities and religious freedom in general takes shape. thank you. >> very good. thank you, sam. well, you've -- you've -- all three of you have given us a great deal to reflect upon. i think what i'd like to do given the amount of time left is sort of ask -- try to ask an uberquestion and start with samer and go down the line again. get you to reflect on -- use this question to scituate the themes that you would like. i'm going to pick up on sam tatros's notion that religious freedom means more than private, if you like, confessionalism. i'm not sure this is the way jillian was using it or not. it means the right to bring your religion into the public square.

that means -- it can mean a lot of things. it can mean politics. religion and politics. using your religious beliefs to make religious arguments for laws and policies, economic, other foreign policies as well as domestic policies. it can mean, dare i say it, prosthelytism or trying to convince other people, i believe this came up very early today, convince other people that your religious claims are true and they ought to accept those claims and join your club, but leave the club they're in. which is a big, big problem in the muslim majority countries of the world. just as it was a huge problem in medieval europe or should i say in europe 14 centuries into its existence as a christian dominated culture. so it's not a new problem. it's not an unknown problem. so religious freedom as -- meaning the right to enter the public square. here's the question. does egypt really need this to

succeed as a democracy? by success i mean last. we don't get a collapse in a generation or even two or, you know, the return of a mubarak like figure or simply chaos. how important is this aspect of religious freedom to success? and, mind you, this means not only freedom for coptic christians. it does mean that. to enter in the public square. to make christian arguments within egypt. which may sound a little bit farfetched. but also as sam said, for muslims to criticize the muslim brotherhood. or to criticize openly, without fear of recrimination, an understanding of islam that they may consider to be simply false without being accused of blasphemy. or defamation of islam. so, in short, this is not just about minorities. it's also about the majority community and disfavored members of the majority community.

>> that's a very, very difficult question. i don't know if i'll even begin to be able to address it in any way. but i think what i will agree with is that, you know, this idea of religious freedom isn't as simple as one might think. you know, because as you have done, you've kind of separated different dimensions of it. in fact, i have not even gone that far. what i have focused on or what i think is quite crucial at this moment, and maybe that's because i'm living in this particular moment with regard to the difficulties that are going on in egypt right now, are -- and this might not exactly be religious freedom, but ideas of equality without regard to religion. it's not really religious freedom. that, i think, is quite crucial at this particular moment. i think that kind of a discourse is likely -- or has a better chance of succeeding in creating the kind of society and state which i think many of us would hope that egypt will become. >> samer, if i could just come

back on that very point. >> sure. >> equality under the law is what you're speaking of. >> without regard to religious difference. >> without regard to religious difference. but including the right of religious actors, if we can call them that, to bring their religious views into the public square. i presume you would agree that it is unrealistic to expect muslims in egypt not to bring their religion, or perhaps i'm wrong? >> i think you're right. i think it definitely includes that. i don't necessarily think that that is the way to create the type of society that we want. because one of the problems is that framing it in this -- in this kind of a way, this kind of sectarian way, looking at individuals not as individuals but as a member of religious groups and so on, i think that actually does -- in providing rights on that basis does more damage, in some sense, than good in term of creating a kind of liberal democratic society that we want. so i would definitely include the point that you mentioned in

addition to what i have put forward which is in terms of equality without regard to religion. in addition to, of course, the right to practice one's faith and in the case of egypt, i think this means dealing quite specifically with the creation of a unified building law with regard to churches and mosques and so on. however, however, one could possibly then differentiate that level or that reach of religious freedom with this idea of conversion. because that's such a -- that's the particularly sensitive issue with regard to -- i have no problem with it. but many people do, right? so -- so -- so if there's a way, as it were, as i kind of -- as i think stephen hadley said, frame it with religious tolerance, that might have a greater

likelihood of success in the short term. >> stop short of a right to prosthelytize or a right to convert others or, in fact, a right to conversion. but it's an interesting question how far a democracy can go. eve a muslim majority democracy without grappling successfully with that at some point. jillian? >> so when i teach courses on middle east politics, i always start the first class by saying, middle east politics is not limited to the palestinian/israeli conflict. i want to say the arab spring is not limited to egypt. we've been predominantly talking about egypt. i keep trying to talk a little bit differently. i want to say something about yemen. yemen had a couple of weeks ago abdullah saleh stepped down. yemen is one of these extraordinarily transitioning countries and it has tremendous amount of religious diversity. it has a large heretic shia sect. we don't call that a shia state.

we shouldn't. it's nonsensical. in fact, he's from that sect. you have a very strong wahabi influence. saudi funded. saudi inspired. that's very contentious. you have all kinds of different religious sects. in the case of yemen, i think it would be a mistake to put the question of religious freedom front and center in the transition, because there's all kinds of other issues of power struggle left over from the unification which saw essentially the crushing of a largely secular south and very progressive voices there. not an atheist communist movement but a very secular, privatized religious communist movement. you saw a developed socialist leader from a yemeni socialist party assassinated in 2002 as an isla convention. one of the most contentious things that happens in the country, the wahabis will go into zadi mosques in the north and start praying in wahabi style. they're standing there quietly,

but they're doing it and it's very contentious and political. ultimately one would want to get to the point that a muslim could walk into any mosque they want and pray how they like. putting those questions front and center in yemen's case would be very divisive. it would exacerbate all kinds of tensions. one would hope you'd get their eventually. it's interesting to pull that back for a second and let other kinds of questions come to the fore. i have a piece about to come out, it might be posted today on al jazeera english where i'm arguing yemen should probably have a federated state. rather than a unified centralized state, specifically to address a lot of these issues. when you have a village that has a particularly strong association with a particular religious sect and wants to preserve that, pushing towards them that they have to be open to other voices and prosthelytizing in the public

square is going to be contentious and problematic. i want to say i don't have a particular position that it should ultimately be there or not. ultimately i would like to see all world views tolerated and accepted and open to debate. but in certain transitions putting those issues front and center are going to be more problematic. in other transitions it might be a place to build bridges as a starting point. i want to bracket the timing of that. they could play out very differently depending on contexts. >> good. sam? >> does egypt need this? i would say definitely yes. in the sense of we've had a historic problem with religion in egypt. religion, islam specifically, has been viewed with high suspicious by the intelligentsia that has formed the modern egyptian state. we've never found our peace with islam. many will claim their problem is islamism and the kind of views

that it holds. but in many cases the real problem, the root of the problem is they don't like islam. they've never found a way to deal with the idea of this religion and how it works with the modern world. i think part of this is -- which was referred to in the earlier panel, is the influence, huge influence, of french secularism on egypt. and that we -- in a sense we never read burk. we read volter and raso. this is where the foundation of the egyptian secularism comes from. so while egypt never had a model, it certainly was what they would have wanted if they could have achieved it. so in this sense i think the -- any hope of a long-term, stable democracy in egypt, along with millions of other problems that are there, will have to find a way of accommodating islam in

the public square. that people are allowed to bring -- make religious-based arguments against political decisions and economic views. this is not prohibited. it doesn't mean it's right or wrong, but people are allowed to do it. i think returning to the general political situation, i agree that we are in a transition period and nothing is entirely perfect in a transition period. i don't think it's a transition to democracy. that's another story. in a sense i think the policymakers are beginning to realize that this is much -- the beauty contest here, that we're not having the nice guys were in tahrir. things are lovely. tech savvy youth. things will be great. let's move to the next country of the arab spring. the realization is now coming to this city that we're in front of a situation where each country is different.